BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE JOSE P. CASTRO AND HONORABLE ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. IV AND EXECUTIVE JUDGE, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE COURT OF FIRS…

Petition for mandamus and certiorari praying that
the restraining order issued by respondent Judge Ernani
Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the former Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Quezon
City) in Civil Case No. Q-29194, entitled “Greater Manila
Federation of Jeepney Operators and Drivers
Association, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation, represented by Hon. Don Ferry as
BOT Chairman” enjoining the transfer of the offices of petitioner from the
Gutierrez-David Building
in Quezon City
to the Sandoval Building
in Pasig,
Metro Manila be dissolved and that the aforesaid civil case be dismissed.

Petitioner’s offices were located at Gutierrez?David
Building, corner Panay
Avenue and Scout Reyes
Street, Quezon City.
Sometime on December 10, 1979, Minister of Transportation and Communications
Jose P. Dans, Jr., in a letter-memorandum to the
President of the Philippines, recommended, among others, the transfer of the
offices of the Board of Transportation from Quezon
City to a two-storey building in Pasig, Metro Manila
for the reason that the building where the offices of the BOT are housed is
also occupied by other offices, hence, BOT offices are accessible to fixers and
unofficial personnel.

Petitioner, upon instruction of its Chairman, began transferring
its records. On January 28, 1980, private respondent filed a petition for
prohibition and/or injunction with preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent
the proposed transfer to Pasig, Metro Manila, on
grounds that it is illegal, in grave
abuse of discretion, in gross defiance of law and highly inimical not
only to the interest of private respondent but to the government and the public
as well; that the proposed
transfer will cause difficulties to utility operators and drivers in going to,
and from Pasig, more especially when the government
has imposed a ban against jeepneys cruising along E. de los
Santos Avenue; that the inefficient service of Republic Telephone Company which
has the exclusive franchise to operate a telephone system in Pasig will make
it very difficult to make contact with the new BOT offices.

On the same day,
respondent Executive Judge Ernani Paño,
pending raffle of the case to a specific branch, issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the Chairman of
the BOT from implementing the
transfer. The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction was set on February
5, 1980.

On February
12, 1980, petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that the petition is not sufficient in substance and that it states no cause of
action. It was alleged in the motion that
under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petition for certiorari
may be filed by a person aggrieved by the proceedings of a tribunal,
corporation, board, conducted without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; that the
“person aggrieved” means a person whose legal rights had been
violated, one who suffers a legal wrong; that the alleged difficulties and
hardships to respondent’s members mentioned in their petition are not the wrong
or injury contemplated by the
Rules of Court; that BOT decided to transfer its offices for the following
reasons: (1) Gutierrez-David Building
is also occupied by other offices, hence BOT cannot effectively control the activities of fixers; (2) Other offices in the aforesaid building share common entrance
and facilities, hence the records of BOT are not secured; (3) The Sandoval
Building in Pasig, Metro Manila is new and precisely
constructed to fit the needs of BOT; and (4) To be near the Ministry of
Transportation of which BOT is a
part and thus have easier and better coordination with the Ministry.

On February
19, 1980, the
President approved the transfer of the offices of the BOT. On February
20, 1980, BOT filed a
manifestation and motion requesting that the temporary restraining order be
lifted and the application for preliminary
injunction be resolved. On February 25, 1980, BOT
filed a supplement to the aforesaid manifestation and motion informing the lower court that (1) the Ministry of General
Services has approved the lease agreement over the building in Pasig, Metro Manila for a period of one year; (2) the
President has approved the transfer of
its offices; (3) that it received a letter from the lessor
of Gutierrez-David Building that the same has already beep leased to the National Telecommunications Commission
effective February 15, 1980.

For failure of respondent Judge Jose P. Castro, to whom the case
was assigned, to resolve the motion for the dissolution of the restraining
order, the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the
motion to dismiss, the present case was instituted before this Court.

The core of petitioner’s argument in the present petition is the
inaction for an unreasonable length of time of respondent Judge Jose P. Castro
on the motion for immediately resolution of the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and on the motion for dissolution of the restraining
order. Such inaction, amounting to grave abuse of discretion and tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction, practically paralyzed the operations of petitioner to the
detriment of public interest considering that some of the records of BOT were already
transferred to Sandoval Building while most of the records were already packed
and ready to be transferred when the restraining order was issued. Petitioner
likewise prays that this Court resolve its motion to dismiss instead of
remanding the case
to the lower court because the issue raised in said motion is one of
law — whether private respondent has the right to prohibit or enjoin
petitioner from transferring its offices.

In the resolution of this Court dated April 11, 1980, respondents were required to file
answer to the petition and the case was set for hearing on April 11, 1980 which was reset on April 21, 1980. Private respondent,
in its answer dated April 17, 1980, alleges that as taxpayers, its members are
legally entitled to bring this suit against the proposed transfer of BOT
because the building rental with the owner of Sandoval Building in Pasig has been increased to P33.00 per square meter
compared to P13.00 per square meter in Gutierrez-David Building; that under
Section 10 of the Public Service Act, the Public Service Commission (now BOT)
is mandated “to have its office in the City of Manila or at such other
place as may be designated”; that BOT has a correlative obligation to stay
in Manila or at its present site, the latter being declared as a National
Government Center; that when BOT decided to transfer as it did transfer part of
its records to a site in Pasig, the BOT violated the
law creating it, at the same time, causing injury or wrong prejudicial to
private respondent’s primary right to deal with the BOT at its site mandated by
law. Furthermore, private respondent claims that under LOI No. 767 before a
head of ministry, bureau or agency can enter into a contract,
the chief accountant concerned must certify that funds are available from
allotments actually released by the Ministry of Budget. However, in the present
case, in the contract of lease entered into by and between petitioner and the owner of
Sandoval Building, the amount certified to as available by the BOT Chief
Accountant is only equivalent to one month rental instead of the rentals for
one year as required by the aforesaid LOI No. 767.

On April 21, 1980, this Court, after hearing, issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent judges and their representatives from
stopping the transfer of the offices of petitioner BOT from the Gutierrez-David
Building in Quezon
City to the Sandoval Building in Pasig, Metro
Manila. The offices of BOT are now located in Pasig, Metro Manila.

The main issue in this petition is whether or not respondent
Judge Jose Castro acted with grave abuse of discretion when he failed to act
immediately and without delay on petitioner’s motion to lift the restraining
order and private respondent’s motion for a writ of preliminary injunction.

We find merit in the
petition.

Respondent Judge Jose Castro committed grave abuse of discretion
in failing to resolve without considerable delay, petitioner’s motion for the
dissolution of the restraining order and private respondent’s motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. It must be noted that the present
case was filed before the lower court on January 28, 1980 and on the same day respondent Judge Ernani C. Paño issued ex–parte and without bond, the questioned temporary restraining order. The application for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction was heard on February 5, 1980 but respondent Judge Jose Castro
failed to rule on the motion. During the hearing on February 19, 1980, BOT again vigorously pressed
for the resolution of the aforesaid
motion and for the lifting of the restraining order but despite repeated
plea, the request of BOT went
unheeded which prompted it to file this case before this Court on March 21, 1980.

Respondent Judge should have acted on the pending matters before
it. At the time the restraining order was issued, some of the records of BOT were already transferred to the
Sandoval Building in Pasig, while most of the other
records were already packed and ready to be transferred. Due to the restraining
order, the operations of BOT were
hampered causing prejudice to persons who have transactions with the BOT. It
must be remembered that a restraining order is
an order to maintain the subject of the contro­versy in status quo
until the hearing of an
application for a temporary injunction. Unless extended by the court, a restraining order ceases to be operative at the expiration of
the time fixed by its terms. In cases where it has been granted ex–parte as in this case, it may be dissolved upon motion before answer.^[1]
Due to the indiscriminate issuance of ex–parte
restraining order, Section 5 of Rule 58
of the Rules of Court was amended on April 16, 1982 by Batas Pambansa Blg. 224 which reads:

“Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction
not granted without notice; issuance of restraining order. – No preliminary
injunction shall be granted without notice to the defendant. If it shall appear from the facts shown by affidavits
or by the verified complaint that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the judge to whom the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a restraining order
to be effective only for a period of twenty
days from date of its issuance. Within the said twenty-day period, the
judge must cause an order to be
served on the defendant requiring him to show cause, at a specified time and
place, why the injunction should not be granted, and determine within the same period
whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and shall accordingly
issue the corresponding order. In the event that the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining order is deemed automatically vacated.”

Under
the said provision, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of 20 days from date of issue. If before the
expiration of the 20-day period the application for preliminary injunction is
denied, the temporary restraining order would thereby be deemed automatically
vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary
injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order would
automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial
declaration to that effect being necessary. A temporary restraining order can
no longer exist indefinitely for it has become truly temporary.^[2]

One of the reasons why the aforesaid amendatory provision was
adopted is to prevent and/or correct the deplorable situation, as in the
present case, resulting from the inaction of a judge on a motion to lift a
restraining order for an unreasonable length of time. The questioned
restraining order was issued on January 28, 1980 but after a lapse of fifty-two
(52) days from said date up to the time when the present petition was filed
before this Court, no action has been taken on the motion to lift the same
despite repeated requests. Respondent Judge Castro overlooked the fact that
transportation services are affected by a high degree of public interest, hence, he should have resolved the pending motions
expeditiously and without delay.

Instead of remanding this case to the lower court, We deem it wise to rule on the legality of the transfer
inasmuch as public interests demand the early disposition of the case. It
should be underscored that the transfer of the BOT offices from Gutierrez-David
Building to Sandoval Building was approved by the President.^[3]
The BOT Chairman, in proposing the transfer, and the Minister of Transportation
and Communications, in recommending the transfer to the President, must in the
very nature of things, be familiar with the facts, circumstances and problems
which necessitate the transfer. The reasons cited by BOT in transferring its
offices: to curb the activities of fixers, to insure security of its records,
to have a work area conducive to efficiency, to be near the Ministry of
Transportation of which BOT is a
part, are undisputably valid ones which private respondent cannot question for it deals purely with matters of administering the BOT
offices.

On the other hand, it
admits of no doubt that the President certainly had in his possession
the necessary information and data at the time he approved the transfer. Such
factual foundation cannot be defeated by private respondent’s naked assertions
that the transfer is disadvantageous to the government and will cause untold
difficulties to the members of the association of private respondent which
incidentally is only a segment of the public dealing with the BOT. Furthermore, the determination of
whether the location of BOT offices will best serve the interest of the public
dealing with it, lies within the discretion of the
President. Such discretionary power vested in the President is not subject to contrary judgment or
control of others, in the absence of arbitrariness and grave abuse. In general,
courts have no supervisory power over the actions of the administrative
department of the government like the BOT. This is particularly true with respect to acts involving the exercise
of judgment or discretion.

Finally, it is apparent that
private respondent, before seeking judicial intervention, should have pursued
their plea to the Ministry of Transportation and Communi­cations and eventually
to the President, remedies that are plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary
cause of law. Plainly, private respondent did not exhaust this remedy. Settled is the rule that if a litigant goes to
court without first pursuing his administrative remedies, his action is premature or he has no cause of
action to ventilate in court. His case is
not ripe for judicial determination.^[4]
On this point alone, respondent judge should
have dismissed the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The questioned Order
dated January 28, 1980 of the court a quo is SET ASIDE and
REVERSED. Civil Case No. Q-29194 is hereby ordered dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J.,see concurrence.

Abad Santos, J., this is a clear example of judicial officiousness.

Makasiar, (Chairman), no part.

De Castro, J., on leave.

^[1]
Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation, et al. vs. Hon.
Alfredo Lazaro, et al., G.R. No. 54958, and
Philippine Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Hon. Alfredo Lazaro, et al., G.R.
No. 54966, promulgated on September 2, 1983.

^[2]
Apolonio Dionisio, et al. vs.
Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch II, G.R. No. 61048, promulgated on
August 17, 1983.

^[3]
p. 106, Rollo.

^[4]
Aboitiz
and Co., Inc. vs. Collector of Customs, 83 SCRA 271; Allied Brokerage
Corporation vs. Commissioner of Customs, 40 SCRA 555.

150
Clean

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