FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, PETITIONER, VS. SIXTO DE LA COSTA, RESPONDENT.

This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco
Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this
court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally occupying the
office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and
holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the
office in-question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to
said respondent.

Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth
Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was
discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial
District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over
the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue
of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the
Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly on September 8th of
the same year.

On November 7, 1936, the date on which
Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the Judicial
Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the
President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as
judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District,
with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila
and Palawan, issued in accordance with said Act. As the National
Assembly adjourned on November 20, 1937, without its Commission on
Appointments’ having acted on said ad interim appointment, another ad interim
appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner,
pursuant to which he took a new oath on November 22, 1937, before
discharging the duties thereof. After his appointment and qualification
as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the
petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several executive
acts, some of which consist in the designation of the assistant clerk
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ladislao Pasicolan, as
administrative officer, under the orders of the petitioner, as
executive judge of said court, to take charge of all matters pertaining
to the Court of First Instance of Palawan, which are handled by said
executive judge in Manila (Exhibit 2); in the appointment of attorney
Rufo M. San Juan as notary public for the Province of Palawan, said
appointment to expire on December 31, 1938 (Exhibit 3); in having
authorized justice of the peace Iñigo R. Peña to defend a criminal case
the hearing of which had begun during the past sessions in Coron,
Palawan (Exhibit 5); in having granted a leave of absence of ten days
to justice of the peace Abordo (of Puerto Princesa), Palawan (Exhibit
8); and in having granted a leave of absence of thirteen days to the
justice of the peace of Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 9).

On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the Secretary of Justice on the 20th of said month and year.

On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the
herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance
of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the
Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of
First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. By virtue of said
appointment, the respondent took the necessary oath and assumed office.
On the same date, August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines,
pursuant to said appointment of judge of first instance of the Fourth
Judicial District and after confirmation thereof, issued the
corresponding final appointment in favor of the respondent, Honorable
Sixto de la Costa (Exhibit 11).

The respondent, in answer to
the petition, admits some of the facts alleged therein and denies the
rest, and alleges, as one of his special defenses, that the petitioner
is estopped from attacking the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act
No. 145, for having accepted his new appointment as judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, issued by virtue thereof, to
preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, and
for having taken the necessary oath, entering into the discharge of the
functions of his office and performing judicial as well as
administrative acts.

The defense of estoppel being
procedural, we shall discuss it first to determine whether or not the
petitioner may proceed to question the constitutionality of the law by
virtue of which the new ad interim appointment of judge of
first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, to preside over the
Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor.

As stated beforehand, while the petitioner Honorable Francisco Zandueta
was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Ninth Judicial District, by virtue of an appointment issued to
him on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the National Assembly on
September 8th of the same year, he received, on November 7, 1936, a new
ad interim appointment, issued in accordance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 145, which took effect on the same
date, to discharge the office of judge of first instance, Fourth
Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance
of Palawan, upon which he immediately took the corresponding oath and
entered into the discharge of his office. Under his former appointment
of June 2, 1936, the petitioner had authority to preside solely over
the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila but not over
the Court of First Instance of Palawan, while, according to his new
appointment of November 7, 1936, he had authority to preside not only
over said Fifth Branch of said Court of First Instance of Manila but
also over the Court of First Instance of Palawan. It should be noted
that the territory over which the petitioner could exercise and did
exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last appointment is wider than
that over which he could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by
virtue of the former. Hence, there is incompatibility between the two
appointments and, consequently, in the discharge of the office
conferred by each of them, resulting in the absorption of the former by
the latter. In accepting this appointment and qualifying for the
exercise of the functions of the office conferred by it, by taking the
necessary oath, and in discharging the same, disposing of both judicial
and administrative cases corresponding to the Courts of First Instance
of Manila and of Palawan, the petitioner abandoned his appointment of
June 2, 1936, and ceased in the exercise of the functions of the office
occupied by him by virtue thereof.

The rule of equity,
sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily
accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by a
law,—which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by
him—,qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the
necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by
executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and
receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have
abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former
appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not question
the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last
appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par, 121; id.,
767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his
nonacceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when
he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies (11 American
Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124).

In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim
appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor,
in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. Nothing or nobody
compelled him to do so. While the office of judge of first instance is
of public interest, being one of the means employed by the Government
to carry out one of its purposes, which is the administration of
justice, considering the organization of the courts of justice in the
Philippines and the creation of the positions of judges-at-large or
substitutes, the temporary disability of a judge may be immediately
remedied without detriment to the smooth running of the judicial
machinery. If the petitioner believed, as he now seems to believe, that
Commonwealth Act No. 145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to
accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should have
accepted with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience
to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power
entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law is
unconstitutional or not. The petitioner, being aware of his
constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of
the law (art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office of judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside
over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the
Court of First Instance of Palawan and entered into the performance of
the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby
acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office
to which he was appointed, he would later be estopped from questioning
the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of
which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. He likewise
knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim
appointment was subject to the approval of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said commission were
to disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease
discharging the office.

It appears from all the foregoing
that the petitioner having voluntarily abandoned his appointment of
June 2, 1936, and, consequently, the office of judge of first instance
of Manila, Ninth Judicial District, whose Fifth Branch was being
presided over by him by virtue thereof, upon accepting the ad interim
appointment of November 7, 1936, to the office of judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside
over said Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila
together with the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and entering into
the discharge of the functions of said office, he can not now claim to
be entitled to repossess the office occupied by him under his said
appointment of June 2, 1936 (22 R. C. L., 560, par. 264), or question
the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which
he has been appointed judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial
District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court
of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
which appointment was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of
the National Assembly.

Having arrived at the conclusion that
the petitioner is estopped by his own act from proceeding to question
the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which
he was appointed, by accepting said appointment and entering into the
performance of the duties appertaining to the office conferred therein,
and pursuant to the well settled doctrine established by both American
and Philippine jurisprudence relative to the consideration of
constitutional questions, this court deems it unnecessary to decide the
questions on constitutional law raised in the petition (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259; Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 36 Phil., 116; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binangonan, 34 Phil., 518; McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563; 12 Corpus Juris, 699, section 40; id., 780, section 212).

For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold
that when a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court
of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid
appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same
branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another
court of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial
district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to
the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new
office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old
office and cannot claim to be entitled to repossess it or question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment has
been issued; and, said new appointment having been disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he
claim to continue occupying the office conferred upon him by said new
appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the functions thereof.

Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the
same is dismissed, with costs to the petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Abad Santos, Imperial, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

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CONCURRING IN THE RESULT

LAUREL, J.:

I do not subscribe to the application of the doctrine of estoppel in this case. The ratio decidendi of the majority is found in the following paragraph of their opinion:

“The
rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public
official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created
or reorganized by a law,—which new office is incompatible with the one
formerly occupied by him—, qualifies for the discharge of the functions
thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance
of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or
reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be
considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of
his former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not
question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was
last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767,
par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his nonacceptance of
the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled
to accept it by reason of legal exigencies (11 American Jurisprudence,
770, par. 124).”

To arrive at the
conclusion reached, three important legal principles are invoked and
applied: (a) Incompatibility of public offices; (b) abandonment of
public office; and (c) estoppel. As necessary predicates for the
application of the principle of estoppel reference has to be made to
the doctrines of incompatibility and abandonment of public offices:
“Hence, there is incompatibility between the two appointments
and, consequently, in the discharge of the office conferred by each of
them, resulting in the absorption of the former by the latter. In
accepting this appointment and qualifying for the exercise of the
functions of the office conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath,
and in discharging the same, disposing of both judicial and
administrative cases corresponding to the Courts of First Instance of
Manila and of Palawan, the petitioner abandoned his
appointment of June 2, 1936, and ceased in the exercise of the
functions of the office occupied by him by virtue thereof.”
(Underlining mine.) Thus runs the decision of the majority of my
brethren. Frankly, I do not see how the doctrine of incompatibility of
public offices could have any application here. If a judge of the Court
of First Instance may be a judge of one or more provinces, there can be
no objection in principle to his being judge of one or more districts,
if the constitution or the law authorizes it. It should be observed
that incompatibility in law is not physical impossibility but
inconsistency in the functions of the two public offices concerned. In
the language of Judge Folger, “where one office is not subordinate to
the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such as are
inconsistent and repugnant; there is not that incompatibility from
which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation
of the other. The force of the word, in its application to this matter
is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two
places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the
contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one
person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one,
toward the incumbent of the other.” (People vs. Green, 58 N.
Y., 295, 304.) If the law as an expression of public policy prohibits
the acceptance by a public officer of any office other than that which
he holds, it is not a case of incompatibility but of legal prohibition.
Acceptance of an incompatible office should be distinguished from
acceptance of a forbidden office. (Cf. sec. 18, Jones Law; sec. 8, Art.
VI, Philippine Constitution.) As to abandonment, in order that official
relations may be terminated thereby, the circumstances must be such as
clearly indicate an absolute relinquishment. I find nothing in the
conduct of the petitioner indicative of clear intention to abandon the
particular office involved and its duties and emoluments. On the
contrary, he appears to have clung to the office, until forced to
vacate it.

A fortiori, the doctrine of estoppel
is inapplicable. The petitioner, before the approval of Commonwealth
Act No. 145, was judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, fifth sala, Ninth Judicial District. On the same day that the Act was approved he received his ad interim
appointment for the new Fourth Judicial District established by
Commonwealth Act No. 145, which district comprises not only Manila but
also the Provinces of Rizal and Palawan The appointment was made as
well in the case of the petitioner as in other cases to avoid a break
of continuity in the performance of judicial functions. The petitioner
accepted the appointment and proceeded to discharge his duties as judge
of the reorganized district in the honest belief that enlargement was
all that was done to his old district. I express the opinion that the
conduct of the petitioner does not warrant the application of the
principle of estoppel or the invocation of the maxim that “He who hath
committed iniquity shall not have equity.” I am not prepared to say of
the petitioner that he has performed what Lord Coke would call “an act
which stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth.”
The doctrine of estoppel is inherently founded on equity and its
application should not be predicated on strictly legal principles.

I do not see much utility in referring to adjudicated cases on this
point as hardly any one of them tallies with the facts of the present
case. I should observe, however, that in applying the doctrine of
estoppel we should not overlook the significant fact that the principle
originally arose almost entirely in relation to transfers of property
although it has now come to be applied to a variety of legal
situations. From the point of view of legal and somewhat arbitrary
classification of the Anglo-American law, the principle invoked and
applied is the equitable estoppel, otherwise known as estoppel in pais.
As such, it is, according to Bigelow, estoppel by conduct, which is
said to have its foundation in fraud, considered in its general sense.
(Bigelow, Estop., secs. 437-439.) Upon the other hand, I have a very
serious doubt as to whether the petitioner,—on the hypothesis that the
question involved is his security of tenure under the
Constitution—could by acquiescence or consent be precluded from raising
a question of public interest. Security of tenure is certainly not a
personal privilege of any particular judge. From this point of view it
cannot be said that his remaining silent when he ought to have spoken
debars the petitioner from speaking when conscience requires him to be
silent (10 R. C. L., par. 21).

The petitioner in his
vigorous and impassioned plea asks us to vindicate the independence of
the judiciary and uphold the constitutional mandate relative to the
security of tenure of judges, embodied in section 9 of Article VIII of
the Constitution. He claims that “Commonwealth Act No. 145 is
unconstitutional because the regrouping of the provinces into nine
judicial districts as therein provided for was effected by the National
Assembly without constitutional authority.” Upon the other hand, the
Solicitor-General directs our attention to the power of the legislature
over courts inferior to the Supreme Court, conferred by section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution. I think the constitutional issue thus
squarely presented should be met courageously by the court, instead of
applying to the petitioner the doctrine of estoppel which, in my humble
opinion, is entirely inapplicable. The life and welfare of this
government depends upon close and careful observance of constitutional
mandates. For this reason, in clear cases, this court should not
hesitate to strike down legislative acts in conflict with the
fundamental law. This court is perhaps the last bulwark of
constitutional government. It shall not obstruct the popular will as
manifested through proper organs. It will adapt itself to the needs of
an ever-expanding present and face the future with a clear insight into
economic and social values. It will keep itself alive to the dictates
of national policy. But, in the same way that it cannot renounce the
life breathed into it by the Constitution, so may it not forego its
obligation, in proper cases, to apply the necessary corrective so that,
in the very language of this court, “the course of Government may be
directed along constitutional channels” (Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 23), or its return to them may be accelerated.

I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far
as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial
District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila
and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional.
This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the
legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby
necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII
of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject
to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted
that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the
security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these
two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be
coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not
decide actual cases and controversies of every sort (Justice Holmes in
Lochner vs. New York, 198 U. S., 45; 49 Law. ed., 937).

I am not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may
abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional
provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges. But, is this
the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on
the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the
other, to realize that the application of a legal or constitutional
principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of
principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say,
and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of
the constitutional provision regarding security of judicial tenure is
palpable and plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be
sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of
that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and
heavily; But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular
point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was
considered a great public need by the legislative department and that
Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely
the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. Under these
circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the legislative
department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater
necessity for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the
new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved
by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of
these two Acts there was an express, provision providing for the
vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the case of
Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt
should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative
power.

I, therefore, concur in the result.