ELADIA MAGTIBAY, DONATO MAGTIBAY AND JOSE MAGTIBAY, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. ROWEL TIANGCO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On December  17,1937,  defendant-appellant herein, Rowel Tiangco,  who  was  then a  minor  under  eighteen years  of age, pleaded guilty to an information for homicide through reckless negligence, in that he had recklessly driven an auto- mobile and thereby caused the  death of  Mateo  Magtibay, of whom plaintiffs-appellees are the lawful heirs. The Court of First Instance of Batangas found Rowel  Tiangco guilty as charged, but  as he was under eighteen years of age, the sentence was suspended, and he was committed to the care and custody of  Attorney  Gavino  S.  Abaya, until Tiangco would reach his majority, subject to the supervision of the Superintendent of Public Schools of the Province.  A  little over one year and a half later, on July 27,  1939,  Attorney Gavino S. Abaya in  view of Rowel Tiangco’s good conduct, recommended the dismissal of the  case.  The Court of First Instance  dismissed  the criminal  case, but reserved  such right as the heirs  of the deceased might have to recover damages in a civil action against said Tiangco.  Accordingly, the civil action in the instant case  was filed on September 2,  1941, against defendant-appellant herein,  for  damages in  the sum of P2,000 for the death of Mateo  Magtibay.  The Court of  First Instance gave judgment for plaintiffs  for P2,000 as damages. Hence this appeal.

We believe the court a quo committed no error in rendering judgment for plaintiffs.  The suspension of the sentence under article 80 of the Revised Penal Code,  after appellant herein had pleaded guilty, did  not  wipe out his guilt,  but merely  put off the imposition of tjie corresponding penalty, in order to give the delinquent minor a chance to be reformed.  When, therefore, after he  had observed good conduct, the criminal case was dismissed, this did not mean that he was exonerated from the  crime  charged, but  simply that he would suffer no penalty.  Nor did such dismissal of the criminal case obliterate his civil liability  for damages. The Court of First Instance of Batangas in dismissing the criminal case correctly reserved the right of plaintiffs herein to bring a civil action for damages.

Counsel for  defendant-appellant  contends that a minor can not be held civilly liable for his acts.  However, whether we view  the present civil action as  one under the Penal Code or under  the Civil Code, defendant-appellant is liable in damages.  If the theory of  the  civil action is civil liability arising from the crime of homicide through reckless negligence,  defendant-appellant is  bound to  pay  damages because article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”  Defendant herein  was found guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless negligence.  The suspension of the sentence did not exculpate him from the crime, as already stated.

If,  on the other hand,  the theory  of the civil  action is culpa aquiliana or tort, the minority of defendant-appellant does not free him from responsibility for damages because article  32, paragraph  2,  of the  Civil  Code provides that “La menbr edad, la demencia 6 imbecilidad, la sordomudez, la prodigalidad y la interdiccion civil no son mas que restricciones de la personalidad juridica.  Los que se hallaren en alguno de esos estados son susceptibles de derechos,  y aun de obligaciones cuando estas nacen de los hechos  6  de relaciones  entre los bienes  del  incapacitado  y  un tercero,”

Manresa  says  that said article 32 renders minors liable-for culpa aquiliana under article  1902, Civil Code.    (See his. comment on Article 32.)  Moreover, it is established  that “Liability of an infant in a civil action for  his torts is imposed  as  a mode, not of punishment, but of compensation. If property has been destroyed or other loss occasioned by a wrongful act, it is just that the loss should fall upon the estate  of  the wrongdoer rather than  on that of  a  guiltless person, and that without reference to the question  of moral guilt.  Consequently, for every tortious act of violence or other  pure tort, the  infant  tort-feasor is  liable in a  civil action to  the injured person in the same manner  and to the same extent as an adult”  (27 A.J., p 812.)

The judgment appealed  from is  affirmed, with  costs against appellant.  So ordered.

Yulo,  C. J., Moran, Horrilleno, Ozaeta,  and Paras, JJ.,concur.