CESAR ACDA, PETITIONER, VS. THE MINISTER OF LABOR AND PAN ORIENTAL MATCH CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.

Subject of this petition for certiorari is the Order^[1]
of respondent Minister of Labor dated 11 May 1979 upholding petitioner’s
dismissal and setting aside the Resolution^[2]
of the National Labor Relations Commission, affirming the Decision^[3]
of the Labor Arbiter, which ordered respondent company to reinstate petitioner
to his former position as Sales Supervisor with full back wages from the date
of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement without loss of seniority rights.

Record reveals that on 26
September 1976, petitioner officially received his appointment bearing
the same date as Sales Supervisor Trainee, but due to the urgent need to fill
up the position, he was made to work starting 1 September 1976, before the effectivity
date of the appointment.  The term of the
contract is that the employment shall be temporary in nature for a period of
one (1) month, and if the respondent company should find his performance
satisfactory during the said period, he would be extended a probationary
appointment.

Effective the close of working day of 31 January 1977 or within his probationary
employment, petitioner was dismissed by the respondent company on the alleged
grounds of “loss of confidence and for want in capabilities as Regional
Sales Supervisor”.  As a
consequence, petitioner filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor on 28
February 1977 against the respondent company contesting his termination as
illegal allegedly because respondent company denied him due process as he was
not informed beforehand of his shortcomings; that matters should have been
explained to him in order that he could rectify or defend the mistakes he
committed; that the excuse of loss of confidence has no basis in the absence of
any standard of performance upon which he was rated on the job; and that his
dismissal was a plot to circumvent the law on security of tenure.  For its part, respondent company argued that
as a managerial em­ployee, petitioner’s appointment was anchored on the trust
and confidence reposed in him by the Company and that when this ceased to
exist, he may be terminated, more so, within the probationary period of his
employment.

On 23 August 1977, the Labor Arbiter assigned on the case
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring the charges levelled against him, aside from being flimsy in character,
to be without factual and legal bases as he had explained point by point his
reasons or answer against the charges, the dismissal being triggered by
“the outburst of Mr. Perez’ petty jealousy,” as may be gleaned from
the following circumstances:

“When (petitioner) was granted a car, Mr. Perez restricted him
of its use by issuing a memorandum that it will not be used outside the greater
Manila area and that it will not be brought home in the night.  The memo was set aside by the company president
in view of the activities of (petitioner) in connection with his work.

“The company president also bypassed Mr. Perez in favor of
(petitioner) when the latter prepared a project analysis in connection with the
company’s 5-year sales projection after which (petitioner) was directed by the
company president to make proper representations with bank officials, which
normally is the task of Mr. Robert Perez, being the Vice-President for
Marketing.”^[4]

The Labor Arbiter also took into
consideration the letter dated 3
January 1977 of respondent company’s president extending his
congratulations to petitioner for “excellent job performance.”

On appeal at the instance of respondent company, the Na­tional
Labor Relations Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in its
resolution dated 19 January 1978,
the material portion of which reads:

“The appeal was filed in only seven copies instead of ten as
required by the Rules of this Commission. 
No appeal fee appears to have been paid, which means that the appeal has
not been perfected in accordance with the said Rules.

“These facts notwithstanding, we read the record of this case
and found no error committed by the Labor Arbiter below.  Not only has the (petitioner) convincingly
refuted the charges which are being invoked as grounds for his dismissal; he
has also shown by facts and figures, that he performed well in his job, which
caused the president of the respondent company, shortly before he was
dismissed, to congratulate him ‘for a job well done,’ and to expect
‘spectacular’ performance in his area of operation in 1977.”^[5]

Not satisfied, respondent company appealed to the Minister of
Labor.  In an Order dated 11 May 1979,
the Deputy Minister, by authority of the Minister of Labor, reversed the
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission and dismissed the
complaint for illegal dismissal holding, in substance, that by the probationary
nature of petitioner’s appointment, it is well within the prerogative of
respondent company to terminate the services of petitioner, if in the former’s evaluation, the latter did not meet the
requirements to said position.

After his motion for reconsideration was denied in the Order^[6]
of 27 July 1979, petitioner came to Us, questioning the jurisdiction of
respondent Minister of Labor to entertain respondent company’s appeal and
prayed for the setting aside of the Order of 11 May 1979, for being null and
void, and for the revival of the NLRC resolution sustaining his claim for
illegal dismissal and back wages.

We find this petition to be impressed with merit.

Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an appeal within
the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned
decision final and executory that deprives the
appellate court or body of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less
to entertain the appeal.^[7]
As may easily be gleaned from the NLRC resolution, the appeal of respondent
company to said body did not comply with the requirements prescribed in
perfecting an appeal.^[8]
Being so, the appeal has not been duly perfected thereby rendering the decision
of the Labor Arbiter final and executory after the
lapse of the reglementary period provided by the
Labor Code.  The jurisdiction of the
respondent Minister entertaining the appeal may thus be questioned and rightly
so, even in the instant petition.

While it may be true, as pointed out by the Solicitor General^[9]
that technical rules are not binding in labor cases, Article 221 of the Labor
Code, as amended, is quite explicit in restricting its application in the
following tenor:

“In any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor
Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not
be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the
Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively
and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest
of due process.  x x
x.“

Verily, non-payment of the appeal fee cannot be excused by
invoking the aforequoted provision whose scope is
limited to the application of the rules of evidence and the use of all
reasonable means, in the ascertainment of facts.  The requirement of an appeal fee is by no
means a mere technicality of law or procedure. 
It is an essential requirement in the perfection of an appeal without
which the decision appealed from would become final and executory,
as if no appeal was filed at all.  And
this must be so considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right nor
a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of the
law;^[10]
therefore, respondent company must conform to the rules of appeal as provided
for in labor cases, consistent with an imperious need for the prompt
disposition of labor cases in line with the policy of affording speedy labor
justice.

We likewise find to be well-taken petitioner’s claim that the
“just cause” contemplated under the Labor Code did not exist insofar as his dismissal is concerned.  The findings of the Labor Arbiter on this point, as upheld by the
National Labor Relations Commission, are quite clear, and We find no reversible
error therein the same being substantiated by evidence of record, aside from
the fact that said findings had already attained the character of finality by
the non-perfection of a proper appeal.

What makes said findings more forceful is the commend­ation
issued by respondent company’s president to petitioner, shortly before his
dismissal, congratulating the latter “for a job well done.” While the
respondent company argued that petitioner could not invoke said commendation in
his favor as the president was misled into issuing the same, such is a mere
claim unsupported by sufficient proof. 
With the charges against petitioner found to be unsubstantiated, We are
left with no other alternative but to hold that the so-called “loss of
confidence” is without basis and may not be successfully invoked as ground
for dismissal which requires some basis therefor,^[11]
such ground never having been intended to afford an occasion for abuse by the
employer of its prerogative, as it can easily be subject to abuse because of
its subjective nature, to dismiss employees in contravention with the
“protection of labor” clause of the Constitution.^[12]
It is this Constitutional guaranty that accords even to employees employed on a
probationary basis the protection that their services “may be terminated
only for a just cause or when authorized by existing laws, or when he fails to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards
prescribed by the employer.”^[13]

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Order of respondent Minister of
Labor dated 11 May 1979 is hereby set aside and declared null and void and the
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 19 January 1978
upholding the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 23 August 1977 is hereby
reinstated, but the award of backwages is herein
limited to three (3) years without qualification and deduction in accordance
with existing jurisprudence, with costs against the respondent company.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, and Escolin,
JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., dissents, the decision does not show when the petitioner raised the
issue as to the nonpayment of the appeal fee. 
The fact that the NLRC entertained the appeal, notwithstanding the
alleged nonpayment of the appeal fee, shows that that requirement is not
important.  The Minister of Labor
correctly held that since the appointment of the petitioner was probationary
the company could terminate his services. 
On the other hand, it is not just and equitable that the petitioner
should be awarded backwages from 1977 when he had
done nothing and when the company has no confidence in him.

^[1]
pp. 10-13, Rollo.

^[2]
pp. 14-15, Ibid.

^[3]
pp. 110-117, Ibid.

^[4]
p. 6, Labor Arbiter’s Decision, p. 116, Rollo.

^[5]
NLRC resolution, pp. 14-15, Rollo.

^[6]
Annex “7” to Respondent Company’s Comment, p. 145, Rollo.

^[7]
Vega v. WCC, 26 March 1979,
89 SCRA 140; Soliven v. WCC, 30 June 1977, 77 SCRA 518; Ramos v.
Republic, 27 February 1976,
69 SCRA 576.

^[8]
See Section 1(s), Rule I, Book V, Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code, which defines “perfection of an appeal” as to include
“the payment of the appeal fee.”

^[9]
p. 10, Memorandum for the Respondent, p. 181, Rollo.

^[10]
Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 439; Bello v. Fernando, 4 SCRA
135.

^[11]
Galsim v. Philippine National Bank, 29 SCRA 293;
Philippine Education Co., Inc. v. Union of Philippine
Education Employees (NLU), 107 Phil. 1003.

^[12]
Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution.

^[13]
Sec. 6(c), Rule 1, Book VI, Implementing Rules; Art. 282, Labor Code of the Philippines.