PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., HON. BUENAVENTURA S. DE LA FUENTE, HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MELCHOR J. JAVIER AND VICTORIA…

The Court hereby sets aside the challenged resolutions of
respondent Court of Appeals – the first dated September 18, 1979 which granted
private respondents-accused’s motion that the trial
court’s challenged order denying their demurrer to evidence be considered a
“judgment of conviction” against them and that their petition for certiorari
against said order of denial be considered as an “appeal” from such
“judgment” and declared that it would decide the “appeal”
on the merits “as soon as the respective briefs and/or memorandum of the
parties are in” and gave the “appellants” (respondents-accused)
twenty days from the time the basic record
and transcripts were submitted within which to submit their
“memorandum in lieu of appellants’ brief” and the appellee
(the petitioner People who was merely a respondent therein) a period of twenty
days from receipt of “appellants’ brief” within which to file their
“appellee’s brief;” and the second, dated October 8, 1979 which declared the case submitted for decision without the
briefs or memoranda having been filed, which respondent court has stated in its comment was a
“manifestly erroneous” resolution inadvertently issued by the
division clerk of court upon his own res­ponsibility.

Respondents-accused upon the denial by the trial court of their demurrer to evidence and prayer
for dismissal of the criminal case against
them (arising from their conversion to their own use and benefit of an
erroneous bank remittance to them of U. S. $1, 000, 000. 00 instead of U. S. $1, 000. 00) had filed in
respondent court their special civil action of certiorari^[1]
praying for the annulment of said inter­locutory order, on the claim that their
liability was civil rather than criminal. 
When they moved that they waived the right to present evidence in the
trial court and that the trial court’s challenged order be considered a “judgment of conviction” and that their
action be considered as an appeal from the said judgment, “it was an
admission of the futility of
their action which could not prosper since the trial court obviously committed
no grave abuse of discretion in denying their demurrer to evidence.  All that was before respondent appellate
court were the trial court’s interlocutory orders denying dismissal of the
criminal case since it “believe(d) that the prosecution has established a
prima facie case” and setting the continuation of the trial on September
22, 1978 for reception of evidence on behalf of respondents-accused.

All that respondent court could accordingly do in view of
respondents-accused’s motion was to dismiss the
petition and remand the case to the trial court for the rendition of its final
judgment determining the imposable penalty in the exercise of its original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the criminal case. 
Respondent court being exclusively a court of appellate jurisdiction
could not preempt or arrogate unto itself the trial court’s original and
exclusive jurisdiction, much less convert the accused’s
petition of certiorari before it (questioning interlocutory orders of
the trial court) into an appeal over a criminal case wherein the trial court
had not yet rendered judgment nor imposed any penalty on the accused.  In short, there was no judgment of the trial
court over which it could exercise its only jurisdiction – the appellate
jurisdiction of review on appeal.

Assuming arguendo that
respondent court could validly entertain respondents-accused’s
motion to consider themselves convicted solely on the prosecution’s evidence
since they were no longer presenting any evidence on their behalf and to rule
upon their “conviction” by way of an appeal, the most that respondent
court could do – since only a pure question of law is involved, to wit, whether
their admitted acts as shown by the evidence of the prosecution constitute the
crime of estafa or merely give rise to a civil
liability which they admit – was to elevate the case to this Court under its
exclusive jurisdiction to review and determine all such cases in­volving only
errors or questions of law.

The undisputed pertinent background facts of the case are as
follows:  On November 8. 1977,
respondents-accused Melchor J. Javier and Victoria L.
Javier were charged with estafa before the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Seventh Judicial District presided over by then Judge,
now Court of Appeals Associate Justice, Onofre Villaluz, in an information reading as follows:

“That on or about June 3, 1977, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court the above-named accused, Melchor J. Javier, Jr.
and Victoria L. Javier, received from Prudential Bank & Trust Company, Pasay City Branch, the amount of US$999, 993. 70, United
States Currency, by virtue of a Telex from Manufacturers Hanover Bank, New
York, U. S. A. , indicating that the remittance was upon instructions of Mellon
Bank, N. A. which later bank acted pursuant to a request of the First National
Bank of Moundsville, Moundsville, West Virginia, U. S. A. , to effect a
transfer of US$1, 000. 00 to the Prudential Bank & Trust Company for the
account of the accused Victoria L. Javier but a Mellon Bank, N.A. employee sent
by mistake a wire to Manufacturers Hanover Bank, New York, U.S.A., to effect
the transfer of US$1,000,000.00 instead of only US$1,000.00; that once in
possession of the aforesaid amount of US$999,993.70, said accused Melchor J. Javier, Jr. and Victoria L. Javier, conspiring
and confederating with each other, and fraudulently taking advantage of said
mistake, of which they were fully aware, with grave abuse of confidence and/or
unfaithfulness, in serious breach of their legal obligation to return the excess
amount unduly sent and received by them, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently misappropriate, misapply and convert
the amount of US$999,000.00 for their own use and benefit and despite repeated
demands by the complainant, the accused refused and failed to return the same,
to the damage and prejudice of Mellon Bank, N. A. in the aforesaid amount of
US$999,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”

A plea of not guilty, having been interposed by the accused, the
trial proceeded, and after the People had rested its case, the accused, on June 30, 1978, filed a demurrer to
evidence and prayed for the dismissal of the criminal charge against them.  Upon opposition by the People, the trial
court on July 27, 1978 denied the demurrer
to evidence or motion to dismiss, ruling that ”the prosecution has
established a prima facie case and that “demurrer to evidence, under Rule
35, is not applicable to criminal cases.” Reconsideration, which was duly
opposed by the People, was denied per the
trial court’s Order of August
18, 1978, which set the continuation of the trial for reception of
the accused’s evidence on September 22, 1978.

On September 8, 1978,
the accused filed with respondent Court of Appeals their petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction questioning the interlocutory denial of their
demurrer to evidence and motion for dismissal. 
The parties, respectively, thereafter filed their comment, reply,
rejoinder and sur-rejoinder.

The petition was set and called for oral argument in respondent
court on July 10, 1979 and respondents-accused, as petitioners therein, then
made their move personally and through counsel eschewing the presentation of
any evidence in their behalf in the trial of the criminal case and praying that
respondent appellate court treat their petition as if it were an appeal from a
judgment of conviction and rule upon their “appeal.”

After having required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda on the question of whether it could so consider and convert the
petition for certiorari as and into an “appeal,” respondent
court issued its challenged Resolution of September 18, 1979 reciting what transpired at the oral argument
and ruling as follows:

“Herein Petition for Certiorari challenges the order of
the court a quo denying petitioners ‘Demurrer to the Evidence’ as well as its
order denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.  Without giving due course to the Petition, we
required the respondents to comment and in the meantime restrained respondents
from any further proceedings in Criminal Case No. CCC-VIII-2369-P. C.

“The pertinent facts, are as summarized in the People’s
memorandum, as follows:

‘On November 8, 1977,
petitioners were charged before the Circuit Criminal Court of the Seventh
Judicial Dis­trict with the crime of estafa through
misappropriation for refusing to return or account for the amount of US$999,
000. 00 which was erroneously remitted to them by the Manufacturers Hanover
Bank of Pittsburgh.  In due course, petitioners pleaded not guilty
and the prosecution presented its evidence. 
After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioners filed a demurrer
to evidence.  The same was denied by
respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz.’

“The court a quo denied petitioners’ ‘Demurrer to Evidence’ on
its belief that the prosecution has established a prima facie case and because
demurrer to evidence under Rule 35, Rules of Court is not applicable to
criminal cases.

“The herein case was scheduled for oral argument on July 10, 1979, at which hearing,
counsel for the petitioners manifested that they had no intention to present
any further evidence in the criminal case; that on the basis of the evidence
presented by the prosecution before the court a quo, they deserve an
acquittal.  They moved that the
challenged order be considered a judgment against the petitioners and that the
herein Petition for Certiorari be considered as an appeal from the said
judgment.  Confronted with the
manifestation of their counsel, the peti­tioners, by themselves affirmed their
counsel’s representation, thus:

‘MR. JUSTICE RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR.:

Are the petitioners
here?

‘ATTY. BALGOS:

Yes, your Honor.  They are here.

‘MR, JUSTICE RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR.:

Make it of record that
the petitioners are here.

‘MR. JUSTICE RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR.:  (to the petitioners)

Did you understand what your
counsel said insofar as his manifestation is concerned to the effect that you
are not going to present evidence?

PETITIONERS:

Yes, your Honor.

‘MR. JUSTICE RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR.:

Q – Do you also share your counsel’s
position that you consider the denial of your demurrer to the evidence as a
verdict against you by the court a quo?

A 
– Yes, your Honor.

Q – Do you also realize that if this
petition is treated as though it is an appeal, and, a verdict is found by this
court against you, you could no longer go back to the court of origin for a new
trial?

A 
– Yes, your Honor.

Q – And that y our only area of relief
is with the Supreme Court?

A 
– Yes, your Honor.’

“On the basis of the foregoing, we find it pointless for Us to
remand the record of the here­in case to the court of origin for the lower
court to do no more than impose the proper penalty.  A review of the challenged order admits no
other rationale.  For clarity, however,
we are incorporating pertinent portions of the findings upon which His Honor based
his denial of petitioners’ demurrer to the evidence.”

(Note:  The trial court’s
interlocutory order of denial of the demurrer to evidence and motion to dismiss
is reproduced, but for brevity’s sake is herein excerpted.) The trial court
after ruling that “the prosecution has established a prima facie
case” made a general dissertation as to the world-wide interest that the
case aroused and that

“x x x The
Philippines can unques­tionably take pride in the fact that justice as it is
known, practised and accepted by highly civilized
society can be attained here.  This is so
because Philippine laws are based on the quintessence of civilization’s well
established, undebatable, and impregnable norm of
conduct, perception, sense of values, and proper upbringing which, in turn, are
in recognition of the supremacy of God’s own laws.

“In bringing this case to the proper perspective, it is
important to cite Chapter 22 of the Book of Deuteronomy in the Old Testa­ment
portion of the Bible:

‘If you see someone’s ox or sheep wandering away, don’t pretend you
didn’t see it; take it back to its owner. 
If you don’t know who the owner is, take it to your farm and keep it
there until the owner comes looking for it, and then give it to him.  The same applies to donkeys, clothings, or anything else you find.  Keep it for its owner.’

“In analogy, the one million dollars which the Javier couple
received by mistake, an amount which was nine-hundred-ninety-nine thousand
dollars in excess of what was due them, as an inanimate object but, under the
circumstances upon which the said amount found its way to them, it was akin to
the movement of the ox or sheep (made as example in the Bible) that
wandered.  It went to the Javier couple,
and the couple, instead of obeying the Bible’s mandate to ‘take it back to its
owner, ‘ kept the excess amount to themselves. 
They insisted in keeping it despite demands from the Mellon Bank to give
it back.”

It added that “A predominantly
Christian country, the Philippines produced Christian legislators who lost no
time in enacting laws based on the Laws of God” and that “(I)t is not
only the Christian religion that mandates the return to its owner of anything
found or given by mistake.  Other great
religions – Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Shintoism –
espouse the virtue of honesty, too.  No
wonder that the bodies of man-made laws all over the world reflect the same
God-given mandate.  As Christians are
fully aware of, ‘The Lord hates cheating and delights in honesty. ‘ (Proverbs
II),” and concluded as follows:

“Considering the wide publicity generated by the Mellon Bank
case, the world is indeed keenly waiting for the outcome.  It has been very eager to find out if a
foreign bank can attain justice in a court of law in the Philippines.  Filipinos, of course, know the answer.  They knew fully well that any person or any
citizen of the world can attain it here.

“Implicit in the Philippine’s bid for bene­ficial foreign
investment and joint economic venture with Filipinos in a manner that would
give the host people a just and reasonable share of profits in the development
of their own country is the inherent capacity of its courts of law to
administer justice.  Beneficial foreign
investment and joint economic venture would just be relegated to dreams if the
host people are regarded as dishonest, cheaters, and deceivers and the
country’s courts of law incapable of meting out elementary justice.  Indeed, the Philippines will just be scaring
away foreign investors ? all those who sincerely want to help in the
development of this country – if Filipinos who steal, cheat and deceive were
not held in check and were not meted out punishments by their own courts of
law.  The tourism program would collapse,
too, for what foreign visitors would visit with a people who they think, does
not value the virtue of honesty?

“In the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration it was pointed
out that:

‘1.  It was error to declare that a demurrer to
the evidence is not applicable to criminal cases.

‘2.  It was error to deny the demurrer to the
evidence on the basis of conjectures and speculations not based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution.

‘3.  The order amounts to a pre-judgment of the
case which practically declares the accused guilty as charged.’

The motion for reconsideration was,
however, denied for lack of merit.

“In the light of the foregoing and considering the right of
the accused to a speedy trial, the appellants’ motion is granted, hereby
treating the herein Petition as an appeal, and hereby proceeding to decide herein
case on the merits as soon as the respective briefs and/or memorandum of the
parties are in.

“A review of the records show that on July 3, 1979, we required the court a quo to
forward within ten (10) days from notice, the records and the stenographic
notes of Criminal Case No, CC-VII-2369-P.C. for our consideration at the
hearing scheduled for July 10, 1979.  Since record does not show any compliance,
the order is reiterated.  Accordingly,
the appellants are ordered to file their memorandum in lieu of Appellant’s
Brief within a period of twenty (20) days from the time basic record and
transcripts are submitted and the appellees, their Appellees‘ Brief within a period of twenty (20) days from
receipt of Appellants’ Brief.”

As indicated above, respondent court, through the division clerk
of court, thereafter issued its admittedly “manifestly erroneous”
Resolution of October 8, 1979 declaring the case submitted for decision without
any briefs or memoranda having been filed (under the mistaken notion of the
division clerk of court that such briefs or memoranda on the merits, pursuant
to respondent court’s questioned resolution considering the action before it as
one of appeal, had already been filed), leading to the filing of the present
action.

The petitioner People in its petition for certiorari, pro­hibition
and mandamus prays that the Court annul the two resolutions in question,
prohibit respondent court from deciding the criminal case as if it were already
an appeal and command said court to remand the case to the trial court for
promulgation of judgment.  As further
prayed for, the Court issued on October
15, 1979 its temporary restraining order enjoining respondent court
from enforcing its challenged resolutions of September 18, 1979 and October 8, 1979, and from further proceeding with the
case before it.

The Court finds the petition to be well taken, by virtue of the
following considerations in amplification of those outlined hereinabove.

1. The only question submitted to the respondent court in the certiorari
petition filed by respondents-accused was whether or not the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion in denying their demurrer to evidence and motion
to dismiss – which was filed therein in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.^[2]
Such a petition was doomed to failure in view of the long settled rule that certiorari
does not lie to challenge the trial court’s interlocutory order finding in the
exercise of its sound judgment and discretion that the prosecution’s evidence
has established a prima facie case and denying the accused’s
motion to dismiss, since as reaffirmed in Joseph vs. Villaluz,^[3]
(which controlling case was expressly noted
by respondent court in the course of the hearing of July 10, 1979) that
the appellate courts cannot and will not review in such special civil actions
the prosecution’s evidence and decide here and now in advance that it has or
has not established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused and hence
“this Court will not annul an interlocutory order denying a motion to
dismiss a criminal case.  Appeal is the
proper remedy of the [accused] in order to have the findings of fact of the
respondent judge reviewed by a superior court.” Such special civil actions
questioning the trial court’s interlocutory order denying the accused’s motion to dismiss the criminal case by way of
demurrer to evidence, should be given short shrift, since the orderly procedure
prescribed by the Rules of Court is for the accused to present their evidence
after which the trial court, on its evaluation of the evidence submitted by
both the prosecution and the defense, may then properly render its judgment of
conviction or acquittal.

2. Respondents-accused’s move at the
hearing of July 10, 1979 waiving their right to present evidence and praying
that respondent court unprecedentedly consider the
trial court’s interlocutory denial of the motion to dismiss as a “judgment
of conviction” and convert their certiorari action to one of appeal
from such “judgment” could not confer any jurisdiction or authority
upon respondent court to do so.  The
moment the accused waived their right to present evidence and accepted the
interlocutory order of denial as a verdict of conviction, thereby conceding the
futility of their petition, its appellate jurisdiction ceased.  The petition was filed with it in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction and all it could do was to dismiss the petition
accordingly for the trial court to render judgment imposing the corresponding
penalty.  At the hearing of July 10,
1979, Justice Paras had in his interpellation of the accused’s counsel correctly brought this out, as per the
transcript of the hearing submitted by respondent court with its comment, as
follows:

“MR. JUSTICE EDGARDO L. PARAS:

Now, in such a case has
there been any penalty imposed by the court a quo?  Now, if there is no penalty it will be very
difficult for this court to affirm or to deny it since there is no penalty
imposed as yet.

“ATTY. BALGOS:

I submit to the
pronouncement of the Honorable Justice. x x x Inasmuch as Judge Villaluz has
already said that under the bible and to help the tourism program of the government
and to aid the economic program of the government these people must be
convicted.  Why do we have to go back to
Judge Villaluz and then just come up here again?  We might as well resolve the case already
here before this Honorable Court. x x x

“MR. JUSTICE EDGARDO L. PARAS:

Mr. counsel, I think the
court is aware of this fact that although generally an appeal here should be
the remedy.  I mean that this case cannot
as yet be appealed.  It is merely
interlocutory.  According to you are
manifesting before us that your clients will not present evidence anymore.  You said it will be a waste of time if we
remand this to the lower court.  But the court
below has not yet imposed any penalty. 
Even assuming that it is convinced that your clients are guilty, it has
not yet imposed any particular penalty. 
Do you think Mr. counsel that this court, Court of Appeals, can impose a
penalty even if no such penalty has been given by the court a quo?

“ATTY. BALGOS:

Yes, your Honor, I
cannot find specific jurisprudence on this point x x x Our penal code provides for penalties in a situation like
that.  So, I sincerely believe that this
court as it is so inclined can find the accused guilty and impose upon them the
requisite penalty provided for by law. 
We feel that this petition for certiorari can be considered a
petition for review and you would then resolve the questions on the merits
already.”^[4]

3. The accused’s contention has been
that their liability is civil and not criminal, as per their extensive comment
at bar wherein they aver that “(J)udge Villaluz has obviously confused criminal responsibility
with civil liability to the extent that where civil liability is contested in
court, there must also be criminal responsibility.  This is certainly wrong and confused.  The Javiers have
never denied receipt of the money, they have never denied their civil
obligation to account for and return what was not rightfully theirs, what they
have contested was the attitude of the Mellon Bank representative s and their
unreasonable demand for the immediate reimbursement to the last cent — which
is precisely the subject of a pending civil case.”^[5]
While the trial court did make a general dissertation on Philippine laws being
based on the Bible and the Laws of God without specifically mentioning the
particular Article on Estafa of the Revised Penal
Code under which the accused were charged, all such disserta­tions were but obiter
dicta, and the determinative ruling was his finding of the prosecution
having established a prima facie case with the documentary and testimonial
evidence.  The pleadings of the People,
both in the trial and respondent courts in opposition to the accused’s demurrer and motion to dismiss (as well as in the
case at bar) had specified Article 315, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a) of the
Revised Penal Code under which the accused were charged for misappropriation
and conversion to their own use and benefit of the US$999,000.00 erroneously
remitted to them but involving the duty and obligation on their part to return
the same as well as complete undisputed details of the accused’s
massive withdrawals and disbursements of US$975,000.00 in eleven days from
their receipt of the US$1,000,000.00 bank remittance, complete with citations
of authorities and jurisprudence.^[6]
The lack of express factual findings in the interlocutory order goes but to
show the need of returning the case to the trial court for the rendition of
judgment and imposition of penalty in the exercise of its original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the criminal case.

4. Manifestly, respondent court was bereft of jurisdiction to
grant accused’s counsel’s motion, supra, to
by-pass the trial court and itself “find the accused guilty and impose
upon them the requisite penalty provided by law” (with their proposal to
consider the trial court’s denial order as a “judgment of
conviction”) and then review its own verdict and imposition of penalty
(with the conversion of the certiorari petition into one of review on
appeal).

The exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear the case for estafa involving the sum of US$999,000.00 and pass judgment
upon the evidence and render its findings of fact and in the first instance
adjudicate the guilt or non-guilt of the accused lies with the trial court i. e. the Court of First Instance^[7]
concurrently with the Circuit
Criminal Court, as in this case.^[8]

On the other hand, the certiorari petition before it was filed
only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction on the narrow issue of whether the trial court committed a grave abuse
of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the criminal case.  Such a petition merited outright dismissal,
more so with the accused’s motion to consider the
denial order as a verdict of conviction, as above shown.

There was no judgment of the trial court over which respondent
court could exercise its appellate jurisdiction.  The mandate of Article X, section 9 of the
Constitution requires that “Every decision of a court of record shall
state the facts and the law on which it is based.” Rule 120, section 2 of the
Rules of Court requires further that “The judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the defendant and upon which the judgment is based.  If it is of conviction the judgment or
sentence shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by
the acts committed by the defend­ant, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there is any; (b) the
participation of the defendant in the commission of the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon
the defendant; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate action has been reserved.” It is obvious that the denial order was not such a
judgment.

Assuming further that the denial order could be deemed such a
“judgment of conviction”, since the facts are undisputed and based
solely on the prosecution’s evidence (with the accused having waived their
right to present evidence), respondent court could not exercise appellate
jurisdiction over the “appeal”, since the case would involve purely
questions of law, i. e. whether the admitted facts
constitute or not the crime of estafa – which falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review on certiorari
under Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 5440.

5. There is no question that as per the record of the hearing of
July 10, 1979, respondents-accused affirmed personally and through counsel that
they categorically waived their right to present their evidence in the trial of
the criminal case.  Thus, Justice de la Fuente expressly asked: “You have to be
consistent.  If the case is denied and
returned to the court of origin, you want to present witnesses” of their
counsel, Atty. Balgos, who replied “No
more,”^[9]
and “so that our position is this – inasmuch as Mr. Justice de la Fuente asked whether if the petition were denied and the
case were returned to the court of origin whether we will still present
evidence.  We are not presenting
already.”^[10]
Their counsel further replied to Justice Gaviola:
“Precisely I asked my client to come here today and for the record make
manifest that they are not presenting any further evidence.”^[11]
Respondents-accused affirmed their counsel’s manifestations to respondent court
as reproduced in respondent court’s September 18, 1979 Resolution quoted
hereinabove, wherein they expressly undertook that if a verdict were found
against them, “they could no longer go back to the court of origin for a
new trial” and that their “only area of relief is with the Supreme
Court.” Such express waiver is binding upon them and the trial court
“has no alternative but to decide the case upon the evidence presented by
the prosecution alone.”^[12]

The Court makes this clear in the exercise of its supervisory
power so that there may be no further undue delay in this case, and the orderly
procedure prescribed by the law on jurisdiction and judgments and by the Rules
of Court be duly observed by all subordinate courts.  Since the accused accepted as a judgment of
conviction the trial court’s denial of
their demurrer to evidence and waived their right to present evidence, their
petition for certiorari is ordered dismissed and the case remanded to
the trial court for rendition of judgment and imposition of the corresponding
penalty, as should have been done from the beginning.  And any appeal
that accused may take therefrom would have to be to this
Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Republic Act No. 5440
in relation to section 17 of the Judiciary Act as amended thereby, since it
would involve the pure question of law of whether their acts make them
criminally liable for estafa or swindling, besides
their accepted civil liability for the excess bank remittance of US$999,000.00.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the questioned
resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals of September 18, 1979 and October 8,
1979, are hereby annulled and set aside, and the restraining order enjoining
said respondent court from further proceedings in Case CA-G. R. No. SP-08339 is
hereby made permanent.  As further prayed
for, Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-2369-P. C. against respondents-accused is ordered
remanded to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Seventh Judicial District for
prompt promulgation of judgment in accordance herewith.  This decision is immediately executory upon its promulgation.  SO ORDERED.

Plana, Vasquez, Relova,
and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., in the result.

^[1]
Docketed as CA-G. R. No. 08339, entitled “Melchor
J. Javier, Jr. and Victoria L. Javier vs. People of the Phil. and Hon. Onofre H. Villaluz, etc.”

^[2]
Under Rule 65, section 4 of the Rules of Court.

^[3]
89 SCRA 324 (April 10, 1979), citing Manalo vs.
Mariano, 69 SCRA 80 (1976).  See also to
same effect:  U.
S. vs. Romero, 22 Phil 565 (1912); U.
S. vs. de la Cruz, 28 Phil 279
(1914); and U. S.
vs. Choa Chiok, 36
Phil 831 (1917).

^[4]
Transcript of hearing of July 10, 1979,
Annex B of respondent court’s Comment; Re­cord, pp. 313-314.

^[5]
Record, p. 254.

^[6]
Record, pp. 12, et seq., 92, p. 353-365, Record, cit. U. S. vs. Yap, 34
Phil 102.

^[7]
Section 17, Judiciary Act in conjunction with Article 315, Revised Penal Code.  The cited statutes read: “Section
44.  Original jurisdiction. ?
Courts of First Instance shall have original juris­diction:

‘x x x
(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment
for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos; xxx'”

“Art. 315.  Swindling (estafa).
– Any person who shall defraud another by way of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall by punished by:

First.  The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12, 000 pesos but does not exceed 22, 000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10, 000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years.  In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

^[8]
Rep. Act 5179, section 1.

^[9]
Transcript of hearing, p. 4, Rec. p. 307.

^[10]
Idem, p. 5, Rec., p. 308.

^[11]
Idem, pp. 8-9, Rec., pp. 311-312.

^[12]
Abriol v. Homeres,
84 Phil 525 (1949).