G.R. No. 50321. March 13, 1984
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL R. ENRIQUEZ AND FERNANDO CAPIO, RESPONDENTS.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
the respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed
the decision of the labor arbiter and ordered the reinstatement of the
comÂplainants with full backwages and no loss of seniority rights and
other benefits.
Respondent Enriquez and Capio are budget clerk and accounting clerk
respectively of the Metal Closure and Lithography Plant under the
Accounting Department of the petitioner.
The labor arbiter found the following facts as substantially established by the evidences of both parties:
“On 11 November 1977, Messrs. Enriquez and Capio were each sent a
letter by the Assistant Vice-President & Plant Manager F. Andres in
this wise:“Dear Mr. Enriquez:
“After investigation, the Management of San Miguel Corporation
has found out that you have on various occasions received from the
Acting Plant Cashier, Mr. Federico Esguerra and/or his back-up man Mr.
Antonio Fontanilla, as well as the representative of the Storeroom
Department Mr. Romualdo Abad, the total amount of P278,805.43
representing cash remittances for sale of finished products as well as
storeroom materials from the period covering February, 1976 to July,
1977 for you to remit to the Cash Department, Makati Head Office which
you failed to do.“Demand is, therefore, made on you to pay and restitute to the
Company the said amount of P278,805.43 within five (5) days from your
receipt hereof. Should you fail to do so, much to our regret, we will
be constrained to institute the appropriate criminal action against
you.’“Dear Mr. Capio:
“After investigation, the Management of San Miguel Corporation
has found out that you have received from Acting Plant Cashier, Mr.
Federico Esguerra, and Mr. Romualdo Abad of the Storeroom Department,
the total sum of P28,498.10 sometime last July, 1976 for your remittance
to the Cash Department, Makati Head Office and which amount you failed
to remit to said Cash DepartÂment to the prejudice of the company.“Demand is made upon you to pay and restitute to the Company the
said amount of P28,498.10 within five (5) days from your receipt of
this letter. Should you fail to do so, much to our regret, we will be
constrained to institute the appropriate criminal action against you.’“Clearances to terminate the services of Enriquez and Capio for
alleged misappropriation of company funds were filed by SMC. Pending
approval of the clearance applications, complainants were placed under
preventive suspension.“On 18 November 1978, complainants filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against SMC which is, in effect, an opposition to the
clearance applications. Hence, the instant case.“The incident that precipitated the present conÂtroversy started
on 20 July 1977 when Romeo Valderama, Plant Accountant of the Metal
Closure and Lithography Plant of SMC, acting upon a report of the
Billing and Recording Department verified a complaint of a customer who
was allegedly called upon by SMC’s Collectors in spite of the fact that
it has already paid its account. Upon examination of the Cash Receipt
Summary, he discovered that some official receipts issued by the Plant
Cashier and Assistant Plant Cashier were not reflected in the Cash
Receipts Summary. Otherwise stated, the cash amount covered by said
official receipts were not delivered to and received by the Cash
Department of SMC. He also discovered that amounts realized from sales
of scrap metal were not remitted to the Cash Department of SMC because
no official receipts were issued by said department. On the whole, a
total of P307,303.53 were allegedly received and transmitted to the Cash
Department of SMC but did not reach their supposed destination. The
matter was then referred to the Legal Department of SMC and all the
personnel of the Accounting Department were invesÂtigated. The result
of the investigation shows that the persons allegedly responsible for
the misappropriation were Manuel Enriquez and Fernando Capio.xxx xxx xxx
“The evidence on record shows that Manuel Enriquez was charged
with the task of personally delivering funds received or collected by
the Metal Closure and Lithography Plant in Paco, Manila, to the Cash
Department in Makati. His position description clearly indicates that
he goes to the Head Office in Makati for cash deposits. This fact is
further confirmed by witnesses for SMC. Hence, Manuel Enriquez’
possession and control of company property is sufficiently clear.“Witnesses for SMC also attest to the fact that whenever Enriquez
is absent, complainant Capio, the mail carrier, takes charge of
depositing cash remittances to Makati. Witness Romualdo Abad attests to
the fact that on 7 July 1976 he turned over to Complainant Capio the
amount of P28,498.10 for remittance and delivery to the Cash Department
of SMC but records subsequently showed that the aforementioned amount of
P28,498.10 never reached the Cash Department in Makati.“The sizeable amount of money totalling P307,303.05 was actually
lost is undenied by complainants. They merely asserted that somebody
else was responsible. At any rate, witnesses Valderama, Abad,
Fontanilla and Esguerra positively stated that various amounts were
entrusted to the complainants. On the other hand, witnesses Vengco and
Richard of the Cash Department denied having received the amounts in
question and they are concurred in by the Cash Receipts Summary of the
Billing and Recording Department. Official receipts issued by the Plant
Cashier and/or his assistant were not validated by the Cash Department.
No official receipts were also issued by the Cash Department for sales
of scrap metal.xxx xxx xxx
“x x x The records show that complainants have to have either the
logbooks or the transmittal slip signed by either Richard or Vengco of
the Cash Department to show that the amounts entrusted to them for
delivery were duly received. It appears that when investigations
started the logbook in the possession of complainant Enriquez
mysteriously disappeared. They therefore resorted to the use of the
transmittal slips. SMA subÂmitted four (4) samples of transmittal slips
which were apparently received by R. Vengco of the Cash Department.
However, Vengco repudiated the signatures, explaining that they were
obvious forgeries. At first glance, the spurious signatures appear
genuine but a comparison with the real signature of R. Vengco reveals
that the head of the capital ‘R’ is more closed, the tail of the letter
‘g’ is also closed and is connected with the letter ‘C’.“A transmittal slip dated 8 July 1977 was also submitted by SMC
whereby complainant Enriquez acknowledged receipt of the amount of
P2,340.96 (Annex ‘B’ -Res.). However, Vengco denied having received
such amount.“It is worthy to note that the general tenor of complainants’
evidence is mere and outright denial of the charges imputed against
them. This, however, failed to overcame the positive assertions of
SMC’s witnesses which, when taken together with SMC’s documentary
evidence, results in a clear preponderance in favor of SMC’s stand that
complainants were responÂsible for the amounts lost.“Verily then, all the essential elements to justify loss of
confidence or breach of trust are present in the instant case. Thus,
individual complainant duties involve in a positive way the posÂsession
or control of company property; the actual loss of such property and;
their conduct tending to prove a well-founded suspicion, including
negligence or carelessness.”xxx xxx xxx
The complainants, private respondents herein, appealed on grounds of
abuse of discretion and serious errors in the findings of fact. The
respondent NLRC adopted basically the same facts as found by the Labor
Arbiter but came out with a different conclusion:
“We will readily concede one thing, which is that it was guite
logical, and certainly very conÂvenient, for the respondent to point the
finger of suspicion at the complainants, for they admittedly handled
money belonging to the respondent for transÂmittal from its Metal
Closure and Lithography Plant to its Cash Department. But the suspicion
could also be directed at its other functionaries, such as, for
instance, those who received and handled the money first, who could have
failed to deliver to the complainants the amounts supposedly lost for
the purpose of having them transmitted to the Cash Department. In other
words, it is entirely possible that the complainants never received the
said amounts, in which case the latter could not have been responsible
for their loss.“There is no evidence, in fact, other than the unconfirmed
statements of same of the responÂdent’s witnesses, who, as stated above,
are themselves not above suspicion, that the complainants received the
amounts for the loss of which they are being made responsible.“In his recommendatory memorandum in the case of the criminal
complaint filed by the respondent company against complainant Manuel
Enriquez, dated 11 April 1978, Manila Assistant Fiscal Felizardo M. Lota
observed, among others, that the said company ‘has not come up with
records to pinpoint, much less impute liability’ to complainant
Enriquez. On this basis, he found that the Company was not able ‘to
establish a prima facie case to warrant the filing of the corresponding
information’ against Enriquez, and accordingly recommended the dismissal
of the case against him. The record shows that this recommendation was
approved by Fiscal Lota’s superiors, and, to all appearances, no
criminal information was ever filed against Enriquez in the proper
court.“No similar complaint appears to have been lodged against complainant Capio.
“Indeed, the record of this case shows the kind of laxity in
accounting procedure that we have earlier remarked upon. The
complainants, contrary to all standards of care, were not reÂquired to
acknowledge the receipt of the money they were made to carry to the Cash
Department. The result is that it could not be determined with any
degree of certainty who was responsible for any loss that occurred
between the time the money was received from the customers to the time
it was supposed to be deposited in the Cash Department.xxx xxx xxx
“On the basis of the foregoing, we do not agree with the Labor
Arbiter below that there exists in this case ‘a well-founded suspicion’
of wrongdoing upon which to base a judgment to terminate the
complainants’ services. To repeat what we have earlier said, the
complainants herein appear to us to be the victims and not the culprits
of the supposed misÂdeeds that led to this case.”
A divided First Division of the NLRC rendered the above decision by a vote of two to one.
Petitioners raise the following assignments of errors:
A) RESPONDENT COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN REVERSED
THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT WAS FULLY SUBSTANTIATED BY
EVIDENCE AND, IN LIEU THEREOF, RENDERED A DECISION NOT SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.B) FURTHERMORE, RESPONDENT COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO APPLY ITS PREVIOUS RULINGS ON SIMILAR CASES AND IN FAILING
TO APPLY SIMILAR DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL.
We find no compelling reasons to disturb the arbiter’s findings of facts
and his conclusions. The conclusions of the respondent NLRC based on
practically the same facts established in the hearings before the
arbiter impress us to be speculative and conjectural.
The doctrine that the findings of facts of the NLRC are binding on this
Court if supported by substantial evidence is well established.
(Antipolo Highway Lines, Inc. v. Inciong, 64 SCRA 441; Philippine Labor
Alliance Council (PLAC) v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 75 SCRA 162;
Genconsu Free Workers Union v. Inciong, 91 SCRA 311; Pan-Philippine Life
Insurance Corp. v. NLRC, 114 SCRA 866; Pepsi-Cola Labor
Union-BFLU-TUPAS Local Chapter No. 896 v. National Labor Relations, 114
SCRA 930; Int’l. Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Phil. v. Leogardo, 117
SCRA 967 and Mamerto v. Inciong, 118 SCRA 265). However, in the same
way that the findings of facts unsupported by substantial and credible
evidence do not bind this Court (Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Employees Association-NATU v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 76 SCRA
50), neither will we uphold erroneous conclusions of the NLRC when we
find that the latter committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing
the decision of the labor arbiter (See Visperas v. Inciong, 119 SCRA
477; Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes v. Camara Shoes, 111 SCRA
477).
The central issue in this case is focused on the right of an employer to
terminate the employment of an employee on the ground of loss of
confidence or breach of trust. The labor arbiter found sufficient
evidence to uphold the right of the employer. As a rule this Court
leans over backwards to help workers and employees continue in their
employment. We have mitigated penalties imposed by management on erring
employees and ordered employers to reinstate workers who have been
punished enough through suspension. However, breach of trust and
confidence and acts of dishonesty and infidelity in the handling of
funds and properties are an entirely different matter.
In Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals (1 SCRA
1251) we held that where an employee occupies position of trust and
confidence, as where he is entrusted with confidential or delicate
matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the
employer’s property, acts tending to show untrustworthiness may
constitute a just cause for dismissal, or of loss of employer’s
confidence.
Similarly, we stated in Nevans v. Court of Industrial Relations (23 SCRA 1321):
“loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee,
and proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee’s misconduct –
apparently demanded by the Minister of Labor – is not required to
dismiss him on this charge. (See National Organization of Laborers and
Employees v. Roldan, 95 Phil. 727; Phil. Refining Co. v. Garcia, 18 SCRA
107; Gatmaitan v. MRR, 21 SCRA 191). It is sufficient if there is
‘some basis’ for such loss of confidence; (Galsim v. PNB, 29 SCRA 293)
or if the employer has reasonable grounds to believe, if not to
entertain the moral conviction that the employee concerned is
responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his participation
therein renÂdered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position.” (See Reyes v. Zamora, 90 SCRA 92; San Miguel
Corp. v. the Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos.
61232-33, December 29, 1983).
By and large, this Court has continually recognized the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of confidence or
breach of trust. In Galsim v. Philippine National Bank (29
SCRA 293) we upheld the dismissal of a bank teller found to have given
money to a co-employee in violation of bank rules. Said act which
caused prejudice to the bank was a justifiable basis for the bank to
lose its confidence in the employee. Likewise, we upheld the dismissal
of an employee on the grounds of use of company property for personal
use and gain without authority, dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud,
and wilfull breach of trust in Int’l. Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Phil. v. Leogardo (supra).
We have, of course stressed that the right of the employer must not be
exercised arbitrarily and without just cause; otherwise, the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure of the workers would be
rendered nugatory. While it is true that to dismiss or lay off an
employee is a management’s prerogative, it must neverÂtheless be done
without abuse of discretion, for what is at stake is not only the
worker’s position but also his means of livelihood (Kapisanan ng
Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes v. Camara Shoes, supra).
This, we emphasized as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
“xxx Such a vague, all-encompassing pretext as loss of confidence,
if given the seal of approval by this Court, could easily be utilized
to reduce to a barren form of words the constitutional guarantee of
security of tenure. Precisely, the employee is afforded that protection
so that his means of livelihood is not placed at the mercy of
management. He is just as much a participant in the industrial process.
He is entitled to be considered as such. Constitutional provisions
protecting labor are in line with the predominant thinking all over the
world safeguarding human dignity. It would then be to ignore not only a
mandate of the fundamental law but also a counsel of wisdom and fair
play to impart to the concept of loss of confidence such a
latitudinarian scope. What matters the investigation undergone by
private respondent resulting in the affirmation of his innocence, if
thereafter management would just rely on an alleged loss of confidence?
x x x” Central Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 90 SCRA 9; see also Acda v.
Minister of Labor, 119 SCRA 306).
In disposing of this case, we have fully taken into account the above
considerations. We note the undisputed fact that after the discovery of
the failure to remit payÂments made by the petitioner’s customers to
the Cash Department, the petitioner through its legal department
conducted a thorough and intensive investigation. It was not only the
respondents Enriquez and Capio who were under suspicion for the loss of
the P307,303.53 but also all the other employees of the petitioner who
could have had acÂcess to the funds prior to their remittance to the
Cash Department. They were all equally investigated.
The respondent NLRC remarked that there was laxity in the accounting
procedures of the petitioner. That is a matter addressed to the
petitioner but it does not excuse dishonesty of employees and should not
in any case hamper the right of the employer to terminate the
employment of employees on the ground of loss of confidence or breach of
trust. Precisely, the accounting procedure which called for
improvements was based primarily on trust and confiÂdence.
The two members of the respondent NLRC who voted for the reinstatement
of the private respondents capitalized on what they considered
insufficiency of the testimonial evidence. It should be noted however,
that the logbook in the possession of respondent Enriquez had
mysteriously disappeared and the petitioner had to rely on transmittal
slips to bolster its evidence.
In Phil. Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Education Employees and CIR (107 Phil. 1003) we held that –
xxx xxx xxx
“The relation of employer and employee, specially where the
employee has access to the employer’s property in the form of articles
and merchandise for sale, necessarily involves trust and confidence. If
said merchandise are lost and said loss is reasonably attributed to
said employee, and he is charged with theft, even if he is acquitted of
the charge on reasonable doubt, when the employer has lost its
confidence in him, it would be highly unfair to require said employer to
continue employing him or to reinstate him, for in that case, the
former might find it necessary for its protection to employ another
person to watch and keep an eye on him. x x x” (See also Dole
Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, 123 SCRA 673).
Private respondents rely on the fact that the criminal charges
brought against them by the petitioner were disÂmissed by the Fiscal for
insufficiency of evidence. Conviction in a criminal case for the loss
of the P307,303.53 is not necessary in order that the petitioner may
terminate the employment of respondents Enriquez and Capio (See Phil.
Geothermal, Inc. v. NLRC, 117 SCRA 692):
“x x x Proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee’s misconduct
is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for the
sane or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the
employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein
renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his
position. (Reyes v. Zamora, 90 SCRA 92 [1979]).
As correctly observed by the arbiter, the very wording of the Assistant
Fiscal’s memorandum shows that it was merely recommendatory. At any
rate, a failure to pursue a criminal prosecution on grounds of
insufficient evidence, as in this case where the primary documentary
evidence was lost, is not determinative of the innocence or culpability
of the private respondents for purposes of the case before the public
respondent. We have held that the acquittal of an employee in the
criminal charge filed against him by his employer does not guarantee his
reinstatement if the employer has validly lost confidence in him (Dole
Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, supra). A company has the right to
dismiss its erring employees if only as a measure of self-protection
against acts inimical to its interest (Manila Trading & Supply Co.
v. Zulueta, 69 Phil. 483; Int’l Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Phil. v.
Leogardo, supra).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent National Relations Commission
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter is
REINSTATED and the clearance to terminate the employment of the private
resÂpondents may issue forthwith.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Acting Chairman), Plana, Relova and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., on leave.