RODOLFO ANIMAS ALIAS “TINGTONG”, ZACARIAS SEMINIO, JR. ALIAS “CAROL” RODOLFO SEMINIO, CARLITO FERNANDEZ, GOLEM JACILDO, RICARDO JAVIER ALIAS “KAPID”, CARLOS JAVIER, GENEROSO DE …

Animas versus Military Commission Number 27

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the Supreme Court by twelve persons, eleven of them civilians and one a soldier, Sergeant Rodolfo Animas, who were charged with murder in the killing of Diosdado Yanson on the eve of the November 1971 local elections in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. The petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of Military Commission Number 27 to try them, contending that the offense was an ordinary common crime with no national security or political complexion, committed long before martial law, and that the charge sheet had been manipulated to bring them within military jurisdiction. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's clearest statement that the primacy of civil courts over military tribunals is the rule, and that a lone military accused does not drag his civilian co-accused into a military court.

Procedural History

The petitioners were investigated for murder by the Negros Occidental Constabulary and by a captain of the Judge Advocate General Service. The Judge Advocate General then filed a charge sheet before a military tribunal, but changed the offense from murder to violation of the Revised Administrative Code provisions on firearms in relation to Presidential Decree Number 9, illegal possession of firearms with murder. The Minister of National Defense referred the case to Military Commission Number 27 in February 1978. The twelve accused were arraigned in November 1978 and pleaded not guilty. In June 1979 the prosecution amended the title of the charge sheet to add violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, without amending its body. Before trial could proceed, the Minister of National Defense ordered the transfer of the case to the civil courts in June 1979, but that order was superseded in August 1979 by a first indorsement directing implementation of the President's handwritten marginal instruction that the Military Commission retain jurisdiction. That retention prompted this petition in the Supreme Court, which granted it.

Facts

Diosdado Yanson was a political leader of Ernesto Montilla, a candidate for mayor of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental in the local elections of November 11, 1971. On the eve of those elections, Yanson was allegedly mauled, taken in a car to Malicon Beach, shot, tied to an engine block, and dumped at sea. The petitioners were charged with murder qualified by superior strength, nighttime, use of a motor vehicle, and treachery.

The accused were arrested almost a year later, in September 1972, after martial law had been proclaimed. Only in 1974 was a summary preliminary investigation conducted by a captain of the Judge Advocate General Service. Because one of the accused, Sergeant Rodolfo Animas, was a military man, the case was recommended for prosecution before a military tribunal, and the charge sheet was filed there.

In 1977 the petitioners were released even as the provincial fiscal began investigating the murder charge, but a warrant of arrest issued in June 1978 led to the re-arrest of fourteen accused. After the Minister of National Defense ordered the transfer of the case to the civil courts, the President, upon the letter of the victim's widow, Nelly Yanson, ordered the Military Commission to retain jurisdiction, and this petition followed.

Issues

• Whether or not Military Commission Number 27 has jurisdiction over the criminal case against the petitioners.
• Whether or not the presence of a single military accused among twelve accused brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the military courts.
• Whether or not the charge sheet sufficiently alleges the crime of illegal possession of firearms so as to vest jurisdiction in the military tribunal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Presidential Decree Number 1850 provides:

Section 2. Segregation of Criminal Cases of Armed Forces and Integrated National Police from Civilian Co-Accused. In cases where there are two or more accused one or some of whom is or are civilian(s), the case against the latter shall be segregated from accused Armed Forces or Integrated National Police member, and filed with the appropriate civil court for trial in accordance with existing laws; Provided, however, that should such civilian accused waive in writing civil court jurisdiction and submit himself to court-martial jurisdiction, then the whole case involving members of the Armed Forces or the Integrated National Police as well as the civilian(s) shall be referred for trial to a court-martial.

This decree shows that the law itself separates civilian accused from their military co-accused and sends the civilians to the civil courts, unless the civilians themselves waive in writing.

Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

The Court invokes this guarantee to require greater precision in military charge sheets, so that a person deprived of the jurisdiction of civil courts is at least informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Ruling

The Court granted the petition. On the first issue, it held that the military commission had no jurisdiction. The crime was committed in November 1971, long before martial law, when civilian fiscals prosecuted and civil courts tried such cases. The Court stressed that the jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes and civilian accused, at a time when all civil courts were fully operational, constitutes one of the saddest chapters in the history of the Philippine judiciary.

On the second issue, the Court held that the presence of one military accused does not sweep the whole case into the military court. It applied its earlier ruling in De Guzman versus Leopando, where the lone military personnel was ordered tried together with nineteen civilian accused before a civil court. In other words, it is the military accused who joins the civilian trial, and not the other way around. The Court also noted that the acts charged against Sergeant Animas had nothing to do with the performance of official duty.

On the third issue, the Court held that the charge sheet was insufficient. It failed to allege the lack or absence of a license to possess the firearm, which is an essential ingredient of illegal possession of a firearm. The change in the offense charged was obviously made to bring the case within the jurisdiction of a military court, and the Court applied the rule on sufficiency of allegations strictly against the prosecution.

Doctrine

First, the primacy of civil courts over military tribunals is the rule. In case of doubt, the presumption is in favor of civil courts trying civilian accused. Second, where military and civilian accused are charged together, it is the military accused who joins the civilian trial, not the civilians who are dragged into the military court. Third, the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of illegal possession of a firearm, and where a case ordinarily triable by civil courts is sought to be brought within military jurisdiction, the rule on sufficiency of allegations is applied strictly against the prosecution. Fourth, military charge sheets must be precise, to satisfy the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the criminal case was ordered transferred to the appropriate Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, with the prosecution handled by the Provincial Fiscal, and the temporary restraining order was made permanent.

Remember This

Memorize this line: it is the military accused who joins the civilian trial, and not the other way around. Examiners use this case to test the primacy of civil courts, the strict pleading of illegal possession of firearms, and the constitutional right to be informed of the accusation.