RODOLFO ENCARNACION, PETITIONER, VS. DYNASTY AMUSEMENT CENTER CORPORATION, LORENZO CO AND LUCISNO TAN, RESPONDENTS.

This refers to the appeal from the October 24 and November 20,
1978 Orders of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XI, at that
time presided over by the Honorable Elias B. Asuncion, dismissing the complaint
on the ground that the case is principally a labor case.

In  1975,  petitioner was employed as a projectionist by
respondent Dynasty Amusement Center of which the other respondents are
officers. On September 29, 1978,
petitioner filed a complaint for damages with the then Court of First Instance
of Manila, alleging among others, that he was suspended or had been disallowed
to work and that was made the subject of harrassment and slanderous
accusations. Respondents filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the nature of the case as it involves a labor dispute which
pertains exclusively to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Commission.

Without waiting for respondent court to resolve their motion to
dismiss, respondents filed their answer dated October 16, 1978, wherein they
averred that the suspension of petitioner from work is a prerogative of
management so as to impose
discipline among employees, said right being recognized under the New Labor
Code of the Philippines.

On October 24, 1978, the trial court issued its Order dismissing the case on the
ground that it has jurisdiction over the nature of the case (p. 44, Rollo). The subsequent motion for reconsideration
was denied by the court a quo on November 20, 1978 (p. 54, id.)

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner maintains that the case is more of one for damages and
thus is a civil dispute. Besides, he
claims, reinstatement is not prayed for. Petitioner further contends that respondents had already waived and are
estopped from questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction when they filed their answer seeking affirmative reliefs.

When this case was filed, the applicable law was Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1367, which provided as follows:

“Section 1. Paragraph
(a) of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

a). The Labor Arbiter shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non agricultural:

1)     
Unfair labor practice cases;

2)    
Unresolved cases in collective bargaining, including those
which involve wages, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of employment; and

3)    
All other cases arising from employer-employee relations duly
indorsed by the Regional Directors in accordance with the provisions of this
code; Provided, that the Regional Directors
shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages.”

However, the amendatory provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1691, which took effect during the pendency of this case, ousted respondent
court of the jurisdiction it initially had under Presidential Decree No.
1367. Jurisdiction over all money
claims, including claims for damages arising from or in connection with
employer-employee relations, is now vested exclusively in the Labor Arbiters of
the National Labor Relations Commission.

The question now is whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1691
has a retroactive effect to cover the instant case.

This query was resolved in the case of Atlas Fertilizer
Corp. vs. Navarro, (149 SCRA 432) wherein We ruled:

“In conflicts of jurisdiction
between the courts and the labor agencies arising from the amendments effected by P.D. 1691 on P.D. 1367,
this Court held in the cases of Ebon v. De Guzman (113 SCRA 52), Aguda v. Vallejos (113 SCRA 69), and Sentinel insurance
Co., Inc. vs. Bautista, (supra),
that P.D. 1691 is a curative statute which corrected the lack of jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter at the start of the proceedings and,
therefore, should be given a restrospective application to the pending
proceedings. P.D. 1691 merely restored
a jurisdiction earlier vested in
Labor Arbiters before the enactment
of P.D. 1367. It was intended to
correct a situation where two
tribunals would have jurisdiction over separate
issues arising from the same labor conflict.   

x          x     x

x          x         x

x          x         x

This construction of law is
not new. It must be noted that
the amendatory provision of P.D. 1367 itself was give retroactive application, for also being curative in nature.

P.D. 1691 should, therefore, be given a retroactive application to
this pending case as the precise purpose of the amendment was to hopefully
settle once and for all the conflict of jurisdiction between regular courts and
labor agencies (Sentinel Ins., Co. vs. Bautista, supra).”

In the cases of Getz Corporation Phils. vs.
Court of Appeals (116 SCRA 86), PLDT vs. Dulay
(172 SCRA 33) and Polotan-Tuvera vs. Dayrit (160 SCRA
423), the Court also declared that Presidential Decree No. 1691 is a curative
statute with retrospective application to pending proceedings.

In the case of Abad
vs. RTC of Manila (154 SCRA 664,
671), the Court held:

“However, whereas before jurisdiction over money claims of laborers and employees
appertained to Courts of First Instance, the same are now to be taken
cognizance of by proper authorities in the Department of Labor and Employment.

“The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is
finally resolved or adjudicated does not apply when the change in jurisdiction
is curative in character. Thus in the
instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that Courts of First
Instance/Regional Trial Courts no longer have jurisdiction over aforesaid
monetary claims of labor.”

The petition is, therefore, unmeritorious for the complaint
clearly shows that the petitioner’s claim for damages arose from the acts
attributed to his employer, while he was still an employee thereof. Thus, the action for damages arose from an
employer-employee relationship. We do
not agree with petitioner that the case is a civil dispute simply because he
did not ask for reinstatement, for an employee need not seek reinstatement in
order to file a complaint before the labor arbiter (A. Consteel Construction
Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 64673, Oct. 21, 1988). More
so, estoppel cannot attach by virtue of Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules
of Court, inasmuch as the question of compentencia maybe raised even for
the first time on appeal, apart from the fact that jurisdictional issues can never be waived. Besides, the
issue of jurisdiction was raised
even before the answer was
filed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the order appealed from AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, and
Nocon, JJ., concur.