MANUEL R. DULAY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF COTABATO, AND EUSEBIO C. TANGHAL, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction, to
annul and set aside the order of the respondent judge which annulled the
redemption of several parcels of land levied upon and sold at an execution
sale.

In Civil Case No. 2152 of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, an action for the recovery of a sum of money, the
trial court rendered a decision ordering the defendant, Manuel R. Dulay, the petitioner herein, to pay the
plaintiff, Eusebio C. Tanghal,
the herein private respondent, the sum of P143,980.00.  Seventeen (17) parcels of land belonging to
the defendant were, consequently, levied upon then sold at a public auction
sale to the plaintiff, as the highest bidder thereof, at prices proffered and
fixed for each parcel, for the sum of P82,598.00.^[1] Within the reglementary
period for redemption, the defendant redeemed eight (8) of the levied
properties by paying the prices at which they were actually sold in the auction
sale, for the sum of P17,017.00, and was issued a Certificate of Redemption.^[2] Upon motion of the plaintiff, however, the
trial court citing the case of Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Dionisio Mirang,^[3] declared the redemption as null and void on
the ground that piece-meal redemption is not allowed by law and that for
redemption to be valid, the judgment debtor should pay the entire judgment debt
and not the purchase price.^[4] Hence, this petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction, to annul and set aside the order of the respondent
judge.  As prayed for, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order, restraining the respondents from enforcing the
questioned order.^[5]

There is merit in the petition. 
In the redemption of properties sold
at an execution sale, the amount payable is no longer the judgment debt,
but the purchase price.  In the case of Castillo vs. Nagtalon,^[6] the Court said:

“The procedure for the redemption of pro­perties sold at
execution sale is prescribed in Sec. 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.  Thereunder, the judgment debtor or redemptioner may
redeem the property from the purchaser within 12
months after the sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with
1% per month interest thereon up to the time of redemption, together with the
taxes paid by the purchaser after the purchase, if any.  In other words, in the redemption of properties sold at an execution
sale, the amount payable is no longer the judgment debt but the purchase
price.  Considering that appellee tendered payment only of the sum of P317.44, where­as
the 3 parcels of land she was seeking to redeem were sold for the sums of
P1,240.00, P24.00 and P30.00, respectively, the aforementioned amount of
P317.44 is insufficient to effectively release the properties. 
However, as the tender of
payment was timely made and in good faith, in the interest of justice We
incline to give the appellee opportunity to complete
the redemption purchase of the 3 parcels as provided in Sec. 26, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, within 15 days from the time this decision becomes final and executory.

“Should appellee fail to complete
the re­demption price, the sheriff may either release to appellee
the 2 smaller lots and return the entire deposit without releasing any of the 3
lots, as the appellee may elect.”

The case of DBP vs. Mirang, relied upon by the respondent judge, wherein
the Court ruled that the mortgagor whose property has been sold at public
auction, either judicially or extrajudicially, shall
have the right to redeem the property
by paying all the amounts owed to the mortgagee on the date of the sale, with
interest thereon at the rate specified in the contract and not the amount for
which the property was acquired at the foreclosure sale is not controlling
because of different factual settings. 
The Mirang case involves the redemption
of mortgaged property sold at a foreclosure sale and the mortgagor was ordered
to pay his entire indebtedness to the mortgagee, plus the agreed interests
thereon, before redemption can be effected, because the charter of the
mortgagee (DBP) required the payment of such
amount.  The Court said:

“The third issue has likewise been resolved by this Court in a
similar case.  The issue posed there
involved the price at which the mortgagor should redeem his property after the same had been sold at public auction –
whether the amount for which the property was sold, as contended by the
mortgagor, or the balance of the loan obtained from the banking institution, as
contended by the mortgagee RFC.  Cited in that case was Section 31 of Com. Act No. 459, which was the special law applicable exclusively to
properties mortgaged with the RFC, as follows:

“The mortgagor or debtor to the Agricultural and Industrial
Bank whose real property has been sold at public auction, judicially or
extra-judicially, for the full or partial pay­ment of an obligation to said
Bank, shall, within one year from the date of the auction sale, have the right to redeem the real property
by paying to the Bank all the amount he owed the latter on the date of the
sale, with interest on the total indebtedness at the rate agreed upon in the
obligation from said date, unless the bidder has taken material possession of
the property or unless this has been delivered to him, in which case the
proceeds of the property shall compensate the interest.  x x x

“The same provision applies in the instant case.  The unavoidable conclusion is that the
appellant, in redeeming the foreclosed
property, should pay the entire
amount he owed to the Bank on the date of the sale, with interest thereon at
the rate agreed upon.”

The instant case, on the
other hand, involves the redemption of property levied upon and sold at public auction to satisfy a judgment and, unlike the
Mirang case, there is no charter that requires the payment of sums of
money other than those provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court.

Redemption of properties mortgaged with the Philippine National
Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines and foreclosed either
judicially or extrajudicially are governed by special
laws which provide for the payment of all the amounts owed by the debtor.  This special protection given to government
lending institutions is not accorded
to judgment creditors in ordinary civil actions.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order
issued on January 11, 1978 should be, as it is hereby, ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.  The temporary restrain­ing order heretofore issued is hereby
made permanent.  With costs against the
private respondent Eusebio C. Tanghal.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, and Escolin, JJ., concur.

De Castro, J., on leave.

^[1] Rollo, p. 10.

^[2] Id.,
p. 16.

^[3] G.R. No. L-29130, Aug. 8, 1975, 66 SCRA
141.

^[4] Rollo, p. 20.

^[5] Id.,
p. 28.

^[6] 114 Phil. 7.