SPOUSES EUSEBIO ABRIN AND JULIANA ABRIN, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. VICENTE R. CAMPOS, AND SPOUSES GONZALO GUEVARRA AND CLARA LONTOK-GUEVARRA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
reverse and set aside the order dated January 3, 1979 of the then Court of
First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch III, First Judi­cial District,
Bayombong which dismissed petitioner’s complaint for Reconveyance (Civil Case
No. 2547) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The land subject matter of the controversy is a four and one-half
(4-½) hectares farmland located
in Bone South, Aristao, Nueva
Vizcaya.

On April 24, 1978, spouses Eusebio Abrin and Juliana Agni (Abrin,
for brevity) filed an action for reconveyance with damages against the spouses
Gonzalo Guevarra, Sr. and Clara Lontok (Guevarra, for short). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2547
assigned to Branch III of the then CFI of Nueva Vizcaya, Bayombong. In their complaint, petitioners alleged,
among others, that they are the owners of the land subject matter of the
controversy; that in connection with CAR Case No. 205-NV 66 entitled
“Eusebio Abrin v. Telesforo Ellorenco”, they hired the services of
defendant Guevarras’ son, who is a lawyer, to recover the aforesaid land from
Telesforo Ellorenco and Angel Opinia; that in connection with the said case,
they needed the sum of P10,000.00
and incurred expenses totalling P21,200.00 which amount was advanced by the
Guevarra spouses; that because of the amount advanced by the Guevarras, a
contract denominated as “Farm Partnership with Promise to Reconvey”
(Annex “A” to the complaint) was executed by the parties, providing,
among others, that the Abrins shall personally till and cultivate the land in
question which was also used as security for the payment of the money advanced
by the Guevarras with the understanding that the Abrins can redeem the land and
that a portion of the harvest and/or other crops produced in the land shall be
applied as part of the redemption price; that the document Annex “A”
was written in the English language and prepared by the son of the Guevarras
who is a lawyer; that the signatures of the Abrin spouses on the document were
fraudulently obtained because they are ignorant and could hardly read or write
and Notary Public Rufo Paras did not translate and explain its contents to the
Abrin spouses so that they entered into a voidable contract with unconscionable
provisions; that in an effort to redeem the land, the Abrin spouses paid the
amount of P4,140.00 in cash and delivered to the Guevarras for the crop years
1970 to 1977 a total of 966 cavans of palay valued at P19,320.00, thereby
paying the sum of P23,460.00 which is more than the amount of the redemption
price stipulated in Annex “A”; that despite repeated demands by the
Abrin spouses for the execution of the deed of reconveyance, the ­Guevarra spouses who secured TCT No. 31747
over the subject parcel of land in their names, refused to execute the said
document. By way of relief, the Abrin
spouses prayed, among others, that the Guevarra spouses be ordered to execute
the deed of reconveyance and to
pay to the former exemplary and moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00, plus
costs.

In their answer dated May 15, 1978, the Guevarra spouses,
controverted the complaint and maintained, inter alia, that
they bought the land in question from the Abrin spouses for a total
consideration of P21,200.00; that after the sale was consummated, they
constituted the Abrin spouses as tenants so they freely and voluntarily
executed the document Annex “A” to the complaint which set forth the
conditions governing their landlord-tenant relationship; that they received 45
cavans of palay in 1975 and 88 cavans of palay in 1976-77 as their share in the
produce of the land, they being the landowner and not as part of the redemp­tion
price; that the dispute arising from the tenant-landlord relationship between
the parties is not within the
jurisdiction the regular court; that the Abrin spouses have no sufficient cause
of action against the Guevarra spouses and assuming that they have a cause of
action, the same had prescribed or barred by estoppel or laches. As counterclaim,
the Guevarra spouses pray for the value of the fruits of the land starting from
1977 to the present, payment of attorney’s fees of P5,000.00, moral and
exemplary damages, plus costs.

On July 11, 1978, the Guevarra spouses filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the issues allegedly raised in the
complaint is within the jurisdiction of
the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Despite the opposition filed by the Abrin spouses, the trial court in its order dated January
23, 1979, dismissed the case without prejudice. The motion for reconsideration of the Abrin spouses was likewise
denied in the trial court’s order dated February 22, 1979. Hence, the instant petition.

The only issue for resolution is whether or not the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the dismissal of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 for lack of jurisdiction.

Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the Court
which has jurisdiction over the case, is the allegation made by the plaintiff
in his complaint (Ching v. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412; Ganadin v. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613;
Republic v. Sebastian, 72 SCRA 227; Magay v. Estandian, 69 SCRA 456; Time, Inc.
v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 303). To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, the Court must
interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
averments of the complaint
(Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation v. Judge Mendoza, 154 SCRA 548
[1987]). The defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dis­miss are not to be considered in
resolving the issue of jurisdiction, otherwise the question of jurisdiction
could depend entirely upon the defendant (Magay v. Estandian, 69 SCRA 456
[1976]).

A perusal of the allegations in the complaint which, for purposes
of resolving the motion to dismiss must be hypotheti­cally admitted (De Dios v.
Bristol Laboratories, Inc., L-25530, January 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 349), will show
that the Abrin spouses are seeking the reconveyance of the land in dispute on
the theory that it was encumbered only as security for the amount advanced by
the Guevarras in connection with the prosecution of the action to recover its possession
and that they have the right to redeem the land in accordance with
paragraph 11(8) of the document denominated as “Farm Partnership with
Promise to Reconvey,” and the
Abrin spouses have already paid the redemption price. Otherwise stated, the complaint is an action for reconveyance of
a parcel of land which had been fraudulently titled in the name of de­fendants. Such averments, the truth of which is
hypothetically admitted for the purpose of resolving the motion to dismiss
filed by the Guevarra spouses, certainly falls within the jurisdiction of the
then Court of First Instance pursuant to Section 44(b) of the Judiciary Act of
1940 as it is an action which
involves the title to or possession of the property subject matter of the
controversy. The defense interposed by
the Guevarra spouses to the effect that the Abrin spouses are their tenants and
the dispute is within the jurisdiction of the then Court of Agrarian Rela­tions
should have been disregarded by the trial court. Said defense of tenancy could be properly considered only if the
trial court conducted a preliminary hearing on the issue of jurisdic­tion
raised in the answer and reiterated in the motion to dismiss or after the trial
on the merits.

While it is true that Annex “A” was incorporated as an
in­tegral part of the complaint and should be considered in the determination
of the issue of jurisdiction, a preliminary consi­deration thereof in its
entirety will reveal that although the Abrin spouses were considered as
“tenants” in paragraph 11(1) of the so-called document denominated as
“Farm Partnership with Promise to Reconvey”, however, they can
exercise the right of redemption within ten (10) years from July 2, 1970
pursuant to paragraph 11(8) of the said agreement. The exercise of the right of redemption is not a right emanating
from a tenancy contract but a right granted to the Abrin spouses who are the
previous re­gistered owners of the land in dispute.

At any rate, with the abolition of the Court of Agrarian
Relations pursuant to Section 44 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 dated August 10,
1981, and fully implemented on February
14, 1983 (Enriquez v. Fortuna Mariculture Corporation, 158 SCRA 651 [1988]),
even agrarian disputes or those cases* falling
within the orig­inal and exclusive jurisdiction of the then Court of Agrarian
Re­lations pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946 are now within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under Section
19(7) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Locsin v. Valenzuela, 173 SCRA 454
[1989]). However, under Section 23 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Regional Trial Courts which may be designated by the
Supreme Court to try agrarian cases are required under Section 24 thereof to
apply the special rules of procedure applicable under present laws until such
time that said rules are amended by law or by the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, the Order dated January 3, 1979 dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 is hereby Set Aside and the case is Remanded
to the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Vizcaya for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ.,
concur.

* (a)  Cases
involving the rights and obligation of persons in cultivation and use of
agricultural land x x x;

(b)  Questions involving rights granted and
obligations imposed by law, presidential decrees, orders, instructions, rules
and regulations issued and promulgations in relation to the agrarian reform
program x x x;

(c)  Cases involving the collection of amortization
on payment for lands acquired under Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended, x x
x. (Sec. 12, PD 946)