JUAN BAYANG, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND BENIGNO BIONG, RESPONDENTS.

Sometime in November 1969, Juan Bayang filed a complaint for quieting of
title with damages against Benigno Biong in the Court of First Instance of
Surigao del Norte, Branch I, docketed as Civil Case No. 1892.^[1] In 1970, while the case was pending, Biong
succeeded in dispossessing the plaintiff of the land in question and remained
there until January 25, 1978.^[2] On
February 21, 1972, the case was decided in favor of Biong, but the Court of
Appeals on December 8, 1977, reversed the trial court, declaring in the
dispositive portion of its decision:

“WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and appellants
are hereby declared owner of the property in litigation, and defendant-appellee
are (sic) hereby ordered to pay appellant the sum of P56.40 as the
latter’s share in the proceeds from the sale of the copra derived from the third
harvest of coconuts from the same land, and 1,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and
costs of litigation.”^[3]

This decision became final on February 2, 1978.

On February 6, 1978,
Bayang filed a second case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2589, with the CFI of
Surigao del Norte, Branch II, seeking to recover from Biong the incomes earned
from the same land from 1970 up to the quarterly incomes from 1978 until the
said land was delivered to the plaintiff.^[4] At the pre-trial conference held on July
10, 1978, the counsel for Bayang admitted that as of January 25, 1978, Biong had
already surrendered possession of the land in question to Bayang. ^[5] On August 16, 1978, Biong filed a motion
for summary judgment, reiterating the affirmative defense of res judicata
raised in his answer dated April 12, 1978, insofar as it related to the
incidents concerning the case prior to January 25, 1978.^[6] An opposition to this motion was duly
filed by Bayang.^[7]

The trial
court, after considering the arguments of the parties, granted the motion and
rendered a summary judgment on October 30, 1978.^[8] The said decision was sustained by the
Court of Appeals, and Bayang is now before us in this petition for review by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

His assignment
of errors raises two basic submissions, to wit:

1. Civil Case No. 2589 should not have been decided by summary
   judgment.

2. The judgment in CA-G.R. No. 54720-R (appeal from judgment in Civil Case No.
   1892) did not constitute res judicata as to bar Civil Case No.
   2589.

Both contentions are incorrect.  We rule for the respondents.

In its
decision, the Court of Appeals quoted the following excerpt from Singleton
v. Philippine Trust Co.^[9] on the
nature and functions of the summary judgment:

“Summary judgment is one of the methods sanctioned in the present
Rules of Court for a prompt disposition of civil actions wherein there exists no
serious controversy.  The procedure may be availed of not only by claimants, but
also by defending parties who may be the object of unfounded claims.  A motion
for summary judgment assumes that scrutinizing of the facts will disclose that
the issues presented by the pleadings need not be tried because they are so
patently unsubstantial as not to be genuine issues, or that there is no genuine
issue as to any material facts or where the facts appear undisputed and certain
from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits.”

We hold that there was no genuine or triable issue of fact raised by the
parties, in view particularly of the affirmative defense of res
judicata invoked by the private respondent. That defense is
sustained.

A long line of decisions has consistently held that for
res judicata to apply:  a) the former judgment must be final; b) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and d) there must be
between the first case and the second case identity of parties, identity of
subject matter and identity of cause of action.^[10]

The decision in Civil Case No.
1892 became final and executory on February 2, 1978.  There is no dispute that
the trial court which rendered that decision had jurisdiction over the subject-
matter and the parties to the proceeding.  The case was tried on the merits. 
The parties to Civil Case No. 1892 and the subsequent Civil Case No. 2589 are
the same petitioner and private respondent now before us.

The petitioner
would draw a distinction between the land in dispute in Civil Case No. 1892 and
the income from that land being claimed in Civil Case No. 2589.  But that is in
our view splitting hairs to split a cause of action.  The subject-matter is
essentially the same in both cases as the income is only a consequence or
accessory of the disputed property.  We cannot agree that there are involved
here two causes of action calling for two separate cases.  The claim for the
income from the land was incidental to, and should have been raised by Bayang in
his earlier claim for, ownership of the land.

We note that while the
first case was pending, the private respondent, by the petitioner’s own account,
“succeeded in dispossessing” him of the disputed land^[11] and that at the pre-trial conference on
Civil Case No. 2589, Bayang’s counsel admitted that Biong had vacated the said
property as of January 25, 1978.^[12] This
means that from 1970 to the date the respondent surrendered the property in
1978, Biong was presumably collecting and enjoying the income therefrom to the
exclusion of the petitioner.

Civil Case No. 1892 was commenced in
November 1969 and was finally decided only on February 2, 1978.  The private
respondent entered the disputed property in 1970 and left it only in 1978. For
about seven years, therefore, the petitioner made no move at all to amend his
complaint to include a claim for the income supposedly received by the private
respondent during that period.

Under Rule 10, Section 6, of the Rules of
Court:

“Sec. 6.  Matters subject of supplemental pleadings.  — Upon motion of a
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions,
occurrence or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought
to be supplemented.  If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party
should plead thereto, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.”

In the case of Jalandoni v. Martin-Guanzon,^[13] this Court declared through Justice
J.B.L. Reyes:

“As to the value of the plaintiff’s share in the products of the land during
the time that the former action was pending (which are the damages claimed under
the second cause of action), their recovery is now barred by the previous
judgment.  These damages are but the result of the original cause of action,
viz., the continuing refusal by defendants in 1941 to recognize the
plaintiff’s right to an interest in the property.  In the same way that
plaintiffs claimed for their share of the produce from 1941 to 1947, these later
damages could have been claimed in the first action, either in the original
complaint (for their existence could be anticipated when the first complaint was
filed) or else by supplemental pleading.  To allow them to be recovered by
subsequent suit would be a violation of the rule against multiplicity of suits,
and specifically of sections 3 and 4 of Rules 2 of the Rules of Court, against
the splitting of causes of action, since these damages spring from the same
cause of action that was pleading (sic) in the former case No. 573
between the same parties (Blossom & Co., Inc. v. Manila Gas
Corporation, 55 Phil. 226; Santos v. Moir, 36 Phil. 350;
Pascua v. Sideco; 24 Phil. 26; Bachrach Motor Co. v.
Icarangal, 68 Phil. 287).”

And in another case,^[14] the same
jurist declared:

“Urtula, as defendant in the expropriation case, could have raised
the matter of interest before the trial court even if there had been no actual
taking yet by the Republic and the said court could have included the payment of
interest in its judgment but conditioned upon the actual taking, because the
rate of interest upon the amount of just compensation (6%) is a known factor,
and it can reasonably be expected that at some future time, the expropriator
would take possession of the property, though the date be not fixed.  In this
way, multiple suits would be avoided.  Moreover, nothing prevented appellee from
calling the attention of the appellate courts (even by motion to reconsider
before judgment became final) to the subsequent taking of possession by the
condemnor, and asking for allowance of interest on the indemnity since that
followed the taking as a matter of course, and raised no issue requiring remand
of the records to the Court of origin.

“As the issue of interest could
have been raised in the former case but was not raised, res judicata
blocks the recovery of interest in the present case.  (Tejedor vs. Palet, 61
Phil. 494; Phil Engineering Corp., et al. vs. Ceniza, etc., et al.,
L-17834, 29 Sept. 1962).  It is settled that a former judgment constitutes a
bar, as between the parties, not only as to matters expressly adjudged, but all
matters that could have been adjudged at the time (Rule 39, sec. 49; Corda
vs. Maglinti, L-17476, Nov. 30, 1961; Rodriguez vs. Tan, 48 Off.
Gaz. 3330).”

Clearly, then, Civil Case No. 2589 is barred by the previous judgment in
Civil Case No. 1892. This being so, it should follow that the trial judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion in deciding the latter case by summary
judgment.

We are not unmindful of the argument that affirmance of the
challenged decision of the respondent court will result in the unjust enrichment
of Biong at the expense of Bayang.  This assumes, of course, that the petitioner
could have proved his right to the income he now claims belatedly.  The point is
that he did not make the proper claim at the proper time and in the proper
proceedings, and he cannot do it now.  Whatever right he might have had is now
deemed waived because of his neglect.

Nemo debet bis vexare pro
una et eadem causa.  This has to be so if litigants are to be spared
the annoyance, anxiety and expense that could otherwise be inflicted upon them
endlessly by capricious, malicious or vindictive
suitors.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, and the
appealed decision is affirmed.  Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Gancayco, and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.

^[2] Ibid., pp. 9, 33.

^[3] Id., pp. 24, 33.

^[4] Annex A, Petition; Rollo, p.
33.

^[5] Rollo, pp. 33,
83.

^[6] Ibid.; Annex E,
Petition

^[7] Rollo, pp.
7, 33; Annex F, Petition.

^[8]
Rollo, pp 34, 83.

^[9] 52
O.G. 3948.

^[10] San Diego v.
Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; Valdez v. Pineda, 89 Phil. 547; Lapid
v. Lawan, 101 Phil. 1243; Nater v. CIR, 4 SCRA 727; Malvar v.
Pallingayan, 18 SCRA 121; Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 589;
Santos v. Gabriel, 45 SCRA 488; Aroc v. PHHC, 81 SCRA
350.

^[11] Annex A,
Petition.

^[12] Rollo, pp
33, 83.

^[13] 102 Phil.
859.

^[14] Urtula vs.
Republic, 22 SCRA 481.