THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF & APPELLEE, VS. GODOFREDO INGUITO, ET. AL., ACCUSED, GODOFREDO A. INGUITO, DEFENDANT & APPELLANT.

The Court reverses the trial court’s judgment of conviction imposed
on accused-appellant Godofredo Inguito
and acquits him of the charge of murder considering that extra-judicial
confessions obtained through force and intimidation and in violation of the accused’s constitutional right to remain silent and to
counsel are null and void and inadmissible in evidence by constitutional
mandate.  Without the outlawed
extra-judicial confession, the remaining weak circumstantial evidence cannot
support the judgment of conviction nor overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused.

Accused-appellant, Godofredo Inguito alias Gudong, together
with his co-accused Bienvenido Auguis
alias Benido and Salvador Petallino
alias Badoy were sentenced by the Court of First
Instance of Baybay, Leyte1 to a
prison term of Reclusion Perpetua for the
crime of murder committed against one Epifanio Cajis on the date and in the manner described in the
information filed on February 20, 1979 by Asst. Provincial Fiscal Joventino P. Isidro of Leyte as
follows:

“The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses GODOFREDO
INGUITO, alias Gudong, BIENVENIDO AUGUIS, alias Benido and SALVADOR PETALLINO, alias Badoy
of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 7th day of January 1979, in the
municipality of Bato, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the three
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, taking
advantage of their superior strength and with the intent to kill, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, beat and stab for several times one EPEFANIO CAJES alias “Panyong Cajes” with
“Madre Cacao” and “Biateles” wood
sticks and with a sharp and pointed stainless kitchen knife about 6 inches long
without any handle which they purposely provided themselves, thereby hitting
and inflicting upon the said Epefanio Cajes with mortal wounds on the different parts of his body
which directly caused his death shortly thereafter.

“Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.”

The evidence of the prosecution directly implicating the three
accused were the affidavit of confession of accused-appellant and the joint
statements of the two other accused given to the investigator, Patrolman
Mariano V. Batoto, Jr.  Believing that their confessions were
voluntarily given, the trial court found them guilty as charged and sentenced
each of the three to a prison term of Reclusion Perpetua
and to indemnify the heirs of the victim, jointly, in the sum of P12,000.00,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.  From the decision, Godofredo Inguito erroneously
filed his appeal to the Court of Appeals. 
The records of the case were transmit­ted to this Court, considering
that the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.  His convicted co-accused failed to appeal.

In the extra-judicial confession executed by accused-appellant on
January 19, 1979, he
appears to have admitted that he masterminded the killing of Epifanio Cajes and was assisted
by his two co-accused in carrying out his plans.  However, accused-appellant later retracted
his admission of the crime and insisted that he signed the affidavit of
confession because he was mauled in the toilet outside the prison cell and was
warned by the guard who escorted him to the investigating judge that after the
judge shall have read his affidavit, he should sign it, otherwise he will be
mauled again.

As narrated by the trial court in its decision of December 12, 1979, accused-appellant
Godofredo Inguito, on
direct testimony, testified as follows:

“He is one of the accused in this case.  He knows Epifanio Cajes.  On January 7, 1979, he was at home.  He knows Sitio Calingohan, Bato, Leyte. 
He knows Bienvenido Auguis
for a long time.  Bienvenido
Auguis resides in Bato, Leyte. 
He knows Salvador Petallino, because they are
neighbors.

“In the Investigation Report of Patrolman Mariano Batoto, Jr. of Godofredo Inguito, marked as Exhibit “B”, the signature
appearing thereon is his signature.

“In this investigation he was not represented by counsel.  He has not finished Grade One.  He does not know well the Cebuano-Visayan
dialect.  The contents of Exhibit
“B” were not read to him by Pat. Mariano Batoto,
Jr.  He signed his signature before the
Judge.  The affidavit was read to him by
the Judge and not all the contents are true. 
What is not true is the charge of killing of Epifanio
Cajes.  He
signed this affidavit because he had been mauled.  He does not know who mauled him.  He was mauled in the toilet in Bato, Leyte.  The toilet was outside the prison cell.  The investigation was made when he was caught
by the police on January 19, 1979.  After he was mauled he was placed inside the
cell.  The investigation was ahead.  He was mauled before the signing of the
affidavit.

“He was alone in going to the Judge but escorted by the guard
up to the door.  He does not know the
guard.  The guard told him that after the
Judge shall have read the contents of the affidavit, he should sign it, otherwise
he will be mauled.  He was not aided by a
lawyer.  The police was at the door when
he signed the affidavit.  After signing
the affidavit he was placed back in jail. 
The policeman who escorted him was in police uniform and armed.

“It is not true that they killed Epifanio
Cajes at the volleyball court.  It is not true that they killed Epifanio Cajes with two (2) clubs
and one stainless knife.  It is not true
that he started planning to kill Epifanio Cajes when Epifanio started
hating him and planning to kill him.

“Before January 7,
1979, they had no differences with Epifanio
Cajes.”

Based on the circumstances declared by the accused-appellant, and
in the absence of evidence by the prosecution to rebut accused appellant’s
claim that he was coerced into signing his confession the Court finds the
extra-judicial confession to be null and void and consequently, inadmissible in
evidence to convict accused-appellant. 
If it were true that the
alleged confessions were voluntarily given by the three accused, the
prosecution should have presented Patrolman Batoto to
rebut accused-appellant’s claim that he was mauled and threatened into signing
it.  Even his co-accused Salvador Petallino testified that he affixed his thumbmark
on his alleged sworn statement because he saw accused-appellant already weak,
because of the mauling.2

The Court is not unmindful of the practice of some officers of
the law resorting to illegal and reprehensible tactics in order to coerce a
person to sign a confession admitting his guilt.  Hence, the Court has repeatedly stressed that
‘the most painstaking scrutiny must be resorted to by the trial courts in
weighing evidence relating to alleged voluntary confessions of the accused and
the courts should be slow to accept such confessions unless corroborated by
other testimony.’3

We have always stressed that involuntary or coerced confessions
obtained by force or intimidation are null and void and are abhorred by the
law, which condemns the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to secure a
confession.  All courts of justice have
invariably rejected such confessions not only because of their unreliability
but more fundamentally on the ground of humanitarian principles which abhor all
forms of torture or unfairness toward the accused in criminal proceedings.4 A coerced confession thus ‘stands discredited in
the eyes of the law and is a thing that never existed.’5

In repudiating his extra-judicial confession, accused-appellant
asserted, as borne out by the record, that during the investigation, he,
together with his co-accused were not assisted by counsel nor were they
apprised by the investigator of their right to silence.  On cross-examination, accused-appellant
further testified that the investigating policeman did not read to him the
contents of the affidavit nor was he asked whether his answers to the questions
are true and correct.

It also appears that during the investigation, Pat. Batoto was typing while asking questions.  Yet, accused-appellant has not even fin­ished
Grade I, and cannot understand and read English.  His confession which was in English was asked
in Cebuano-Visayan dialect, which he does not know
well and further was translated to and typed in English by the
investigator.  Similarly, his answers had
to be translated to and typed in English. 
Such a multiple process of reading and translating the questions and
translating again the answers is naturally pregnant with possibilities of
human, if not unintentional inadequacies and incompleteness which render the
said confession unsafe as basis for conviction for a criminal offense, unless
sufficiently corroborated.6

Accused-appellant likewise testified that during the preliminary
investigation, they were not represented by counsel.  Although he told the judge that not all of
the contents of the affidavit were true, when it was read to him, still he was
made to sign it.  Prescinding
from the force and intimidation used in securing the confession, the same was
inadmissible and could not be used against him in court by force of Article IV,
section 20 of the 1973 Constitution which mandates that “(N)o person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself. 
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right.  No force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him.  Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.” As held in People vs. Jimenez,7 such confessions obtained during custodial
interrogation by the police without proper safeguards and warnings to the
accused that ‘he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used against him and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney
– either retained or appointed’ are inadmissible in evidence to prove the guilt
of the appellant.”

Aside from the extra-judicial confessions, there is no direct
evidence nor actual witness linking the accused to the commission of the
crime.  The prosecution tried to
establish the guilt of the accused-appellant and his co-accused through the
testimony of Felimon de Veyra.  He testified that on January 6, 1979 at 7:00
o’clock in the evening, he was at the dance hall in the yard of his
brother Climaco de Veyra.  The dance was held to celebrate the wedding
of Climaco.  He
saw accused-appellant and his co-accused drinking with the victim.  After a while, they disappeared and the four
of them went to an isolated place about fifty (50) meters from him where the
light of a Petromax lamp reached them.  Although he was observing them, he did not
know what they were doing.  Then, only
the three accused came back and continued dancing.

On cross-examination, de Veyra
testified that he did not actually see what the three accused did to the
victim.  The following day, he noticed
that the victim was no longer in his house. 
He observed supposedly that the three accused were evading him and after
the police got their statements, he then concluded that they were the ones who
killed the victim.  In point of time,
since the victim was last seen that night by the witness, his decomposing body
was recovered only about three weeks later.

The Court rules that the testimony of de Veyra
and his conclusion that the accused-appellant and his co-accused were the
perpetrators of the crime are mere conjectures and purely circumstantial which
fall far short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that produces moral certainty
of the guilt of the accused.

The accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence as guaranteed
by the Constitution.  It is thus required
that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.  The proof against him must survive the test
of reason.  The conscience must be
satisfied that the defendant has been proven guilty of the offense charged.8 Only by proof
beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty “a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon
it” may the presumption of innocence be overcome.9 The Court
finds no such proof in the case at bar.

Accordingly, the decision of the lower court under review
imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua on
accused-appellant Godofre­do Inguito
is hereby reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the charge against him.  His immediate release is ordered, unless he
is held for some other lawful cause. 
With costs de oficio.  In view of the circumstances above-recited
which cast doubt on the validity and admissibility of the statements of the two
co-accused of the herein accused-appellant who were likewise convicted by the
trial court but who for reasons not shown in the record failed to appeal, let
copy of this decision be furnished the Honorable Minister of Justice for
possible recommendation of executive clemency.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Vasquez, Relova, and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

1 Presided by Judge Fortunato B. Cuna.

2 P. 10, Decision.

3 People vs. Urro, 44 SCRA 473 (1972); People vs. Palacpac, 49 SCRA 440 (1973); People vs. Manioula, et. al., 52 SCRA 1 (1973); and People vs.
Francisco, 74 SCRA 158.

4 People vs. Andag, L-43618, March
31, 1980.

5 U.S.
vs. delos Santos,
24 Phil. 329; People vs. Nishisima, 57 Phil.
26.

6 People vs. Francisco, 74
SCRA 158; People vs. Robles, 92 SCRA 107.

8 People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59.

9 People vs. Ramos, 41 SCRA
19 (1971); People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59
(1971); People vs. Imperio, 44 SCRA 75 (1972);
People vs. Custodio, 47 SCRA 289 (1972);
People vs. Basuel, 47 SCRA 207 (1972); People vs.
Pa­lacpac, 49 SCRA 440 (1973); People vs.
Zamora, et al., 54 SCRA 47 (1973); People vs. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81
(1974); People vs. Beltran, 61 SCRA 246 (1974); Duran vs. CA, et
al., 71 SCRA 68 (1976); and People vs. Montero, 76 SCRA 437, (1977).