JUAN MALONDA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JUSTINA INFANTE VDA. DE MALONDA ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

In the year 1936, Eufronio Malonda died in Camarines Sur leaving the
defendant Justina Infante as his widow and the other defendants as his
legitimate children .

On March 15, 1943, Juan Malonda instituted this potion to obtain a partition
of the properties belong to the estate of said Eufronio Malonda. He alleged he
was a natural son of the deceased, had continuosly enjoyed possession of the
status of acknowledged child, and was entitled to share in the inheritance.

After the plaintiff had rested his case, upon motion of defendant, the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Judge Gabriel Prieto, dismissed the
proceeding the reason that the action involved a petition which, according to
the Civil Code, could only be considered during the lifetime of the putative
parent, except in two cases, none of which — His Honor said — applied to herein
plaintiff. Such exceptions are these: (1) if the father or mother died during
the minority of the child * * *; and (2) if, after the death of the father or
mother, some document, before unknown, should be discovered in which the child
is expressly acknowledged. (Article 137 Civil Code.)

Juan Malonda was born in Aug. 1897, in Iriga, Camarines Sur. At that time the
Civil Code was already in force, it having become law in 1889. His rights are
therefore governed by that system of legislation. Now, in 1936 when Eufronio
Malonda departed, Juan Malonda was no longer a minor. Hence, the first exception
above-mentioned is inapplicable .

Plaintiff-appellant, without contesting the general rule invokes the second
exception, by prasenting Exhibit B and by declaring about, two letter’s Eufronio
Malonda had addressed to him. Exhibit B is not in the record, as reconstituted.
It seems to be a “certifico de confirmición” , taken from the church registry of
the Bishop of Nueva Caceres. Supposing that — as plaintiff claims — it actually
.contains a statement that Juan Malonda is the son of Eufronio Malonda, in
default of proof that Eufronio had signed it, no recognition of paternity may
thereby be imputed to him. It is safe to assume that such certificate is signed
merely by church authorities, attesting to what appears in their records. And
statements in ecclesiastical books have consistently been held insufficient
acknowledgments of the filiation of natural children.^[1]

Anyway Exhibir B — or what it represents — Is not a document unknown
to Juan Malonda before the death of his father, as everyone in this Catholic and
Christian country is supposed to be cognizant of the existence of such church
records. And the letters to which Juan Malonda referred in his oral testimony
included no declaration expressly acknowledging Juan Malonda as the offspring of
Eufronio. Again, such communications are not documents discovered after the
death of Eufronio. They were received by, and therefore were known to Juan
before the demise of his alleged father.

It follows from the above exposition that the trial judge made no mistake in
refusing to entertain the demands of plaintiff-appellant, for it is settled that
a natural child not acknowledged has no rights whatsoever against his father or
his estate.^[2] Some authors and jurists
regard this rule as unfair to natural children who are brought into this world
through no fault of their own. Others sustain it upon the ground that it
protects the rights of the legitimate family and serves [to discourage illicit
relations. Much could be written expounding or criticizing the opposing schools
of thought. But it is unnecessary to do so at this time. The Code Commission has
taken a definite stand on the latter in the draft of the Civil Code it has
submitted to the Congress, — which is currently under study by a committee of
the House of Representatives — and any official pronouncements made in this
connection might be considered as an attempt to Influence the members thereof
and the Congress itself, whose wisdom, patriotism and vision will surely be put
to a test in the discussion of the many statutory reforms the Code Commission
has chosen to recommend. In the meantime, until this particular rule about
natural children is modified by legislative authority our duty is to apply it in
proper cases, regardless of our preferences.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, with cost. So
ordered.

Parás, Actg. C. J., and Tuason, J., concur.

FERIA, J.:

I concur in the result.

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DISSENTING

PERFECTO, J.:

There is no course of action more commodious in dispensing justice than that
of applying the law as we find it clearly printed in a book. When the law we are
called upon to apply harmonizes with our sense of justice or does not appear to
contravene any rule of fair play, the course of action should be followed
without the least hesitation. In this case we are faced with a provision of law
that provokes revolt in our conscience. The situation creates the alternative of
whether to apply or not the provision as it is. It calls for a resolute attitude
from one who, by the nature of his office and by his oath, is duty bound to
administer true justice.

The law in question is that embodied in article 137 of the Civil Code which
provides:

“Actions for the acknowledgment of natural children may be commenced only
during the lifetime of the putative parents except in the following cases:

“1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which
case the latter may commence the action within the four years next following the
attainment of its majority.

“2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some document, before
unknown, should be discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged.

“In this case the action must be commenced within the six months next
following the discovery of such document.”

There are several fundamental reasons why the provision should be considered
obsolete and should be denied enforcement:

1. Being procedural or adjective in nature, it was nullified and superseded
   since July 1, 1940, by the Rules of Court adopted by the Supreme Court as
   provided by the Constitution.

2. Being a regulation as to the time when a petition for the acknowledgment of a
   natural child should be filed and considered, the matter is governed by the
   Statute of Limitations and provisions on prescription of the Code of Civil
   Procedure, and since the latter’s enactment, it ceased to have any effect.

3. The provision would compel a natural child to bring action against his own
   father, during his lifetime, to seek judicial confirmation of his
   acknowledgment, which is shocking upon moral considerations.

4. The provision is discriminatory against a natural child, and, therefore, is
   unconstitutional, because it violates the “equal protection of the law”
   clause.

5. The provision is one of the manifestations of feudal ideology, absolutely
   incompatible with the tenets of our present day constitutional
   democracy.

The philosophy underlying the provision in question is the product of the
twisted medieval mentality which, giving back to the healthy processes of
reason, would punish or impose civil sanction or social ostracism not upon the
guilty parents, but upon the innocent children who have no choice whether to be
born out of approved wedlock or out of more or less clandestine illegitimate
relationship. The injustice is so glaring that only defective morbid mentality
can fail to perceive it.

It is high time that, in the light of the equal protection of the law and
social justice clauses of the fundamental law, the discriminatory provisions
against illegitimate children in the Spanish Civil Code should be erased from
our statute books as a nullity and permanently relegated to the archaeological
museum of the mistakes and injustices of a socially and morally immature
humanity.

All children are entitled to equal protection from their parents. Only a
distorted concept of that parental duty, Which springs from and is imposed by
nature, may justify discriminatory measures to the prejudice of those born out
of illicit sexual relations. The legal or moral violations upon which some of
our present day legal provisions penalize. illegitimate children with social,
economic and financial sanctions, are perpetrated by the parents without the
consent or knowledge of the children. If the erring parents deserve to have
their foreheads branded with the stigma of illegitimacy, it is iniquitous to
load the innocent children with the evil consequences of that stigma. There can
be illegitimate parents but there should not be any illegitimate children.

In affording protection to their offspring, animals, including the wildest
and most ferocious, do not make unjust distinctions. Can a people of the 20th
century afford to face the indictment of lacking the sense of justice with which
even the most sanguinary beasts are endowed? There will not be enough water in
the Jordan to wash out such shame nor enough flames in the Phlegethon to melt
the plaque of that sin.

Agreement on the need of surrounding the institution of marriage with legal
guarantees cannot enshrine it as a cult where the votaries may blindly sacrifice
innocent children in the altar of Mammon. No matter how high we may place it in
the category of human institutions, marriage cannot be an end in itself. It is
only one of the many means devised by mankind to serve its well-being. The
security, welfare, and happiness of children, so as to Insure the survival and
perpetuation of humanity, are among the essential purposes of marriage. If
marriage cannot serve those purposes in the case df illegitimate children, it
should tot, be used as a pretext to hamper or destroy them. Created bid
established to promote social welfare, it should not be used as a pretext for or
an instrument of injustice. Otherwise, the hatred it may provoke will engender
revolt against its existence.

The present legal discriminations against illegitimate children are
perpetrated avowedly in the interest of the Institution of marriage. But they
are miserably missing the mark. By unjustly punishing the innocent illegitimate
offspring, marriage is not promoted nor protected, while there is no statistical
evidence that the procedure has reduced ;the number of parents bent on begetting
children of free love or of mere lust. The authors of the discriminatory laws
have committed injustice because they did not look at social phenomena realities
with their retinas but only, as jesting youngsters, with eyelids in entropion.
No matter how pullulating the number of their unfortunate victims may be, their
cruelty does not have the effect of an antidote against illicit love or simple
lust which—call them vices, morbid conditions, or mere weaknesses, as you may
choose—have afflicted even many of the greatest specimens of humanity, including
outstanding names in history, starting from David and Solomon of the Sacred
Scripture, if we choose not to delve further beyond remote antiquity.

The ever present distressing problems of love, sex and marriage, should be
solved with deeper wisdom than that shown by the rudimentary reasoning process
behind the discriminatory legal provisions. The problems seem to be part of the
common ailments of mankind and are becoming more difficile and complex with the
growing complexity of modern society. They had been and continue to be among the
main preoccupations of man in all times. Only hypocrisy may conceal the fact.
The spicy conversations on account of sex very often occupy considerable time of
many men, without excluding the most cultured ones and those placed in the
higher brackets of social hierarchy or official authority. Phallicism was a
characteristic of the most ancient religions. Greek mythology created the cult
of Priapus in the Dionysiac mysteries. Priam, one of the protagonists of the
Illiad, was distinguished by his one hundred children. Widespread divorces in
the most civilized countries, measures to eradicate prostitution, war babies,
clandestine polygamy, are just some of the problems that so far have defied all
solution. Certainly, the solution cannot be found in increasing the number of
social injustices if allowing the continuation of discriminatory measures
against illegitimate offsprings. Let it be remembered illegitimate children are
human beings like others and are entitled to the same rights and privileges. And
no one can deny that many of them have afforded substantial contributions for
the improvement of the lot of man. Much of the strength and greatness of the
greatest democracy of modern times is due to the genius of Alexander Hamilton,
who has been called the “sublime bastard.”

The prevailing attitude towards illegitimate children and their mothers
should be revised. Besides causing Iniquities against the children, it is
directly responsible for many abortions and infanticides. Without in any way
encouraging illicit sexual relations, it is high time that the social anatema
against them should subside in the face of motherhood, which should be taken as
a redeeming happening, fecundation should give the woman the feeling of being
blessed by nature, and that should give her enough pride to overcome the shame
of social taboos so as to preclude her ¦from attempting against the life of her
child and make her feel that the event had placed in her hands a noble mission,
the rearing of her child, born in accordance with the inscrutable plans of
nature. By dedicating herself to such mission she must feel that she is
contributing to achieve the perpetuation of mankind.

The order of dismissal
should be reversed and the lower court should be ordered to give plaintiff his
day in court to try and decide the case on the merits, by following general
rules of procedure and evidence.

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^[1] Adriano vs. De Jesus 23 Phil.,
450; Samson vs. Corrales Tan, 48 Phil., 401.
^[2] Buenaventura vs. Urbono, 5 Phil., 1.