CALASIAO FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC., AND JOSE F. DIZON, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE CAROLINA C. GRINO-­AQUINO OF THE COURT OF…

In this appeal by Certiorari, petitioners seek to set
aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 07895-SP, which
upheld the Orders in Civil Case No. 14759 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XIX, dated January 10, 1977, order­ing the amendment of
petitioners’ Record on Appeal; and that of December 19, 1977, which diapproved
the same for not having been seasonably filed.

In said Civil Case No. 14759 entitled, “Aurora Lucero Vda.
de Sevilla vs. Calasiao Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. and
Jose F. Dizon”, private respondent was allowed by the trial Court to
present her evidence ex-parte before the Deputy Clerk of Court for
failure of petitioners’ counsel to appear for hearing on March 8, 1973.  Petitioners subsequently moved for
reconsideration on March 27, 1973, praying that they be allowed to
cross-examine respondent’s witnesses and to present their evidence.^[1]
On May 21, 1973, the trial Court modified its Order of March 8, 1973 and set
the case for hearing to receive petitioners’ evi­dence and further stated that
the cross-examination of respondent’s witnesses was deemed waived.^[2]

The Trial Court rendered judgment against petitioners on August
31, 1976.

For clarity, we outline hereunder the sequence of events and the
material dates from the time of the rendition of judgment:

Private respondent opposed the approval of the Record on Appeal
on the ground that certain Orders and pleadings had not been included
therein.  Thereafter, the following
incidents transpired:

Petitioners’ first and second Motion for Reconsideration of this
last Order were successively denied.

Petitioners resorted to Certiorari proceedings before the
Court of Appeals praying, as heretofore stated, for the nullification of the
Orders of January 10, 1977 and December 19, 1977 of the trial Court, as well as
the Orders denying their Motions for Reconsideration.  The Court of Appeals upheld the challenged
Orders and dismissed the Petition on March 30, 1979.  The reconsideration sought met with failure.

In this instance, petitioners raise the follow­ing issues:

1.  Didn’t the respondent Judge of the trial court
really commit grave abuse of discretion when she ordered the petitioner to
amend their original record on appeal by including therein, the pleadings and
orders prayed for by respondent Sevilla to be included in said record, and
inspite of the position of petitioners that said orders and pleadings are not
related to the appealed judgment and not necessary for the proper understanding
of the issues involved?

2.  Didn’t the respondent Judge of the trial court
really commit grave abuse of discretion when she disapproved petitioners’
amended record on appeal for having been filed one day late (less than one day)
and inspite of petitioners’ argument that per the existing jurisprudence, their
amended record on appeal is deemed to have been filed on the presentation of
the original record on appeal filed on time?

3.  If as stated in the fore­going, the respondent
Judge of the trial court did abuse her discretion, then, was the Honorable
Court of Appeals correct in holding that the same respondent Judge didn’t commit
even a simple abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari?

We gave due course to the Petition and after the submission by
the parties of their respective memoranda, the case was deemed submitted for
decision on October 15, 1979.

Petitioners first contend that the Orders and other pleadings
required by respondent Judge to be incorporated in their Record on Appeal are
not related to the appealed judgment, and are unnecessary for the proper
understanding of the issues involved on appeal. 
These Orders and pleadings are:

1)   Petitioners’ Manifestation and Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the trial court, dated March 8, 1973, declaring
the defendants (petitioners herein) to have waived the presentation of evidence
in their behalf and authorizing the Deputy Clerk of Court to receive the
evidence for the plaintiff (respondent herein).^[3]

2)   Motion to set for hearing the Manifestation
and Motion for Reconsideration.^[4]

3)   Order of the Court dated April 25, 1973
requiring defendants (petitioners) to submit proof of service on the plaintiff
(respondent) of their Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration.^[5]

4)   Petitioners’ Manifestation and Compliance
regarding the Order of the Court dated April 25, 1973.^[6]

5)   Respondent’s Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration.^[7]

6)   Order of the Court, dated May 21, 1973,
modifying its Order of March 8, 1973 and setting the case for the reception of
defendants’ evidence, but con­sidering as waived the cross-examination of
plaintiff’s witnesses.^[8]

We find no abuse of discretion in the Order of inclusion.  As aptly held by the Court of Appeals, under
Section 7, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court, a Trial Judge is clothed with
authority to determine the matters deemed essential for the determination of the
issues involved in the appeal.  The
Orders and pleadings complained of appear to be necessary for the proper
understanding and determination of the issues on appeal.  The Order of the trial Court authorizing the
reception of evidence by the Deputy Clerk of Court, for example, could possibly
be the basis for an assignment of error, having in mind the ruling of this
Court in Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975) discouraging reception of
evidence by Clerks of Court.  Similarly,
the Order considering the cross-examination of private respondent’s witnesses
as waived, could well be assailed on appeal. 
Moreover, enough leeway should be given appellants in respect of
incidents that should be included in a Record on Appeal for it is they who are
in a position to determine those necessary and indispensable for the successful
prosecution of their appeal, subject, of course, to the approval of the trial
Court, which should be granted unless the matters sought to be included are
obviously immaterial.  The converse
should also be followed in order to allow appellees full opportunity to refute
possible claims or arguments of appellants.

However, the disapproval of the Amended Record on Appeal must be
set aside.  As early as Vda. de Oyzon vs.
Vinzon,^[9]
this Court has ruled that when the original Record on Appeal was seasonbly
presented, the fact that the Amended Record on Appeal was filed beyond the
prescribed period does not render the perfection thereof untimely because the
Amended Record on Appeal is deemed to have been filed on the presentation of
the original.^[10]

Although there was no formal order expressly granting
petitioners’ Motion for second extension of five (5) days to file the original
Record on Appeal, the Trial Court itself in its Order, dated February 16, 1978,
acknowledged that the original Record on Appeal was seasonably filed when it
stated catego­rically that “the contention of the defendants that the
original Record on Appeal was filed on time is correct”^[11]
In ruling thus, the Trial Court must have taken into consideration the fact
that the second Motion for Extension was filed within the first period of
extension granted, and the original Record on Appeal submitted within the
extension requested.  This crucial timeliness
factor was apparently overlooked by the Appellate Court when it held that
petitioners’ original Record on Appeal was “filed four days late”^[12]
It should be concluded then that the Amended Record on Appeal in question,
although filed a day late, is deemed to have been presented upon the submission
of the original Record on Appeal, which was done within the reglementary
period.

“Amendments in pleadings do not necessarily expunge those
previously filed.  Amendments made, more
so when ordered by the court, relate back to the date of the original
complaint, if, as in the case at bar, the claim asserted in the amendment
pleading arose out of the same conduct, transaction or occur­rence.  Amendment presupposes the existence of
something to be amended and, therefore, the tolling of the period should relate
back to the filing of the pleading sought to be amended x x x x.”^[13]

Moreover, the prevailing trend in the computation of the period
of appeal is one of liberality.^[14]
Thus, this Court ruled that a six (6) day delay in the perfection of appeal
does not warrant its dismissal.^[15]
Even the delay of four (4) days in filing a notice of appeal and a motion for
extension of time to file Record on Appeal can be excused on the basis of
equity.^[16]
With more reason, the Amended Record on Appeal in question, although presented
a day late, should have been approved, considering that the same was already
before respondent Trial Court.

Dismissal of appeals based on purely technical grounds is frowned
upon as the policy of the Courts is to encourage hearing of appeals on the
merits.^[17]
Rules of procedure are intended to promote, not to defeat substantial justice,
and therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Order of January 10, 1977
ordering the amendment of the Record on Appeal, is affirmed, but the Order of
December 19, 1977 disapproving the Amended Record on Appeal for late filing, is
set aside.  The Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XIX, is hereby ordered to give due course to petitioners’
appeal.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
pp. 24-28, Court of Appeals Rollo.

^[2]
p. 39, ibid.

^[3]
pp. 24-28, ibid.

^[4]
p. 32, ibid.

^[5]
p. 33, ibid.

^[6]
pp. 34-35, ibid.

^[7]
pp. 36-38, ibid.

^[8]
p. 39, ibid.

^[9] 8
SCRA 455 (1963).

^[10]
Pajarillo vs. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 151 (1976).

^[11]
p. 61, Court of Appeals Rollo.

^[12]
p. 5, Decision.

^[13]
Phil. Ind. Church, etc. vs. Juana Mateo and I.G. Ilaño, G.R. No.
L-14793, April 28, 1961; 1 SCRA 1119, 1123 (1961).

^[14]
De las Alas vs. Court of Appeals 83 SCRA 201 (1978).

^[15]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals 83 SCRA 453 (1978).

^[16]
Ramos vs. Bagasao 96 SCRA 395 (1980).

^[17]
Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals 72 SCRA 120 (1976).