CINE LIGAYA, PETITIONER, VS. ALEJO LABRADOR, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LAGUNA, AND LAZARUS JOSEPH, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner
commenced this certiorari proceeding to set aside the orders of the
respondent judge dated July 3 and July 20, 1938, both of which were
issued in civil case No. 7102 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
alleging that the same constitute an illegal and arbitrary act and an
abuse of authority or jurisdiction by said judge.

In the
above-mentioned case petitioner filed a complaint on July 2,1938
praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
the respondent Lazarus Joseph in order to prevent the latter, his
agents, attorneys and representatives from molesting and interfering
with the petitioner in its possession of the cinematograph known as
Cine Ligaya, in the municipality of Biñan, Province of Laguna. The
respondent judge acceding to the prayer in the complaint that a writ of
preliminary injunction issue against Lazarus Joseph while the case was
not yet decided on the merits, issued ex parte the writ
prayed for on petitioner’s filing a bond in the amount of P1,000. In
said writ he directed that until further order, Lazarus Joseph, his
employees, attorneys and agents, and whoever might aid him should stop
molesting, preventing or interfering with the petitioner or his new
lessee, Jacinto Francisco, in the ownership, possession and use of the
Cine Ligaya. The writ of preliminary injunction issued was duly served,
Lazarus Joseph and his attorney, Vicente Bautista, being notified of
the same at 12 o’clock noon on July 2, 1938. Instead of acting in
accordance with the requirements of said writ, Lazarus Joseph and his
men went to the Cine Ligaya at 2 o’clock in the afternoon of the same
day, July 2, 1938, and once there forced open the gates which had been
closed with padlocks placed there by the petitioner through its
representatives. This they did in spite of the opposition of the
latter, who, nevertheless, stayed in the building without leaving it
for a moment. In order to avoid disorder and acts of violence,
petitioner had to apply to the Army authorities in Biñan for their help
which they in fact gave, more on the verbal request of the respondent
judge than on that of petitioner. It was through these means that
petitioner was able to continue its possession and occupation of the
cinematograph and to maintain the effectiveness of the writ. On the
following day, which was Sunday, while petitioner was in possession of
the cinematograph through its representatives and agents, the
respondent judge, on verbal petition of Lazarus Joseph, and without the
formal requisite of a sworn statement supporting the petition of said
interested party or of notice to the petitioner, and without a trial
having been held so as to give opportunity to all the parties to state
their reasons, issued an order on the same day whereby the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by him on the previous day was set aside
and dissolved. Shortly thereafter, he gave a verbal order to allow
Lazarus Joseph to enter the building and continue holding shows therein.

Petitioner, on and prior to the dates herein mentioned, was and had
been and continues to be the owner of the Cine Ligaya. It leased the
same to Lazarus Joseph on May 18, 1937 for a period of six months to be
counted from July 1st of the said year, with the understanding that
this period might be extended at the will of both parties. The second
period of lease expired on June 30, 1938. Five days before the latter
date, that is, on June 25, 1938, petitioner notified Lazarus Joseph of
the fact that he should vacate the Cine Ligaya at the expiration of his
term of lease on the 30th of said month and year. In the meantime,
petitioner leased said cinematograph to Jacinto Francisco for two years
from July 1, 1938. Around 7.30 in the morning of July 2, petitioner
took possession of the cinematograph and was already occupying it at
the time it filed the complaint above-mentioned with the effects and
incidents hereinbefore stated.

The questions which the
parties have raised in their pleadings may be summed up as follows: Did
the respondent judge act with abuse of jurisdiction in issuing the
orders in question which required the restoration of the natural
possession or possession in fact held by the petitioner to the
respondent Lazarus Joseph, dissolving previously and summarily the writ
of preliminary injunction he had issued the day before?

The law confers authority or jurisdiction on Courts of First Instance to issue writs of preliminary injunction ex parte
and to dissolve those which they may have issued in said circumstances
under prescribed limitations (sections 164, 166,169, Act No. 190). It
does not require that in order to annul or set aside a writ of
preliminary injunction issued by a Court of First Instance, a notice be
previously sent to plaintiff; but it does require that, at least, a
hearing be first held so that plaintiff may make such objections as he
deems proper. Nevertheless, even if a previous notice were required and
even if there had been no hearing on the petition to lift or dissolve
the injunction granted, it cannot be said for that reason that the
courts dissolving the injunction thus issued, acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction. The courts have such jurisdiction and the
respondent judge in the case now before us had authority to take
cognizance of the case and also, of course, of all the incidents
thereof. The failure to send notice or to hold a hearing as required by
section 169 aforecited of Act No. 190 is not in any way jurisdictional
so as to invalidate the proceedings of the court on the ground of lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

“Preliminary
injunction could be dissolved without notice when, from the urgency of
the case, it was necessary to guard against serious loss, which
sometimes might be occasioned by the delay incident to serving notice,
and except, we may add, where the injunction has been improvidently
granted upon a complaint disclosing no ground whatever for equitable
relief, as in the present case.” (Borland vs. Thornton, 12 Cal., 440, 449.)

“An ex parte
injunction order may be modified or dissolved by the court in which it
was granted, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, at any time
before final judgment, either on motion of the parties themselves, or,
it Would seem, on the court’s own motion, whenever it becomes satisfied
that the order was improvidently or erroneously made.” (14 Cal. Jur.,
sec. 82, p. 282.)

At most, the respondent
judge, in dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction which he had
issued the day before, committed an error but not one involving lack of
jurisdiction. It was only an error which should and can be remedied by
appeal and not by certiorari. The respondent judge, however, did not
limit himself to merely dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by him, but ordered that the possession of the Cine Ligaya be
delivered to the respondent, knowing that the petitioner had actual
possession thereof. The law recognizes but one method of depriving one
of possession of real estate with the view of giving the same to
another. Said method is that set forth in section 80 of Act No. 190 as
amended by Act No. 4115. This cannot be done summarily, but only by
following the procedure marked out by said provision of law. In so
doing, the judge undoubtedly acted in excess of jurisdiction, in fact,
without any jurisdiction at all because the illegal detainer in the
present case having taken place within one year, it is the justice of
the peace court which had and has the power to determine and decide it.
We cannot but reiterate on this occasion what we said in the case of
Mediran vs. Villanueva (37 Phil., 752). We there said that in
giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the
purpose of the law is to protect the person who, in fact, has actual
possession, and, in case of controverted right, it requires the parties
to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them
sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction
upon the question of ownership; that it is but just that the person who
has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending this
decision; and that the parties cannot be permitted to engage in a petty
warfare over the possession of the property because to do so would be
dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social order.

In passing we may say that with regard to the observation made that the
order of the respondent judge having been carried out on a Sunday,
should be declared null and void, this fact does not destroy the
validity of the challenged writ if it were valid for other reasons
because there is no law in this jurisdiction which prohibits the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on a Sunday or on other
holidays.

“* * * a court of equity,
independent of statute, has power to issue a preliminary injunction
upon Sunday, in a case where immediate relief is necessary for the
prevention of irreparable injury.” (High on Injunctions, 3d ed., sec
1584, p. 1199; 60 C. J.; 1139, sec. 91.)

But, as has been said, the respondent judge did not have authority on
jurisdiction to dispose of the question of possession in the summary
manner that he had done, removing the petitioner from its possession of
the Cine Ligaya in order to turn it over to Lazarus Joseph.

In view of all the foregoing, the respondent judge is held to have
acted not only in excess of, but without, jurisdiction; and his
challenged orders are, accordingly, null and void and without effect
whatsoever. It is, therefore, ordered that things be restored to their
former state at the time the respondent judge required the return of
possession of the Cine Ligaya to Lazarus Joseph; or, in other words.
let said possession be restored to the petitioner, without prejudice to
the final prosecution of case No. 7102 above-referred to.

Costs shall be assessed against respondent Lazarus Joseph. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.