SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (11TH DIVISION) AND MANUEL G. RAMOS, RESPONDENT.

Once again the Court is presented with yet another plea for a review
and reversal of conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals.  Once again, as in innumerable instances in
the past, that plea will be spurned.

The proceedings at bar were commenced by a petition filed with
the Social Security System (SSS) by Felicisima Orcino against Manuel G. Ramos, an architect.^[1]
Her petition sought the payment to her by Ramos, as alleged employer of her
deceased son, Emeterio Orcino,
of an amount equivalent to the death benefits that would otherwise have been
payable to her by the System but for the culpable omission of Ramos to register
Emeterio with said System as his covered
employee.  The petition described Ramos
as an architect-builder and averred that Emeterio,
until his demise,^[2]
had been working for the former, initially as a laborer, and later as a
foreman; that because her son’s death was the result of a work-induced ailment,
she had claimed death benefits under the Workman’s Compensation Act from Ramos
and a certain Ms. de Jesus, the owner of the construction being undertaken by
Ramos at the time; that she had received on account of this claim the sum of
P4,192.00 as death compensation benefit — for which she had signed a document
acknowledging receipt thereof as “full payment of the balance of all **
claims under the Workman’s Compensation Act and or any other laws resulting
from the death of ** Emeterio Galang
while he was under the employ of Mrs. de Jesus and/or Mr. Manuel G.
Ramos,” as well as in consideration of the “dismissal of the case **
filed with the (MOLE)”1 — and on
the same occasion, a further sum of P3,600.00 — for which she had executed
another document entitled “Receipt and Quitclaim” confessing receipt
of the amount in consideration of “the dismissal of any case filed with
the Social Security System ** in connection with (the) claim for benefits under
the Social Security Act resulting from the death of (Emeterio
Galang) on account of his previous employment by Mrs.
de Jesus and/or Mr. Manuel G. Ramos **.”2

In his answer Ramos denied being a builder or contractor.  He alleged that his vocation was exclusively
that of an architect; that as regards construction projects of his clients, his
participation therein was limited to supervision and administration, or when
specifically requested, recruiting workers for employment by his clients; that Emeterio Galang had indeed
previously worked for him, but only for a year, intermittently, and in some
capacity or another; that Emeterio had died after
completion of the residence of Ramos’ client, Ms. de Jesus; that his death was
not the result of a “work-induced ailment;” and that on Ramos’
intercession, Ms. de Jesus had paid Ramos P4,192.00 and P3,600.00, from
considerations purely of charity and not from any acknowledgment of the
existence of an employment relationship between them.3

The SSS itself filed a petition-in-intervention basically to
allege what its records reveal, i.e., that Ramos had registered as an employer
in 1966 but Emeterio Galang’s
name did not appear in his SSS Form R-1A, I.D. 03-36236; that from 1956 to May,
1966, Ramos had not submitted any R-3 form (monthly collection list); that from
June, 1966 to June, 1967, Emeterio’s name had not
been included in any R-3 form submitted by Ramos, either; and that from July,
1967 to 1971, Ramos had not submitted any R-3 form at all.4

Reacting to the petition-in-intervention, Ramos declared that Emeterio’s name did not appear in his SSS Form R-1A for the
simple reason that he had never been his employee; and he had not submitted any
R-3 forms to the SSS during the periods stated because he had no employees
then.5

The SSS rendered judgment in due course.  It held Ramos liable, on account of his
failure to register Emeterio as his employee for
coverage, to pay death benefits by way of damages to petitioner Felicisima Vda. de Orcino, as well as back
contributions for the corresponding period of Emeterio’s
employment, including penalties due thereon pursuant to law.  The judgment however allowed Ramos to deduct
from the aggregate of his liabilities the sum of P3,600.00
which he had paid to Ms. Orcino.1

The judgment was, on appeal by Ramos, reversed by the Court of
Appeals.2 The Appellate Tribunal analyzed and assessed the
evidence relied upon by the SSS for its verdict in favor of Ms. Orcino, i.e., the testimony of Orcino
herself and the documents proffered in support thereof, and pronounced them
inadequate to establish the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between Emeterio and Ramos.  It considered material portions of her
testimony as plainly hearsay, dealing with matters which clearly she could not
know of her own personal knowledge.  The
decision also deemed other portions of her testimony, and the exhibits
ostensibly corroborative thereof, as obviously inaccurate as they tended to
show, in relation to Ramos’ proofs, that Emeterio Galang had been hired by Ramos at a time when the latter
was still a student, or employed in a Government office or a private firm, and
not yet engaged in private practice on his own as an architect.  The decision finally declared as sufficiently
demonstrated by the evidence, the fact that except for one year, Ramos had
never hired any employee, those that he had recruited, including Emeterio Galang, having in truth
been employed by the owners of the structures being constructed under Ramos’
administration, said owners having paid their wages; and the further fact that
during the time material to the inquiry, Ramos had exercised his profession
purely as an architect and had never had any financial outlay for hiring
laborers or employees.3

In the appellate proceedings instituted in this Court by the SSS,
the latter assails as erroneous the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, that
there existed no employer-employee relationship between Emeterio
Galang, Jr. and M. G. Ramos and that it was the
latter’s client, Ms. de Jesus, who was in fact Emeterio’s
employer.

The SSS obviously would have this Court review and reverse
factual findings of the Court of Appeals. 
This, of course, the Court cannot and will not do.  A review of factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, as was observed in a 1987 case,4 “is
not a function ordinarily undertaken by this Court, the rule admitting only a
few exceptions recognized in decisional law. 
The principle is consistent with the Rules of Court which categorically
provide that a petition for review on certiorari
must raise ‘only questions of law’ to be ‘distinctly set forth’ in
the petition.  Even then, the review
sought will be denied if the questions raised are ‘too unsubstantial to require
consideration’ or if the Court is not convinced of the existence of ‘special
and important reasons’ to warrant review.”

On the basis of the Appellate Court’s conclusions of fact made
after an assessment of the evidence on record — particularly that no
employment relationship had been adequately proven between respondent Ramos and
the decedent, Emeterio Galang,
and that the former was not an independent contractor but an architect, pure
and simple, designing structures for particular clients and, in behalf of said
clients, recruiting workers and supervising the construction of the structures
thus designed, Ramos cannot be held liable for death or other compensation to Galang’s heirs resulting from his failure to register Galang as his employee. 
What was said by this Court in 1933, in Catalla
v. Tayabas Lumber Co.,1 may well
be said now:

“We regret to be compelled to decide the question against the
claimant-appellee’s claim.  This case should be decided not from a
sympathetic point of view which the working class well deserves, but in
accordance with the proven facts and the law applicable thereto.  Where there is no doubt that the deceased was
not an employee or laborer, and there is not even a contractual or juridical
relation between the parties, the claim for compensation should be
denied.”

The Court’s attention is drawn by the SSS to the two (2)
documents earlier mentioned,2
evidencing payments to Ms. Felicisima Orcino on October 18, 1972 of the sum of P4,192.00 -­-
representing “full payment of the balance of all ** claims under the
Workman’s Compensation Act and/or any other laws resulting from the death of **
Emeterio Galang while he
was under the employ of Mrs. de Jesus and/or Mr. Manuel G. Ramos”
— and the amount of P3,600.00 — in consideration of “the dismissal of any
case filed with the Social Security System ** in connection with (the) claim
for benefits under the Social Security Act resulting from the death of (Emeterio Galang) on account of his
previous employment by Mrs. de Jesus and/or Mr. Manuel G. Ramos**.”3 These
writings, it is theorized, constitute persuasive proof of the existence of the
employment relationship between Emeterio Galang and respondent Ramos.  They do not. 
The documents are signed only by Ms. Orcino
herself and her lawyer.  They are
subscribed neither by respondent Ramos nor his client, Ms. de Jesus (in the
construction of whose residence Galang was one of the
workers at the time of his death).  They
cannot consequently be deemed admissions of either respondent Ramos or Ms. de
Jesus.  It is noteworthy, moreover, that
as found by the Court of Appeals, a finding not shown to be unsupported by the
evidence or otherwise erroneous, the payments in question were made out of
considerations of pity and charity and not from a consciousness of a legal duty
to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino,
and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Docketed as SSS Case No. 2327

^[2]
On May 29, 1971

1 Rollo,
p. 19

2 Id.,
pp. 57, 58

3 Id.,
pp. 58-59

4 Id.,
pp. 59-60

5 Id.,
p. 60

1 Id.,
p. 57

2 The appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. No. SP-04953-R, and the judgment, promulgated on May 11, 1977, was written for the Court by Puno, J., and concurred in by Escolin and Lood, JJ.

3 Id.,
pp. 63-64

4 Cu Bie,
et al. v. IAC, et al., 154 SCRA 599; SEE also Apex Investment and
Financing Corp., et al. v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 69723, Oct. 18, 1988; Knecht v. CA, et al., 158 SCRA 80 [1988]; Estate of
Rodolfo Jalandoni v. CA, et al., 144 SCRA 334
[1987]

1 55 Phil. 835

2 SEE footnote 2 at page 2, supra

3 Italics supplied