PEDRO JOYA Y AGUSTIN JOYA, RECURRENTES, CONTRA PEDRO TIONGCO, RECURRIDO.

Joya versus Tiongco

The Case

This is the case of Joya versus Tiongco, decided by the Supreme Court in April 1941. Pedro Joya and Agustin Joya, the petitioners, sued Pedro Tiongco, the respondent, to vindicate their ownership of one undivided half of a parcel of land in Cavite. The whole controversy turns on a single question of law: whether the deed by which Marcelina Joya gave that half share to the Joya brothers in 1928 was a donation inter vivos, made during her lifetime, or a donation mortis causa, one that takes effect only upon her death. The answer decides who owns the land, because the donor later dealt with the same property in favor of Tiongco. The case matters to every reviewee because it fixes the test for distinguishing the two kinds of donation, and it shows how a registered donation defeats a later transaction by the donor.

Procedural History

The action was commenced in the Court of First Instance, the trial court of origin. That court held that the donation was inter vivos and rendered judgment for the Joya brothers. The cause was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court and declared that the donation was mortis causa. The Joya brothers then came to the Supreme Court on appeal against that decision of the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court.

Facts

On the twenty fifth of October 1928, Marcelina Joya executed a deed of donation in favor of her relatives, the brothers Agustin Joya and Pedro Joya. By that deed she ceded and transferred, by way of donation, one half of lot 2347 of the Hacienda de Santa Cruz de Malabon, Cavite, a half that she owned in undivided share and that was covered by certificate of title number 6116. The deed recited that the donation was made in consideration of her relationship to the donees and of their recognition of her right, title and interest over the lot, and that they were ready to deliver possession of the land to her. The deed then contained the clause that gave rise to the litigation: the donation would take effect only after her death, and the donees would bear the expenses of subdividing the lot.

The donation was legally accepted, registered in the Registry of Property of Cavite, and annotated on the back of certificate of title number 6116. Later, by virtue of a writ of execution issued in 1931 in a civil case before the justice of the peace court of Tanza, Cavite, against Marcelina Joya, the same undivided half was sold at public auction to Jugo Area for 510 pesos. The final certificate of sale was issued to the buyer in 1934, and the buyer in turn sold the property back to Marcelina Joya in July 1934. Marcelina then leased the same property to Pedro Tiongco for a term of five years. In October 1935 she transferred to Tiongco her right of possession and usufruct over the half share in consideration of a debt of 821 pesos and 91 centavos. In a later public document she acknowledged that her total debt to Tiongco was 1,250 pesos, and it was agreed that if she failed to pay within one year, her creditor Tiongco would become the owner of the property. Marcelina died on the thirty first of January 1937 without having paid the debt.

All of these transactions between Marcelina and Tiongco, except those of October 1935, were registered and annotated on the back of certificate of title number 6116. That certificate was later cancelled by the issuance of transfer certificate of title number 16459 in March 1937 in favor of Florentino Joya as owner of one undivided half, and of Pedro and Agustin Joya as co owners of the other undivided half of lot 2347.

Issues

• Whether or not the donation made by Marcelina Joya in favor of Pedro and Agustin Joya is a donation mortis causa or a donation inter vivos.
• Whether or not the respondent Tiongco may validly claim any right over the donated half share by reason of the later transactions between him and the donor.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a codal article; it applies the settled rule laid down in its own prior jurisprudence, which it states as follows:

El hecho de que la materia, objeto de donacion, o sea, la propiedad donada no se entregue de momento al donatario, y que dicha entrega no tenga lugar sino despues de la muerte del donante, no hace que deba entenderse que la donacion es mortis causa. Para que lo fuera es preciso que la muerte sea la causa o consideracion del acto de liberalidad del donante. Cuando se senala la muerte, no como la consideracion o causa de la donacion, sino como una condicion suspensiva de sus efectos, el acto debe considerarse como una donacion inter vivos y no mortis causa.

This rule bears directly on the case because the deed itself named the donor's death as the point when the donation would take effect, and the Court had to characterize that stipulation.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the donation is inter vivos. The Court of Appeals had evidently relied on the clause of the deed stating that the donation would take effect only after the donor's death. The Supreme Court rejected that reliance. The deed itself showed that the donation had for its cause the relationship between the donor and the donees and their recognition of her right, title and interest over the lot, in consequence of which they delivered the land to her. The donor's death, therefore, was not the cause or consideration of her liberality; it was merely a suspensive condition of the effects of the donation. Following its prior rulings, the Court held that where death is stipulated not as the consideration or cause of the donation but as a suspensive condition of its effects, the act is a donation inter vivos and not mortis causa.

On the second issue, the Court held that Tiongco cannot validly claim any right over the property. The donation had been duly executed in a public deed, legally accepted by the donees, annotated and registered long before the transactions between Marcelina and Tiongco. As a donation inter vivos, it partakes of the nature of contracts, and the ownership or dominion over the undivided half passed to the donees from the date of its execution and registration. Having been executed, annotated and registered ahead of Tiongco's transactions, it left the donor with nothing over that half that she could later convey to him.

Doctrine

A donation is mortis causa only when the donor's death is the cause or consideration of the act of liberality. Where death is stipulated not as the cause or consideration of the donation but merely as a suspensive condition of its effects, the donation is inter vivos. The non delivery of the donated property at the moment of the donation, and delivery only after the donor's death, does not by itself make the donation one mortis causa. A donation inter vivos partakes of the nature of contracts, and once the deed is duly executed and legally accepted, ownership passes to the donee from the date of execution and registration. A donor who has thus parted with the property can no longer validly convey it to a third person, and a later grantee acquires no right over it.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, declared the donation inter vivos, held that ownership of the half share passed to Pedro and Agustin Joya from the execution and registration of the deed, held that Tiongco acquired no right over the property, and condemned Tiongco to pay the costs of the instance.

Remember This

Memorize the line: death as the cause makes the donation mortis causa, but death as a mere suspensive condition of its effects makes it inter vivos. Examiners use this case to test the mortis causa and inter vivos distinction, and to test whether a registered donation inter vivos defeats a later transaction by the donor.