CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE LA CARLOTA, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, ACTING MINISTER OF LABOR, AND EMELITA T. DACANAY, RESPONDENTS.

This is a labor case on termination of employment.  Emelita T. Dacanay was
employed as “console operator” in the electronics data and processing (IBM)
department of Central Azucarera de la Carlota, Inc.  She took a vacation leave
from January 16 to 31, 1977.  On February 1, she sent a telegram to Ben Aplaon,
her immediate chief, requesting that her leave of absence be extended
indefinitely because she was going to review for the board examination for
cer­tified public accountants.  She had exhausted her leave credits.

Because her services were badly needed, that request was denied by the
company in a reply-telegram sent to Emelita on Feb­ruary 2.  She was advised to
return to duty on or before February 6.  Emelita informed Ben Aplaon by long
distance telephone that she could not return to duty.

Aplaon apprised the company’s personnel manager that in accordance with the
company’s policy Emelita would be regarded as an AWOL, that her employment would
be terminated and that her position would be considered vacant (p. 7, Rollo).

On February 8, 1977, the company’s personnel manager filed with the Bacolod
City regional office of the Department of Labor an application to terminate
Emelita’s services on the ground that she had been absent without leave since
February 1.  Emelita, single, was then thirty-two years old and had worked for
the company for more than four years (p. 6, Rollo).

The assistant regional director in an order dated March 2, 1977 granted the
application for clearance with the observation that Emelita did not oppose it
despite the service upon her of a copy of the company’s application.

On March 24, 1977, Emelita filed a motion for reconsi­deration on the grounds
that she was not served with a copy of the application for clearance and that
the company had been informed of her “illness” (p. 8, Rollo).

The company opposed that motion.  It alleged that the assistant regional
director acted on the application for clearance because Emelita was duly served
by registered mail with a copy of that application; that Emelita was absent
without leave, not on account of illness but because she was reviewing for the
certified public accountants’ examination, and that, although she knew that her
services would be terminated, she did not bother to communi­cate with the
company’s officers (pp. 9-11, Rollo).

The regional director in his order of July 7, 1977 directed the reinstatement
of Emelita with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights.  He assumed
that Emelita acted in good faith in not returning to duty on or before February
6, 1977 because it was only on February 9 or 10, 1977 when she allegedly
re­ceived the denial of her request for an indefinite leave of absence.  He also
branded her dismissal as “drastically inhuman”.  He said that she was “not
guilty of absence without leave” (pp. 12-13, Rollo).

The company’s motion for the reconsideration of the re­instatement order was
denied.  It appealed to the Secretary of Labor.  Acting Minister Amado G.
Inciong in his brief orders of July 5 and November 24, 1978 and April 16, 1979
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.

On July 9, 1979, the company was served with a writ of execution to enforce
the reinstatement order.  The execution was suspended after the company filed a
surety bond in the sum of P30 ,000 to answer for Emelita’s backwages.  It was
only on July 12, 1979 when the company mailed to this Court its petition for
certiorari.

There can be no question that Emelita disobeyed the directive that she should
return to duty on or before February 6, 1977 and that she was absent without
leave from February 1 to March 2, 1977 when she allegedly returned to duty but
was not allowed to work because the assistant regional director had already
approved the company’s application to terminate her employment.  She abandoned
her job.  The regional director erred in concluding that she was “not guilty of
absence without leave”.

The regulations of the company provide that an employee may be dismissed for
at least six days of absence without leave within a calendar year (p. 22,
Rollo).

Article 283 of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an
employment for “serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work”
or for “gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties” or for “other
causes analogous” thereto.

After taking into account the equities of the case and the conflicting
interests of the employer and employee, we hold that respondent Emelita T.
Dacanay should be reinstated without backwages.

WHEREFORE, the regional director’s order is modified.  The
petitioner is ordered to reinstate immediately the private respondent to her
former position or to a substantially equivalent position but without the
obligation to pay her back compensation.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, and Escolin,
JJ.,concur.
Barredo, (Chairman), I concur.  It is not
clear to me that respondent’s absence constituted without disobedience.  The
equitable consideration on which the main opinion is based is
justified.
Abad Santos, J., I vote to grant the petition. 
Private respondent was guilty of willful disobedience and abandonment of work. 
She does not deserve reinstatement.