ATLAS FREE WORKERS UNION (AFWU) – PSSLU LOCAL, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CARMELO C. NORIEL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS, MINISTRY OF LABOR, AND ASSOCIATED LABOR UN…

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus
brought by petitioner union against respondent Director of Labor Relations to set aside respondent’s order to remand the
case to the Med-Arbiter or Office of Origin (Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City) for further hearing and reception of evidence
instead of granting the petitioner union’s petition filed since December 14,
1978 for the holding of a certification election.

The Court resolves to grant the petition in line with the liberal
approach consistently adhered to by this Court in matters of certification election.  The whole democratic process is geared towards the determination of
representation, not only in government but in other sectors as well, by
election.  Thus, the Court has declared its commitment to the view that a certification election is
crucial to the institution of collective bargaining, for it gives substance to
the principle of majority rule
as one of the basic concepts of a democratic policy.^[1]

The facts can be read from the decision dated September 28, 1979
of respondent Noriel. 
On December 14, 1978, petitioner Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU) – PSSLU Local filed a
petition for certifi­cation election to determine the bargaining representative
of all the rank-and-file workers and employees of Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation numbering some 7,000 workers, and averring “that
petitioner has been authorized and given consent to file the petition by no
less than 30% of the workers and employees; that there has been no petition for
certification election filed within the rank-and­-file employer unit in said
corporation by any labor organization 12 months prior to the filing of the
petition; that there is no legal impediment to the petition as there is no
legitimate labor organization with an exclusive bargaining agreement duly
certified by the Ministry of Labor; that the Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the Associated Labor Union (ALU) and Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corpora­tion expires on December 15, 1979;
that without being certified and authorized by the employees and workers
in said corporation, the Associated Labor Union (ALU)
has been assuming the bargaining representation since 1966 and since
then there has been no certification election for more than 12 years now
because the employees and workers have been threatened with dismissal by ALU in their endeavor to choose their own union to
represent them, as in fact they had been dismissed when they petitioned for
certification election in 1972; that the overwhelming majority, if not all, of
the rank-and-file employees and workers clamor for the holding of a
certification election in said corporation to be able to exercise their right
to choose the union of their confidence to represent them; and that they have
lost their trust and confidence in ALU.”^[2]

On January 18, 1979, respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU), which had been assuming the bargaining representation
of the employees since 1966, intervened and moved to dismiss the petition on
the ground that there was an existing collective bargaining agreement between
the company and the ALU and that the petition was not
supported by 30% of the employees as required by the Labor Code alleging that
of the 1,249 signatures appearing in the petition, the consent of the workers
were either falsified, other signatures were those of persons long dead, others
belonged to persons not members of the bargaining unit, others signed twice and
still others were security guards and managerial employees.  Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss the
petition main­taining that the petition had the written consent of clearly more
than 30% of the workers of the company.

On March 23, 1979, the Med-Arbiter, after receiving the evidence
of intervenor Associated Labor Union, issued an order
arbitrarily (as found by respondent director in his decision)
dismissing the petition for certification election for alleged failure to
comply with the 30% subscription requirement of the workers of the company.

On March 30, 1979, petitioner appealed from the Order of the
Med-Arbiter followed by a supplemental appeal dated April 5, 1979, on the
grounds that “there is no truth in the allegation that some signa­tures
supporting the petition had been fraudulently acquired or falsified, that it is
not shown whether the number of those forged signatures, etc., would reduce the
30% subscription requirement” and maintained “that in any event, this
matter can best be threshed out during the pre-election conference when the inclusion
and exclusion process and other details concerning the mechanics of the
election will be taken up.”^[3]

On September 28, 1979, respondent Noriel,
instead of ruling on the holding of the certification election which he himself
expressly found had been arbitrarily dismissed by the Med-Arbiter, issued the
questioned order remanding the petition for certification election to the
Med-Arbiter or office of origin for further hearing, as follows:

“Against the preceding guidelines, this Bureau finds the above
Order wanting in some vital points.

In the first place, the findings of facts cannot be upheld
for it clearly appears to have no reasonable support in evidence.  There is no substantial evidence of record
upon which the said findings of fact may be based.  To be substantial, the evidence must first of
all be credible.  Here, the findings of
the Med-Arbiter are based merely on the death certificates and unsworn lists submitted by one B.G.
Cavada, Jr. who signed as Acting Personnel Relations
Director of the Company.  Specifically,
as regards the death certificates, there was no showing that the persons
referred to therein were the same persons alleged to have signed the
petition.  On the other hand, a cursory
examination would instantly show that two of the death certificates referred to
Leopoldo E. Bacalzo and
Mateo V. Alisoso in contrast to the Leopoldo N. Bacalzo and Mateo Alisoso who signed the petition.  With respect to the lists of alleged security
guards, managerial employees and non-employees, respectively, the same were not
sworn to, neither were they verified and identified in a hearing, nor was
there any evidence of record to show its accuracy and truth.  The said lists are self-serving and at most
arbitrary.  At the least, the
Med-Arbiter should hear both parties on these issues and receive evidence
thereon.

In the second place, the findings themselves con­tain mathematical
errors and loose ends clearly indicative of the hasty manner in
which the decision was ren­dered.  Thus,
the Med-Arbiter found that 147 were managerial employees based on the list
submitted by the Acting Personnel Relations Director.  A cursory count of the persons in said list however gives only 47 per­sons.  Likewise, there was a finding that a number
of persons denied having signed and supported the petition for certification
election based on the list of em­ployees together with their individual
affidavits of denial.  But a careful
check of the alleged list against the supporting affidavits reveals a great
disparity.  Thus, while the list of
persons who allegedly denied having signed the petition numbered about 796, the
sup­porting individual affidavits numbered only about 125.  Add to this is the charge that at the close
of the proceedings before the Med-Arbiter, the said alleged individual
affidavits were not duly sworn to. 
Again, these facts, plus the obviously haphazard preparation of the
lists and the affidavits should have placed the Med-Arbiter on guard
and cautioned him into subjecting the same to verification and identification
or at the least, against giving it due weight. 
In any case, a specific finding on this question is necessary, both as
to its truth and the exact number thereof. 
Further hearing is thus, again, necessary.”

Reconsideration of the Order to remand the case for further
hearing having been denied by public respondent, petitioner union filed the
instant petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking to set aside
the decision of September 28, 1979 and praying that respondent Noriel be ordered to exercise his
power to grant the petition for certifica­tion election.  Petitioner posed the issue as to whether or
not respond­ent Director of Labor Relations acted with arbitrariness in evading
or refusing to exercise, on appeal, the discretionary power vested in him to
call a certification election.

Art. 257 of the present Labor Code, P.D.
No. 442, states that “any petition for certification election filed by any
legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at
least 30% of all the employees in the bargaining unit.  Upon receipt and verifi­cation of such
petition, it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to con­duct a certification
election for the purpose of determining the repre­sentative of the employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of all the employees in the unit.”
What is required is that the peti­tion should be signed by at least 30% of all
the employees in the bargain­ing unit. 
As long as the statutory requirement is complied with, the Director of
Labor Relations has no choice but to call a certification election.  In the words of the Chief Justice, “the
language used is one of command. 
Once it has been verified that the petition for certifica­tion election
has the support of at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit, it
must be granted.  The specific word used
can yield no other meaning.  It becomes
under the circumstances, ‘mandatory’ for respondent Noriel
as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations to order such certification
election precisely to ascertain which labor organi­zation should be the exclusive
bargaining representative.”^[4]

Respondent Noriel unqualifiedly held
that the findings of facts of the Med-Arbiter in dismissing the petition could
not be upheld for “it clearly appears to have no reasonable support in
evidence” and because “the findings themselves contain mathematical
errors and loose ends clearly indicative of the hasty manner in which the
decision was rendered.” Under the circumstances and with respondent union
having been already given the opportunity and dismally failed to establish the
grounds for its opposition to the petition, to still remand the case to the
Med-Arbiter for further hearing would constitute grave abuse of discretion in
giving the oppositor-respondent more than what it was
entitled to and unduly delaying the holding of the certification election to
which the petitioners-workers were clearly entitled, espe­cially considering
that as of the filing of the petition in 1978, no such certification election had been held for twelve (12) years.

The 30% statutory requirement need not be established with
absolute certainty.  A prima facie
showing of compliance with the 30% statutory requirement should suffice.  As long as there is reasonable ground to
believe that indeed a substantial section of the workers involved seek an
election, the certification election should be ordered.  In case of doubt, the best and logical way
to determine which union really commands the allegiance and loyalty of the
rank-and-file employees is through the holding of a properly supervised
certification election.  The Court has
consistently ruled that “even conceding that the statutory require­ment of
30% of the labor force asking for a certification election had not been
strictly complied with, respondent Director is still empowered to order that it
be held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of the
contending labor organizations shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representative.”^[5]

The 30% statutory requirement is a mere technical requirement
which should not be used to frustrate the will of the rank-and-file employees
but should be interpreted to help determine the same.  As the proceedings in the Bureau of Labor Relations
are summary in charac­ter, technical rules of court practice, procedure and
evidence do not have to be rigidly applied^[6]
considering the nature of administrative bodies, the character of the duties they are required to
perform, the purpose for which they are organized, and that the persons who
compose them are technical men but not necessarily trained law men.^[7]

Petitioner, in its appeal of March 30, 1979 from the arbitrary
order of dismissal of its petition for certification election correctly pointed
out that the issue as to whether some signatures supporting the petition have
been “fraudulently acquired or falsified” and that the same would
reduce the 30% subscription requirement “can best be threshed out during
the pre-election conference when the inclusion and exclusion process and other
details concerning the mechanics of the election will be taken up.” The
Court in Federacion Obrera
de la Industria y Otros Trabajadores
de Filipinas vs. Noriel^[8]
laid down the salutary rule that should be followed in case of alleged
withdrawals and retractions that “the best forum for determining whether
there were indeed retractions from some of the laborers is in the certification
election itself wherein the workers can freely express their choice
in a secret ballot.” Suffice it to say that the will of the
rank-and-file employees should in every possible instance be determined by
secret ballot rather than by administrative or quasi-judicial inquiry.  Such representation and certification
election cases are not to be taken as contentious litiga­tions for suits but as
mere investigations of a non-adversary, fact-finding character as to
which of the competing unions represents the genuine choice of the workers to
be their sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative with their
employer.^[9]

The calling and holding
of the certification election was thus practically mandatory, in view of public
respondent’s own express find­ing that the dismissal was arbitrary.  Granted that it lay within public
respondent’s discretion to call for the certification election,^[10] the Court finds that public respondent did
not properly utilize his authority in remanding the petition for certification
to the office of origin for further hearing and delay rather than ordering that
the certification election be conducted. 
For with the 30% requirement, it becomes man­datory to call the
certification election, but even without compliance with such requirement, the
respondent could in the exercise of his dis­cretionary power order the holding
of a certification election to deter­mine the proper employees’ representative
for purposes of collective bargaining.^[11] As stressed by the Chief Justice in another case: 
“In all other instances, the discretion, according to the rulings
of this Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily exercised in favor of a petition
for certification.”^[12] The necessity and urgency for a
certification elec­tion to be conducted immediately become more
pronounced when it is con­sidered that no such certification election has been conducted as of 1978 for more
than twelve years in the
company.^[13] Furthermore, res­pondent-oppositor
had clearly failed to substantiate the grounds for its opposition to the
certification election.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby granted and public
respond­ent’s order remanding the petition to the Med-Arbiter for further hear­ing
is set aside.  Respondent Director of
Labor Relations Noriel is ordered to call and direct
the immediate holding of a certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of Atlas Consolidated Mining Corporation.  This decision is immediately executory.

Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro*, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1]
National Mines and Allied Workers Union vs. Luna,
83 SCRA 610, per Fernando, C.J.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 23; emphasis supplied.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 24.

^[4]
Federation of Free Workers vs. Noriel,
86 SCRA 132; Benguet
Exploration Miner’s Union vs. Noriel, 76 SCRA 107.

^[5]
National Mines and Allied Workers Union vs. Luna,
83 SCRA 610, per
Fernando, C.J.

^[6]
Antipolo Highway Lines, Inc. vs. Inciong, 64 SCRA 441.

^[7]
Asprec vs.
Itchon, et al., 16 SCRA
921.

^[8]
72 SCRA 24; See National Mines and
Allied Workers Union vs. Luna, supra.

^[9]
LVN
Pictures, Inc. vs. Phil. Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725; Federation of
Free Workers vs. Paredes, 54 SCRA
76 (1973); Phil. Communications, Electronics and Electricity Workers Federation
vs. CIR, 56 SCRA 480.

^[10]
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte-FOITAF
vs. Noriel, 77 SCRA
414.

^[11]
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte-FOITAF
vs. Carmelo Noriel, ibid;
Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial
College vs. Noriel, 85 SCRA
494.

^[12]
National Mines and Allied Workers Union vs. Luna, supra.

^[13]
Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions, et al. vs. NLRC, 60 SCRA 450.

* Mr. Justice Pacifico P. de Castro was designated to sit with the First
Division in lieu of Mr. Justice Ramon C. Fernandez who is on official leave.