🎧 Case Brief Lecture

FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ REPIDE, GENERAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LIMITED, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MARTIN ASTUAR ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND…

G.R No. 505. April 08, 1902 April 8, 1902

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Repide versus Astuar

The Case

This is Repide versus Astuar, an early Philippine decision on the nature of judicial possession under Title Thirteen of Book Three of the old Code of Civil Procedure. The Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, through its general administrator Francisco Gutierrez Repide, asked the Court of First Instance of Cavite to place it in judicial possession of two sugar estates, Naic and Tanza. The tenants and residents of those towns objected. The question that reaches us is whether a proceeding for judicial possession is a mere voluntary or non-contentious matter that runs its course despite objection, or whether the objection of an actual occupant converts it into a contentious suit that must stop. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between a summary administrative placing of possession and the constitutional guarantee that no one be deprived of what he holds without being heard in court.

Procedural History

On the twentieth of June 1901, the company's attorney filed with the Court of First Instance of Cavite a petition under Title Thirteen of Book Three of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying that the company be placed in judicial possession of the estates of Naic and Santa Cruz. On the twenty-seventh of June the court granted the prayer and directed the justices of the peace of Naic and Santa Cruz to carry out the order. The justice of the peace of Santa Cruz suspended proceedings when the local president, the military commander, and some two hundred inhabitants protested. The justice of the peace of Naic likewise met refusal from the local president, who held the hydraulic machinery, and received a written protest from more than two hundred residents who said they occupied part of the land. Formal protests were filed with the Court of First Instance, which ordered a provisional suspension. On the twelfth of September 1901 the Court of First Instance entered judgment declaring the matter contentious. The petitioner appealed, the appeal was admitted, and the case came to the Supreme Court by ordinary appeal.

Facts

The company claimed two estates. The hacienda of San Isidro Labrador, or Naic, covered more than seven thousand nine hundred seventy-eight hectares, part planted to palay, part to sugar cane, part laid out as building lots, and more than three thousand hectares uncultivated. The hacienda of Santa Cruz, or Tanza, was put to the same uses and carried a stock farm. The petition asked that possession be given in the towns of Naic and Santa Cruz, that placards be posted to inform the tenants, and that the military officers occupying the principal building and warehouse at Naic, and the occupant of the hydraulic mill, be required to recognize the company as possessor. No demand was asked against any other tenant or occupant.

When the justice of the peace of Santa Cruz moved to give possession, the local president, the military commander, and some two hundred inhabitants appeared and protested that they would not recognize the company's representative. The justice of the peace suspended and asked for instructions. The court directed him to record the protest, and later ordered suspension. At Naic the local president, following the municipal council, refused to deliver the hydraulic machinery or to recognize the company. More than two hundred residents filed a protest stating that they occupied part of the land and asking that the company be required to assert its rights in an ordinary action.

On the thirtieth of August 1901, before the order of suspension reached him, the justice of the peace of Naic proceeded to give possession in the public plaza, reading the order aloud and inviting the company's representative to enter upon and leave the lands. Some inhabitants opposed the act, and twenty-eight of them filed a written protest. On the twelfth of September the Court of First Instance declared the matter contentious, and the company appealed.

Issues

  • Whether or not article 1800 of the Law of Civil Procedure applies to proceedings commenced under Title Thirteen, such that when objection is made the matter must be declared contentious.
  • Whether or not the opposition made in this case was sufficient to put an end to the proceeding for judicial possession.

Applicable Provisions

Article 430 of the Civil Code provides:

Possession includes the idea of occupation, and except in the cases mentioned in article 444, the possession can not exist without it.

This anchors the Court's premise that the possession conferred under Title Thirteen is real possession, which requires occupation or occupancy in the owner's name.

Article 440 of the Civil Code provides:

Every occupant has the right to be respected in his possession.

This protects the bare possessor and is the source of his standing to object.

Article 441 of the Civil Code provides:

He who believes that he has a right to deprive another of the possession of a thing must seek the aid of the proper authority if the occupant objects to the delivery.

This tells us that the proper authority is the court of contentious jurisdiction, not the summary proceeding.

Article 446 of the Civil Code provides that the bare possessor disturbed in his possession may bring the action to retain or to recover, according to the circumstances. This confirms that eviction through the summary proceeding would itself generate a cause of action in the occupant.

Article 1800 of the Law of Civil Procedure provides that if opposition is made by anyone who has an interest in the matter, the suit will be made contentious. This is the procedural bridge that converts the voluntary proceeding into a contentious one.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that article 1800 does apply to Title Thirteen. The possession contemplated by that title is the possession of the Civil Code, which includes occupation. If the land is vacant, the petitioner may be placed in possession. If a third person holds it and recognizes the petitioner as owner, the petitioner acquires civil possession through that person. But where a third person is in actual occupation and refuses to abandon the land or to recognize the petitioner, the proceeding must end. The Court reasoned that the officer has no right to evict by force, and that the occupant's refusal is enough regardless of the titles he may show. The Court said:

We therefore hold that if, either before or in the act of giving possession in accordance with Title XIII, the bare possessor objects to the proceeding, it must be made contentious.

The Court added that no particular form of opposition is required; it is enough that the occupant is opposed to the delivery. The phrase "without prejudice to third persons" in article 2016 refers to third persons other than the occupant, because giving possession to the petitioner necessarily takes it from the one in possession.

On the second issue, the Court held that the opposition was sufficient. Had the petitioner asked each tenant to recognize him as owner, the tenants could have refused, and that refusal alone would have sufficed. The tenants who were not asked did all they could: a great number made their opposition known to the justice of the peace, and more than two hundred filed a written protest with the Court of First Instance. They were real occupants with an interest in the matter. The Court found it unnecessary to pass on the municipality's protest. As to the scope of the suspension, the Court held that once a sufficient opposition covered part of the lands, the petitioner should have amended his petition to omit those lands; failing that, the whole matter was properly made contentious, and the fault was his.

Doctrine

Judicial possession under Title Thirteen of Book Three of the Code of Civil Procedure is a proceeding of voluntary jurisdiction that confers the possession defined in the Civil Code, which includes occupation. It cannot operate against an actual occupant who objects. The objection of the bare possessor, made before or at the act of giving possession and in no particular form, terminates the voluntary proceeding and requires the court to declare the matter contentious under article 1800 of the Law of Civil Procedure. The petitioner must then assert his rights in an ordinary action against the occupant, for every occupant has the right to be respected in his possession under article 440, and he who would deprive another of possession must seek the aid of the proper authority under article 441. The phrase "without prejudice to third persons" protects persons other than the occupant, not the occupant himself.

Disposition

The order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite declaring the matter contentious was affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the objection of the bare possessor, in any form, ends the voluntary proceeding for judicial possession and makes the matter contentious. Examiners use this case to test the limits of summary judicial possession and the occupant's right to be heard before eviction.