LEOPOLDO FACINAL AND SANCHA O. FACINAL, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE JUDGE AGAPITO I. CRUZ, RAMON DASAL AND DOMINGO DASAL, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus to
annul and set aside the orders^[1]
dated September 15, 1978,^[2]
November 6, 1978,^[3]
December 14, 1978^[4]
and February 5, 1979^[5]
of the then Court of First Instance of Capiz, 11th Judicial District, Branch
III in Civil Case No. M-177 (R-53) and CA-G.R. No. 13641-CR in granting
probation to private respondents Ramon Dasal and Domingo Dasal.

It appears on record that petitioners Leopoldo and Sancha Facinal
are owners of a parcel of land consisting of a fishpond covered by Tax
Declaration No. 2075 and situated at Sapian, Capiz with a total area of one
hundred and three (103) hectares, more or less.

Sometime in 1957, a portion of the aforesaid property consisting
of twenty (20) hectares, more or less, was leased to Clodualdo Jamora and
Luciana Orbion for a term of ten (10) years from the date of the execution of
the lease contract or until December 31, 1966.

Upon the expiration of the lease contract, Clodualdo Jamora and
Isagani Jamora, who subsequently acquired the leasehold rights of Luciana
Orbion, refused to vacate the leased property despite repeated demands from the
petitioner Leopoldo Facinal.

On January 15, 1968, petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against Clodualdo Jamora and Isagani Jamora with the Municipal Court
of Sapian, Capiz in Civil Case No. M-177 (R-53). After due hearing or on September 30, 1969, a decision was
rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgement is hereby rendered,
ordering the defendant Clodualdo Jamora and Isagani Jamora and all persons
claiming under them to vacate the premises mentioned and described in the
Complaint and sentencing the said defendants to pay the plaintiffs[s] the sum
of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P750.00) yearly for the use and occupation of the
fishpond in question, beginning January 1, 1963 until they vacate and surrender
the same to the plaintiff[s] and to jointly and severally pay to plaintiffs
attorney’s fees in the amount of P1,000.00 plus the costs of this action. The counterclaim of the defendants, Clodualdo
Jamora and Isagani Jamora is dismissed for lack of merit.”^[6]

On October 17, 1969, the trial court issued a writ of execution
for the aforementioned judgement.

On December 12, 1969, the sheriff, acting on said writ of
execution, ordered private respondent Ramon Dasal, who claims to be the lessee
of Clodualdo Jamora, and the caretakers of Ramon Dasal namely: Domingo Dasal and Primo Acevedo, to vacate
immediately the premises, which they did, and thereafter, placed petitioners in
possession of the land in question.

Sometime in January, 1970, Clodualdo Jamora, Isagani Jamora,
Ramon Dasal, Domingo Dasal and Primo Acevedo re-entered the fishpond in
question after the same had been delivered to petitioners and refused to vacate
said premises. Consequently,
petitioners instituted contempt proceeding against them with the then Court of
First Instance of Capiz as an incident to the appealed case interposed by
Clodualdo Jamora and Isagani Jamora from the decision of the Municipal Court of
Sapian, Capiz, which found Clodualdo Jamora, Ramon Dasol and Domingo Dasol
guilty of indirect contempt in a decision dated September 10, 1971, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this court finds Clodualdo
Jamora, Isagani Jamora, Ramon Dasal and Domingo Dasal guilty of indirect
contempt committed against the Municipal Court of Sapian, Capiz, defined and
penalized in paragraph (b), Section 3, Section 6 and 7, Rule 71, Revised Rules
of Court, beyond reasonable doubt, and hereby renders judgement imposing upon
each of them, as principals, a fine of P100.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 per day AND imprisonment of thirty (
30) days and until such time that said respondents shall have vacated and delivered
the physical possession of the property in litigation to the plaintiffs and to
pay the costs. Primo Acevedo, for lack
of sufficient evidence against him and on grounds of reasonable doubt, is
hereby acquitted of this charge.”^[7]

Meanwhile, the Court of First Instance of Capiz dismissed the
appeal interposed by Clodualdo Jamora and Isagani Jamora from the decision of
the Municipal Court of Sapian in the unlawful detainer case in view of their
failure to pursue their appeal and said decision became final.

On November 19, 1972, private respondents Ramon Dasal and Domingo
Dasal together with Alfredo Aringo, Jimmy Aringo, Antonio Olano and Ciriaco
Jamora de Alano, entered the subject property and emptied the fishpond of
crabs, shrimps and other fishes for which private respondents Ramon Dasal and
Domingo Dasal were convicted for qualified theft in a decision dated November
3, 1975 by the Court of First Instance of Capiz.

Sometime in March, 1973, private respondents filed a criminal
case against petitioner Leopoldo Facinal who had to go to Manila to seek
redress and was subsequently cleared by the Military Tribunal in a summary
investigation conducted by the latter.

Upon his return to the
subject property, petitioner found private respondents Dasals and their men to
have reentered said property again and petitioner spouses had to go to the
court for the issuance of an alias writ of execution which was granted on April
2, 1974. Thereafter, petitioners were
placed in possession of the subject property as shown in the Sheriff’s Return
Service dated April 22, 1974.

On April 23, 1974, private respondents accompanied by their men
and several heavily armed PC soldiers reentered the subject property and
violently drove out petitioners who have been in actual and physical possession
of said property compelling the latter to file another contempt proceeding
against private respondents on June 23, 1974 with the Court of First Instance
of Capiz.

On July 8, 1977, the Court of Appeals^[8]
affirmed the trial court’s Order in finding respondents Ramon Dasal and Domingo
Dasal guilty of indirect contempt.

After the record of CA-G.R. No. 13641-CR was remanded to the
court of origin, private respondents applied for probation with said court
which was denied on June 15, 1978 on the following grounds, to wit:

“This Court in its Order dated February 16, 1978 has made it a
condition for the grant of probation the vacation and physical delivery of the
property in litigation to plaintiff Leopoldo Facinal. Without said delivery, respondents would be in a state of
continuous defiance of the decision which has become final and executory, and
the terms of imprisonment of the decision affirmed in CA GR No. 13641-CR by the
Court of Appeals might be more than 6 years as the decision states “imprisonment
of thirty days and until such time that said respondents shall have vacated and
delivered the physical possession of the property in litigation to
plaintiffs”.

“Since no delivery of the property in litigation has been
shown, the Court is constrained to deny as it hereby denies the petition for
probation of RAMON DASAL and DOMINGO DASAL who are hereby committed to prison
for the period stated in the decision in CA-G.R. No. 13641 dated July 8,
1977.”^[9]

Upon private respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration, the trial
court granted said motion in an Order dated September 15, 1978, the pertinent
portion of which reads:

“It therefore, become [sic] indubitable that Leopoldo Facinal
was in possession of the property in litigation sometime between January 1970 and
April 23, 1973 [1974]. Hence after the
contemptuous acts committed by the Dasals in the second week of January,
Leopoldo Facinal again repossessed the property in litigation. If he was already in possession why should
possession be ordered delivered again to him? But Leopoldo Facinal was again dispossessed of the property — the
Dasals were not found in the decision of the Court of Appeals guilty of
contempt for this subsequent dispossession.

“ACCORDINGLY, the order of this Court dated January 15, 1978
denying probation to petitioners is reconsidered and set aside, and another is
hereby entered granting probation subject to the conditions contained in the
corresponding order.”^[10]

On November 6, 1978, the trial court denied petitioners’ Motion
for Reconsideration.

Acting on petitioners’ notice of appeal, respondent judge on
December 14, 1978, disapproved said appeal on the ground that an order granting
probation is non-appealable.

On February 5, 1979, respondent judge denied petitioners’ Motion
for Reconsideration which was filed on December 29, 1978.

Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondent judge in granting probation to private respondents
notwithstanding the fact that private respondents are still in possession of
the subject property.

We find the petition meritorious.

Although private respondents would ordinarily be entitled to
probation after their conviction in a contempt proceedings since they are not
expressly disqualified under the probation law, considering however that their
conviction was the result of their continued defiance of the court’s order,
private respondents have not shown that repentance nor a predisposition to
rehabilitation or reformation which the probation law sought to achieve. They have defied the Court’s order not only
once or twice but five times, showing their contempt and disrespect for court
orders and processes.

Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 968 provides:

“SEC. 2. Purpose —
This Decree shall be interpreted so as to:

“(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by
providing him with individualized treatment;

“(b) provide an
opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less
probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and

“(c) prevent the commission of offenses.”

Clearly, therefore, the purpose of probation is reformative in
nature and not preventive and is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.^[11]

On the other hand, the punishment for contempt of court is a
remedial, preservative or coercive act, rather than a vindictive or punitive
one, and is imposed for the benefit of complainant or the other party to the
suit who has been injured, and its object is to compel obedience to, or the
performance of, the court’s orders or decrees, which the contemnor refuses to
obey although able to do so, and thus, to secure, preserve, vindicate, enforce,
or advance the rights of such private parties, as well as to vindicate
the court’s authority.^[12]

In the instant case, private respondents were declared in
contempt of court when they repeatedly refused to comply with the final
decision of the trial court which ordered them to vacate the subject property.

In granting private respondent’s application for probation,
respondent judge noted that while admittedly private respondents are still in
possession of the subject property, petitioners were also in possession of said
property between January, 1970 and April 23, 1974, consequently, the respondent
judge is of the opinion that the subsequent re-entry of the private respondents
in the subject property should be the subject matter of another contempt
proceeding since this subsequent dispossession is not the act for which the respondents
were held in contempt for. The
condition, therefore, imposed by the trial court as a pre-requisite for the
approval of respondents’ probation, that is, that respondents vacate and
deliver the subject property to the petitioners would not be applicable.

We do not share respondent judge’s opinion on the matter,
inasmuch as the private respondents have not yet complied with the final
decision of the court below, as they are still in possession of the subject
property. Respondent judge should not have
granted probation to the private respondents until the latter have permanently
vacated and delivered said property to petitioners. Precisely, because of private respondents blatant refusal to obey
the final order of the court that they were cited for indirect contempt.

To require petitioners to file another contempt proceeding
against private respondents for subsequent dispossession would not only be time
consuming but would practically condone the continuous defiance by private
respondents of a final decision of a court of record. As long as private respondents have not complied with the orders
of the Court they are in a state of indirect contempt. They cannot make a mockery of court
processes and get away with it.

Procedural rules are
intended only as an aid to justice and not as a means for its frustration. Technicalities should always give way to the
realities of the situation and should not in any way adversely affect the
substantial rights of a party as in the case at bar. As aptly observed by the petitioners in its memorandum:

“[T]o require petitioners to proceed still with their motion
for contempt which they filed in 1974 and still pending up to the present is to
require them to undergo a vicious cycle with no end at sight draining their stamina
and finances. Previous alias writ of
execution had already proved inutile. Private respondents had no care for them. Their conviction for qualified theft did not reduce their
obstinacy and audacity.

“Courts sit as ones of equity and justice. It would be in conformity with its assigned
task if this Honorable Court reverses respondent judge Order of September 15,
1978 allowing private respondents probation notwithstanding their noncompliance
of their civil liability to petitioners, i.e., to vacate the subject
fishpond. For in so doing and allowing
probation only until such time private respondents surrender the premises in
question to petitioners, the following shall have been achieved:

“1. It emphasizes that ejectment suit is summary
in character and in a short period of time for its termination, the winning
party must enjoy the fruit of his victory.

“Unlike in this case, the ejectment proceeding started in
1968, it has yet to end although petitioners have long won their legal battle
against private respondents who to date have been in possession of the fishpond
and enjoying the fruits thereof. The
summary character of petitioners’ ejectment suit will be further frustrated if
they being in their twilight years, die without it being ended by them being
restored into possession of the property in question.

“2. Public policy will be served. It will give finis to the case sparing
parties especially herein petitioners from tension and anxiety of court
litigations. This is not to mention
that they will be relieved from the consequential and pernicious effect of
their being drained of their stamina and resources.

“As clearly shown, the ejectment proceeding which started in
1968 by petitioners against private respondents despite the former having won
therein has ramified into various contentious litigations, criminal or
otherwise, yet, to date, although victorious, they have yet to wait for a
miracle in order that they can take back possession of their property.

“3. The rule of law will be upheld. Private respondents succeeded in frustrating
judicial orders because for one reason or another they had, and still they
have, the support of unscrupulous government officials and abusive Military
men. Judicial declaration of this
Honorable Courts requiring private respondents to surrender possession of the
premises to petitioners before they should be allowed probation wilt delineate
the demarcation line up to which government officials and military men in Capiz
would act. In such a way also, it will
upheld the supremacy of the civilian over the military.”^[13]

Furthermore, this court has always held that in meritorious
cases, a liberal not literal interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and
technicalities should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent of the
rules which is the proper and just determination of litigations.”^[14]
To require otherwise would render nugatory the efficacy of a final decision and
make a mockery of our judicial processes since the losing party can always use
technicality to circumvent the enforcement of a decision as in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the
questioned Orders of the respondent judge are hereby set aside. Respondent Judge is further ordered to
execute the contempt Order of September 10, 1971 until private respondents
shall have vacated the land in litigation. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., no part.

^[1]
Penned by Judge Agapito I. Cruz.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 66-70.

^[3]
Id., at p. 77.

^[4]
Id., at p. 83.

^[5]
Id., at p. 86.

^[6]
Rollo, p. 32.

^[7]
Id., at pp. 29-30.

^[8]
CA-G.R. No. 13641-CR with Justice Lorenzo Relova as ponente and
Justice Ricardo C. Puno and Justice Guardson R. Lood, concurring.

^[9]
Id., at p. 46.

^[10]
Id., at pp. 66, 69-70.

^[11]
Tolentino vs. Alconcel, 121 SCRA
92.

^[12]
Victorino vs. Espiritu, No.
L-17735, July 30,1962.

^[13]
Rollo, p. 198.

^[14]
Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 188
SCRA 23.