REMIGIO QUIQUI, EMILIANA Q. ARELLANO, TURCUATA Q. DIPUTADO, APOLONIA Q. SALCEDOR, LORETO QUIQUI, SUPLICIA Q. CHAN, ELDEGUNDA Q. MONASTERIO, ELSA Q. ARBON AND ANTIPAS Q. YANG, PE…

This is a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.  It concerns a parcel of agricultural land
situated in Barangay Cabangan, Siaton, Negros Oriental with an area of about
450 square meters.  The said parcel of
land is a portion of Lot No. 3217, Pls-­659-D covered by Free Patent Title No.
FV-13703.  The improvements on the parcel
of land in question include several fruit trees and a modest residential house.

The record of the case reveals that on May 22, 1973, the herein private respondents
Estefania G. Amolo, Lope Amolo, Sofia G. Albon, Pastor Gadingan, Angel
Gadingan, Antero Gadingan, Teofilo Gadingan and Felicitas Gadingan were able to
secure Free Patent Title No. FV-­13703 in their names.  The 450-square meter lot in question was included
in the survey of the entire parcel of land covered by the said Title.

On the other hand, it is the position of the herein petitioners
Remigio Quiqui, Emiliana Q. Arellano, Turcuata Q. Diputado, Apolonia Q.
Salcedor, Loreto Quiqui, Suplicia Q. Chan, Eldegunda Q. Monasterio, Elsa Q.
Arbon and Antipas Q. Yang that the 450-square meter lot in question belongs to
them and not to the private respondents. 
They contend that the said lot was purchased by their late father
sometime in 1920 and that ever since then, they have been in actual possession
thereof, peacefully, openly, continuously and adversely, for a period of 56
years already.  They also contend that
the private respondents succeeded in putting the said property in their name by
clandestinely including the said lot in the survey of the premises undertaken
by the Government sometime in the 1970s.

On November 9, 1976,
the petitioners, assisted by the Citizens Legal Assistance Office of the then
Ministry of Justice, filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental for “reconveyance and/or annulment of Title with damages”
against the private respondents.^[1]
The said Complaint was anchored on the theory that the title to the lot in
question obtained by the private respondents in their name was secured through
fraud.  The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 6606.

On December 5, 1976,
the private respondents filed their Answer to the Complaint, alleging, inter
alia, that the petitioners have no cause of action against them.  By way of Counterclaim, the private
respondents sought the payment to them of moral damages and attorney’s fees.^[2]

Thereafter, a pre-trial conference was scheduled by the trial
court.  Inasmuch as the parties could not
reach an amicable settle­ment of their case, the pre-trial conference was
terminated and the case was set for trial on the merits.  In the course of the proceedings, more
particularly on May 10, 1979,
the private respondents filed a Motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
lack of jurisdic­tion on the part of the trial court.^[3]

On June 7, 1979,
the petitioners submitted their Opposition to the said Motion, stressing that
the trial court has jurisdiction over cases for reconveyance.^[4]
In its Order dated July 16, 1979, the trial court, with respondent Judge Alejandro
R. Boncaros presiding, dismissed the Complaint for reconveyance on the ground
that it had no jurisdiction over the case.^[5]
Counsel for the petitioners received a copy of the said Order on July 17, 1979.^[6]

On August 17, 1979, the petitioners filed a Motion for the
reconsideration of the Order of the trial court dismissing the Complaint.^[7]
The said Motion for Reconsideration is dated August 16, 1979.

The private respondents opposed the Motion for Reconsideration,
stating that the same had been filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period
under the Rules.  The private respondents
maintain that inasmuch as the petitioners received their copy of the Order of
dismissal on July 17, 1979, they had up to August 16, 1979 to file the Motion
for Reconsideration, computed on the basis of the 30-day reglementary
period.  They contend that since the said
Motion was filed beyond the 30-day period, the Order of dismissal has become
final and executory and could no longer be the subject of a Motion for
Reconsideration.^[8]
In its Order dated August 21, 1979, the trial court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground asserted by the private respondents.^[9]

On August 23, 1979, the petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal,
seeking relief from the Court of Appeals. 
They sought the Appeal on the ground that the Orders of the trial court
dismissing their Complaint and denying their Motion for Reconsideration are
contrary to law and the evidence submitted.^[10]
On August 24, 1979, the petitioners filed their Appeal Bond, together with their
Motion to approve the same.

In its Order dated August 28, 1979, the trial court denied the
Notice of Appeal, including the Motion to approve the Appeal Bond.  The pertinent portion of the said Order are
as follows -?

“THE order of dismissal of this Court which was dated July 16,
1979 was received by the plaintiffs (the herein petitioners) on July 17,
1979.  Under Section 3, Rule 41 of the
Revised.  Rules of Court, the period to
appeal is thirty (30) days, so with the motion for a reconsideration so that
(sic) under Art. 13 of the Civil Code that in the computation of the period
exclude the first (day), include the last (sic), August 16, 1979 therefore was
the last day to file the motion for reconsideration but it was filed on August
17or one day late and this motion for reconsideration was denied by this Court
on August 21, 1979 (sic).  The reason for
the denial was the motion for reconsideration was filed (sic) beyond the
reglementary period, in which case, the notice of appeal xxx (was) likewise
filed beyond the reglementary period xxx.

“xxx.”^[11]

Finding the action taken by the trial court unsatisfactory, the
petitioners brought their case directly to this Court by way of the instant
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 
They maintain that the Order of the trial court dated July 16, 1979 is
illegal and void for having been “issued without jurisdiction or in excess
of juris­diction or with grave abuse of discretion, for the so-called ‘one day
late’ (ground) upon which it is based does not actually exist.”^[12]
They pray, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to approve
their Notice of Appeal.^[13]

Complying with the instructions of this Court, the private
respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition.^[14]

In the Resolution of this Court dated January 14, 1980, We gave
due course to the instant Petition.^[15]
The parties submitted their respective Memoranda after which the case was
deemed submitted for decision on
June 11, 1980.

After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We
find the instant Petition devoid of merit.

At the time this litigation was instituted in the trial court,
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court was the provision governing the period
within which an Appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals, to wit —

“SEC. 3.  How appeal
is taken. — Appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse
party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of
order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on
appeal.  The time during which a motion
to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall be
deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.

“But where such a motion has been filed during office hours of
the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within
the day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the
denial of said motion.”

Under this cited provision, the Appeal may be taken within 30
days from notice of the judgment or order of the trial court.^[16]
In the event that the party aggrieved by the judgment or order of the trial
court files a Motion to set aside the judgment or order, i.e., a
Motion for Reconsideration, the time during which such Motion is pending
resolution shall, as a rule, be deducted from the 30-day period.^[17]
In relation thereto, the New Civil Code states that in computing a period, the
first day shall be excluded and the last day included.^[18]

The petitioners admit that they received their copy of the Order
of dismissal of their Complaint on July 17, 1979.  Under Section 3, Rule 41, they had 30 days
within which to appeal their case or to file a Motion for Reconsideration of
the judgment or order of the trial court. 
In computing the 30-day period, July 17, 1979 (the first day) is
excluded, pursuant to Article 13 of the New Civil Code.  Counting 30 days thereafter, beginning on
July 18, 1979, the petitioners had up to August 16, 1979 to file their Motion
for Reconsideration.  Their Motion for
Reconsideration, although dated August 16, 1979, was filed with the trial court
on August 17, 1979 or one day beyond the 30-day reglementary period prescribed
by Section 3 of Rule 41.

Under these circumstances, the order of the trial court dis­missing
the Complaint has become final and executory. 
As such, it is beyond the reach of a Motion for Reconsideration.^[19]
The Notice of Appeal, therefore, was properly denied.  Perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has
the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.  A strict observance of the reglementary
period within which to exercise the statutory right of appeal has been
considered as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays.^[20]

As a last recourse in support of their case, the petitioners
invoke the following observations made by this Court in De Las Alas v. Court of Appeals,^[21] to wit:

“Regardless, however, of the above findings and even assuming
that respondents’ position were correct, WE find that a one-day delay does not
justify the dismissal of the appeal under the circumstances obtaining in this
case.  The real purpose behind the limitation
of the period of appeal is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay, in the
administration of justice and to put an end to controversies xxx.”^[22]

Unfortunately for the petitioners, the observation made by this
Court in De Las Alas does not apply to their case.

In De Las Alas, the view expressed by this
Court to the effect that “a one-day delay does not justify the dismissal
of the appeal” is qualified by the phrase “under the circumstances
obtaining in this case“.  Unlike the situation faced by the herein
petitioners, there is no showing that the petitioners in the De Las
Alas case failed to file their Motion for Reconsideration as well as
their Record on Appeal with­in the reglementary period.  On the contrary, this Court noted therein the
lack of delay on the part of the petitioners in that case, viz -?

“Furthermore, WE note from the records the absence or lack of
the element of intent to delay the administration of justice on the part of
petitioners in this case.  On the
contrary, petitioners’ counsel have demonstrated cautiousness, concern and
punctuality in the prosecution of the appeal. 
They filed their motion for reconsideration October 7, 1972, even if the
respondent lower court judge had given them an extension up to October 24,
1972, with­in which to file the said motion. 
Petitioners had up to December 25, 1972, within which to submit their
record on appeal, yet they filed their record on appeal on December 8, 1972, or
17 days before the deadline.”^[23]

Moreover, a doubtful and controversial question of law confronted
the parties in the De Las Alas case, i.e.,
the matter of computing the reglementary period for filing an Appeal.  The respondent court found petitioner had
only two (2) days left to perfect the appeal after the denial of the motion for
reconsideration while this Court held petitioners had three (3) days left
deducting the period within which the motion for reconsideration has been
pending, excluding the first day in the computation of the period, but since
the last day falls on a Sunday the period of appeal is ipso jure
extended to the first working day immediately following.^[24]
In the case at bar, however, there is no such doubtful or controversial
question of law submitted for Our resolution.

For the petitioners to seek exception for their failure to comply
strictly with the requirements for perfecting their Appeal, strong compelling
reasons, like the prevention of a grave miscarriage of justice, must be shown
to exist in order to warrant this Court to suspend the Rules.^[25]
No such reasons have been shown to exist in this case.  In fact, the petitioners did not even offer
any reason­able explanation for their delay.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, We find no jurisdic­tional
infirmity, sufficient to call for the issuance of the corrective writ of certiorari,
in the action taken by the trial court. 
As stated earlier, the instant Petition is devoid of merit.

WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, the instant Petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.  We make no pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Pages 13 to 16, Rollo.

^[2]
Page 19, Rollo.

^[3]
Pages 23 to 26, Rollo.

^[4]
Pages 28 to 31, Rollo.

^[5]
Pages 32 to 33, Rollo.

^[6]
Pages 4 and 5, Petition.

^[7]
Page 5, Petition; pages 34 to 36, Rollo.

^[8]
Page 37, Rollo.

^[9]
Page 38, Rollo.

^[10]
Page 39, Rollo.

^[11]
Page 44, Rollo.

^[12]
Page 7, Petition.

^[13]
Page 9, Petition.

^[14]
Pages 47 to 49, Rollo.

^[15]
Page 52, Rollo.

^[16]
Section 3, Rule 41 has been modified by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as The Judiciary Act of
1981. The period within which an Appeal may be taken has been reduced to 15
days, except in habeas corpus cases.

^[17]
First paragraph, Section 3, Rule 41.

^[18]
Article 13, New Civil Code.

^[19]
Elizalde & Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 25 SCRA 58,
61-62 (1968).  See also Carreon v.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 77 SCRA 297, 300 (1977).

^[20]
Macabingkil vs. People’s Homesite and Housing Corp., 72 SCRA 339,
L-29080, Aug. 17, 1976; Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. Reyes, 71 SCRA 661,
L-43469, June 30, 1976.

^[21]
83 SCRA 200 (1978).

^[22]
Citing Dy Cay v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521 (1918).

^[23]
83 SCRA at 215.

^[24]
Supra, applying Lloren vs. De Vera, 4 SCRA 637.

^[25]
Workmen’s Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Augusto, 40 SCRA 123, 127 (1971).  See also Ronquillo v.
Marasigan, 5 SCRA 304, 312-313 (1962).