POTENCIANO CORREA ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. MARCELO BUÑOL ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This
is an appeal taken by defendants from the decision rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo on January 7, 1990 sentencing them to
pay plaintiffs the sum of P210, plus 24 sacks of palay or their market
value, with legal interest from July 8, 1936, the date of the filing of
the complaint.

By means of a deed executed on June 28, 1927
defendant Marcelo Buñol and his deceased wife, Manuela Mainar, when the
latter was still living, sold under pacto de retro to
plaintiff Potenciano Correa and his late wife Remedios Paniza a parcel
of land located in the sitio of Ygdapug of the suburb of Lucena,
municipality of Santa Barbara, Iloilo, for the sum of P210, Philippine
currency, and twenty-four sacks of palay each containing seventy-five
liters. From the date of the execution of the deed of sale plaintiff
Potenciano Correa and his late wife had been in possession of the land
up to May, 1933 when defendant Marcelo Buñol and his children by his
deceased wife Manuela Mainar, named Alfredo, Carmen, Leoncio, Consejo,
and Sofronio, all surnamed Bunol, who have also been made defendants,
took possession of the same without first repurchasing it by paying the
price of P210 and delivering twenty-four sacks of palay.

“Defendants,”
says the judgment appealed from, “on their part contend that the
obligation set forth in Exhibit A was usurious inasmuch as the
principal sum was 9210, the twenty-four sacks of palay being the annual
interest on the same; that on account of said obligation defendants
have already paid seventy sacks of palay to plaintiffs; and lastly that
the land which is the subject matter of Exhibit A was the exclusive
property of Manuela Mainar, and that if Marcelo Buñol signed the same
it was only for the purpose of giving his marital consent.”

After finding “that the evidence for plaintiffs was stronger than that
for defendants,” the court rendered the judgment appealed from.

The appeal is based on the two following questions of law which are assigned as errors of the lower court:

“1. That the facts alleged in the complaint are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

“2. That the justice of the peace court of Sta. Barbara where the
complaint in this case was first filed did not have jurisdiction to try
the case, and, therefore, the Court of First Instance to which the case
was brought on appeal likewise did not have jurisdiction to try it.”

Defendants and appellants contend that, according to the foregoing
facts, plaintiffs and appellees could bring only one of these two
actions: That for recovery of possession and that for rescission of the
contract with pacto de retro executed in favor of the latter.
Defendants allege that plaintiffs can not ask for the return of the
price of the sale as they do in their complaint, without first having
asked for the rescission of the contract of sale with pacto de retro.
The first assignment of error is based on this contention. In support
of the second assignment of error, it is alleged that the justice of
the peace court with which the complaint was filed, did not acquire
jurisdiction because none of the two actions which plaintiffs and
appellees should have brought fell within the jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace court so that the Court of First Instance neither
acquired appellate jurisdiction over the case.

As may be
seen, the second assigned error is founded on mere assumptions, not on
facts, for the truth was that the complaint filed in the justice of the
peace court sought the return of the sum of P210 and twenty-four sacks
of palay. This action, by its amount, was within the jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace court.

As to the first alleged
error, it must be remembered that, according to plaintiffs and
appellees, “the land described in paragraph 4 of the complaint and
known as lot No. 7377 of the cadastre of Sta. Barbara, was, through
fraud and deceit, adjudicated on November 23, 1931 by the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo to the defendants named Alfredo, Carmen,
Consejo, Leoncio, and Sofronio, all surnamed Buñol. Relying on the
decree of title issued in their favor, which became indefeasible for
the reason that the period of one year within which it may be reviewed
had already elapsed, defendants took possession of said land in May,
1933.”

According to what has just been quoted, when, in the
cadastral proceedings of Sta. Barbara, defendants and appellants
applied for the registration in their name of the land in question,
plaintiffs and appellees could have timely opposed the registration
applied for by alleging that they had bought the land under pacto de retro.
Neither the fact that plaintiffs had filed their answer nor the reason
for its overruling if one had been filed, appears in the record for the
reason that, as has been stated, the land was adjudicated to the
defendants. Whether or not an answer to the application for
registration had been filed, the fact remains that the title to the
same having been decreed in favor of defendants, herein appellants,
plaintiffs could not thereafter ask either for the return of possession
of the land or for the rescission of the contract of sale with pacto de retro.

The sole legal remedy left to plaintiffs and appellees after the lapse
of one year for the review of the decree of registration was not to
demand the price of the sale, as they did in their complaint, but
damages from defendants and appellants or from the assurance fund, if
they could prove that the latter had obtained the registration of the
land through fraud, without negligence on the part of plaintiffs
themselves. (Section 38 of Act No. 496 as amended by section 3 of Act
No. 3621 and section 1 of Act No. 3630; sections 55 and 101 of same
Land Registration Act; Estrellado and Alcantara vs. Martinez, 48 Phil, 256.)

In view of the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is
reversed, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concur.