IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THOMAS TOYE PATTERSON FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
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Patterson versus Shuster
The Case
This is the landmark early Philippine case of Patterson versus Shuster. A British subject, Thomas Toye Patterson, was arrested by the Collector of Customs of the Philippine Archipelago and held for deportation under Act 265 of the Philippine Commission, a law aimed at keeping out persons reasonably believed to have aided, abetted, or instigated insurrection against the sovereignty of the United States in the Islands. Patterson sued out a writ of habeas corpus to test the lawfulness of his detention. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's first sustained pronouncement on the power of the State to exclude and deport foreigners as an attribute of self-preservation, on the discretionary authority of an administrative officer under an exclusion law, and on the narrow scope of judicial review over that discretion.
Procedural History
The action began in the Supreme Court itself as an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Collector of Customs, through his return to the writ, justified the arrest on the ground that he had reasonable grounds to believe Patterson guilty of some or all of the offenses specified in Act 265. On the seventh of December the Court resolved to allow evidence to be taken, and it deliberately placed no limit on the proof or the allegations the parties might offer, so that every question could be fully argued: the exclusive competence of the administrative officer under Act 265, the jurisdiction of the Court to review that officer's decision, the nature, object, and scope of the law, and the authority of the Legislative Commission to enact it. After that exhaustive discussion, the Court rendered its decision on the merits.
Facts
On the fifteenth day of October, 1901, Act 265 of the Legislative Commission of the Philippines was promulgated. About the twenty-third of November following, Thomas Toye Patterson, a British subject, arrived at the port of Manila from abroad on board the steamer Yuensang. It appeared in the proceedings that Patterson was a justice of the peace under the Australian Government, and that he had not lost his official character notwithstanding a residence of ten months in the United States, from which he had gone to the British colony of Hongkong and thence to Manila.
Upon being arrested by the Collector of Customs of the Philippine Archipelago twenty-four hours after landing, Patterson sued out a writ of habeas corpus. The Collector made return that he had arrested Patterson because he had reasonable grounds to believe him guilty of some or all of the offenses specified in the law.
The evidence showed that passengers were not allowed to leave the ship at will after receiving a pass, but were required to go from the ship to the shore, with their baggage, in a certain launch, and that the baggage was not examined by the customs official until it reached the shore. Patterson departed from the ship in that launch, but before it reached the landing he transferred himself into another craft brought alongside by a friend, and thus reached the shore without the knowledge or consent of the Collector or any of his deputies. The next day he presented himself for his baggage, which had remained in the custody of the Collector.
Issues
- Whether or not Act 265 of the Legislative Commission is a valid exercise of the State's fundamental right of self-preservation, as against the claim that it is an immigration law or a law of commerce and international intercourse.
- Whether or not the Collector of Customs, in acting upon reasonable grounds of belief under Act 265, exercises a discretionary power whose findings are final and beyond review by the courts.
- Whether or not Patterson's having succeeded in reaching the shore deprived the State of its right to detain and deport him.
- Whether or not the Legislative Commission had the power to enact Act 265.
Applicable Provisions
Act 265 of the Legislative Commission, as described in the decision, provides:
An act requiring persons whom the Collector of Customs has reasonable grounds for believing guilty of aiding insurrection seeking to land in the Philippines to take an oath of allegiance and prescribing punishment for the violation thereof.
This is the law under which Patterson was arrested and held for deportation, and its terms frame the whole inquiry into the Collector's power.
The same Act, as quoted in the dissenting opinion, provides:
Any person whom the Collector of Customs has reasonable grounds to believe guilty of having aided and abetted or incited an insurrection in these Islands against the authority and sovereignty of the United States or against the government constituted by the United States herein, or of coming to these Islands for that purpose, and who, coming from a foreign country, seeks to land at any port, shall not be permitted to land until after he shall take before the Collector of Customs or his authorized deputy the oath prescribed by the act.
This is the operative grant of power, and the Court construes the phrase reasonable grounds within it as addressed to the officer's discretion rather than as a condition reviewable by the courts.
Article 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure, invoked in the concurring opinion, provides:
Effect must be given, if possible, to all the particulars of a statute.
The concurring justice uses this rule to argue that reading the Collector's decision as final would strike the words reasonable grounds out of the law.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that Act 265 rests on the fundamental right of every State to its existence and development, to the integrity of its territory, and to the exclusive and peaceable possession of its dominions, which it may guard and defend by all possible means. The Court rejected the premise that the law is an immigration law, an emigration law, or a law of commerce, because its precise object is to prevent the entrance of persons who have aided, abetted, or instigated insurrection, or who come here with that object, without distinction of nationality. Nor does the treaty between England and the United States avail the petitioner, for the right of intercourse gives rise to no obligation on the part of the State to admit foreigners under all circumstances. The Court put the principle thus:
Superior to the law which protects personal liberty, and the agreements which exist between nations for their own interest and for the benefit of their respective subjects is the supreme and fundamental right of each State to self-preservation and the integrity of its dominion and its sovereignty.
On the second issue, the Court held that the power conferred on the Collector is discretional, so that his act is presumed to be based upon reasonable grounds, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law, may examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted. The use of the term reasonable grounds does not require the officer to show the reason for his belief to a court of justice; it means only that he must not proceed arbitrarily but with discretion, honestly, tactfully, and prudently.
On the third issue, the Court held that Patterson's successful landing did not extinguish the State's right to deport him, comparing the case to a quarantine law: if a person suffering from a contagious disease succeeds in landing despite prohibition, the State does not lose the right to deport him and free itself from the danger of contagion.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that the Legislative Commission had power to pass the law, and that no law was violated or right infringed by a law which advances the welfare of the people, the supreme law of all affairs of life.
Doctrine
Every State possesses the fundamental right of self-preservation, including the right to exclude and deport foreigners, and this right is superior to the law which protects personal liberty and to treaties of intercourse between nations. A law excluding persons reasonably believed to have aided or instigated insurrection is a political measure resting on that right, not an immigration or commerce law.
Where a statute confers a discretionary power on an administrative officer, to be exercised upon his own opinion of certain facts, he is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law, may examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted. The requirement of reasonable grounds demands only that the officer act honestly, tactfully, and prudently, not arbitrarily; it does not oblige him to prove his grounds before a court.
A foreigner who lands in defiance of an exclusion law does not thereby defeat the State's right to detain and deport him; the right continues, as in the quarantine analogy.
Disposition
The Court denied Patterson's application for discharge and remanded him to the custody of the Collector of Customs, with costs against Patterson.
Remember This
The one line to memorize: the supreme and fundamental right of each State to self-preservation and the integrity of its dominion and sovereignty is superior to the law which protects personal liberty and to treaties between nations. Examiners use this case for the State's power to exclude and deport aliens, the finality of an administrative officer's discretionary findings under an exclusion statute, and the rule that a prohibited entrant who slips ashore does not thereby acquire a right to stay.