G.R. No. 50433. November 13, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CIPRIANO BARBA Y DORIA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On 3 March 1977,
an information was filed in the Criminal Circuit Court of Manila charging
Cipriano Barba y Doria, alias “Perry Barba”, with the crime of murder
committed as follows:
x x x
“That on or about February 10, 1977, at nighttime purposely
sought to better accomplish his criminal design, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one MAGDALENA
JULIANO Y SULTAN ALIAS MAGGIE, by then and there stabbing her with a bladed
instrument on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon the said
MAGDALENA JULIANO Y SULTAN ALIAS MAGGIE mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”[1]
Upon arraignment on 7
March 1977, the accused, then assisted by counsel de officio,
entered a plea of not guilty.
After trial on the merits, with the accused represented by his
counsel de parte, the trial court promulgated on 21 March 1979 a decision,[2]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused, Cipriano Barba
y Doria, alias PERRY BARBA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, and crediting him with
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which offsets the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime, hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of
Magdalena Sullano (sic) y Sultan in the sum of P12,000.00; to suffer all the
accessory penalties; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.”
Unable to accept the decision, accused, hereinafter referred to
as Appellant, interposed the instant appeal.
In his Brief, he assigns the following errors:[3]
“I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF
APPELLANT ‘OF THE CRIME OF MURDER, QUALIFIED BY TREACHERY AND EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION COMMITTED DURING THE NIGHTTIME WHICH HE PURPOSELY SOUGHT THE
BETTER TO ACCOMPLISH HIS CRIMINAL INTENT’.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED AND IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT.”
The operative facts and circumstances surrounding the commission
of the crime charged are summarized by the trial court as follows:
“EVIDENCE
FOR THE PROSECUTION
The evidence in chief for the prosecution is articulated through
eight (8) witnesses, namely: Rosalie Zafra, Nenita Tolentino, Dr. Angelo
Singian, Alexander Roman, Antonio Villegas, Renato Abaya, Eduardo Sison and
Pfc. Florencio Munar. Shorn of its
unnecessary details, the said evidence tends to prove the following facts:
The Victim. – The deceased,
Magdalena Juliano y Sultan who was nicknamed Maggie, 30 years old and single,
was employed as a service attendant at the Coffee Shop of the Philippine Plaza
Hotel. She has been working there since
the said hotel opened on September 27,
1976. She had for her
closest friends among her co-workers, Rosalie Zafra who was the receptionist in
the coffee shop, and Nenita Tolentino, another service attendant with whom she
boarded in an apartment located at 1827 Tiago Street in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Her friendship with these two, Rosalie Zafra
and Nenita Tolentino, was such that she has confided to them her past; that she
once lived with the accused, Cipriano Barba, nicknamed Perry, without the benefit
of marriage, but that she has separated from him because she has found out that
Perry was a married man and with children, and because whenever Perry who was a
heavy drinker, got drunk, he would maltreat her. She further confided that she was avoiding
Perry who was then insisting that they resume their living together.
The death of Maggie.
– On the night of February 9, 1977,
the two boardmates. Magdalena Juliano
and Nenita Tolentino, went home together after their tour of duty ended at
about 11:30 o’clock. They actually left the premises of the
Philippine Plaza Hotel at about 12:00 o’clock,
midnight, in an owner-type jeep with
one, Exequiel Yuzon, a suitor to Magdalena and another
named Caloy who was driving the jeep.
Upon reaching the corner of Isagani and Tiago streets, the two girls
alighted and walked home. Exequiel and
Caloy then drove away.
The two girls arrived at their apartment at about 12:55 o’clock a.m.. Five minutes later, while still on the ground
floor thereof, they heard successive knocks on their door, accompanied by a
man’s voice who (sic) introduced himself as ‘JIM’. Nenita and Magdalena refused to open the door
as house rules forbade them to accept visitors at that late hour and when they
told the caller that they did not know anyone by that name, the insistent
caller continued to knock on the door and announced that he was ‘PERRY’, x x x
(The caller peeped through the glass jalousie window, moved the curtain aside
through the jalousie and was thus recognized by Nenita to be Perry Barba who was then wearing a white
polo.) x x x The knocking continued but the girls ignored the same. Nenita then told Magdalena
to go upstairs, which the latter did, while she went to the comfort room (at
the ground floor). While there Nenita
sensed that somebody went downstairs and opened the door which slammed with a
loud noise when it closed. (Even while
in the comfort room, Nenita could hear Magdalena and
Perry quarreling outside.) Getting out of the comfort room, Nenita went
upstairs and saw Magdalena’s ring, wrist watch and
college ring on the latter’s empty bed.
Through the open window she heard Perry and Maggie talking in loud
voices and a little later, she heard shouts from Maggie asking for help like
‘Aray! Aray! Tulungan ninyo ako!’ and other words to that effect. Looking out of the window facing the street,
she saw Perry and Maggie on the sidewalk just outside the gate leading to the
apartment, with Perry (apparently) slapping both sides of Maggie’s face with
the latter shouting ‘Aray! Aray!’ until her view of them became obstructed by
the gate. Then she heard people shouting
to the effect that Maggie was stabbed, so she and her other roommates who were
awakened by the shouts, ran downstairs and to the street where they saw Maggie
sprawled and bloodied just outside the gate.
The dying Maggie was brought to the Chinese
General Hospital
in a jeep where she was pronounced dead on arrival.
The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Angelo S. Singian, Chief,
Medico-Legal Officer of the Western Police district, who reported the following
Postmortem Findings as contained in Exhibit “H”.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1)
Stab wound of the face piercing
the right ala nasi as the point of entry going obliquely backwards, upwards and
lacerally to the left zygamatic area traversing a path of 5 cm. in length in
the subcutaneous tissue.
2)
a) Point of Entry measures 1.7 cm. x 0.5 cm.
b)
Point of exit measures 1.7 cm. x
0.4 cm.
Stab
wound of the face immediately below the left nostril and measuring 1.2 cm. x
0.3 cm. x 1 cm. piercing deep into the bone in a right angle trajectory.
3)
Stab wound, neck, right anterior,
level of the cricoid cartilage and measuring 3.4 cm. x 0.5 cm. x 9.5 cm. and
course is slightly downwards, backwards, and medially cutting the right common
carotid artery.
4)
Stab wound, thru and thru,
proximal 3rd of right arm, lateral as the point of entry going obliquely
upwards, slightly forwards and medially, traversing a path of 6 cm. in length
in the subcutaneous tissue.
a. Point of entry measures 2.5 cm. x 0.8 cm.
b. Point of exit measures 1.7 x 0.8 cm.
5)
Penetrating stab wound of the
chest, right level of the 4th intercostal space lateral to the right,
midelavicular line and measuring 2 cm. x 0.8 cm. x 11 cm. Course is obliquely backwards and slightly
downwards and medially cutting 4th rib and piercing the lower lobe of the right
lung.
6)
Penetrating stab wound of the
chest, left, level of the 4th intercostal space, lateral to the left
parasternal line and measuring 2.3 cm. x 0.8 cm. x 10 cm. Course is obliquely backwards and slightly
downwards and laterally perforating the diaphragm.
7)
Stab wound, left arm, distal 3rd,
anterior measuring 2 cm. x 0.7 cm. x 11.5 cm.
Course is obliquely upwards, slightly backwards and medially piercing
the bicep muscle.
8)
Stab wound, thru and thru proximal
3rd of the left forearm, anterior as the point of entry going obliquely
downwards, slightly backwards and medially traversing a path of 5 cm. in length
piercing through the anterior muscle of the left forearm.
9)
Incise wound, right hypothenar
surface and measuring 1 cm. x 0.5 cm. involving the subcutaneous tissue.
10)
Stab wound, right arm, middle 3rd,
lateral and measuring 2.5 cm. x 0.8 cm. x 12 cm. Course is obliquely downwards, forwards and
medially.
11)
Incise wound, right forearm,
distal 3rd, posterior and measuring 4 cm. x 1.3 cm. involving the subcutaneous
tissue.
12)
Stab wound, left arm, proximal
3rd, lateral and measuring 3 cm. x 1.3 cm. x 11.5 cm. Course is obliquely downwards, forwards and
slightly medial piercing the left deltoid muscle.
13)
Stab wound, thru and thru middle
3rd, lateral and a little posterior as the point of entry going traversely
inwards and slightly upwards, traversing a path of 6 cm. in length piercing the
tricep muscle.
a.
Point of entry measures 3.5 cm. x
1 cm.
b. Point of exit measures 2.4 x 0.5 cm.
14)
Penetrating stab wound of the
chest, left midaxillary line, 6th left intercoastal space and measuring 3 cm. x
0.7 cm. x 11 cm. Course is obliquely
downwards, forwards and medially perforating the left dome of the diaphragm
with evisceration of the portion of the descending colon.
15)
Non-penetrating stab wound of the
posterior chest wall, 3 cm. left of the midline, level of the inferior angle of
the left scapula and measuring 1.8 cm. x 0.5 cm. x 4 cm. Course is obliquely upwards, slightly
forwards and medially piercing the muscle of the left inter scapular area.
16)
Non-penetrating stab wound, of the
posterior chest wall, 5 cm. x left (sic) of the midline, level of the 12th
thoracic vertebra and measuring 2 cm. x 0.5 cm. x 7.5 cm. Course is obliquely upwards slightly forwards
and medially and piercing the muscle superficially.
17)
Non-penetrating stab wound of the
posterior chest wall, right posterior axillary line, level of the inferior
angle of the right scapula and measuring 3.5 cm. x 1 cm. x 9 cm. Course is obliquely forwards, upwards and
medially and piercing the right scapular muscle.
18)
Non-penetrating stab wound of the
posterior chest wall, right posterior axillary line, level of the 10th thoracic
vertebra and measuring 2 cm. x 11 cm.
Course is obliquely downwards, slightly forwards and medially and
piercing the muscle superficially.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1)
Cut right common carotid which is
completely severed.
2)
Fractured 4th right rib at
anterolateral surface.
3)
Stabbed wound of the lower lobe of
the right lung at the anterior surface.
4)
Stabbed wound of the diaphragm at
the left anterior and lateral portions.
5)
Left hemothorax – 750 cm.
6)
Right hemothorax – 400 cm.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
‘Shock and hemorrhage secondary to multiple (18) stab wounds of the
body, face and upper extremities lacerating the right common carotic artery and
right lung.’
Dr. Singian also issued a death certificate for the deceased
Magdalena Juliano (See Exhibit G).
The assailant. – The death
of Magdalena Juliano was reported to the Crimes and Persons Section,
Investigation Division, of the Western Police District at about 1:00 o’clock a.m., February 10, 1977, by Pfc. Cesar Yanco of the Traffic
Division, and Pfc. Florencio Munar was assigned as officer of the case. Through interviews with persons who brought
the dying Magdalena to the Chinese
General Hospital,
particularly, Nenita Tolentino, who was Magdalena’s
roommate, Pfc. Munar came to know the name of the suspect: Cipriano D. Barba,
nicknamed Perry Barba, a Meralco employee.
Aside from Nenita, Munar also questioned Eduardo Sison, Alexander Roman
and Romeo Liongson, who declared that while walking home along Tiago Street,
they noticed a man and a woman quarreling near the gate of a house until the woman
fell to the ground, with the man bending over her and moving his arm up and
down as if boxing her with his fists.
The three further told Munar that when they approached the man and the
woman, the man ran away and when pursued by one of them, he threatened the
pursuer (See Exhibit “I”) with his knife, saying ‘Huwag kang
makialam!’ Statements of Nenita Tolentino and Eduardo Sison (See Exhibits
“C” and “I”) were taken by Pfc. Munar later during the day. Munar also interviewed Antonio Villegas,
barangay chairman, who turned over to him a ball pen with the engraved name
‘PERRY. D. BARBA’ which he claimed was given to him by one, Renato Abaya with
the information that the latter found the same in the premises of the
killing. Proceeding to the scene of the
crime at 1827 Tiago St.,
Pfc. Munar further made inquiries and was able to interview residents in the
vicinity like Renato Abaya who found the afore-described ball pen, and Antonio
Villegas himself.
With the suspect having been identified as Cipriano D. Barba, the
police flashed a teletype message to all police stations for his apprehension
(See Exhibit “K”). On February
24, 1977, at about 7:00 o’clock, p.m., the suspect, accompanied by one, Atty.
Rafael Bueno, presented himself to the offices (sic) of the Homicide Section of
the Manila Police where he was identified in a police line-up by Nenita
Tolentino as PERRY BARBA, the man who knocked at their apartment door on the
early morning hours of February 10, 1977, and with whom the deceased Magdalena
Juliano had a quarrel a few minutes later.
A picture showing Nenita Tolentino pointing to Perry Barba was taken by
the police on the said occasion (See Exhibit “L”).
Sworn statements were taken from Rosalie Zafra (Exhibit
“O”), Nenita Tolentino (Exhibit. “D”), Alexander Roman
(Exhibit “M”), and Renato Abaya (Exhibit “N”).
Motive for the killing.
– The motive for the killing of Magdalena Juliano, nicknamed Maggie, is
suggested by prosecution witnesses Rosalie Zafra and Nenita Tolentino, her
closest friends and co-workers at the Philippine Plaza Hotel, the former being
the receptionist in the coffee shop where they worked and the latter being her
co-attendant in the same coffee shop as well as her roommate in their boarding
house besides (sic). Both Rosalie and Nenita, testified among
others on Maggie’s love life with Perry Barba; her living with him without the
benefit of marriage; her discovery that he was a married man and with children;
her separation from him; how she has been avoiding him; the insistence of Perry
that they resume their living together; and the fear which she entertained
whenever he is known to be waiting for her to leave the Philippine Plaza Hotel
after her tour of duty late in the evening.
Rosalie Zafra also testified about phone calls she received as
receptionist from a caller who identified himself as Perry Barba of Meralco who
wanted to talk with Maggie, his sweetheart.
In several of these calls, Perry was angry because he was told that service
attendants are prohibited from answering calls over the telephone. On one occasion, Perry has berated Rosalie
for hiding Maggie from him in the following manner: ‘Putang ina mo, bakit
itinatago mo si Maggie!’ (You son of a bitch, why are you hiding Maggie!). On another occasion he asked Rosalie to tell
Maggie ‘Bago siya mapakinabangan ng iba, papatayin ko muna siya!’ which,
loosely translated, means, ‘Before any one else can have her, I will kill her
first.’
Rosalie Zafra testified further about an occasion when, before
finishing her tour of duty one night in January, 1977, one of the lady security
guards in the employees’ exit and entrance door called on her, saying that a
drunken man was outside who wanted to talk to Maggie over the intercom. Rosalie gave permission for Maggie to talk
over the intercom and when Maggie was through, she told Rosalie that she was
going to sleep in the hotel because she was afraid of Perry who was waiting for
her outside. On this occasion, when
Rosalie went home at 11:00 o’clock,
p.m., and as her bag was being inspected, the lady security guard who conducted
the inspection pointed to Perry seated in a taxi cab parked in the parking
lot. On her way to her taxi which was
waiting for her, she passed by Perry’s taxi and saw the face of the man for the
first time.
On the part of Nenita, her testimony touched on the last hour of Magdalena’s
life: from the time they left the hotel at about 12:00
o’clock, midnight, with
Exequiel Yuson and Caloy, in a jeep, up to the time the two men let them off at
the corner of Tiago and Isagani Streets where they walked home to their
apartment.”[4]
On the other hand, the accused relying mainly on his testimony
and that of Augusto Carlos, who admitted in open court that he testified after
having been requested to do so by the accused’s wife, interposed the defense of
alibi. Their testimonies were summed up
by the trial court as follows:
“EVIDENCE
FOR THE DEFENSE
x x x
On February 9, 1977, at about 5:00 o’clock, p.m., the accused and
his friend, Augusto Carlos, took a taxi cab at corner (sic) T. Alonzo and Claro
M. Recto, for the LTB Terminal in Pasay City.
They were bound for Nagcarlan, Laguna to visit the parents of the
accused. Augusto was without any
clothing except those which he had on (and an extra t-shirt). At around 6:00
o’clock, they boarded an LTB bus and arrived at San
Pablo City at
about 8:30 o’clock. They took a jeepney for Nagcarlan, arriving
thereat at about 9:30 o’clock. They spent the night in the house of Perry’s
grandmother located in the poblacion and at about 8:00
o’clock the following morning, February 10, 1977, they proceeded to Barrio Kanluran
Lasaan where Perry’s parents lived. Said
Barrio is about 7 to 8 kilometers away from the poblacion of Nagcarlan, part of
which is accessible by motor vehicles and part on foot. They arrived in the barrio at about 11:00 o’clock, a.m.
Augusto stayed in barrio Kanluran Lasaan for four days during which
he went to the hinterlands with friends of the accused to hunt. On the fourth day, February 13, 1977, a Sunday, he left for Manila
but Perry was left behind to help his parents make copra.
Perry came back to Manila
on February 23, 1977 x x x
only to be informed by his wife that police authorities were looking for
him. Spending the night with his family,
he called up his uncle, Atty. Rafael Bueno, on the next day, February 24, 1977, and asked him to
verify why he was wanted by the police.
When he came to know the cause, he gave himself up at the headquarters
of the homicide section of the Manila Police, accompanied by his uncle, Atty.
Bueno.
Cipriano D. Barba, nicknamed Perry, further declared that he came
to know the deceased, Magdalena Juliano, way back in 1972 who was introduced to
him by a co-employee of his at the Meralco offices. Since then, he saw Magdalena
going to the Meralco offices every now and then and in the course of time, he
came to know that Magdalena was married to a
Muslim. In January, 1977, he also came
to know that Magdalena was employed in a hotel but did
not know the name of the hotel. One day
during the same month, as he stepped out of his office at Claro
M. Recto Street opposite the Arranque Market, he
saw Magdalena and Nenita Tolentino waiting for him. This was the first time that he was meeting
Nenita and on that occasion, he talked with them for about 30 minutes at a
restaurant where he invited them. This
was also the occasion when he last saw Magdalena Juliano.
Admitting ownership of the ballpen, Exhibit “B”, wherein
his name ‘PERRY D. BARBA’ was engraved, he explained that the same was borrowed
from him by Magdalena Juliano on one occasion when the latter went to his
office to pay her electric bills. After
a week, Magdalena asked for the ballpen and as a man, he
agreed.”[5]
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses,
namely, Nenita Tolentino, Pfc. Florencio Munar and Servando Malabute, whose
testimonies are summarized by the trial court, thus:
x x x
“On the claim of the accused that he never went to the
Philippine Plaza Hotel where she and the deceased worked, Nenita declared the
same to be untrue as in fact, the accused even fetched her and the deceased
from the same hotel once, and brought them in a taxi to the corner of Tiago and
Isagani Streets which was near their apartment.
On the claim of the accused that on February 9, 1977, he left for
Nagcarlan, Laguna, with the knowledge and permission of his wife and came back
to Manila only on February 23, 1977, Pfc. Munar declared the same to be untrue
for the reason that when he interviewed his wife, Dr. Neriza Barba, x x x on
February 10, 1977, that is, the following morning after the killing, Dr. Barba
gave the information that her husband, Cipriano Barba, has not gone home for
quite some time and at the time of the interview, she did not know the
whereabouts of her husband.
Servando Malabute, a member of the team which investigated the
killing of Magdalena Juliano, also debunked the claim of the accused that his
trip to Nagcarlan, Laguna was known to his wife for the reason that when said
wife, a dentist at the Tondo Puericulture Center, was interviewed at her
office, she gave the information that she did not know the whereabouts of her
husband and even gave a written authority (See Exhibit “Q”) for the
police officers to enter her home located at 1207 Castañas Street. On the strength of said authority, the
investigation team went to 1207 Castañas Street
and the maid gave them the information that Mr. Barba does not sleep in the
house as he is not frequenting the place.
On the claim by the accused that his absence from work at the
Meralco Offices during the period from February 10 to February 23, 1977, was covered by a leave of
absence, Servando Malabute declared that he interviewed the Meralco Manager of
Tondo Branch Offices, and he was informed that the accused had not been
reporting for work.”[6]
In convicting the appellant of the crime charged, the trial
court, after discussing the defense of alibi, concluded:
“Furthermore, the cause or reason that moved and induced him
to commit the crime has been clearly and sufficiently shown by the evidence
adduced by the prosecution. The refusal
of the deceased to resume living with him; her acts which tended to avoid him
whenever he wanted to see her; the fact that another suitor is after her and
who even brought her home immediately before he killed her — all these became
the moving power, the impelling and insuperable force which drove him into
committing the dastardly act imputed to him in the instant information.
Under all the foregoing circumstances, the Court is satisfied that
the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to produce that degree
of moral certainty to support a conviction of the accused, Cipriano Barba y
Doria of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation
committed during the nighttime which he purposely sought the better to
accomplish his criminal intent. The
prosecution has conclusively proven that the accused has threatened to kill the
victim ‘before any one else can have her’ and that, in a sudden, concerned and
unprovoked act, armed with a deadly weapon, stabbed the victim who was
defenseless and unsuspecting.”[7]
It, however, credited the appellant with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
In not giving weight to the defense of alibi, the trial court
took into account: (a) the clear and positive identification of the accused by
Nenita Tolentino who had seen him at least three (3) times before 9 February
1977 and (b) the lack of sufficient corroboration by persons who could be in a
position to convince the court as to its truth and veracity. More concretely, the trial court held that:
“It will be readily seen that the thrust of the defense is
anchored on alibi, considered as one of the weakest defenses for it is easy of
fabrication (sic) (People v. Raagas, 44 SCRA 152; People v. Mori, 55 SCRA 382;
People v. Derejo, 56 SCRA 554; and People v. Sapatero, 58 SCRA 450), and which
must be looked upon with suspicion (People v. Bondoc, 85 Phil 545). It cannot be sustained in the face of a clear
and positive identification of the accused (People v. Mabuyo, 63 SCRA 532;
People v. Caili, 65 SCRA 24; People v. Bautista, 65 SCRA 460; People .v.
Moises, 66 SCRA 151; and People v. Tizon, 66 SCRA 372), as in this case, where
the accused, Cipriano Barba y Doria was positively identified by Nenita
Tolentino who has seen him at least three times before that fateful night of
February 9, 1977, twice at close range: when Magdalena introduced her to him at
the premises of the Meralco and invited them to eat in a restaurant, a fact
which the accused himself admitted, and when he fetched her and Magdalena from
the Philippine Plaza Hotel and conveyed them in a taxi to the corner of Tiago
and Isagani Streets.
Moreover, the defense of alibi set up by the accused is not
sufficiently corroborated by persons who could be in a position to convince
this court as to its truth and veracity.
For instance, his grandmother, his parents, his friends who supposedly
invited Augusto Carlos to hunt in the hinterlands of Nagcarlan, or his
wife. The fact is, his wife, Dr. Neriza
Barba, gave the information to the police investigators Munar and Servando
Malabute on the day following the killing that she did not know the whereabouts
of her husband as he has not gone home for quite sometime.
x x x
The corroborative testimony of Augusto Carlos to the effect that he
accompanied the accused to Nagcarlan, Laguna is of no moment. For a city resident to go on a trip to a far
away place in the province without any other clothing than those which are
being worn is simply ridiculous and unbelievable. And while it may be true that said accused
fled to his hometown in Nagcarlan, Laguna, it must have been after he killed
Magdalena Juliano. Such flight gravely
militates against him for it is an indication of guilt (People v. Uleta, 103
Phil 730; People v. Amiscua, 37 SCRA
813; People v. Comelio, 39 SCRA 435; People v. Jamonte, 64 SCRA 319).”[8]
In support of the assigned errors, appellant submits the
following arguments:
1)
The evidence of the prosecution
does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the
assailant. On the one hand, the two
eyewitnesses, Alexander Roman and Eduardo Sison, who saw the assailant at a
close distance and with a full and unobstructed view when they passed by the
assailant, could not assert that the appellant was the assailant. Furthermore, while it is true that Nenita
Tolentino pointed to appellant as the assailant, her testimony is unreliable as
it contains inconsistencies and betrays contradictions, improbabilities and a
lack of persuasiveness.
2)
The court should not have
considered the testimonies of Rosalie Zafra and Nenita Tolentino as to the
alleged past relations of the appellant and the deceased from which an alleged
motive for killing was deduced as such are patently hearsay testimonies.
3)
The court should not have
disregarded the corroborative testimony of Augusto Carlos as there is nothing
unusual or ridiculous for one to bring along only one spare T-shirt on a trip
to a nearby province for only a few days.
4)
The crime proved is homicide and
not murder because the evidence does not show the presence of any qualifying
circumstance. There is no basis for the
finding that the stabbing was “sudden, concerned and unprovoked” as
it was established by the prosecution witnesses themselves that a heated
quarrel between the assailant and the deceased preceded the stabbing. Moreover, the fact that the place where the
stabbing occurred was outside the gate and the deceased was even able to shout
for help for several minutes, thereby enabling several passers-by to come to
her succor and chase the assailant, negates the attendance of treachery.
5)
There is no sufficient basis for
the court’s finding of evident premeditation.
The court relied solely on the alleged telephone conversation of the
appellant with Rosalie Zafra where the former supposedly said “Instead of
others taking her, I will just kill her.” It must be pointed out that this
utterance, even if true, was made only once.
6)
Nighttime cannot be considered as
a generic aggravating circumstance in the case at bar because the evidence
shows that the assailant did not take advantage thereof for purpose of
impunity. The assailant first knocked at
the door of the boarding house. If the
assailant had intended to take advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the crime or to escape, there would have been no reason for him
to first knock at the door and later on engage the deceased in a heated
argument, thereby attracting the attention of passers-by and other people in
the neighborhood.
The People, in its Brief[9]
filed by the Solicitor General on 28 December 1979, disagrees with the
accused-appellant and maintains that the prosecution was able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the accused, his guilt, motive and the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and
nighttime. It argues that even assuming
that the testimonies of Rosalie Zafra and Nenita Tolentino on the motive of the
accused are hearsay, which is not so, and the same are not to be considered,
the accused could nevertheless be convicted of the offense charged as his
identity and participation were definitely established by the testimony of
Nenita Tolentino. To the appellant’s
submission that Nenita Tolentino’s testimony pointing to the accused be
disregarded because of inconsistencies therein, it asserts that the
inconsistencies do not detract from but rather enhance the credibility of the
witness.
As regards the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the People
submits that the trial court correctly ruled that the same was sufficiently
established as Maggie was unsuspecting and unarmed at that time of the
stabbing. Furthermore, the fact that
appellant inflicted 18 wounds on Maggie and that some of those wounds were
caused even after she was already lying on her back with the former on top of
her, proves that the killing was treacherous.
It likewise maintains that evident premeditation was sufficiently
established as the records show that barely a week after appellant’s threat to
kill Maggie, he was seen in the vicinity of the employees’ exit of the
Philippine Plaza waiting for her. It
further argues that there is no question that nighttime facilitated the
commission of the crime. Appellant knew
that in the early morning, the tenants of the boarding house of Maggie would be
sleeping already and that the chances of passers-by witnessing the intended
crime would be very slim; he thus took advantage of the darkness to
successfully consummate his plan.
On 17 March 1980,
the appellant filed his Reply Brief wherein he categorically admits that
“upon the state of evidence on record:
“1. The crime proved is homicide and not murder
because the evidence do (sic) not establish either qualifying circumstance of
treachery or evident premeditation;
2. Nighttime cannot be considered a generic
aggravating circumstance because evidence show (sic) that assailant did not
take advantage thereof; and
3. The evidence do (sic) not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was the assailant.”[10]
Except as to the issue of treachery, We find no merit in this
appeal.
We agree with the trial court’s holding that appellant’s identity
as well as his participation in the killing of Magdalena Juliano was sufficiently
proven by the prosecution. While it may
be true that prosecution witnesses Alexander Roman and Eduardo Sison failed to
point to the appellant as the culprit, the latter was positively identified by
Nenita Tolentino. Thus, on direct
examination, Nenita declared:
“Q What
did you do after you sensed that the door was opened and slammed close?
A I
went out of the comfort room and saw that Maggie was not there, sir.
Q What
did you do?
A I
heard somebody talking outside, so, I went upstairs, sir.
Q What
did you do upstairs?
A I
saw Maggie’s things on the bed like her ring, wristwatch and college ring, sir.
Q What
else happened?
A I
heard them talking outside, sir.
Q Who
they?
A Perry
and Maggie, sir.
Q What
did you do after you heard still Maggie and Perry talking outside?
A I
remained upstairs. A few minutes
thereafter I heard Maggie shout, sir.
Q How
did Maggie shout?
A ‘Aray!
Aray! Tulungan ninyo ako,’ sir.
Q And
where was the voice of Maggie coming from at the time she was uttering these
words?
A Outside
the gate of the boarding house, sir.
Q What
did you do after you heard Maggie shouting for help?
A I
peeped through the window, sir.
Q What
floor is this window?
A Second
floor, sir.
Q What
did you see after you peeped at the window?
A I
saw her being hurt by Perry, sir.
Q In
what manner did you see Perry, hurting Maggie?
A He
was moving his hands backwards and forwards.
I saw Perry striking by his right hand from right to left direction
several times, sir.
Q And
what was Maggie doing in the meantime that Perry was hitting her in this
manner?
A She
was still shouting, sir.
Q What
was she shouting?
A ‘Aray!
Aray!,’ sir.
Q And
what happened — what transpired next?
A Both
disappeared from my eyesight, sir.”[11]
The law does not require that an
identification by one witness be corroborated to obtain a conviction. Moreover, the fact that appellant’s ballpen
with his name engraved thereon was found at the scene of the crime a few
minutes after the stabbing is mute yet devastating proof of his presence at the
scene of the crime. His explanation as
to how it happened to be there is not only unsatisfactory, it places as well a
heavy burden on one’s credulity.
Appellant claims that the victim borrowed it from him in August 1976 but
that a week later, when she returned to his office, she asked she can have it,
to which he agreed.[12]
We are unable to find any explanation why, if indeed this version of the
appellant is correct, the victim should bring the ballpen outside when, as
testified to by Nenita Tolentino, the victim first went up to her room and left
her things, such as her ring, wrist watch and college ring,[13]
on her bed.
The attempt to diminish the impact of Nenita’s identification of
the appellant by a showing of her conflicting testimony as to the number of
times she saw appellant before the date of the incident is of no moment. It is true that on cross-examination, she
testified that she saw the appellant on two (2) separate occasions, a month
before said date, the first of which was when she was introduced to him by
Maggie and the second when appellant fetched Maggie from her place of work and
she, Nenita, joined them in the taxi.[14]
On rebuttal, Nenita Tolentino, however, confirmed the testimony
of the appellant that she met the latter only once, thus:
“Q Miss
Tolentino, in the testimony of the accused, he, testifying in his own behalf,
stated that he knows you but that he only met you once and that was sometime in
January 1977, is that true or not?
A That
is true.”[15]
Nevertheless, also on rebuttal, clarifying this, she
categorically declared:
“Q Now,
he said that he only saw you once and that was in January, 1977, is that true
or not?
ATTY. LEE:
Answered already. She said that is true.
A He
met me.
Q Once,
and that was only January?
A Yes,
sir.
Q How
about you, how many times have you seen him?
A Twice.
Q Besides
January 1977?
A Yes,
sir.
Q And
where were these two occasions that you saw him after meeting him in January
1977?
A That
was when he went to the Philippine Plaza and fetched my friend.
x x x
Q Who
is that friend?
A The
deceased.
Q The
victim herein?
A The
victim.”[16]
The foregoing minor inconsistencies neither destroy the witness’
credibility nor cast doubt on her definite and positive identification of the
appellant. There is, therefore, no
reason to disregard her testimony.
It is a well-settled and oft-repeated rule in criminal cases that
minor inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses do not affect their
credibility, as they are but natural and even enhance their credibility as
these discrepancies indicate that the responses were honest and unrehearsed.[17]
In People vs. Manzanares,[18]
We ruled:
“x x x Far from being badges of fraud and fabrication, the
inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be justifiably be considered
as manifestations of the truthfulness on material points of the prosecution
witnesses. These little deviations also
confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The most candid witnesses may make mistakes
sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic
credibility (People v Cabato, No. L-37400, April 15, 1988). In the case at bar what is important is that
the witnesses positively identified the appellant as one of the
assailants. Rather than discredit the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor details must be
viewed as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies. x x x”
In People vs. Noguerras,[19]
We said:
“As held by this Court, discrepancies in minor details are to be
expected from an uncoached witness (People v Arbois, 138 SCRA 31). Such minor variations would rather show the
sincerity of the witnesses and the absence of connivance between them to make
their testimonies tally in every respect (People v Pielago, 140 SCRA 419, 423)
Truth to tell, such trivial differences constituted fail-safe reliability
(People v Dollantes, 15 SCRA 592, 603).”
Having been positively identified, appellant’s defense of alibi
merits no further consideration. Such a
defense, being inherently weak and easily fabricated,[20]
looked upon with suspicion and always to be received with caution,[21]
cannot prevail over the positive identification of an accused.[22]
Having settled the matter of appellant’s participation in the
killing of Maggie Juliano. We now
address the issue of whether or not the killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation and the generic
aggravating circumstance of nighttime.
To begin with, it must be stressed that qualifying circumstances
must not only be alleged in the information but established by direct and
positive evidence as well. Mere
presumption or inferences are not sufficient no matter how logical or probable
they may be.[23]
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
“There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.”
In the instant case, the trial court anchors its finding of
treachery on the alleged suddenness of the attack on the unarmed Maggie
Juliano. The People submits as
additional proof thereof the number of wounds — eighteen (18) in all — some
of which appellant inflicted on the victim as he continued his attack even as
she was already lying on her back.
It is true that Maggie was unarmed. There is, however, no positive and direct
evidence to show that the attack was unexpected and sudden. The evidence on record discloses that no one
actually saw how the attack was commenced.
Per Nenita’s testimony, as earlier quoted, appellant and Maggie were
talking outside the first time she saw them; a few minutes later, she heard
Maggie shouting “Aray! Aray!.” When she peeped at the window, she saw
Perry just “moving his hands backwards and forwards” striking by his
right hand from right to left. As
testified to by prosecution witness Alexander Roman, when he saw Maggie and the
man for the first time at the scene of the incident, they were only talking,
and “seemed to be quarreling”; then, as he continued walking, he
heard “shoutings” and so he returned to where the shouts came from
and he saw the man “seemed to be slapping the woman” who was lying
down along the sidewalk; he went nearer, but the man ran away.[24]
Also, in the light of the
revelation of prosecution witness Rosalie Zafra, We are inclined to believe
that the deceased could no longer take in her confidence herein appellant. At the very least, she was aware of what he
could do to her once he met her. Rosalie
had informed Maggie of what the appellant told her (Rosalie) over the phone
sometime in January 1977, to wit: “Bago siya mapakinabangan ng iba,
papatayin ko na muna siya” (Instead of others taking her, I will just kill
her). Although Maggie just laughed it
off, she seemed to be afraid whenever the appellant’s name was mentioned. At one time, when Maggie learned that
appellant was waiting in a taxicab at the parking lot of the hotel, she decided
not to go home but instead sleep in the hotel because she was afraid.[25]
Between the last week of January 1977 and 10 February 1977, Maggie told Rosalie
that she was very Afraid of the appellant because the latter kept on waiting
for her outside.[26]
It was likewise established that minutes before Maggie was
killed, appellant kept on knocking successively and loudly at the door of the
apartment where she resided.[27]
Thus, there is indeed a paucity of evidence to show how the
aggression was commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of Maggie
began and developed. In U.S. vs.
Perdon[28]
and U.S. vs. Pangilion,[29]
this Court held that where no particulars are known as to the manner in which
the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the
victim began and developed, it can in no way be established from mere
suppositions that the killing was perpetrated with treachery. Accordingly, treachery cannot be considered
where the lone witness did not see the commencement of the assault.[30]
In cannot be said to exist if the prosecution failed to present any eyewitness
to testify as to the manner the victim as attacked.[31]
In short, treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence.[32]
That the victim sustained eighteen (18) wounds does not by itself
prove treachery. They could have been
inflicted after an expected frontal attack preceded by what seemed to be,
according to witness Roman, a quarrel, by a man who was moved by hate after
having been rebuffed in his bid to revive an illicit affair.
We agree, however, with the trial court and the People that the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was convincingly established
by the prosecution.
In U.S. vs. Gil,[33]
this Court ruled that to justify the inference of deliberate premeditation,
there must be a period sufficient in a judicial sense to afford full
opportunity for meditation and reflection and sufficient time to allow the
conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his will if he desires to
hearken to its warning.[34]
Three (3) requisites must, therefore, be duly proved before
evident premeditation may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
(a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination, and (c)
a sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and execution to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[35]
These requisites must be established with proof as clear as the
crime itself.[36]
In the instant case, it was clearly and convincingly shown by the
testimony of Rosalie Zafra that sometime in January 1977, appellant told her
over the phone that: “Instead of others taking her, I will just kill
her.” As testified to by Rosalie, which appellant did not care to
seriously object to or categorically deny, appellant was Maggie’s former
live-in sweetheart; she, however, separated from him because he is a married
man with children.[37]
Appellant wanted to live again with Maggie; however, the latter refused as the
appellant is a heavy drinker and would beat her whenever he is drunk.[38]
As also correctly summarized by the People in its Brief:
“x x x Barely a week after he made his threat, appellant was
in the vicinity of the Philippine Plaza Hotel particularly at the employee’s
exit (p. 30, t.s.n., April. 25, 1977).
Appellant knew exactly where to wait for his victim. He had cased the joint and it was but
fortunate that Maggie was forewarned of his presence. Maggie elected to sleep in the hotel that
night because Barba was waiting for her outside.”[39]
Indisputably then, from the time he made known to Rosalie that he
would kill Maggie, until the time he actually killed her, sufficient time had
elapsed to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to arrive
at a clear judgment. That he had clung
to his plan to do away with Maggie was positively demonstrated by his
subsequent external manifestations, such as waiting for Maggie outside her
working place and carrying a bladed instrument which, according to Dr. Singian,
may be categorized as a knife,[40]
when he went to her apartment. There is
no doubt that appellant had murder in his heart when he decided to see Maggie
that night of 10 February 1977.
The killing is thus qualified to murder by evident premeditation.
We likewise agree with the trial court and the People that
nighttime should be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Appellant deliberately sought it either to
prevent him from being recognized or to ensure his unmolested escape.[41]
He chose a very unholy hour after midnight believing that everybody would be
asleep and, therefore, none could witness his deed and that the darkness of
night would facilitate his escape and prevent his identification.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death.
The 1987 Constitution has, however, abolished the death penalty, and
mandates that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.[42]
Nevertheless, in People vs. Munoz,[43]
We ruled that this Constitutional provision does not change or alter the
periods for the penalty for murder. It
only reduces the penalty of death to reclusion
perpetua. Accordingly, the
three (3) periods for the penalty remain to be:
1.
minimum – reclusion temporal in its
maximum period
2.
medium – reclusion perpetua
3.
maximum – death, but automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua
The appellant shall be credited with the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender. He surrendered
on 25 February 1977,[44]
before the filing of the information in this case. This offsets the generic aggravating
circumstance of nighttime.[45]
Thus, the penalty which may be imposed upon the appellant should
be the medium of that prescribed as above-stated, which is reclusion
perpetua.
The indemnity awarded by the trial court is only P12,000.00. Conformably with the rule laid down in People
vs. Sison[46]
and People vs. Sazon,[47]
the same is increased to P50,000.00.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
affirming the decision appealed from with respect to the sentence and modifying
it with respect to the indemnity. As
affirmed, this Court finds the appellant, CIPRIANO BARBA y DORIA, GUILTY beyond
all reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby SENTENCED to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and all the accessory
penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Magdalena (Maggie)
Juliano y Sultan in the sum of P50,000.00.
With costs against appellant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo,
4.
[2] Rollo,
5-14. Per then Judge Amante Q. Alconcel.
[3]
Brief for Appellant, 1-2.
[4] Rollo,
5-11.
[5] Rollo,
11-12.
[6] Rollo,
12-13.
[7] Rollo,
13-14.
[8] Rollo,
13-14.
[9] Rollo,
57, et seq.
[10] Rollo,
73, et seq.
[11]
TSN – de la Cruz, 29 April 1977,
12-15.
[12]
TSN – Macariola, 17 April 1978, 60.
[13]
TSN – de la Cruz, 29 April 1977, 13.
[14] Id.,
28, 34, 36.
[15]
TSN – Macariola, 19 July 1978,
4.
[16]
TSN – Macariola, 19 July 1978,
4-6.
[17]
People vs. Del Socorro, 182 SCRA 359; People vs. Javier, 182 SCRA
830; People vs. Mangalino, 182 SCRA 329; People vs. Cantuba, 183
SCRA 289; People vs. Santos, 183 SCRA 25; People vs. Palino, 183
SCRA 680; People vs. Flores, 185 SCRA 366.
[18]
177 SCRA 427, 433.
[19]
181 SCRA 19.
[20]
People vs. Rafallo, 86 Phil. 22; People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47.
[21]
People vs. Bondoc, 85 Phil. 545; People vs. Cinco, 67 Phil. 196;
People vs. De Guzman, 70 Phil. 23; People vs. Loveria, supra.
[22]
People vs. Pasco, 181 SCRA 233; People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316;
People vs. Obando, 182 SCRA 95; People vs. Corrales, 182 SCRA
439; People vs. Repuela, 183 SCRA 244; People vs. Tamayo, 183
SCRA 375; People vs. Cayaan, 183 SCRA 445; People vs. Dinola, 183
SCRA 493; People vs. Clores, 184 SCRA 638; People vs. Carmina,
185 SCRA 59; People vs. Demecillo, 186 SCRA 161; People vs.
Acosta, 187 SCRA 39; People vs. Ampo-an, 187 SCRA 173; People vs.
Marapao, 188 SCRA 243; People vs. Cagalingan, 188 SCRA 313; People vs.
Felipe, 191 SCRA 176; People vs. Tasarra, 192 SCRA 266; People vs.
Kyamko, 192 SCRA 374.
[23]
People vs. Samonte, 64 SCRA 319; People vs. Sarmiento, 118 Phil.
266.
[24]
TSN – Perez, 23 September 1977,
13-16.
[25]
TSN – Macariola, 25 April 1977,
20-21; 24-25; 28-30.
[26] Id.,
32.
[27]
Testimony of Nenita Tolentino, TSN – de la Cruz, 29 April 1977, 9-11.
[28]
4 Phil. 141.
[29]
34 Phil. 786.
[30] People
vs. Cananowa, 92 SCRA 427; People vs. Narit, G.R. No. 77087, June
1991.
[31]
People vs. Bachar, 170 SCRA 700.
[32]
People vs. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649.
[33]
13 Phil. 530.
[34]
People vs. Torejos, 43 SCRA 158; People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA 634;
People vs. Tingson, 47 SCRA 243; People vs. Palacpac, 49 SCRA
440; People vs. Renegado, 57 SCRA 275; People vs. Manangan, 59
SCRA 31; People vs. Tumalip, 60 SCRA 303; People vs. Francisco,
G.R. No. 69580, 15 February 1990.
[35]
U.S. vs. Bañagale, 24 Phil. 69; People vs. Diaz, 35 SCRA 178;
People vs. Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245; People vs. Lacao, 60 SCRA 89;
People vs. Estillore, 141 SCRA 456; People vs. Camilet, 142 SCRA
402; People vs. Obenque, 147 SCRA 488; People vs. Manalo, 148
SCRA 98.
[36]
People vs. Obenque, supra.; People vs.
Molato, 170 SCRA 640; People vs. Repe, 175 SCRA 422; People vs.
Batas, 176 SCRA 46.
[37]
TSN – Macariola, 25 April 1977,
12-13.
[38] Id.,
24.
[39]
Brief for Appellee, 11.
[40]
TSN – de la Cruz, 11 May 1977,
16.
[41]
People vs. Baring, 187 SCRA 629; People vs. Matbagon, 60 Phil.
887; People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 800.
[42]
Section 19 (1), Article III, 1987 Constitution.
[43]
170 SCRA 107. See also People vs.
Cagalingan, 188 SCRA 313; People vs. Espiritu, G.R. No. 80406, 20 November 1990.
[44]
TSN – Macariola, 17 April 1978,
52.
[45] Article
64 (4), Revised Penal Code.
[46]
189 SCRA 643 (1990).
[47]
189 SCRA 700 (1990).