BULACAN BUS COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. FERNANDO ENRIQUEZ, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

Inasmuch
as two cases of identical nature and related to each other are involved
herein, and as the same question is raised in both, the above-entitled
cases were heard jointly before the Public Service Commission and are
likewise to be considered jointly in this instance.

After
the Public Service Commissioner had taken the evidence which the
parties deemed advisable to present, he rendered judgment, as had been
asked him, in favor of the respondents, lifting the restrictions
imposed upon the certificates of public, convenience issued to them
respectively in the year 1929, in cases Nos. 20450 and 22478, and 28880
of the Public Service Commission, to authorize them to engage in the
land transportation business by means of autotrucks, following the
overruling of the oppositions presented against their application by
the Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., Bulacan Bus Company, Inc., Pasay
Transportation Company, Inc., Manila Electric Company, Manila Railroad
Company, and Aurora V. Nerit, who, like the above-stated respondents,
were also engaged in the same business. The Bulacan Bus Company, Inc.,
appealed from the decision of the Public Service Commissioner and
assigns in its brief the following errors:

“1.
The Public Service Commission erred in not taking into account the
increase in the number of buses operated by unrestricted operators
along the restricted area as a natural and necessary consequence of the
increased volume of traffic therein.

“2. The Public
Service Commission erred in holding that the lifting of the
restrictions of the applicants is for the public convenience.

“3. The Public Service Commission erred in holding that the lifting of
applicants’ restriction will not at all prejudice the oppositors
because of the fact that the said applicants have been actually,
although clandestinely and illegally, violating their restrictions.

“4. The Public Service Commission erred in not holding that the
restricted area in question is now, as it has always been, adequately
and satisfactorily served by the oppositors.

“5. The
Public Service Commission erred not only in lifting the restrictions
contained in the certificates of public convenience of the applicants
but also in changing their time schedules.”

The five errors above-quoted clearly raise the same question, to wit:
whether or not the restrictions imposed upon the respondents should be
lifted.

Fernando Enriquez, the respondent in case G. R. No.
46085, is engaged in the land transportation business since 1929, and
by virtue of his certificate of public convenience, he could make ten
round trips daily between Masantol and Manila, via Macabebe and Apalit,
and two round trips between Masantol and Guadalupe, via Manila. His
business was subject to the restriction not to pick up or drop
passengers within the distance of 55 kilometers from the municipality
of Calumpit to Manila, and vice versa, via Pulilan, Piaridel,
Guiguinto, Bigaa, Bocaue, Marilao, Meycauayan, Polo and Caloocan, and
within the distance of 7.5 kilometers of his line from Manila to
Guadalupe, and vice versa.

Marcelo Diaz, the respondent in
case G. R. No. 46036, is likewise engaged in the land transportation
business from the year 1929, and by virtue of his certificate of public
convenience, he could make, three round trips daily from the barrio of
Santa Cruz of the municipality of San Luis to Manila. His business was
subject to the restriction not to pick up passengers or freight at San
Jose or at any intermediate point between San Jose and Manila, or in
this city, or north of the same, with San Jose as destination. It was
likewise subject to the restriction not to pick up passengers or
freight at Tulano, for Manila, or at intermediate points and vice versa.

The reasons which the Public Service Commissioner took into account in
deciding the question in favor of the respondents, were as follows: (1)
The great volume of traffic existing on their routes, which began to be
constantly on the increase a few years after they had been granted
their respective certificates of public convenience, which fact is not
disputed by the petitioner because it is precisely the same reason
invoked by it in asking said commissioner for the lifting of the
restrictions which, in turn, existed on its certificate of public
convenience, on February 26, 1938 (case No. 51309 of the Public Service
Commission); and the same reason invoked by it shortly before, in
seeking, as it in fact sought and was granted, an increase in the
number of its autotrucks, so that it may now have 49 instead of only
39; (2) when the restrictions, the lifting of which is now under
consideration, were imposed upon the respondents, the public
convenience did not yet demand the service now demanded by it; (3) to
maintain the restrictions imposed upon the respondents, as it has been
so done to date, notwithstanding the fact that the circumstances and
necessities of life have changed, is tantamount to discriminating
between the respondents and the petitioner and the other companies
which, together with the latter, opposed the application of the
respondents, naturally to the prejudice of the respondents; (4) by
lifting the restrictions imposed upon the respondents, they would be
given the same opportunity as that now had by the petitioner, to serve
the public, which would thereby be better served than it is now,
because in this manner it would be saved the trouble of having to wait
long, whenever it needs to go from one place to another, by using the
autotrucks of the public service; (5) to avoid encounters or disputes
which ordinarily and frequently take place when persons, who are not
aware of the restrictions to which the respondents are subject, compel
or force the latter to admit them into their autotrucks in order to go
from one point to another on their route; and (6) to promote the public
convenience or interest over and above the private interest of those
engaged in the autotruck transportation business.

The
evidence of record supports the conclusions arrived at by the Public
Service Commissioner, particularly on the point that the lifting of the
restrictions imposed upon the respondents does not work to the
prejudice of the petitioner, on the ground that there are a vast field
and sufficient customers for all the three of them, and even for the
others actually engaged in the same business on the same routes had by
them; and also on the point that, in doing so, the public, which makes
use of the autotrucks of the public service for its business and other
necessities, would be more adequately served. In view of all the
foregoing, and following the already established rule that when an
order or a decision of the Public Service Commission is reasonably
supported by the evidence, it should be sustained instead of modified
(San Miguel Brewery vs. Lapid, 53 Phil., 539; Philippine Shipowners’ Association vs. Public Utility Commissioner and Board of Appeal, 43 Phil., 328; Philippine Shipowners’ Association vs. Public Utility Commission, 51 Phil., 957; Gilles vs.
Halili, 38 Off. Gaz., 1988), the necessary and inevitable conclusion
arrived at by this court is that the lifting of the restrictions to
which the respondents were subject, was and is in accordance with the
law, as it was so held by the Public Service Commissioner in his
judgment.

Wherefore, the judgment of the Public Service Commissioner is affirmed in toto, and the petitioner is ordered to pay the costs in said two cases G. R. Nos. 46085 and 46086. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Laurel, JJ., concur.