G.R. No. 52091. March 29, 1982
TERESO V. MATURAN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. MAYOR SANTIAGO MAGLANA OF SAN FRANCISCO, SOUTHERN LEYTE, VICE-MAYOR HONORIO MAGONCIA, MUNICIPAL COUNCILORS BONIFACIO AMARGA, JR., AL…
DE CASTRO, J.:
to its resolution dated October 30, 1979, the issue raised herein being
purely legal, which is the interpretation of Presidential Decree No.
12-A and Letter of Instruction No. 14 in relation to the present case.
Petitioner was appointed as patrolman of San Francisco, Southern Leyte
on February 1, 1965 with a compensation of P540.00 per annum. On
October 1, 1967 he was promoted to the rank of police sergeant at
P720.00 per annum. On October 8, 1968 and July 1, 1969 petitioner’s
salary was adjusted to P1,320.00 and P1,800.00 per annum, respectively.
All the aforesaid appointments of petitioner were provisional. On
July 1, 1970 his provisional appointment was renewed. Likewise on July
1, 1971 his provisional appointment was renewed with an increase in pay
in the amount of P2,640.00 per annum.
On September 15, 1972, respondent Mayor Santiago Maglana suspended the
petitioner from office because of two pending criminal cases against
him, namely Criminal Case No. 236, for falsification of public document
by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts, and Criminal
Case No. 312, for falsification of public document. On October 2, 1972
respondent Vice-Mayor Honorio Magoncia, who was then the Acting Mayor,
instructed petitioner together with Chief of Police Francisco Duterte
and Patrolman Asisclo Irong, to tender their resignations pursuant to
the Letter of Instruction No. 14 of the President of the Philippines.
Petitioner submitted his letter of resignation on October 9, 1972.
Petitioner’s resignation was approved on January 19, 1973 and petitioner
was accordingly informed thereof.
In a letter dated February 19, 1973 petitioner sought the
reconsideration of the approval of his resignation for being null and
void on the ground that Letter of Instruction No. 14 does not apply to
him.
In the meantime, Criminal Case Nos. 236 and 312 were dismissed on January 31, 1973 and November 5, 1973, respectively.
In a letter dated January 12, 1974, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile then Acting
Chairman of the National Police Commission informed petitioner that due
to the dismissal of the aforesaid criminal cases, the latter’s
preventive suspension has been lifted and petitioner was directed to
report for duty to his Chief of Police. Petitioner reported for duty on
February 1, 1974 but Chief of Police Francisco Duterte refused to
accept the former in the police force.
Respondent Mayor sent a letter dated February 5, 1974 to the Chairman of
the National Police Commission requesting advice as to whether the
resignation tendered by petitioner pursuant to Letter of Instruction
No. 14 is valid. In a reply letter dated August 13, 1974 the Deputy
Executive Commissioner stated that since petitioner resigned from office
on October 2, 1972, the lifting of his suspension as directed in the
National Police Commission’s letter dated January 12, 1974 is no longer
feasible, the same having been rendered moot and academic; that said
office had occasion to rule that resignations submitted by members of
the police force in compliance with the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 14 are valid, said Instruction being broad in scope to
include both local and national officials.
Petitioner sought the intervention of the Governor of Southern Leyte to
no avail, hence, on May 21, 1974 petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus with claim for back salaries, traveling expense and damages
before the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch III.
It was alleged by petitioner that the refusal of respondents Mayor and
Chief of Police to reinstate him is a violation of paragraph 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 12-A which provides:
“7. Members of the police force who have been preventively
suspended shall, upon exoneration be entitled to immediate
reinstatement and payment of the entire salary they failed to receive
during the period of suspension;”
that the case of petitioner falls squarely within the purview of
Presidential Decree No. 12-A which was promulgated on October 4, 1972
and which governs policemen with pending cases; and that Letter of
Instruction No. 14 under whose provisions petitioner was made to resign
is not applicable to policemen.
In respondents’ answer dated July 3, 1974, they set up the defense that
petitioner has falsely entered in his duly sworn information sheet that
he is a high school graduate of the University of Manila during the
school year 1954-55, but in his Personal Data Sheet, CS Form No. 212,
dated October 8, 1968 he feloniously alleged and/or entered therein that
he is a graduate of the Pana-on Academy in the school year 1950-51 when
in truth he was only a second year high school student; that
petitioner, who has voluntarily resigned, needs a new appointment and
has to meet the qualifications required by law among which, are, that he
must be at least a high school graduate and not over 33 years of age;
that petitioner falls short of these requirements; and that petitioner
is notoriously undesirable, publicly known to be of bad moral character
and oftentimes got drunk while on duty.
On February 4, 1975 respondent court issued a decision dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. The court a quo agreed with the opinion of
the National Police Commission that resignations submitted by members of
the police force in compliance with the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 14 are valid. Since petitioner has been separated from
the service, reinstatement is not the proper remedy. The court also
said that the evidence of conflicting entries on petitioner’s two
information sheets have not been denied or rebutted, hence the
preponderance of evidence is against the petitioner that he is not a
high school graduate, as he could not have graduated in two high
schools, one in the University of Manila during the school year 1954-55
and the other at the Pana-on Academy during the school year 1950-51.
Lastly, the trial court ruled that since all petitioner’s appointments
were provisional, he can be removed at any time by the appointing
power, Mayor Maglana.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed his brief on June
28, 1976. For failure of respondents to submit their brief, the case
was submitted for decision on November 16, 1976.
Petitioner made the following assignment of errors:
“FIRST ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESIGNATION OF
PETITIONER FROM THE POSITION OF POLICE SERGEANT OF THE SAN FRANCISCO
POLICE FORCE AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH RESIGNATION BY RESPONDENT MAYOR
MAGLANA DURING THE PENDENCY OF A CRIMINAL CASE FILED AGAINST PETITIONER
AND WHILE PETITIONER WAS UNDER PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ARE LEGAL AND
VALID;“SECOND ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE AT ANY TIME BY RESPONDENT MAYOR MAGLANA;
“THIRD ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT MAYOR COULD NOT BE
COMPELLED TO REINSTATE AND/OR REAPPOINT PETITIONER WHO POSSESSED CIVIL
SERVICE ELIGIBILITY AS PATROLMAN AND WITH POLICE TRAINING AT THE POLCOM
ACADEMY; and“FOURTH ERROR
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DISMISSING THIS CASE AND DISALLOWING PETITIONER TO COLLECT HIS BACK SALARIES AND TRAVELING EXPENSES.”
Petitioner contends that under Presidential Decree No. 12-A promulgated
on October 4, 1972 the power to dismiss or remove a member of the police
force has been transferred from the Mayor to the Police Commission.
Hence, the acceptance of petitioner’s resignation by respondent Mayor on
January 19, 1973 is null and void because the latter is no longer
clothed with authority to dismiss or remove a member of the police force
on said date. Furthermore, petitioner stresses that Letter of
Instruction No. 14 under whose provisions he was made to resign is not
applicable to him as said Instruction covers only officials and
employees with pending capes excluding policemen. Lastly, petitioner
banks on his testimonial eligibility which he obtained on October 10,
1974 to justify his reappointment.
Presidential Decree No. 12 dated October 3, 1972 created the
Adjudication and Investigation Boards in the Police Commission to
review and dispose of all administrative cases of city and municipal
forces referred to the Commission. On October 4, 1972 Presidential
Decree 12-A was promulgated providing for the procedure to be followed
in case an administrative charge is filed against any member of the
local police agency or when a member of the police force is accused in
court of any felony or violation of law. Nowhere in the provisions of
said Presidential Decrees show that the power to dismiss or remove has
been transferred from the Mayor to the Police Commission as contended
by petitioner. It was only on August 8, 1974 when such power was
removed from the Mayor pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 531
integrating the municipal police forces in all the municipalities of the
province of Southern Leyte. Presidential Decree No. 531 states:
“SEC. 6. Power of administrative control and supervision. –
Administrative control and supervision over the several police and fire
departments and jails composing each of the Integrated Police Forces
herein constituted shall, prior to the transfer provided for in Section 7
hereof, remain with the offices, agencies and officials in which said
power is vested in accordance with existing laws; x x x. Accordingly,
administrative matters, such as appointment, promotion, suspension,
separation and other disciplinary action x x x and such other matters
pertaining to personnel administration which are currently vested in and
exercised by other officials pursuant to existing laws, rules and
regulations shall remain with said officials, x x x.“SEC. 7. Administrative control and supervision to be transferred
to the Philippine Constabulary. – After one year, but not later than
two years, from the effectivity of this Decree, the power and
administrative control and supervision provided for in Section 6 hereof
shall be taken over and exercised by the Philippine Constabulary. x x
x.”
It is clear therefore that at the time petitioner’s resignation was
approved by respondent Mayor on January 19, 1973 the latter still had
the power to dismiss or remove the former.
Petitioner did not dispute that at the time he was appointed member of
the Police Force of San Francisco, Southern Leyte, he had neither
qualified in an appropriate examination for the position of policeman
nor was he possessed with any civil service eligibility for any position
in the government. Such lack of a civil service eligibility makes his
appointment temporary[1] and without a definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power.[2] Although indicated as provisional and approved under Section 24 (c)[3]
of Republic Act 2260 the petitioner’s appointment did not acquire the
character of provisional appointment because of his lack of appropriate
civil service eligibility for the position of municipal policeman.
The Civil Service Commission cannot even legally approve his appointment
as provisional as this act would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
the discretion of the appointing power.[4]
If the approval of his appointment as provisional under Section 24 (c)
of Republic Act 2260 did not make it so, the fact remains that his
appointment was temporary which could be terminated without any need to
show that the termination was for cause.[5]
The fact that petitioner subsequently obtained a testimonial eligibility
on October 10, 1974 is of no moment. At the time he received his
appointment, as aforestated, petitioner had no eligibility. As such
what is required is a new appointment, not merely reinstatement. But
even then, he cannot compel the Mayor to reappoint him for the power to
appoint is in essence discretionary and the appointing power enjoys
sufficient discretion to select and appoint employees on the basis of
their fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of
the position filled.[6]
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 4, 1975 of the lower court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Ericta, and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., on official leave.
[1] Ramos vs. Romualdez, 32 SCRA 590.
[2] Mendiola vs. Tancinco, 52 SCRA 66; Cuñado vs. Gamus, 8 SCRA 77.
[3] (c) Provisional
Appointment. – A provisional appointment may be issued upon prior
authorization of the Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and the rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereto to
a person who has not qualified in an appropriate examination but who
otherwise meets the requirement for appointment to a regular position in
the competitive service, whenever a vacancy occurs and the filling
thereof is necessary in the interest of the service and there is no
appropriate register of eligibles at the time of the appointment.
[4] Re: Elvira C. Arcega, 89 SCRA 318; Santos vs. Chico, 25 SCRA 343.
[5] Ata vs. Namocatcat, 47 SCRA 315; Hojilla vs. Mariño, 13 SCRA 825.
[6] Reyes vs. Abeleda, 22 SCRA 825.