PAQUITO BALASABAS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GREGORIO U. AQUILIZAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, COTABATO CITY, RESPONDENT.

These two (2) cases, G. R. No. 51414 and Administrative Case No.
2077, involving the indirect contempt citation and the indefinite suspension
from the practice of law, respectively, of lawyer Paquito
G. Balasabas are taken up together as per Resolution
of this Court dated October 5, 1979.^[1]

In G. R. No. 51414, petitioner Paquito
G. Balasabas, in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeks to declare as null and void the
order^[2]
which cited him for indirect contempt and suspended him indefinitely from the
practice of law issued in open court on August 27, 1979 by respondent Judge
Hon. Gregorio U. Aquilizan, then judge of the Court
of Agrarian Relations, 16th Regional District, Branch I, Davao
City, in CAR Case No. 1912, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Honorable Court cites
Atty. Paquito G. Balasabas
for Indirect Contempt of Court under Section 3(b) Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
in consonance with Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and therefore
is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law unless he explains
satisfactorily and meritoriously his
failure to comply with the Resolution of the Honorable Court dated June 19,
1979.

“Copies of this Order shall be properly furnished all courts
of justice in Davao Pro­vinces including that of Davao City
as well as the Supreme Court of the Philippines
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
National Office, Quezon City.”

“SO ORDERED.”

A temporary restraining order^[3]
dated September 17, 1979 was issued by this Court after the petition was filed
on September 12, 1979 restraining respondent judge from enforcing his order
dated August 27, 1979 and from
acting on his indirect contempt
citation against petitioner in CAR
Case No. 1912 Davao-1974, entitled
“Edgardo Medrocillo, plaintiff
vs. Jose Bandigan, et al., defendants; and CAR Case No. 3271 Davao-1979, entitled
“Jose Bandigan, et al., plaintiffs vs. Edgardo Medrocillo,
defendant”, of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Branch I, Davao City or in proceedings
related thereto.

Administrative Case No. 2077 is the proceedings before this Court
following its receipt of the copy of the Order of respondent Judge suspending
Atty. Paquito G. Balasabas,
as quoted above, which was transmitted by said respondent to this Court,
pursuant to Section 29 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

It appears that petitioner was the counsel of record for the
plaintiff in an agrarian case entitled “Edgardo Medrocillo vs. Jose Bandigan, et
al,” for unlawful ejectment with preliminary
injunction, damages and attorney’s fees, filed on March 4, 1974, docketed as CAR Case No. 1912 in the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch I, Davao City. 
After trial, the then CAR Judge (now CFI Judge) Filomeno
Gapultos rendered a decision on December 27, 1974 in
favor of the plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

“(1)  Finding
plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo
an agricultural share tenant in the landholding in question located at San
Ignacio, Manay, Davao Oriental,
consisting of 11 and 1/2
hectares, more or less, since 1964, and was illegally ejected from the said
landholding in February, 1974, by defendant;

“(2)  Declaring void and illegal that portion of the Order of the Cadastral Court of Mati, Davao Oriental, issued on
August 15, 1973, insofar as it involved
the dispossession of plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo from his tenanted landholding implemented by
defendant Juan Labasano, Clerk of Court, Court of
First Instance of Mati, Davao Oriental,
in his capacity as Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff;

“(3)  Ordering
defendants Jose Bandigan and his wife Davina Bandigan to reinstate
immediately plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo
to the landholding in question and thereby allowing him to cultivate same,
gather the coconuts therefrom and process same to
copra, the proceeds thereof to be divided 70% – 30% in favor of plaintiff;

“(4)  Ordering defendants Jose Bandigan
and his wife Davina Bandigan
to submit to the court, fifteen (15) days after receipt of this decision, the
complete accounting of the proceeds of copra they produced from February, 1974
to the present to be able to determine the 70% share of plaintiff which he
failed to receive;

“(5)  Ordering defendants Jose Bandigan
and his wife Davina Bandigan
to pay to plaintiff the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as attorney’s
fees and another sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as reimbursement of
plaintiff’s necessary expenses in protecting his rights in this case;

“(6)  Ordering defendant Jose Bandigan
and his wife Davina Bandigan
to pay to plaintiff the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as moral
damages.”

The said decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations was elevated
on appeal by Jose Bandigan, et al to the Court of
Appeals which rendered a decision on July
28, 1976 affirming in toto the CAR decision.

On July 5, 1978,
plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo,
thru counsel Paquito G. Balasabas,
filed a motion for execution in the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch I, Davao City
which was duly opposed by defendants Jose Bandigan,
et al.  After hearing the motion and the
opposition thereto, respon­dent Judge Gregorio U. Aquilizan,
Presiding Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Cotabato
City, who had succeeded Judge Filomeno Gapultos, issued a resolution on November 24, 1978 giving
due course to the motion for execution but ordered plaintiff Medrocillo to render an accounting of the copra sold during
the period specified therein.

Plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo,
however, failed to comply with the November 24, 1978 resolution issued by Judge
Aquilizan and, so, upon motion of Jose Bandigan, respondent judge, after hearing, issued an order
dated May 14, 1979 requiring plaintiff Medrocillo to
appear in court on May 21, 1979 to explain why he should not be cited for
contempt of court for failure to render an accounting of the copra sold.  On the day set, plaintiff Medrocillo
and his counsel, Paquito G. Balasabas,
failed to appear, prompting respondent judge to issue another order dated May 21,
1979 for the arrest of plaintiff Medrocillo.

A motion for reconsideration of the order of May 21, 1979 was
filed by plaintiff Medrocillo on June 2, 1979, but
through another counsel, Atty. Leo S. Carillo,
stating, among others, that the only order plaintiff had received from the Honorable Court was the order of May
21, 1979, and plaintiff has not received any notice of hearing, pleadings and
all other motions and orders pertinent to CAR Case No. 1912 and pointed out
that his former counsel who had met a vehicular accident on February 3, 1979 in
Tayasan, Negros Oriental
was still recovering and had not yet reported to his office.  Plaintiff likewise, assailed the resolution
of November 24, 1978, alleging that it is contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on July 28, 1978, hence, null and void.  Acting on the motion for reconsideration of
the order dated May 21, 1979, respondent judge issued a resolution5 on June 19, 1979, declaring thus:

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Honorable Court rules:

“1.  That the Resolution of November 24, 1978 stands valid and legal and
should be complied with by the plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo to the letter;

“2.  That with respect to the motion to cite plaintiff
Edgardo Medrocillo for
contempt of court, the case should be heard on August 1, 1979;

“3.  That Attorney Paquito
G. Balasabas should be made to explain in writing why
he should not be punished for indirect contempt of court under Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court by
abandoning the cause of his client without prior notice and compliance of
Section 26 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.”

“SO ORDERED.”

Meanwhile, on June 18,
1979, Jose Bandigan, et al filed an
action for ejectment against Edgardo
Medrocillo docketed as CAR Case No. 3271 in the Court
of Agrarian Relations, Branch I, Davao
City.  On June
22, 1979, respondent judge issued an order consolidating CAR Case
No. 1912 and CAR Case No. 3271, stating as reasons therefor,
that CAR Case No. 3271, is a continuation of CAR Case No. 1912 and the fact that Edgardo Medrocillo refused to
abide by the resolution of the Court of
Agrarian Relations dated November 24, 1978.6 The initial hearing of the two consolidated cases was set on August
27, 1979.

On the other hand, on August 25, 1979, Edgardo
Medrocillo, now a defendant in CAR Case No. 3271,
thru counsel Paquito G. Balasabas,
filed a motion to disqualify respondent Judge Gregorio U. Aquilizan
from hearing CAR Case No. 3271 Davao-1979 and CAR Case No. 1912 Davao-1974
alleging that CAR Case No. 1912 has long been terminated, therefore, there is
nothing to be heard; that the latest incident of CAR Case No. 1912 was the
motion for reconsideration of the order of May 21, 1979 which was denied and as
a matter of fact the order has been implemented by the court already; that CAR
Case No. 3271 is a new case which Judge
Aquilizan “had not started to hear” since
he has been assigned to Cotabato City; that since a
new judge, Hon. Judge Emilio Jacinto, has been assigned in the Court of
Agrarian Relations, Branch I, Davao City, the new case should be heard by Judge Jacinto pursuant to P. D. 946 Section
11;7 that Edgardo Medrocillo has likewise filed an administrative case
against the Presiding Judge Aquilizan before the
Supreme Court and the Office of the President and was properly informed of the
charges on July 6, 1979.  Counsel Paquito G. Balasabas requested
that the said motion be submitted for resolution and approval on August
27, 1979 at 8:30 a.m. without
further argument.

On the scheduled hearing
of CAR Case No. 1912 and CAR Case No. 3271 on August 27, 1979, petitioner entered his appearance for
Edgardo Metrocillo and
argued his motion for the disqualification of respondent Judge Aquilizan.  After
hearing, respondent judge issued on that same day an order, in open court,
citing petitioner Paquito G. Balasabas
for indirect contempt of court and indefinitely suspended him from the practice
of law unless he explains
satisfactorily and meritoriously his failure to comply with the resolution of June 19,
1979.

Hence, the instant petition
raising constitutional and statutory objections against the questioned order of
August 27, 1979, alleging, among others, that respondent judge acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned order.  After the parties have
submitted their respective pleadings, the petition was given due course and was
deemed submitted for decision by a resolution8 of this Court dated May 14, 1980.

In this certiorari and prohibition proceedings under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, there is, on the part of the petitioner, an emphatic
assertion of violation of petitioner’s constitutional and statutory rights when
respondent Judge issued the questioned order of August 27, 1979 which cited him
for indirect contempt of court and suspended him indefinitely from the practice
of law in total disregard of the fundamental safeguards of procedural due
process such as
notice to petitioner that he was to be tried that day for indirect
contempt, a reasonable time and opportunity to submit his written explanation,
opportunity to present witnesses in his own behalf, opportunity to be heard of
the charge for indirect contempt because what was heard on August 27, 1979 was
petitioner’s motion for disqualification, violating therefore Rule 71, Section
3 of the Rules of Court which provides:

“Section 3.  Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing.  After charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt:

“a)  x x x.“

On the indefinite suspension imposed upon him from the practice of
law, petitioner maintained that respondent Judge took this action without
regard to Rule 71, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

“Section 6.  Punishment
if found guilty.  – If the accused is thereupon
adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a superior court or judge, he may
be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos or imprisoned not more than six 6 months, or both; if adjudged guilty of contempt committed
against an inferior court or judge, he may be fined not exceeding one hundred
pesos or imprisoned not more than one (1) month, or both, and if the contempt
consists
in the violation of an
injunction, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation.”
(Underscoring ours).

It is clear from the foregoing provision
that the imposable penalty, if the accused is, after hearing, adjudged guilty of
contempt committed against a superior court or judge, is fine not exceeding one
thousand pesos or imprisonment of not more than six (6) months, or both.

Petitioner also stressed that Rule 138, Section 30 of a the Rules
of Court mandatorily requires that “No attorney
shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has
full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or
counsel.” No clearer demand for the observance of procedural process can
be imagined before a lawyer is removed or suspended from the practice of law.

For his part, respondent Judge Gregorio U. Aquilizan,
in his comment, pointed out that when petitioner was asked during the joint
hearing of CAR Case No. 1912 and CAR Case No. 3271 on August 27, 1979 as to his
reasons for failing to comply with the order of June 19, 1979, petitioner
responded that he did not receive the said order which, according to
respondent, was received on July 11, 1979. 
Respondent also contended that petitioner promised to submit the necessary
papers substantiating his claim that he never received the resolution of November 24, 1978 and that of June 19, 1979 within the period of
one (1) month but instead
decided to argue his case with the Honorable Tribunal.

Respondent judge, noticeably, did not reason out his order of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law in his comment, not until after
he filed his opposition to the reply of petitioner wherein he alleged that it
was based on grounds of “wilful disobedience of any lawful order of superior court” as provided for under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court inasmuch as petitioner continued to ignore the Honorable Court’s
resolution, orders, and notices of hearing claiming not to have received said
notices when the records clearly show that he received all of them.9 In
addition, respondent cited Section 14, P. D. No. 946 in relation to Section 28,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court in arguing that the Court of Agrarian Relations,
possessing “all the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging to
the Court of First Instance,” has likewise the power to suspend a lawyer
from the practice of law.

Fundamentally, therefore, the decisive issue in these two (2)
cases before Us pertains to the all important issue of procedural due
process.  Definitely, the inquiry here
reflects more on the manner with which the contempt and sus­pension powers of
courts of justice were exercised by respon­dent judge.

From what may be gathered from the records of the instant case,
We are convinced of petitioner’s plea of denial of procedural due process of
law; first, on the procedure adopted for indirect contempt against petitioner;
and second, on the procedure followed in his indefinite suspen­sion from the
practice of law.

On the proceedings for
indirect contempt against the petitioner, the grave error of the
respondent judge is manifest when, under the circumstances disclosed in the
records, petitioner was denied his right to notice of hearing, to have his day
in court and present witnesses in his behalf,
a reasonable time to explain in writing
why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court.

Petitioner claimed that he did not receive the order dated June 19, 1979 which, according to the
respondent judge, was received on July
11, 1979.  While it is beyond
Our domain to ascertain the conflicting factual incidents alleged by both
parties, nevertheless, it is arguable that if petitioner did in fact receive the said order of June 19, 1979, fairness requires
that at least, respondent judge should have given the petitioner reasonable
time to explain in writing why he should not be cited for indirect
contempt.  An order directing petitioner
to explain in writing or to show cause constitute, under the law, the written
charge for indirect contempt contemplated under Section 3, Rule 71.  It is, in reality, a compelling mandate of
procedural due process, with its stress on fairness, that petitioner be
afforded a reasonable time and opportunity by giving a definite period within
which to submit a written explanation.

Moreover, Section 3, Rule
71 requires that there must be a hearing of the indirect contempt charge after
notice thereof is validly served on the person charged with indirect
contempt.  As adverted to earlier, an
order requiring petitioner to submit a written explanation constitutes the
written charge for indirect contempt,
and at the same time serves as notice
of said charge.  However, such notice
cannot by all means, be considered as a notice of hearing itself.  The two notices are different, for they have
distinct object and purpose.

At this point, it is noteworthy that during the scheduled joint
hearing of CAR Case No. 1912 and CAR Case No. 3271 respondent judge, at the
start of the proceedings, inquired from petitioner Balasabas
as to his explanation, and petitioner explained, in open court, that he was out
of office for almost three (3) months and would make it of record that he and
his family met a vehicular accident; that he was seriously injured, his brother
died, his father is physically disabled, his mother died last July 1979, his
aunt and the helpers were also injured and that there were 15 of them in the
hospital.10 Inspite of such oral explanation, respondent judge issued
on that same day the questioned order of August 27, 1979. 
Without being overly technical, such an oral explanation given by the
petitioner sufficiently satisfies, under the circumstances, what was sought for by respondent in his
order of June 19, 1979.  In any case, respondent judge should have
given petitioner ample opportunity to substantiate his explanation.

The non-observance of the fundamental right of due process as
enunciated above manifests arbitrariness, unfairness and injustice.  This Court frowns upon proceedings which
depart from the solemn adherence to the tenets of justice and fairness.  This Court too has its responsibility.  Regard for the requirements of due process of
law inescapably imposes upon it an exercise of judgment upon the whole course
of the proceedings.  As this Court said, thru
Justice Jose P. Bengzon, the due process clause is
designed to secure justice as a living reality,11 especially so, it may be
postulated, when courts exercise this inherent power to punish for contempt.

A contempt of court has been distinctly described as an offense
against the State not against the judge personally.  A judge should always bear in mind that the
power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that
are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the
judges as persons, but for the functions that they exercise.12
Rightly then, such power of the courts must be used sparingly in a preservative
and not on the vindictive principle, and must be used on the corrective rather
than on the retaliatory idea of punish­ment.13 In this regard, when one is
charged with contempt of court, the proceedings attendant thereto partake of
the nature of a criminal action14 even when the acts complained of
is an incident of a civil action.  In the
case at bar, the respondent judge did not observe the procedure outlined in
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

That is not all.  What is
worse, to Our mind, is the fact that respondent judge not only cited petitioner
for indirect contempt in open court; he summarily suspended him indefinitely
from the practice of law in violation of the procedure prescribed under Rule
138 and 139 of the Rules of Court relative to suspension of lawyers.  The petitioner here was indefinitely suspended
unless he explains satisfactorily and meritoriously his failure to comply with
the resolution of the court dated June
19, 1979.  Obviously, pending
the submission of a satisfactory and meritorious explanation, he is, under all
circumstances, already placed under indefinite suspension.  In the event that he submits an explanation
which the court may find not satisfactory and meritorious, the indefinite
suspension would go on.  Such an
indefinite suspension meted out as a penalty for alleged indirect contempt is
absolutely not permitted under the law and jurisprudence.  It is tantamount to disbarment without due
process of law not sanctioned by the provisions of Rule 138 and Rule 139 of the
Rules of Court.

The order of June 19,
1979, construed as a notice that petitioner is charged with indirect
contempt cannot be considered as a notice to explain in writing why he should
not be suspended from the practice of law. 
As early as 1920, this Court ruled that the notice served upon a lawyer
to appear before a Judge of the Court of First Instance and show cause why he
should not be sentenced for contempt, cannot be considered as a notice to show
cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of his profession.  These things are different; they have
distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is established.15

On the other hand, respondent judge should have limited his
ruling on the charges of indirect contempt. 
Under the provisions of Section 6 Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which
prescribe in categorical language the punishment for contempt, suspension from
the practice of law is not indicated. 
While it is true that a Court of Agrarian Relations under P. D. 946,
like a Court of First Instance, may suspend a lawyer “for wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court” pursuant to Section 27 Rule 138 or may
suspend on other grounds other than those enumerated by said provision,16 notwithstanding such broad power to suspend,
suspension must not be meted as a punishment for indirect contempt which has
its own corresponding penalty, as provided by the Rules of Court.  Granting, arguendo,
that suspension falls within the domain of the inherent power of courts to
punish for contempt, nevertheless, respondent judge should have exercised such
broad power in full observance of the rules on suspension and disbarment
specifically provided for under Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.

Suspension from the practice of law requires an entirely separate
procedure under the Rules with all the attendant constitutional and statutory
safeguards of procedural due process.  Respondent
should have applied Section 6, Rule 71 on punishment for indirect contempt not
Section 27 Rule 138 on suspension and removal of lawyers from the practice of
law which is entirely a different matter requiring different procedure as to
motion or complaint, service of motion or complaint, investigation, hearing,
confidentiality of investigation, etc. 
It is clear that under Section 29 of Rule 138 that upon such suspension
by the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance, either court shall forthwith
transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a
full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.  Upon receipt of such certified copy and
statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts
involved and make such order revoking or extend­ing the suspension, or removing
the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order issued by
the Court of Agrarian Relations dated August
27, 1979 is declared null and void and is hereby set aside.  Accordingly, the petition in G. R. No. 51414
is granted, and the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 2077 under Section
29, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, by virtue of which the Order of Suspension
was transmitted to this Court, is ordered closed and terminated.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1] p. 139, Rollo.

^[2] p. 47, Rollo.

^[3] p. 45, Rollo.

5
p. 84, Rollo.

6
See Order of CAR dated August
27, 1979, p. 47, Rollo.

7
Presidential Decree No. 946, Section
11.  Detail of Judges x x x.

“Whenever
a Judge of any Branch of the Court of Agrarian Relations is assigned,
transferred or detailed to another Branch or District or to another court of
equal rank or jurisdiction without having decided a case totally heard by him
and which was duly argued or in which oppor­tunity for argument was given to
the parties or their counsel, he shall prepare and sign his decision in said case
anywhere within the Philippines and send the same by registered mail to the
clerk of court to be filed in the proper Branch as of the date when the same
was received by the clerk, which shall to all legal intents and purposes have the same effect as if the Judge were
present in the court to direct the filing of the judgment:  Provided, however, that if a case has been
heard only in part, the Chief Justice, upon petition of any interested parties
to the case, may authorize the Judge who has partly heard the case to continue
hearing and to decide said case notwith­standing his assignment to another
Branch or District, under such conditions as the Chief Justice may
specify.”

8
p. 127, Rollo.

9
p. 132, Rollo.

10
t. s. n., August 27, 1979, p. 12 of the Petition.

11 Albert vs.
University Publishing Co., 13 SCRA 84; cited in Macabingkil
vs. Hon. Yatco, 21 SCRA 150.

12 Emeterio Buyco, et al. vs. Zosa, 34
SCRA 710.

13 Yangson vs.
Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42; People vs. Estenzo, 64 SCRA 211.

14 Concepcion, Jr. vs.
Gonzales IV, 4 SCRA 1124.

15 In re Jesus
Cuenco, 41 Phil. 32.

16 In re Pelaez, 44 Phil.
567; Balinon vs. De Leon,
et al., 50 O. G. 583.