FLORENTINO CURSINO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, (DISTRICT JUDGE, CFI, BRANCH III, PASAY CITY), HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR. (PRESIDING JUDGE, MUN. COURT OF PARANAQUE, …

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
reverse and set aside (a) the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal* (now Regional Trial Court) dated
October 30, 1978 in Civil Case No. Pq-6364-P affirming in toto the decision of the then Municipal
Court of Paranaque** (now Metropolitan Trial Court) dated April 17, 1978 in
Civil Case No. 3809 entitled “Maria James vs. Florentino
Cursino“, ordering defendant (herein petitioner)
and all persons claiming under him to vacate plaintiff’s (herein private
respondent) leased premises and to pay monthly rentals, attorney’s fees and
costs of suit, and (b) the order of the then Court of First Instance dated
February 28, 1979 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The factual background of this case as quoted from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch III, Pasay City,
is as follows:

“”From the record of this case, it appears that plaintiff
is the lawful owner and lessor of the premises
located at 4143 17 de Marzo St., Baclaran,
Paranaque, leased by defendant at a monthly rental of
P100.00, payable within the
first five days of each month; that defendant defaulted in the payment of his
monthly rental for the months of
October, November and December, 1977; that defendant sent two (2) postal money
orders, both dated December 21, 1977, one bearing Money Order No. E-1162-55 in
the amount of P200.00 as payment for the months of October and November, 1977,
and the other bearing Money Order No. E-1162-56 in the
amount of P100.00 for the December 1977 rental; that prior to the sending of
said postal money orders, plaintiff on December 14, 1977 demanded that
defendant pay the back rental and vacate the premises at 4143 17 de Marzo St., Baclaran,
Paranaque, ‘within a period of five (5) days from
receipt of this letter’ (Exh. ‘A’); that despite the
formal demand, defendant failed and refused to vacate the subject premises
without justifiable cause; that by reason thereof, plaintiff was constrained to
secure the services of counsel and incurred expenses in this litigation.

“The defendant contends that he has not defaulted in the
payment of rents and that it was the plaintiff who refused to accept the
same.  As a matter of fact, defendant
claims that he sent Postal Money Order No. E-1162-55 dated December 21, 1977 in the amount of P200.00 as
rental payment for the months of October and November 1977, and another Postal
Money Order No. E-1162-56 also dated December
21, 1977 in the amount of P100.00 for the December 1977
rental.  It is further contended that since the lease of the subject dwelling
place is only for P100.00 a month, it is ‘protected under Sections 1 and 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 20.’” (Rollo.
pp. 40-41).

Petitioner did not vacate
the premises as demanded and so a complaint for unlawful detainer
dated December 27, 1977 was filed by respondent before the then Municipal Court of Paranaque.  After hearing, the court rendered its decision (Rollo, pp. 32-38) dated April 17, 1978 in favor of private respondent (the
plaintiff herein), the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, Decision
is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter and all persons
claiming under him to vacate plaintiff’s premises situated at 17 De Marzo Street, Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila; ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P100.00 representing rental for the month of March and to pay the
same monthly rental of P100.00 commencing April, 1978 until such time that
defendant and all persons claiming under him shall have completely vacated plaintiff’s premises;
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS as and for attorney’s
fees and to pay the costs of this suit.”
(Rollo, p.
38)

Not satisfied with the decision,
petitioner appealed to the then Court of First Instance of Rizal which on October 30, 1978, rendered a decision (Rollo, pp. 40–43)
affirming in toto the decision of the municipal court with double costs
against petitioner.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the decision (Rollo, pp. 44-53),
but the same was denied with
treble costs against petitioner in an
order dated February 28, 1979 (Rollo, pp. 54-55).

Hence, this instant petition filed on May 15, 1979 (Rollo,
pp. 10-23).

Petitioner submits the following reasons for the allowance of the
petition:

FIRST REASON

LIKE THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT
HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH III
COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN THE
INTERPRETA­TION AND APPLICATION OF SECTION 2, RULE 70, RULES OF COURT.

SECOND REASON

RESPONDENT JUDGE BAUTISTA COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN RULING
THAT THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 20, MORE SPECIFICALLY PARAGRAPHS 1 and 4, ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

THIRD REASON

RESPONDENT JUDGE BAUTISTA COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN RULING THAT
PARAGRAPH 2, ARTICLE 1673 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
IS THE APPLICABLE LAW IN THE CASE AT BAR.” (Rollo,
p. 14)

In a resolution dated June
20, 1979 (Rollo, p. 62), the petition was
given due course and both parties were required to submit simultaneous
memoranda.  On November 5, 1979, respondent Maria James
submitted her memorandum (Rollo, pp. 70-73), while in
a manifestation dated October 31,
1979 (Rollo, pp. 74-75),
petitioner adopted the petition as his memorandum.  In the resolution of November 19, 1979 (Rollo,
p. 77), the Court resolved to declare this case submitted for decision.

The issue is whether or not respondent Maria James still has a
cause of action against the petitioner after she received and accepted the
rentals for October, November and
December 1977 at the time of filing of the instant case.  Otherwise stated, is the possession of the
lessee legitimized by the lessor’s acceptance of the
payment of back rentals?

The answer is in
the negative.

Private respondent exercised two unquestionable prerogatives of
the owner-lessor
when a tenant-lessee defaults in the payment of the rent, i.e., to demand
that:  (a) the back rentals be paid, and (b) the premises be vacated.

The records show that petitioner has defaulted in the payment of
his rentals for the months of October, November
and December, 1977; that although he paid the same on December 22, 1977
after receipt of private respondent’s demand letter, he has not paid them on
time, the due date being on the first five (5) days of each month (Rollo, p. 58); and that petitioner refused to vacate the
premises on the ground that he is protected under Sections 1 and 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 20 (Rollo, p. 41).

Under Presidential Decree No. 20, it is very clear that only
paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil
Code which refers to expiration
of leases of dwelling unit or land for an indefinite period, as ground for ejectment, is suspended but not the other provisions of the
Civil Code and the Rules of Court.  In
fact, this Court has categorically ruled that P.D. No. 20 suspended ejectment when the lease is for an indefinite period.  It did not suspend ejectment
on other grounds like lack of payment of the rental stipulated (Velez v. Avelino, 127 SCRA
602 [1984]).

In the same manner,
petitioner’s insistence that he has not defaulted in the payment of
rents because it was private respondent who
refused to accept the same, will not help the former.  As ruled by this Court, “The failure of
the owners to collect, or their refusal to accept the rentals are not valid
defenses.  Article 1256 of the Civil Code
provides that if the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses
without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from
responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due.” (Velez v. Avelino, supra).  Petitioner failed to comply with the
requisite consignation.

But petitioner further argues that in spite of his payment of
back rentals within five days from receipt of the demand letter, private respondent filed the complaint for ejectment which allegedly is contrary to the provision of
Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Such argument is untenable.

It will be recalled that private respondent formally demanded
from the petitioner, the following:  (a)
to pay the back rentals, and (b) to vacate the premises.

Petitioner was able to pay the back rentals but refused to vacate
the premises.  Undoubtedly, petitioner’s
belated payments of his back rentals do not automatically restore the contract
of lease without private respondent’s consent. 
The terms of the contract of lease have been violated and the lessor-owner has the unquestionable right to withdraw from
said contract or agreement whether oral or written.  This Court has consistently ruled that
“It is the landlord’s demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant
has failed to pay the rents on time and tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate,
which make unlawful withholding of possession (Canaynay
v. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36 [1947]; Desbarats
v. Vda. de Laureano, 18 SCRA 116 [1966]; Balucanag
v. Francisco, 122 SCRA 498 [1983]).  In
fact, this Court stressed:  “That
consent, no matter how long it may last makes lawful tenant’s possession.  Only when that consent is withdrawn and the owner demands
tenant to leave the property is the
owner’s right of possession asserted and the tenant’s refusal or failure to move
out makes his possession unlawful because it is violative
of the owner’s preferential right of possession” (Canaynay
v. Sarmiento, supra).  In the case at bar, respondent-lessor did not consent to petitioner’s possession of the leased premises after the
latter’s default in the payment of the monthly rents. 
On the contrary, respondent demanded that petitioner pay the back
rental and vacate the premises.  The
refusal of the petitioner to vacate the premises after demand,
makes his withholding of possession unlawful.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and order of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal is Affirmed in
toto.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez,
Jr., Feliciano, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

*
Presided by District Judge Pedro JL. Bautista, Branch
III, Pasay City.

**
Presided by Judge Nicanor J. Cruz.