THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. ROLANDO CAMAY, ACCUSED.

Our main concern in this
automatic review is to ascertain that the proceedings in the trial court and
the decision^[1] rendered are wholly in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the accused pleaded guilty to the crime of
robbery with homicide, a capital offense.

The procedure to be
followed strictly in a situation like this where the accused, with
the assistance of counsel, voluntarily pleads guilty to a capital offense is
explicitly laid down in Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
promulgated by the Court, and which went into effect on January 1, 1985.  This new rule states:

When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntari­ness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability.  The
accused may also present evidence in his behalf.

The old rule was embodied
in Section 5 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court. 
It is more succinct.

SEC. 5.  Plea of guilty –
Determination of punishment.  – Where
the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or inform­ation, if the court
accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it
may hear witnesses to determine what punishment shall be imposed.

Under the new formulation
three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a
capital offense has been entered by the accused:

1.  The court must conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea;

2.  The court must require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpabi­lity; and

3.  The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires.

The amended rule is a capsulization of the provisions of the old
rule and pertinent jurisprudence.  We had several occasions to issue the
caveat that even if the trial court is satisfied that the plea of guilty was
entered with full knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the Court must
still require the introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing the
guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant.  This is the proper norm to be followed not
only to satisfy the trial judge but also to aid the Court in determining
whether or not the accused really and truly comprehended the meaning, full
significance, and consequences of his plea.^[2]

Four score years ago, this Court first laid down the rule
“that Courts of First Instance may sentence defendants in criminal causes
(sic) who plead guilty to the offense charged in the complaint, without the
necessity of taking testimony.  However,
in all cases, and especially in cases where the punishment to be inflicted is
severe, the court should be sure that the defendant fully understands the
nature of the charges preferred against him and the character of the punishment
to be imposed before sentencing him.”^[3]
The Court continued that “[W]hile there is no law requiring it, yet in every case under the plea of guilty where the
penalty may be death it is advisable for the court to call witnesses for the
purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the
defendant.  This, however, must be left
to the discretion of the trial court.” Thus, although Talbanos and
a plethora of other cases advise the trial court to receive evidence and to
ensure that the accused understands his plea of guilty, at the same time they
recognize the discretion of the trial court to convict the accused merely on
his plea of guilty if it is convinced that the taking of evidence is not
necessary and that the accused understands the allegations of the indictment
and the consequences of his plea of guilty.^[4]

The trial judge complied
faithfully with this strict procedure and more. 
The records of this case show that after the extensive interviews
conducted by the counsel de oficio with his client upon order of
the trial Judge, the latter asked the accused a series of questions, fully
informing him of the nature of the charge against him and the grave
consequences thereof.  Even after the
accused had entered a plea of guilty and signed the Certificate of Arraignment,
all the time with the assistance of counsel de oficio, still the
trial court addressed three questions to the accused, to wit:

1)   whether or not he knew that his plea of guilty
was for the crime of robbery with homicide;

2)   whether or not he understood the gravity of
the penalty of death by electric chair for the offense to which he pleaded
guilty; and

3)   whether or not, knowing the severity of the
penalty, he still insisted on his plea of guilty.

The accused answered all these three questions in the
affirmative.^[5]

Subsequently, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present
its witnesses to prove the guilt of the accused in the presence of the accused
and his counsel.

The first witness for the prosecution was the daughter of the
victim, Angelita Madianda, then six years
old.  She testified that at around 9:00
o’clock in the evening of May 6, 1978, when she and her six months pregnant
mother were lying side by side inside their house at Baugo, Caraga, Davao Oriental, ready to
sleep, the accused barged into their house. 
He demanded money from her mother. 
When her mother said they had no money to give, Rolando Camay hacked her
mother several times, her mother not being able to fight back the accused.  The accused lived in the same barrio and was
a frequent visitor in their house that was why she easily recognized him.6

Pilosopo Madianda, husband of the victim, also testified that in
the evening of May 6, 1978, he was in Barrio Albar making copra and when he
arrived in their house the following day, he found his wife dead.  He also observed
their trunk forcibly opened and their money inside, in the amount of P600.00,
missing.7

Another witness for the prosecution, Juan Lanquibo, was presented
to identify the Death Certificate of Enriquita Madianda (Exh. “C”).

The prosecution’s last
witness was Judge Manuel B. Castro, Municipal Circuit Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Court of Baganga and Caraga, who identified the confession of the accused
dated May 11, 1978 (Exh. “D”). 
He also testified that the accused personally subscribed and swore
before him his Affidavit of Confession. 
The Judge even explained to the accused the contents of his Affidavit.

Thereafter, the prosecution made its formal offer of
evidence.  The accused was then asked to
present his evidence, but, maintaining his plea of guilty, he, without much
ado, by and through his counsel de oficio, submitted the case for
decision.

The trial court, as expected, rendered a verdict of guilty in a
decision dated May 2, 1979, but promulgated on June 5 1979.  The accused was sentenced to suffer the
extreme penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of P12,000.00 and the stolen amount of P600.00, and to pay the costs.

Now before us, the counsel de oficio, Atty. Ernesto
Lumaya, filed, on July 19, 1980, his “Memorandum In Lieu Of Appellant’s
Brief”, dated June 26, 1980.  The
Solicitor General also filed on November 25, 1985 a “Manifestation and
Motion In Lieu Of Appellee’s Brief,” dated November 17 1980.  Both pleadings recommended the affirmance of
the Decision under review manifesting that the same is in accordance with law and
the evidence.

We are convinced that the guilt of the accused has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt in the light of overwhelming evidence presented by the
prosecution, fully corroborated and substantiated by the plea of guilty of the
accused.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua8 and the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the
deceased is increased to THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS.  With costs against the accused.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Judge Roque M. Barnes dated May 2, 1979, Branch III, Court of First
Instance, 16th Judicial District, Baganga, Davao Oriental.

^[2]
People v. Alde, 64 SCRA 224;
People v. Echaluce, 66 SCRA 221;
People v. Hondolera, 72 SCRA 422;
People v. Pajarillo, 94 SCRA 828;
People v. Villacores, 97 SCRA 567;

^[3]
People v. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 543, October 29, 1906.

^[4]
U.S. v. Agcaoili, 31 Phil. 91, 93-94; U.S. v. Janad, 37 Phil.
305, 317-318; People v. Sabilul, 93 Phil. 567.

^[5]
T.s.n., session of September 26, 1978, 4-5.

7 Session of March 21, 1979,
13-19.

8
CONST., art. III, sec. 19
(1).