GO CHUAN GUAN, RECURRENTE, CONTRA JOST GALLOFIN, ADMINISTRADOR DE ADUANAS, PUERTO DE CEBU, RECURRIDO.

Go Chuan Guan versus Jost Gallofin

The Case

This is the case of Go Chuan Guan versus Jost Gallofin, the Collector of Customs at the Port of Cebu, decided by the Supreme Court in April 1940. Go Chuan Guan, an eight-year-old Chinese boy, sought admission into the Philippines as the minor son of a Chinese merchant, and when the immigration authorities refused him he brought a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The case matters because it fixes who, under our immigration law, has the power to decide whether an alien may enter, and because it strikes down an administrative circular that had quietly taken that power away from the body the law had entrusted with it.

Procedural History

The case began before the Special Board of Investigation, the body that examined Go Chuan Guan's right to enter. The Board refused to receive the evidence offered to prove that his father was a Chinese merchant, and it ruled that the boy had no right to enter because that status had not been shown. The Secretary of Labor affirmed the Board. Go Chuan Guan then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. That court received evidence on the father's occupation, and after trial it held that the boy had the right to enter and reside in the country as the minor son of the merchant Go Su Keng. The Court of Appeals reversed the Court of First Instance and dismissed the petition. The case then came to the Supreme Court, which granted the remedy of certiorari prayed for.

Facts

Go Chuan Guan arrived at the Port of Cebu in November 1937 and asked to be admitted to reside in the country as the minor son of Go Su Keng, said to be a Chinese merchant residing in the Philippines. Before the Special Board of Investigation the boy testified that he was born on the twenty-fifth of November 1930 in Tangtan, Chingkang, China; that his father was Go Su Keng and his mother Chua Uy; that he had two brothers and no sister; that he had studied at the Kim Tong school; and that he had come to the Philippines, first in the company of Yok Huy and later of Toa Na, because his father wished him to continue his studies here.

Go Su Keng corroborated his son. He testified that he had married Chua Uy on the twenty-eighth of January 1930, that he had stayed in China about two years after the marriage, and that in 1936 he had visited China again for about two months. His certificate of residence showed that he had returned from China twice, on the ninth of December 1931 and on the twenty-second of October 1937.

During the investigation the boy's counsel tried to prove that the father was a merchant, but the Board refused the offer of evidence on the ground that such status had to be certified by the Secretary of Labor under a circular of that Department. The Board then decided that the boy had no right to enter because he had not proved that his alleged father was a recognized Chinese merchant. The Secretary of Labor affirmed, and the habeas corpus proceedings followed.

Issues

• Whether or not the Special Board of Investigation erred in refusing to receive the evidence offered to prove that Go Su Keng was a Chinese merchant with an established business and residence in the country.
• Whether or not the circular of the Department of Labor, requiring the merchant status of a Chinese to be previously certified by the Secretary of Labor, is valid.
• Whether or not the courts may themselves receive and act upon evidence on that status which the Board had refused to hear.

Applicable Provisions

The decision rests on the Act of Congress of the United States of February fifth, 1917, which the Court cites as the governing immigration law, and which the circular was found to contravene. The Court states the operative principle in these terms:

Hemos resuelto que la unica entidad autorizada por las leyes de inmigracion para determinar el derecho de un inmigrante es la Junta de Investigacion Especial que se nombra por el Administrador de Aduanas, y que la circular en que se ha fundado la Junta para rechazar la prueba que se ha ofrecido es ilegal por ser contraria a la Ley del Congreso de los Estados Unidos del 5 de febrero de 1917.

In plain English: the only body authorized by the immigration laws to determine an immigrant's right to enter is the Special Board of Investigation appointed by the Collector of Customs, and the circular relied upon to reject the evidence is illegal for being contrary to that Act of Congress.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Board should have admitted the evidence offered to substantiate the claim that Go Su Keng was a Chinese merchant, with residence in the country, for at least one year before the boy's arrival. The refusal rested on a circular that had no legal footing.

On the second issue, the Court held the circular illegal. The only entity authorized by the immigration laws to determine an immigrant's right is the Special Board of Investigation named by the Collector of Customs, and a departmental circular cannot add a condition the law does not impose, nor transfer to the Secretary of Labor a power the law has lodged elsewhere.

On the third issue, the Court held that it could not accept the evidence on the same point that had been presented before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, because to do so would deprive the Board of its original faculty to hear the immigrant's evidence and then determine whether he has the right to enter and reside in the country. The Court added that it need not resolve the applicability of Rule 9, Subdivision 2, of the Regulations of the Department of Labor of October first, 1926, and of Administrative Order Number 151 of the Bureau of Customs, because the Board had not relied on either of them. If the boy had failed to comply with those provisions, the Board must so determine in the first instance; otherwise he would not be given a fair and impartial investigation. The Court noted that the boy had been led to understand during the investigation that the only thing he had to prove was the status of his alleged father, and that if he showed him to be a duly accredited merchant residing in the country, he would be entitled to admission as his minor son.

Doctrine

First, the power to determine whether an alien may enter the Philippines belongs exclusively to the Special Board of Investigation appointed by the Collector of Customs; no administrative circular may vest that power elsewhere or make its exercise depend on a prior certification by another officer. Second, a circular that adds a condition contrary to the immigration law is invalid and cannot be the basis for excluding offered evidence. Third, the courts will not supply the evidence the Board refused to hear; the case must go back so that the Board may exercise its original jurisdiction to receive evidence and decide. Fourth, an alien is entitled to a fair and impartial investigation, and the Board must decide on the grounds actually invoked, not on regulations it never relied upon.

Disposition

The Court granted the remedy of certiorari, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and ordered the case returned to the Special Board of Investigation of Cebu to determine the boy's right to enter and reside, admitting the evidence he may offer to establish that Go Su Keng is his father and a merchant residing in the country, without costs.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that the only entity authorized by the immigration laws to determine an immigrant's right to enter is the Special Board of Investigation appointed by the Collector of Customs, and a circular contrary to the Act of Congress is illegal. Examiners use this case on the limits of administrative rule-making, on the original jurisdiction of the Board of Special Inquiry, and on the requirement of a fair and impartial investigation before an alien is excluded.