INVESTORS’ FINANCE CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE “FNCB FINANCE” AND DANILO REYES, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF BRANCH XXI, CFI OF RIZAL (PASIG), PETITIONERS, VS. THE…

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. NO. SP-08818, entitled “Investors’ Finance
Corporation, et al., Petitioner vs. Hon. Eduardo C. Tutaan
as Judge of Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
Branch V, et al., Respondents” promulgated on April 3, 1979 which
dismissed the petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the Order
dated January 17, 1979 of Hon. Eduardo C. Tutaan as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
Branch V, denying the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-26754 and ordered
Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan to proceed with the trial of
Civil Case No. Q-26754, entitled “Richmann
Tractors, Inc., et al., Plaintiff vs. Investors’ Finance Corporation, et
al..”^[1]

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are:

“Before April 30,
1974, private respondents were the owners of certain construction
equipment and being in need of financing, they went to the Investors’ Finance
Corporation (FNCB Finance) with their equipment as collateral.  In the appropriate documents which were executed,
it was made to appear that FNCB was the owner of the equipments and that
private respondents were merely leasing them. 
As a consideration for the lease, private respondents were to pay
monthly amortization.  So that on April
30, 1974, petitioner FNCB Finance and respondent Richmann
Tractors, Inc. executed a ‘Lease Agreement’ (Annex “A”, Petition)
covering various properties described in the Lease Schedules attached to the
Lease Agreement.  As security for the
payment of respondent Richmann’s obligations under
the Lease Agreement, respondent Ricardo B. Pajarillaga
and Ella P. Pajarillaga (respondent spouses) executed
a Continuing Guaranty dated April 30, 1974 (Annex “B”, Petition).

“On May 20, 1976, respondent Richmann
also applied for and was granted credit and financing facilities by petitioner
in the amount of P977,034.88, payable in 24 equal monthly installments
commencing on June 20, 1976 and every month thereafter until fully paid, as
evidence by the Non-Negotiable Promissory Note (Annex “C”, Petition)
executed by said respondent.  The payment
of respondent Richmann’s obligations under said
Promissory Note is secured by a Continuing Guaranty dated July 31, 1974 (Annex
“D”, Petition) executed by respondent spouses.

“Private respondents defaulted in their respective obligations
under the Lease Agreement, Non-Negotiable Promissory Note and the two (2) Deeds
of Continuing Guaranty aforementioned. 
Upon their failure to pay said defaulted obligations notwithstanding
petitioner FNCB Finance’s demands, the latter filed a complaint (Annex
“E”, Petition) for replevin and sum of
money, on June 1, 1978,
against said respondents, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. 29671.

“On June 6, 1978,
Branch XXI issued a writ of replevin for the seizure
of the properties covered by the Lease Agreement.  Subsequently, private respondents executed with
Petitioner FNCB Finance a Compromise Agreement dated June, 1978 (Annex
“F”, Petition) which was, in turn, filed with Branch XXI on June 21, 1978.

“Acting upon the said Compromise Agreement, Branch XXI issued
a Decision oh July 12, 1978
(Annex “G”, Petition) approving the compromise agreement and
enjoining the parties thereto to faithfully comply with the terms and
conditions thereof.

“Private respondents breached their obligations under the
Compromise Agreement whereupon petitioner FNCB Finance, thru counsel, filed an
Ex-Parte Motion for Execution (Annex “H”,
Petition) on December 11, 1978, which was granted by Branch XXI, as shown by
the Order dated January 4, 1978 (Annex “I”, Petition) issued by Judge
Pineda.  In the same Order, Judge Pineda
directed the issuance of a writ of execution and ordered petitioner Sheriff to
enforce said writ thereafter.  On January 4, 1979, the writ of execution
(Annex “J”, Petition) was issued.

“Petitioner Sheriff has partially enforced said writ of
execution.  He has levied on execution
the following properties belonging to respondent Richmann,
to wit:

a)   two (2) units 6 x 6 trucks

b)   three
(3) units Isuzu Dump trucks

c)   one
(1) unit CAT D7-17-A Bulldozer

d)   one
(1) unit CAT Road Grader

e)   one
(1) unit Mack Dump Truck

f)    one
(1) unit Weapons Carrier

g)   one
(1) unit self-loading loader

h)   one
(1) unit Ford Fiera

i)     one (1) unit tow truck

j)     one
(1) unit payloader

k)    one
(1) unit water tank with two big tires

l)     one
(1) Komatsu D-80 Bulldozer

m)  one
(1) unit Caterpillar D7-17-A Bulldozer

n)   one
(1) unit “SAKAI” Kosakusho Road Roller

o)   one
(1) unit Caterpillar D7F Bulldozer

p)   one
(1) unit Caterpillar D9G Bulldozer

q)   one
(1) unit IH Bulldozer (Under Third Party, Peter Lee)

r)    one
(1) unit Road Roller

s)   one
(1) unit Caterpillar D7 Bulldozer

t)    one
(1) unit Vibratory compactor

u)   one
(1) unit Ford Fiera

v)    one
(1) unit Chevy water tank

“Of these, twenty-two (22) units have already been taken under
custody and are all under Sheriff’s guards either in Metro Manila or at Lal-lo, Cummao, Gattaran, Cagayan.

“On January 17,
1979, private respond­ents
filed their complaint (Annex “K”) against herein petitioners,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-26754.

“Likewise on January
17, 1979, respondent Judge issued the questioned Order (Annex
“L”).  Hence, this
petition.”^[2]

The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-26754 is to annul the decision
rendered in Civil Case No. 29671 rendered by Judge Pineda on the ground of
extrinsic fraud.  The case was assigned
to Branch V, Court of First Instance of Rizal
presided by Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan.

The order of January 17,
1979 issued by Judge Tutaan enjoined the
Deputy Sheriff of Rizal, Danilo
Reyes, from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 29671.

The Court of Appeals held that the respondent judge, Hon. Eduardo
C. Tutaan, has jurisdiction over the action for
annulment of the decision of Judge Gregorio Pineda because “the ruling in Dulap vs. Court of Appeals is firmly applicable in the
instant case x x x.”^[3]

According to the petitioners, the respondent Court of Appeals
committed the following errors:

“THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT AFFIRMED AND HELD JUSTIFIABLE THE ORDER ISSUED ON JANUARY 17, 1979 IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-26754,
ENTITLED ‘RICHMANN TRACTORS, INC., ET AL. VS. INVESTORS’ FINANCE CORPORATION,
ET AL.,’ OF BRANCH V OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (QUEZON CITY), PRESIDED BY HONORABLE JUDGE EDUARDO C. TUTAAN,
WHICH ENJOINED THE PETITIONER SHERIFF FROM CARRYING OUT A WRIT OF EXECUTION
ISSUED IN ANOTHER CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 29671) BY THE JUDGE (JUDGE GREGORIO
PINEDA) OF ANOTHER BRANCH (BRANCH XXI) OF THE SAME COURT (COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AT PASIG).^[4]

“THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT ORDERED THE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN CA-G.R. NO. 08818-SP TO PROCEED WITH
THE TRIAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-26754.”^[5]

The petitioners
“disagree with the respondent Court of Appeals when it held that the ‘ruling in Dulap
vs. Court of Appeals is firmly applicable in this instant case x x x’ “^[6]

The petitioners contend
that there is no parallel­ism and no congruence between the Dulap
case and the instant case because “In the instant case, the complaint filed by petitioner FNCB Fiannce in Civil Case No. 29671 has not yet been finally
terminated by Branch XXI, Court o First Instance of Rizal
Pasig, as in fact the writ of execution was still in
the process of enforcement by petitioner Sheriff, when the private respondents
herein filed their complaint for annulment of judgment with Branch V of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon
City), docketed as Civil Case No. Q?26754 and presided by Honorable Judge
Eduardo C. Tutaan.”^[7]

The respondents submit
that Civil Case No. Q-29671, entitled “Investors’ Finance Corporation,
etc. et al. vs. Richmann Tractors, Inc., et al.”
was already terminated when Civil Case No. Q-26754 was filed before Branch V of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City) because nothing was left to be done but to
enforce the judgment therein which had become final and execu­tory
and that the Court of First Instance presided by Judge Pineda could no longer
grant the relief sought by the herein private respondents, plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. Q-26754.

The submission of the
private respondents is supported by decisions of this Court.

It is settled that a
court of first instance or a branch thereof has jurisdiction to annul a final
and executory judgment rendered by another court of
first instance or branch of the same court. 
In Dulap vs. Court of Appeals^[8] the Supreme Court said:

“In an action to annul the judgment of a court, the
plaintiff’s cause of action springs from the alleged nullity of the judgment
based on one ground or another, particularly fraud, which fact affords the plaintiff a right to judicial interference in
his behalf.  In such a suit the cause of
action is entirely different from that in the action which gave rise to the
judgment sought to be annulled, for a direct attack against a final and executory judgment is not incidental to, but is the main
object of, the proceeding.”

“To hold that a court or a branch
thereof has no authority or jurisdiction to annul a judgment simply because
that judgment was rendered by another branch, would, therefore practically
amount to judicial legislation affecting, as it will, the provisions of the
Revised Judiciary Act.”^[9]
Jurisdiction over the action includes jurisdiction over an interlocutory matter
incidental to the cause and deemed necessary to preserve the subject matter of
the suit or protect the parties’ interest.^[10]

Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan, therefore, has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. Q-26754 seeking to annul the
final and executory judgment rendered by Judge
Gregorio Pineda in Civil Case No. 29671 and to issue the order of January 17, 1979 temporarily
restraining the sheriff from proceeding with the execution of the judgment of
said Judge Pineda.

It is contended by the petitioners that the action to annul the
judgment is premature because Civil Case No. 29671 before Judge Pineda was not
yet terminated.

This contention has no merit. 
It is a fact that the decision of Judge Pineda in Civil Case No. 29671
had become final and executory.  Indeed the sheriff was already in the process
of executing said judgment.  Judge Pineda
could no longer grant the relief prayed for by the private respondents in Civil
Case No. Q-26754.^[11]

As held by the Supreme Court in Bayer Philippines, Inc. vs. Agana^[12]
“Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among
the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial function as regards
any matter related to the controversy litigated comes to an end.  The execution of its judgment is purely a
ministerial phase of adjudication.  Indeed
the nature of its duty to see to
it that the claim of the prevailing party is fully satisfied from the
properties of the loser is generally ministerial.”

In view of the foregoing, the second error assigned is not
meritorious.  It is the duty of the
respondent judge to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-26754 over which
he has jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
NO. 08818-SP sought to be reviewed is hereby affirmed, without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., (Chairman), in the result.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 257-273.

^[2]
Rollo, pp.
257-260.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 265.

^[4]
Rollo, p. 26.

^[5]
Rollo, p. 42.

^[6]
Rollo, p. 27.

^[7]
Rollo, p. 30.

^[8]
42 SCRA, 537, 541.

^[9]
Ibid., p. 543.

^[10]
Bayer Philippines, Inc. vs. Agana,
63 SCRA 355, 369.

^[11]
Abirera vs. Court of Appeals, 45 SCRA 314,
318.

^[12]
63 SCRA, 355, 364-365.