FLORENTINO SALINAS AND MILAGROS C. SALINAS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. MIGUEL R. NAVARRO, ARSENIO DE LEON AND ESTRELLA A. DE LEON, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus
filed by spouses Florentino Salinas and Milagros Salinas to set aside the
orders of the respondent court denying motions for immediate execution in an
ejectment case pending before it on appeal.

On June 4, 1973,
respondents spouses Arsenio De Leon and Estrella De
Leon executed a deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage in favor of
the petitioners over a house and lot at 2228 Banaag at Sikat
Street, Tondo, Manila.

According to the petitioners, the De Leons pleaded that they be
allowed a grace period of six (6) months from said date or up to December 5,
1973, during which they could stay in the said premises without paying
corresponding rentals while they were having their new house constructed.  When the period lapsed, the De Leons refused
to vacate the premises thus prompting the petitioners Salinas
to file an action for unlawful detainer with the City Court of Manila.  In addition to praying that the private
respondents be ejected, the petitioners also asked for rentals at six thousand
(P6,000.00) pesos a month and attorney’s fees.

In their answer, the private respondents contended that the real
issue in the litigation was ownership and not mere possession and that,
consequently, the city court had no jurisdiction.

The private respondents stated that they originally purchased the
house and lot from a certain Manuel Torres under term payments.  When the time came to make the final payment,
the De Leons could not raise the necessary amounts so they borrowed money from
the petitioners who were their friends. 
The private respondents alleged that the deed of absolute sale with
assumption of mortgage did not represent the true contract between the parties
but was executed only to guaranty the loan between the friends.  The respondents claimed that their true
agreement was a verbal one of mortgage with an understanding that the house and
lot would be sold at a price between one hundred twenty thousand pesos (P120,000.00)
and one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00) and that the net gain would
be divided between them, or that the De Leons would refund to the spouses
Salinas the twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) with a net gain of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00), in six (6) months.

On April 4, 1978,
the city court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs and
against the defendants ordering the latter and all persons claiming right/title
under them to vacate the premises described at 2228 Banaag at Sikat Street, San
Rafael Village, Balut, Tondo, Manila; to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
P600.00 a month representing the reasonable payment for the use and occupation
of the subject premises, which this Court takes judicial notice of, commencing
from December 5, 1973 until after such time as when the defendants shall have
had actually vacated the afore-described premises; the amount of P1,000.00 as
and for reasonable attorney’s fees, plus the costs of the proceedings.

“Defendants’ counterclaim is hereby dismissed.

“No pronouncement nor award as to
damages.”

During the pendency of the ejectment case before the City Court
of Manila, the private respondents filed Civil Case No. 95731 in the Court of
First Instance of Manila entitled “A. DE LEON, ET AL. vs. F. SALINAS, ET
AL.” for the annulment of the said deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage and/or to declare the same as an equitable mortgage.

On June 27, 1978,
the De Leons perfected an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila.  On January
10, 1979, the petitioners prayed that an order of execution issue
on the following grounds:

“‘That defendants have not made a payments (sic) on the
rentals of the premises at the rate of P600.00 monthly as stated in the
decision appealed from and which should commence from June, 1978, the time when
said appeal was filed by defendants; that such failure entitled the winning
party to move, for immediate execution as per Sec. 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court;

“That the decision states that defendants are adjudged to pay
rentals on the premises from December, 1973 to May, 1978 or a period of fifty
four (54) months with a total sum of thirty two thousand four hundred pesos
(P32,400.00) but with the filing of their appeal,
defendants failed to file any supersedeas bond in the said amount and this is
also violative of said Sec. 8, Rule 70;”

“That the above-stated amounts (P32,400.00
and P4,800.00) plus the award of attorney’s fees of P1,000.00 has a totality of
thirty eight thousand two hundred pesos (P38,200.00).”

The respondent court denied the motion in an order dated January 25, 1979 which reads:

“In view of the pendency of this appealed case for decision by
this Court, the motion for immediate execution is hereby denied.”

On March 6, 1979,
the court denied a motion for reconsideration of the above order.

The petitioners raised the following points in their petition:

“1. DID THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE EXERCISE SOUND DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR EXECUTION
FILED BY PETITIONERS BASED ON SEC. 8, RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND THE
RULING OF OUR SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF DEHESA VS. MACALALAG, L-29096, FEBRUARY 23, 1978?

“2.  IF SAID RESPONDENT
JUDGE ABUSED SAID DISCRETION, CAN HE BE COMPELLED OR ORDERED TO ISSUE A WRIT
FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
APPEALED FROM?”

The petitioners rely on Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
which provides for execution of the judgment even when an appeal has been
perfected unless the appellant files the necessary supersedeas bond and
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time.

We agree with the petitioners. 
Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 8. 
– Immediate execution of judgment. 
How to stay same.- If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution files suf­ficient bond, approved by the justice of
the peace or municipal court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action
in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs
accruing dawn to the time of the judg­ment appealed from, and unless, during
the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of
rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment
of the justice of the peace or municipal court to exist.  In the absence of a contract, he shall
deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the
premises for the preceding month or period. 
The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the justice of the peace or
municipal court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance to which the action is appealed.

All moneys so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited in the
provincial or city treasury, and shall be held there until the final
disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested
parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to
withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise.  Should the defendant fail to make the
payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal,
the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of which the defendant shall
have notice, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the
judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such
execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final
disposition thereof on its merits. 
(Emphasis supplied) (Sec. 8, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court)

The rule is explicit.  In
ejectment cases, the judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor
of the plaintiff in order to prevent further damages to him arising from the
loss of possession.  However, the
defendant may stay execution (a) by perfecting an appeal and filing a
supersedeas bond and (b) by paying from time to time either to the plaintiff or
to the Court of First Instance the reasonable value of the use and occupation
of the property as may be fixed by the justice of the peace court in its
judgment (Base v. Leviste, 99 SCRA 575). 
Thus, in an eviction case where the defendant did not file a supersedeas
bond and did not make any monthly deposit of the rentals, we ruled that the
lessor is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the
municipal or city court’s judgment for the restoration of possession and the
payment of the accrued rentals, or compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises.  In such a case, the duty
of the court to order immediate execution is minis­terial and imperative
(Philippine Holding Corporation v. Valenzuela, 104 SCRA 401).

It is true that in Vda. de Legaspi v.
Avendaño (79 SCRA 135, 144-145) this Court ruled:

“Now, coming to the basic procedural issue before Us in the
instant case, which is, whether or not the final judgment in the ejectment
case, Civil Case No. 953 of the San Pedro court, should be fully executed
before the final termination of the action for quieting of title, Civil Case
No. 929 in the Court of First instance of Laguna, it is Our considered
opinion that it is at least a matter of equity that petitioner’s physical
possession of the premises in controversy should not be disturbed in the
meanwhile.  Actions of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those
who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed
right of possession.  In other words, the
special civil action under Rule 70 has been designed to summarily restore
possession of land or building to one who has been forcibly deprived thereof,
without prejudice to the settlement of the opposing claims of the parties to
legal possession in the corresponding appropriate proceeding.  Where the action, therefore, is one of
illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of
the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper
judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of
confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant
inconvenience and expenses.  For the
Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or
not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be
filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer
case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case
involving legal possession or ownership.x x x”

but the
exception to the rule in this case of Vda. de
Legaspi is based on strong reasons of equity not found in the present
petition.  The right of the petitioners
is not so seriously placed in issue in the annulment case as to warrant a
deviation, on equitable grounds, from the imperative nature of the rule.  In the Vda.
de Legaspi case, execution of the decision in the
ejectment case would also have meant demolition of the premises, a factor not
present in this petition.

The records show that the respondents have delinquent accounts
from December 1973 to May, 1978 adjudged by the municipal court to be P32,400.00.  They have
failed to deposit monthly rentals from June, 1978 to the present at the rate of
P600.00 monthly.  No supersedeas bond has
been filed.  The letter of the Rule and
strong grounds of equity favor the petitioners. 
In accordance with Section 8 of Rule 70, the respondent judge should
have ordered the immediate execution of the decision of the municipal court
instead of denying it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The respondent judge is directed to issue the
writ of execution in Civil Case No. 232733 and the sheriff is ordered to
expeditiously attend to its implementation. 
Costs against the private respondents.  This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, and Relova, JJ., concur.