G.R. No. 50732. August 10, 1989
JOSE M. BAGTAS, JR., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS & EDILBERTO PASAMON, NELIA TALLADA, PRIMITIVO OLETA, LORETO PASAMON, ANTONIO QUIBRANDO, PRIMO TALENTO, GREGORIO CABANELA, R…
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari
of the decision*
of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision** of the Court of First Instance of Quezon in a civil case for “Recovery of Better Right
of Possession with Damages”, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the plaintiff***
is hereby ordered to reimburse GREGORIO CABANELA P10,494.50, RESTITUTO ABACA
P300.00, TEODULO MARCO P450.00, PRIMO TALENTO P1,739.00, LORETO PASAMON (with
brother) P4,037.00, or a total of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND TWENTY PESOS AND
FIFTY-CENTAVOS (P17,020.50) Philippine currency, representing the reasonable
value of their improvements, and should the plaintiff fail or refuse to pay,
the said defendants have the right to retain and enjoy the fruits of their
improvements until reimbursed at legal interest of 6% per annum; denying both
plaintiff’s and defendants’ claim for actual, moral, nominal and exemplary
damages as well as attorney’s fees; vacating and cancelling
the Preliminary Writ of Injunction issued on February 25, 1965; and, with costs
against the plaintiff.
“SO ORDERED.” (pp. 75-76,
Printed Record on Appeal)
Alleging that it is a question of law which may be properly
reviewed by Us, petitioner poses the lone issue of
“whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals, correctly made a ruling
upon the facts of the case, that, indeed, private respondents were possessors
or planters in good faith.” (p. 11, Petition)
Petitioner’s contention does not merit our consideration.
The instant petition originated from Civil Case No. C-184 which
petitioner filed with the lower court on February 23, 1965, being the registered owner of the land
involved in the controversy against the alleged intruders (private respondent
herein included).
Petitioner’s mother, Felicidad M. de Bagtas, was an applicant in November, 1927, for a Sales
Patent under Commonwealth Act #141 as amended of the subject land located at
Bo. San Antonio, Guinyangan, Quezon, with a total
area of 1,132,692 square meters. After
being able to fulfill all the legal requirements, the applicant was on August 12, 1952, finally issued her
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1304 covering said land. Three years later, she transferred her
ownership and title to the property to her son, Jose Bagtas,
Jr., herein petitioner, who was issued TCT No. 22119.
It is the theory of the petitioner that private respondent,
together with the other defendants in Civil Case No. Q-184,
entered the land in question since the year 1951 as intruders or trespassers
without authority or consent of the registered owner and continued to do so
notwithstanding their knowledge and the warning of petitioner’s representatives
or workers that the land which defendants were occupying and were cultivating
belongs to petitioner who is the registered owner.
Among the defendants, only private respondent
Gregorio Cabanela in the hearing of the case on the
merits, presented evidence. The
other defendants however filed their answers namely: defendants Loreto Pasamon,
Primo Talento, Gregorio Cabanela,
Rodolfo Cabanela, Restituto
Abaca and Teodulo Marco. No answer of defendants Edilberto
Pasamon and Antonio Quibrando
was filed. Defendants Nonelon Alano, Juanita Maramba, Abundio Mandares and Rodolfo Mandares
voluntarily appeared in Court as defendants and promised to obey the injunction
issued on February 25, 1965 enjoining defendants “simply or collectively
from entering, evading, intruding and trespassing upon plaintiff’s land, as
well as cutting and removing woods, timber, and other products found
therein.” (Note: this injunction
was cancelled by the trial court as expressed in the dispositive
portion of its decision, aforementioned earlier). Defendants Nelia Tallada and Primitivo Oleta died and the proceedings were dismissed as against
them.
Defendant Gregorio Cabanela testified
before the trial court that the litigated property has been occupied by them
since 1947 or earlier, which was then a forested area
without traces of occupation and cultivation (tsn., June 29, 1966, Cabanela)
that it had already been also alienable and disposable government property
since July 28, 1926 under
BF-MAP-LC-609 (Annex “B”, Motion dated March 18, 1963,
defendants). Defendants-appellees‘ portion was in the area covered by Sales
Application No. 7678 (E-1460) applied for by Mrs. Felicidad
M. Vda. de Bagtas, appellant’s mother, consisting of an area of
113.269 hectares, more or less (Record on Appeal, p. 69). Defendants-appellees
did not have any knowledge of said application.
In fact they made inquiries with the Bureau of Lands requesting for its
subdivision thru the help of a certain Mr. Pablo Joson
and petitioned the late President Ramon Magsaysay
contending that they, having occupied the area since 1947 or earlier upon
information received from Mr. Agapito Tagarao, then officer in charge of said Bureau and that the
property they occupied was within the alienable and disposable area embraced
under Quezon Land Classification Project No. II-G
(BF-MAP-LC-609) and open to homesteaders, are therefore qualified to apply.
However, in the investigation reports dated June 6, 1950 and May 5, 1951 of the Bureau of Lands inspectors and
surveyors, no mention was made of the names of the defendants and the extent
and nature of their improvements. Consequently OCT No. P-1304 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon was issued on August 12, 1952 in the name of Mrs. Felicidad
M. Vda. de Bagtas. All these
series of transactions were not known to appellees
although they were in continuous possession of the property and it was only in
the year 1964 when appellant personally saw Gregorio Cabanela
and showed him his title with the advice that they (defendants) are squatters
on his property. Appellees
pleaded that they tilled the property in their honest belief it was public land
and they have already introduced considerable improvements for a period of 17
years, and that it would not be easy to leave the fruits of their labor. Because of appellee’s
uncompromising attitude, appellant requested the aid of Philippine Constabulary
authorities (tsn. p. 64, June 6, 1966, Bagtas). Petitioner offered to reimburse the
improvements (tsn. p. 62, June 2, 1964, Bagtas)
but the defendants refused to accept the bargain being not commensurate to the
value of the property (tsn. p. 56, June 29, 1966, Cabanela).
In appealing the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, plaintiff-appellant (petitioner herein) assigned three errors hinging
on the issue as to whether or not Gregorio Cabanela
was a planter in good faith.
In deciding the issue in favor of defendants-appellees,
(private respondents herein) the appellate court was given by the
plaintiff-appellant the impression that the acts of depredations and intrusions
in the property were committed by the defendants-appellees
after the issuance of O. C. T. P-1304 in the name of the
predecessors-in-interest of the appellant on August 21, 1952, in spite of the
warnings that the land had belonged to Felicidad Bagtas since 1952.
To substantiate plaintiff-appellant’s claim, he presented evidence to
prove that Cabanela was seen for the first time to
make “kaingin” on December 2, 1951
by Eusebio Abenoja, a
tenant of Felicidad Bagtas,
that on May 5, 1952, Cabanela was again seen making
“kaingin” on the property, thus he
was advised by Bonifacio Mariano, overseer of the
land in question, not to plant any permanent crop. This was followed by another warning of Bo. Lieutenant Ambrosio Lindio
and company to defendants not to continue working on the land in August, 1952. But no evidence was presented to refute the
claim of appellee Cabanela
that he had been in possession and started cultivating the portion of the land
in question which was then forested land since 1947.
In resolving in favor of defendants-appellees
the issue of whether or not the defendants-appellees
were planters in good faith to entitle them to the reimbursement of the
improvements introduced, the appellate court in the assailed judgment stated:
“x x x
Granting arguendo for the sake of argument,
that Cabanela was first seen to make a kaingin on December 2, 1951, it could not be said
that he had acted in bad faith in making a kaingin
for the simple reason that the title issued to Felicidad
Bagtas was dated August 12, 1952. Ergo:
if her application was only approved on August 12, 1952, Felicidad Bagtas could not have been seen in possession of the said
land prior to its approval in 1952, so that Cabanela
would be in a position to know in 1951 that the land he had entered and cleared
belonged to Felicidad Bagtas.
‘Homestead: Approval for application is required before
entry on homestead is allowed. – Under
Section 13 of the Public Land Act, entry on a homestead is allowed only after
the approval of the application.’ (Serapio
Dauan v. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, etc., 19 SCRA, p. 223)
“The Transfer Certificate of the Title No. 22119 in the name
of the appellant is not enough to sustain the cause of action of
appellant. There is a need to further
prove the prior knowledge on the part of the appellees
that the land they have been tilling or entered into belongs to a third
party. In this regard, the appellant
claims that as far back as December 2,
1951, Eusebio Abenoja,
a tenant of Felicidad Bagtas
informed Cabanela not to make any clearing. This is far from the truth because on the
same date December 2, 1951,
Felicidad Bagtas could not
have any claim of ownership over the land as yet considering that her
application was only approved as per Original Certificate of Title No. P-1304
issued on August 12, 1952. Worse still, Felicidad Bagtas, knowing as she
does, that the land in question was titled in her favor since August 1952 and
herein plaintiff having become the new owner of the land in litigation since
1955, by virtue of the transfer of ownership as per Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-22119 and both claiming to know of the fact that Cabanela and other squatters (other defendants), have
entered the area since 1951 and for that matter, they were advised not to make
a clearing, followed by another confrontation with Cabanola
on May 5, 1952 by Eusebio Abenoja
who, likewise, advised him not to make any permanent planting and later in
October 1952, with the assistance of Barrio Lieutenant Ambrosio
Lindio and others, warned Cabanela
not to continue working thereon for the land was ultimately transferred in the
name of Dr. Jose Bagtas, Jr., in the year 1955, who
likewise, ordered his tenant and later soliciting the assistance of authorities
in stopping Cabanela from further making permanent kaingin, why did it take appellant until February
23, 1965 to file this instant action, when the same could have been instituted
way back in the year 1952 when the property has been titled, for the first time
in the name of Felicidad Bagtas? The answer to this query is the observation
made by the Court a quo to which this Court is in full accord:
‘If the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest did not take
action from 1947 up to 1964 or a period of 17 years it can only be surmised
that they deemed it premature to disturb the defendants to avoid protest
against the said sales application, because they (the defendants) were in
actual occupancy and cultivation, which is a valid ground for the cancellation
of the same under Section 28, C.A. 141 as amended so that they chose to remain
silent until after the expiration of one year from the issuance of the title
and that in 1955 the property was transferred to the plaintiff herein, to make
it appear that he is an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith. While it may be true on the surface that
these matters may be considered as actual fraud and misrepresentation in the
acquisition of sales application No. 7678, we are not permitted under the law
to question the title in view of the doctrine of indefeasibility after one year
when a title has been issued in the absence of positive proof to that
effect. Besides, the title cannot be
attacked collaterally in this proceeding.
The defendants also claimed that the survey conducted on April 24-28, 1951 was at a table survey, otherwise it would be impossible for the
investigators of the Bureau of Lands not to have seen or discovered that there
were actually improvements and landholdings of the defendants within the
area. On the testimony of Anacleto Anonuevo, the original
applicant (Mrs. Bagtas) never had any occupancy in
the property because it was then a virgin forest with an area of 113,269
hectares, which was physically impossible for her to comply with the
requirements of the Public Land Law, unless she misrepresented that the
clearings and improvements of the defendants were hers.’
“This question may be asked:
If it were true that the appellees were in
actual occupancy of the land how come that in the investigation report made by
the land officer, the names of the appellees
as occupants thereon has never been incorporated in the said
report? The answer could be taken from
the testimony of Eusebio Abenoja,
encargado of the appellant in the hearing on June 2, 1966:
ATTY. JUBILO:
“Q – And you have seen these improvements of Mr. Cabanela
when the relocation was made by Mr. Herrera, when according to you was relocated by Mr. Herrera?
“A – We did not see them because we were passing this point (witness
pointing to a straight line, Exh.
‘C-1’ to Exh. ‘C-7’).
“Q – You have not seen the improvements because you have not reached this
place, is it not?
“A
– That is right, sir.
(tsn., pp.
48-49, hearing on June 2, 1966)
“It does appear now that Mr. Esguerra,
who submitted the report, actually was not the one who conducted the
survey. It was Mr. Herrera who conducted
the survey without even reaching the place cleared and occupied by the appellees. From this
testimony of Abenoja,
we have no alternative but to arrive at the conclusion that the property was
only a Table survey as claimed by the appellees. This testimony of Abenoja
clearly explains why the names of the appellees as
occupants of the area in litigation, have not been incorporated in the
report. Had the appellees
been duly apprised by Felicidad Bagtas
or Jose Bagtas, Jr., of the approval of the
application of Felicidad Bagtas,
way back on August 12, 1952, there would have been no reason for Cabanela to still solicit the help of Mr. Pablo Joson, to petition the late President Ramon Magsaysay for the subdivision of land occupied by the appellees, in the same way that there appears no further
necessity on the part of the appellees, through the
late Primitivo Oleta and Emigdio Pasamon to still inquire
from the Bureau of Lands as to the status of the property occupied by them, as
evidenced by the reply letter of Mr. Agapito Tagarao, officer?in-charge of said Bureau (Annex ‘A’
to the Answer) certifying the area (sic) by them as alienable and disposable as
of July 28, 1926, under Quezon Land Classification
Project No. II, BF-MAP-LC-609, the same duly marked and presented as Exh. ‘1’ for appellees.
“The occupation of the land by appellees
is further bolstered by the Report of the Commissioner duly appointed by the
trial court, wherein appears the improvements introduced by the appellees, consisting of clearings, fruit bearing trees of
different variety, some of them more than 10 years old. With the above evidence presented by the
parties, this Court is more than convinced that the appellees
had been in the actual, open and peaceful possession and cultivation of the
property before the approval of the application of Felicidad
Bagtas and that it was only upon the filing of this
instant action on February 25, 1965 that they came to know that the property
they were occupying was declared in the name of the late Felicidad
Bagtas and later by the herein plaintiff, Jose Bagtas, Jr.” (pp. 40-52, Rollo)
Again respondents in their Comment point out that the records of
the case as established by evidence show:
‘a) The letter of Mr. Agapito Tagarao, under date of 30 June, 1949, showed that there
were several claims in the sales application of the property in question of
Mrs. Felicidad Bagtas, for
which he promised to take field action.
“But no field action or investigation was taken, hence, the
rights or claims of defendants-appellees were not
heard or determined in any administrative investigation. The survey and the report were both disciplined
(sic) facilitate issuance of title. Disclosure of actual possession and
improvements of defendants-appellees would invite
protest and would amount to a denial and cancellation if not an amendment of
the Sales Application or non-issuance of title in favor of Mrs. Felicidad Vda. de
Bagtas.
‘b) The letter signed by Mr. Andres C. Ayala, Jr., Public Land
Inspector dated June 1, 1950 showed that about two-thirds (2/3) of the property
was cleared and fully cultivated with existing valuable considerable improvements,
and that some of the persons who made improvements thereat had withdrawn their
claims after finding out that Mrs. Felicidad Bagtas had filed her Sales Application.
“Mrs. Felicidad Bagtas,
the original applicant of the property considering her civil status, physical
condition and the area of 113.269 hectares (virgin forest) could not physically
and practically comply with the occupation and cultivation requirements of the
Public Land Law and what she did as the trial court found out from plaintiff’s
own witness, Anacleto Anonuevo,
reads:
‘On the testimony of Anonuevo, the
original applicant, (Mrs. Bagtas) never had any
occupancy in the property because it was then a virgin forest with an area of 113.269 hectares, which was physically
impossible for her to comply with the requirements of the Public Land Law,
unless she misrepresented that the clearings and improvements of the defendants
were hers.’ (Record on Appeal, p. 69)
“And plaintiff-appellant, Dr. Jose Bagtas,
corroborated Abenoja, and:
‘Stated further that when he was a kid he used to go to the place
when there was still no road, and it was only in 1956 after the property was
transferred to him from his mother when he learned that there have been
squatters in the area.’ (Ibid., p. 66)
“The survey whether original or relocation, should reflect and
disclose the true status and actual condition of the property and its occupants
should be stated and more importantly the investigation report must contain a faithful data. This being basic and will serve as reference
of the Bureau of Lands whether a title be issued in the name of Felicidad Vda. de
Bagtas.
“Both the Tagarao and the Ayala
Reports confirmed the existence in the area of 113.269 hectares applied for by
Mrs. Felicidad Bagtas, 25
hectares of which were occupied by defendants-appellees
(Commissioner’s Report) who should be considered bona-fide occupants having priority rights over the portion they
occupy of a public land which is alienable and disposable. This significant factual condition if
reported would have been taken cognizance of by the bureau and a valid ground
for revocation and/or amendment of application of the whole area (appellees‘ possession might have been segregated or
excluded) or (the title of Mrs. Felicidad Bagtas would not have been issued or granted.) (Annex F,
pp. 95-96, Rollo)
It is a condition precedent that at least 1/5 of the whole area
applied for should be cultivated by the applicant both in homestead as well as
in sales application. The presumption of
occupancy of Mrs. Felicidad Bagtas
after the sales award was granted to her and before the issuance of the title
on August 12, 1952 was
indeed completely refuted by the facts established and the findings of the
court during the trial as previously discussed.
The conclusive findings of the trial court establish that
defendants-appellees had occupied the subject land
prior to 1947 or earlier which is no less than five (5) years before title was
issued on August 12, 1952
in the name of Mrs. Felicidad Bagtas. When defendants-appellees
entered and occupied the land Mrs. Bagtas’ title had
not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens System and since no
title was then existing there is nothing to be verified. Notwithstanding this, these defendants-appellees, in their desire to acquire ownership of the land
they were occupying sent (a) a communication dated June 14, 1959, addressed to
the Director of Lands, Manila, inquiring whether the land occupied and
cultivated by them is actually alienable and disposable and that it should be
subdivided in their favor (Annex “B” for the defendants, R.A. p. 63) and
(b) a letter signed by Mr. Primitivo Oleta, dated April 5, 1957 sent to the Acting Chief, Forest
Land Uses Division of the Bureau of Forestry (R.A. p. 63). However, there was no action taken by the
Bureau; neither were defendants informed that the land they occupied was
already titled in the name of Mrs. Felicidad Vda. de Bagtas.
Silence or tolerance by plaintiff-appellant of the
occupation/cultivation by defendants-appellees of the
land for a period of years worked against their favor. It was only in 1964 when Cabanela
for the first time was confronted and was shown document of ownership in the
name of Dr. Jose M. Bagtas, Jr., and it was only in
1965 when the complaint was filed against defendants-appellees. Plaintiff’s considerable delay in asserting
his right before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of merit
of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right when
same is threatened or invaded.
Be it noted that in 1952 when title was issued in favor of Mrs. Bagtas, plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest, said title was
still subject to petition for review and thus, not yet final. To distract defendants-appellees
in their possession of the subject land by filing an action in court, would be
to invite protest and exposure of the misrepresentation made by plaintiff that
there were no other claimants or applicants of the land in controversy, thus
endangering approval of the application.
We find meritorious the conclusion reached by the trial court
that since plaintiff was in bad faith for having tolerated the defendants in
making improvements on his property without positive steps to eject them and
even assuming that defendants were also in bad faith for continuously planting
notwithstanding the advice of the overseer of the plaintiff, following Art.
453, Civil Code, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though
both had acted in good faith.
Hence, considering all the foregoing evidence and arguments it
has been shown that aside from the contested Commissioner’s Report there are
other credible proofs and undisputed facts relied upon both by the trial court
and the appellate court. We quote with
approval the following law and jurisprudence considered by the trial court, to
wit:
“a) In the spirit of fair play and equity, and in order to
give meaning and validity to the doctrine of Social Justice, which is enshrined
in our Constitution, let alone the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code,
it would seem to be the better part of wisdom that the defendants herein be
granted due compensation for the improvements they have done, because they are
in contemplation of law planters or possessors in good faith. (Record on Appeal, p. 70)
“b) On the truism that no one should fatten or enrich himself at
the expense of another, the plaintiff should pay, the
reasonable value of said improvements.
(Ibid., pp. 70-71)
“c) His having failed to take positive steps to
eject the defendants on his property for about 17 years is tantamount to
acquiescence or toleration for the defendants to continue making improvements. Even if the defendants are the plaintiff’s
tenants or farm hands, still following the custom of the place, which is consistent
with law and justice, he is still liable to pay said improvements. (Ibid., p. 71)
“Under Art. 447 of the New Civil
Code, the owner of the land who makes thereon personally or thru another,
plantings, construction or works with the materials of another, shall pay their
value. On our
resolution that defendants are possessors and planters in good faith, pursuant
to Art. 448, the owner of the land in which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Art. 546 and 548, x x x. (Record on
Appeal, p. 71)
“If we believe in the truism that man is not only endowed with
the natural right to exist but also the God-given right to live, in order to
give relevance to Christian brotherhood and minimize if not eradicate the
cancerous growth of communism, it is only doing simple human justice to
defendant if plaintiff pays for their improvements.” (p. 100, Rollo)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., (Chairman), In the result.
*
Penned by Justice Carlos L. Sundiam,
concurred in by Justices Pacifico P. de Castro and
Samuel F. Reyes. (Note: Motion for Reconsideration of the same
decision was denied in a Resolution of the appellate court’s Ninth Division
composed of Justices Emilio Gancayco, Samuel F. Reyes
and Carlos Sundiam.
**
Penned by Judge Union C. Kayanan
***
Petitioner herein