G.R. No. 50526. December 04, 1991
CASIMIRO V. ARKONCEL, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF CASIMIRO F. ARKONCEL, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ALFREDO J. LAGAMON, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CFI OF DA…
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction seeking that the orders of respondent judge dated December 13, 1978 and January 12, 1979 in Special Case No.
2079, Court of First Instance of Davao City, be declared null and void and set
aside, with costs against the respondent Investors’ Finance Corporation (FNCB
Finance).
The order dated December
13, 1978 reads:
“The Compromise Agreement forged between the Intestate Estate
of Casimiro F. Arkoncel, Sr.,
represented by its administrator, Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr., and the FNCB
Finance Corporation, having become final and executory, the motion for
execution filed by the plaintiff thru counsel should be, as it is hereby,
granted.
WHEREFORE, let a writ of execution issue forthwith.”
The order of January 12,
1979 denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner for
lack of merit.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
The late Casimiro F. Arkoncel died intestate on July 20, 1976 at Davao
City (his residence at the time of
his death), leaving behind an estate with a probable value of about
P241,020.00. On November 24, 1976, a petition for letters of
administration seeking, among others, for the appointment of the widow Maria V.
Vda. de Arkoncel as administrator over the intestate estate of the deceased,
was filed by one of the heirs,
Nenita C. Valdez, and docketed as Special Case No. 2079 in the Court of First
Instance of Davao City, Branch I. All
the other heirs manifested their conformity to the appointment of the surviving
spouse, Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel.
In the order dated April
1, 1977, the intestate Court*
identified the heirs of the deceased Casimiro F. Arkoncel as Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel, widow; Casimiro V.
Arkoncel, Jr., son; Florencio V. Arkoncel, son; Maria V. Arkoncel, daughter;
and Nenita Carpio Valdez, daughter, but appointed Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr.,
the eldest son, as the judicial administrator without bond instead of Maria V.
Vda. de Arkoncel, the widow and ordered the issuance to him of letters of
administration. In the same order, the
Court of First Instance allowed him one year within which to dispose of the
estate and to pay the debts of
the deceased. The letters of administration
issued on April 11, 1977
gives Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr., petitioner herein, full authority as
Administrator of the estate of Casimiro F. Arkoncel, to take possession of all
the property of said deceased and to perform all other acts necessary for the
preservation of said property.
On July 5, 1977, the intestate court issued an order giving
notice to all persons having money claims against the decedent Casimiro F.
Arkoncel, “arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses of the
last sickness of the said decedent, and judgment for money against him to file
them in the Office of the Clerk of Court within six (6) months after the date
of the first publication of the notice” in the Mindanao Mail, a newspaper
of general circulation in the City and Province of Davao, wherein the notice was to be published once a week for
three consecutive weeks.
In compliance with the order of the intestate court, FNCB
Finance, respondent herein, filed on October
7, 1977 with the court a quo its claim against the estate
for the payment of certain debts incurred by the decedent during his lifetime,
in the following amounts:
Principal sum
——————— P44,438.00
Interests
—————————- (to
be computed later at 14% p.a.)
Attorney’s
fees——————– 11,109.50
Liquidated
damages———— 4,443.38
On January 9, 1978,
petitioner herein, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Casimiro
F. Arkoncel and the claimant FNCB Finance, assisted by their respective
counsels, entered into an amicable settlement, under the following terms and
conditions:
“1. That the Judicial Administrator admits the
claim of herein claimant against the estate, as follows:
a) P44,438.00 –
representing the outstanding principal balance of the Torana car purchased for
the use and benefit of the decedent Casimiro F. Arkoncel and financed by herein
claimant;
b) Interest on the
outstanding principal balance from the date of default in the payment of the
latter on April 12, 1977
until fully paid at the rate of 14% per annum;
c) P11,109.50 or 25%
of the outstanding principal balance as and for attorney’s fees;
d) Costs of and
expenses in this suit in the amount of P200.00;
2. That
the claimant, with the conformity of its counsel, is willing to reduce, as it
hereby reduces, its claims for attorney’s fees to 15% of the principal balance
or to P6,665.70.” (Rollo, p. 35)
The intestate Court approved the amicable settlement in an order
dated May 17, 1978, directing the parties to strictly comply with the terms
thereof and the Judicial Administrator, “to pay the amounts agreed upon
out of the estate funds and/or properties within 30 days from receipt” of
the said order (Rollo, p. 37).
It appears that the Judicial Administrator, petitioner herein,
was served thru counsel a copy of the aforementioned order on September 17, 1978 but the claim of
private respondent had remained unpaid thirty (30) days after. Thus, on November 25, 1978 private respondent filed with the
intestate court a motion for execution praying for the issuance of a writ of
execution to satisfy its claims (Rollo, p. 39) which was opposed by petitioner
(Rollo, p. 42).
Acting on the motion, respondent judge issued the questioned
order of December 13, 1978
granting the motion for execution and the issuance of a writ of execution. The motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner on December 28, 1978 was denied by respondent judge for lack of
merit in an order dated January 12, 1979 holding that “the order of this
Court dated May 17, 1979 approving the amicable settlement voluntarily entered
into by the parties x x x is a perfectly valid order which was a decision in
itself based on the compromise agreement” (Rollo, p. 57). Hence, this petition filed with the Court by
petitioner on May 15, 1979.
On July 9, 1979,
the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.
After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the
Court declared the case submitted for decision on September 28, 1979.
On March 7, 1988,
the Court resolved to require the parties to move in the premises within 30
days from notice; otherwise the case shall be considered terminated and
closed. In compliance with the same
Resolution, petitioner, on May 13,
1988, manifested that there exists no supervening events (that have
taken place in the interim) that may have rendered the case moot and academic
(Rollo, p. 96). Private respondent
manifested that as matters stand, as between the petitioner and the private
respondent, the instant case is now ripe
for disposition. It also brought to the
attention of the Court the fact that the issue in the instant case is one of
the errors assigned by the petitioner in his appeal from the decision in Civil
Case No. 2079 to the Court of Appeals, which was docketed and considered by the
latter Court under AC-G.R. CV No. 04426, the two other issues being (a) that
the trial court erred in not finding that the Officer-in-Charge of the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Court a quo (formerly Davao Court of First
Instance, Branch I) is not authorized by law to cause to be issued the
controversial alias writ of execution; and (b) that the trial court erred in not finding that when a subject
matter is pending before the Supreme Court, such as the present petition for certiorari,
the court a quo should refrain from issuing implementing orders on the
questioned subject-matter (Rollo, p. 99).
The Third Division of the Court to which the case was transferred
on May 30, 1988 (Rollo, p.
109) resolved to note the manifestations of both parties in its Resolution of June 22, 1988.
The sole issue of the case is:
“WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION FOR THE PAYMENT OF A DEBT IN AN ADMINISTRATION
PROCEEDINGS.” (Rollo, p. 76).
What transpired after the case was elevated to the Court in this
instant certiorari case is described by the appellate Court in its
decision in AC-G.R. No. 04426, as follows:
“x x x Motion
for Reconsideration having been denied, the administrator elevated the issue as
G.R. No. 50526, Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr. etc. v. Hon. Judge Alfredo G.
Lagamon, etc. et al., on certiorari with preliminary injunction to the
Supreme Court which initially required comments. Prior to the elevation, appellee filed
motion for alias writ of execution. The
Supreme Court required comments, thereafter, the intestate court granted the
motion for alias writ which was issued over the signature of the Officer-in-Charge
of the Office of the Davao Court of First Instance Clerk of Court.
Pursuant to the alias writ, the Davao Provincial Sheriff caused
levy to be made on a piece of property with an area of 1,136 square meters
under TCT No. 2436 (T-1339) which forms part
of the estate.
The Supreme Court gave due course but did not issue an injunction.
The Provincial Sheriff thereafter sold the property at public
auction at which the appellee was the highest bidder.
Before expiry of the redemption, the administrator filed this case
for the declaration of nullity of certain proceedings, damages and preliminary injunction x x x.”
The aforementioned supervening events form the bases of the
appeal made to the appellate court but the third assigned error which is
“that the trial court erred in not finding that a writ of execution is not
the property remedy/procedure to satisfy money claims or for the payment of
debts before an intestate court in an administration proceedings” (Rollo,
p. 104), is the same issue brought before the Court in this instant case. The appellate court, however, aware of the
pending issue before the Court, made no ruling on this issue. It simply declared:
“The issue in this error (sic) is squarely raised in G.R. No.
50526, supra, where decision still pends. Carefully mindful of the fact that the
Supreme Court is the final arbiter of dispute, we refrain from passing judgment
upon the issue brought up by this assignment.
As a matter of practice, it is more advisable in a situation like this
one to defer to the Supreme Court. It is
not inconceivable that our appreciation may run counter to the Supreme Court
decision in which event it will be for naught anyway. And, in any case, whatever may be the ruling
from this Court on the issue will provide no comfort to either the appellant or
the appellees both of whom must await the Supreme Court decision on the
matter.” (Rollo, p. 106).
There is indeed a need for the Court to rule squarely on the
issue.
The Judicial Administrator voluntarily entered into an amicable
settlement with the claimant FNCB Finance.
He was not only assisted by counsel but the agreement itself was
confirmed by the other heirs, the widow Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel, Florencio V.
Arkoncel and Maria V. Arkoncel (Mesias).
The other heir, Nenita C. Valdez, was represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact David O. Montano who is at the same time counsel for the other
heirs and the judicial administrator.
The agreement was submitted to the intestate court for approval and it
was duly approved by the court a quo in an order dated May 17, 1978
which incorporated the conditions therein.
The court approves a compromise agreement when not contrary to law,
morals or public policy and renders judgment in accordance therewith (Jose v.
Chem Samco and Sons, Inc., 125 SCRA 142 [1983]; Alejandro v. Philippine
Airlines, 127 SCRA 660 [1984]). In the
instant case, judgment was rendered in consonance with the compromise agreement
and the parties were enjoined to comply with and abide by its terms and
conditions (Gravador v. Elbinias, 126 SCRA 205 [1983]; G & S Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA 212 [1983]; National Housing Authority v. Abaya, 129
SCRA 412 [1984]).
There is no merit to the petition.
The rule is that a judgment rendered in accordance with a
compromise agreement is immediately executory unless a motion is filed to set aside the agreement on the
ground of fraud, mistake or duress in which case an appeal may be taken against
the order denying the motion (De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 730
[1985]; Zagala v. Jimenez, 152 SCRA 148 [1987]). It then becomes ministerial for the lower
court to order the execution of its final executory judgment (Service
Specialists Incorporated v. Sheriff of Manila, 145 SCRA 139 [1986]; Landicho v.
Tensuan, 151 SCRA 410 [1987]).
Even more than a contract which may be enforced by ordinary
action for specific performance, the compromise agreement is part and parcel of
the judgment, and may therefore be enforced as such by a writ of execution
(Tria v. Lirag, 1 SCRA 1207 [1961]; Osmena v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 17 SCRA
828 [1966]; Paredes v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 501 [1984]).
Finally, when the terms of an amicable settlement are violated,
as in the case at bar, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to move for its
execution (Valdez v. Octaviano, 1 SCRA 744 [1961]; Paredes v. Court of Appeals,
132 SCRA 501 [1984]).
Petitioners claim that properties in custodia legis may
not be the proper subject of a writ of execution to satisfy a claim; that what
private respondent could have done was to ask the Court a quo for an
order requiring the administrator to pay the debt and only if there are no sufficient funds on hand to pay the debt
may the court order the sale of the properties and out of the proceeds, to pay
the debt. This argument is untenable
inasmuch as the dispositive portion of the very order approving the amicable
settlement directs the judicial administrator to pay the claim of FNCB Finance
out of the funds and/or properties of the estate, to wit:
“Conformably, the Judicial Administrator is hereby directed to
pay out of the estate funds and/or
properties the amounts agreed upon within 30 days from receipt hereof.”
Nevertheless, petitioner Judicial Administrator chose not to
comply with said order. Inasmuch as the
compromise agreement is part and parcel of the judgment and may, therefore, be
enforced as such by a writ of execution, the respondent judge committed no
reversible error in issuing the questioned writ of execution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr., and
Romero, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), on
leave.
* Presided over by Judge Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. (presently
retired)