DAMIAN HERMITANO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MARCELINO CLARITO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
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Hermitano versus Clarito
The Case
This is an action for restitutory interdict — the summary remedy that restores possession to one who has been despoiled — brought by Damian Hermitano against Marcelino Clarito. Hermitano claims that the municipality of Carmona conveyed to him a parcel of town land in payment for services, that he possessed it quietly and peaceably as owner, and that Clarito, then the local president of the town, ousted him without authority and told the tenants to recognize Clarito as owner. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules: the one-year period to sue for restitution runs from the actual act of dispossession, not from the mere issuance of a resolution; and a possessor is protected in his possession even if his title is void.
Procedural History
The complaint was filed on the seventeenth of April, 1901, in the Court of First Instance, describing the land by area, location, and boundaries, and praying for restoration of possession, damages, and costs. After trial, the Court of First Instance entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, granting the relief prayed for by restitutory interdict together with other relief proper in the premises. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment appealed, with costs against the appellant. Justice Willard, with whom Justice Ladd concurred, dissented; Justice Torres was disqualified.
Facts
On the fourth of December, 1897, the municipality of Carmona conveyed to Hermitano a piece of land belonging to the township, in payment or remuneration for services he had rendered in the years 1895 and 1896. From that time he had quiet and peaceable possession of the land as owner.
On the twenty-eighth of April, 1900, Clarito, then local president of the town, without authority, ousted Hermitano from possession and notified the tenants that from that date they were to recognize him as owner in his capacity as president of the town. Two witnesses stated that Clarito had been in possession since he made demand upon the tenants to attorn to him as owner and to deal with him concerning expenses and seed for cultivation.
Clarito did not deny the facts. He admitted the act of ouster but asserted it took place on the first of April, 1900, not the twenty-eighth. To prove that date he presented a certified copy of a resolution passed on that date by the municipal council establishing a new system for the cultivation of the town commons. The Court found the resolution, by itself, could not have produced the effect of depriving the plaintiff of possession; some subsequent act was needed, and the unanimous testimony fixed that act on the twenty-eighth of April, 1900.
Issues
- Whether or not the action for restitutory interdict was barred by the statute of limitations, that is, whether the ouster occurred on the first or the twenty-eighth of April, 1900.
- Whether or not the alleged invalidity of the conveyance from the municipality to the plaintiff defeats the action for restitution of possession.
Applicable Provisions
Article 446 of the Civil Code provides:
Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the prescriptions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This is the substantive foundation of the ruling: even naked possession de facto commands respect until the possessor is defeated in a proper action.
Article 1635 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as discussed in the decision, provides:
The action for the recovery of possession by means of restitutory interdict must be brought within one year from the date of the ouster.
This is the provision on which the defendant relied, and its one-year period is counted from the actual act of dispossession.
Articles 1633, 1634, and 1638 of the Code of Civil Procedure are cited by the Court for the proposition that the remedy is available to a possessor under a more or less valid title and even to one with only naked possession, and that no evidence should be admitted other than that referring to the fact of possession and the ouster.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the ouster took place on the twenty-eighth of April, 1900. The municipal resolution of the first of April could not, by itself, have deprived the plaintiff of possession; it had to be executed by a subsequent act, which the unanimous testimony fixed on the twenty-eighth. From that date to the filing of the complaint on the seventeenth of April, 1901, the year had not expired. The Court explained:
Furthermore, it is self-evident that the resolution, per se, could not have produced the effect de facto of depriving the plaintiff of his possession.
On the second issue, the Court held that the validity of the conveyance was irrelevant. The question was not the legality of the title but solely the fact of possession. Whether the conveyance was valid or not, the plaintiff was given possession, held it quietly and peaceably as owner for over two years, and was entitled to have that possession respected until defeated in the proper action. The Court stated:
Even if he had been absolutely without title, with nothing more than the naked possession de facto of the land, under article 446 of the Civil Code he was entitled to have this possession respected.
The Court added that the remedy of restitutory interdict is afforded not only to a possessor under a more or less valid title but even to those who have only the naked possession, if they are despoiled thereof; and that for restitution it is unnecessary to consider anything further than the fact of the possession and the ouster.
Doctrine
First, the one-year period for restitutory interdict runs from the actual act of dispossession, not from the issuance of the resolution or order that purportedly authorized it. A resolution per se cannot produce the de facto effect of depriving possession; it must be executed by a subsequent act, and it is that act which starts the period.
Second, the action for restitution concerns solely the fact of possession and the ouster, not the legality of the title. Under Article 446 of the Civil Code, every possessor — even one with naked possession de facto and absolutely without title — has a right to be respected in his possession and protected or restored by the means established by law.
Third, consistent with Articles 1633, 1634, and 1638 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no evidence should be admitted other than that referring to possession and ouster, and evidence not concerning these issues should be rejected by the court on its own motion.
Disposition
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, with costs against the appellant, Marcelino Clarito.
Remember This
The line worth memorizing: even a possessor with nothing more than naked possession de facto is entitled to have that possession respected until defeated in the proper action, and the one-year period for restitutory interdict counts from the actual act of ouster, not from the resolution that preceded it. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between the fact of possession and the question of title, and to test when the one-year period for restitution begins to run.