G.R. No. 46020. December 08, 1938
CONCEPCION MURILLO, IN HER OWN BEHALF AND AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF ANTONIO, CARMEN, FLAVIO AND JOSE LUIS, SURNAMED MADRID, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. ALFREDO MENDOZA, DOING BU…
IMPERIAL, J.:
of her minor children Antonio, Carmen, Flavio and Jose Luis, surnamed
Madrid, the herein plaintiffs brought this action to recover from the
defendant the compensation allegedly granted them by the Workmen’s
Compensation Act by reason of the death of said deceased.
The parties submitted the case upon the following stipulation of facts:
“1.
That the plaintiffs are the dependents of Octavio Madrid, now deceased,
and the defendant is the owner and operator of the S. S. ‘Marie’, the
said defendant conducting his business under the name and style of
‘Manila Steamship Navigation Company’.“2. That on or
about July 8, 1936, the said Octavio Madrid was employed by the
defendant as first officer of the S. S. ‘Marie’, with a salary of P110
a month plus board during the last 12 weeks immediately preceding his
death or an average weekly wage of P28.29.“3. That on or
about the date mentioned in the preceding paragraph, while the said
vessel was plying off the coast of the Province of Isabela, at Palanan
Point, and while Octavio Madrid was performing his duties as first
officer, the vessel was struck by a heavy typhoon, as a result of which
it sank with all the officers and members of the crew perishing in the
disaster.“4. That the plaintiffs are totally dependent
upon the deceased Octavio Madrid, and in accordance with the previsions
of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, they are entitled to the maximum
compensation of P3,000, if the accident is compensable.“5.
That notice of injury and claim for compensation was filed on time by
the plaintiffs despite which said defendant refused and still refuses
to pay the compensation due.“6. That there are nineteen
(19) other cases (Cases Nos. 50632-50636; 50638-50640; 50710, 50746,
50973, 51004, 51016, 51187, 51189 and 51191-51194, of identical nature
now pending in this court, all of which were brought against the same
defendant by the dependents of the other officers and members of the
crew who died in the sinking of the S. S. ‘Marie’.“7.
That the defendant accepts all the facts alleged in the complaints
filed in the other nineteen (19) cases, and specially those relating to
questions of the occurrence of the accident, dependency, wages, and the
amounts of compensation claimed in each and every case.“8.
That the parties plaintiffs and defendant agree that whatever decision
is rendered by the court in the present case shall apply to the other
nineteen (19) cases.“9. That the parties also agree to
submit this case on the above stipulation of facts without any hearing,
and to this end, the respective counsel pray that they be given ten
(10) days from this date to present a memorandum.”
Upon the foregoing stipulation of facts the court rendered judgment on
November 16, 1937, ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the
sum of P3,000 with legal interest thereon from November 23, 1936, and
the costs. The court, believing that the stipulation likewise submitted
for decision the other 19 cases mentioned therein, also ordered the
defendant, in the decision rendered by it in this case, to pay to the
other plaintiffs the sums of money claimed as compensation in the other
complaints filed by them. The defendant appealed from the decision so
rendered, but in this appeal and in the decision rendered by this
court, only the appeal taken in this case G. R. No. 46020 will be
considered and decided. The reason is because in this appeal the
plaintiffs in the other cases have neither appeared nor been heard.
According to the stipulation of facts, it is admitted that on July 8,
1936, Octavio Madrid was employed by the defendant as first officer of
the S. S. “Marie”, with a salary of P110 a month; that on said date,
while the vessel in question was plying off Palanan Point, Province of
Isabela, and while Octavio Madrid was performing his duties as first
officer, it was caught in a severe storm, as a result of which it sank
with all the officers and members of the crew, including Octavio
Madrid, perishing in the disaster.
- It is admitted that the defendant was the owner and operator of the S. S. Marie
and that he was doing business under the name of “Manila Steamship
Navigation Company”; but the plaintiffs did not prove that the gross
income of his business during the year next preceding the one in which
the accident occurred amounted to P20,000 or more. In the first
assignment of error, it is contended that the court should have
dismissed the action for failure to prove such fact, inasmuch as the
Workmen’s Compensation Act requires that the gross income of the
employer during the year next preceding the one in which the accident
occurred should have amounted to P20,000 or more, because otherwise the
claim should be presented in accordance with the provisions of Act No.
1874. In the case of Rolan vs. Perez (34 Off. Gaz., 1593), this
court held that under the law, as amended, the fact that the gross
income of the employer during the year next preceding the one in which
the accident occurred was P20,000 or more, as required by law, need not
be alleged or proven by the plaintiff, but that, it being a defense of
the defendant, the burden is on the latter to allege and establish it.
In the above-cited case, it was said:” * * * The court dismissed the complaint, in addition to the above
ground, because in its opinion the plaintiff had failed to establish
that the gross income of the diary farm in 1933 was not less than
P20,000. We hold that this was error. The law, as it now stands, does
not require. the plaintiff to allege and prove this fact. It is a
defense favorable to the defendant and the burden is on him to
establish it. Subsection (d) of section 39 of Act No. 3428 originally read:“Sec. 39 * * * * * * *
” ‘(d) “Industrial employment” in case of
private employers includes all employment or work at a trade,
occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of
gain, the gross income of which in the year immediately preceding the
one during which the accident occurred was not less than forty thousand
pesos, except agriculture, charitable institutions, and domestic
service.’“As amended by section 13 of Act No. 3812, said subsection (d) is couched in this wise:
“‘(d) “Industrial employment” in case of
private employers includes all employment or work at a trade,
occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of
gain, except agriculture, charitable institutions, and domestic
service, but as to agriculture, employees for the operation of
mechanical implements shall be entitled to the benefits of this Act.’“It will be noted that when the said subsection was amended, the
legislature omitted the phrase ‘the gross income of which in the year
immediately preceding the one during which the accident occurred was
not less than forty thousand pesos.’ This omission simply means that
from the taking effect of the amendment, December 8, 1930, the
necessity to allege and prove the amount of the gross income ceased.“It is true that section 42, as amended by section 14 of Act No. 3812,
provides that when the gross income of any trade or occupation
exercised by the employer during the year next preceding the one in
which the accident occurred, is less than P20,000, the claim for
compensation shall be governed by the provisions of Act No. 1874; but
the only purpose of this provision is to introduce a defense in favor
of the employer so that, in the event his gross income does not reach
said amount, he may invoke his right to be sued under the provisions of
Act No. 1874; and being a defense favorable to the defendant, upon him,
and not upon the plaintiff, rests the burden of alleging and proving
it.”The doctrine laid down in said case directly disposes of the first
assignment of error which should be overruled for being unfounded. -
In second assignment of error it is contended that the accident is not
compensate under Act No. 3428, as amended, on the ground that the
immediate cause thereof was a force majeure or a fortuitous event for which nobody should be responsible.The first point raised by the assignment of error is whether or not the
Workmen’s Compensation Act covers maritime accidents occurring in the
Philippine waters. Unlike legislations existing in the United States of
America wherein, aside from the workmen’s compensation laws adopted by
the different States, the federal admiralty laws and the Longshoremen’s
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act are in force, our Legislature has
deemed it advisable to include in the Workmen’s Compensation Act all
accidents that may occur to workmen or employees in factories, shops
and other industrial and agricultural workplaces as well as in the
interisland seas of the archipelago. In this wise, section 38 of Act
No. 3428, as amended by section 12 of Act No. 3812, provides:“Sec. 38. Interisland trade.—This
Act shall cover the liability of the employers towards employees
engaged in the coastwise and interisland trade, and also in the foreign
trade when such is permissible under the laws of the United States and
the Philippine Islands.”The applicability of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to accidents
occurring in the Philippine seas has been discussed for the first time
in the case of Enciso vs. Dy-Liacco (57 Phil., 446 et seq.), where the question was decided affirmatively. In said case it was stated:“The next point the appellant takes up is whether Act No. 3428 applies
to the accident we are considering, and he contends that the provisions
of this law do not cover the present case. It would be enough, to
refute this contention, to cite section 38 of the Act in question,
which reads as follows:“Sec. 38. Interisland trade.—This Act shall cover the
liability of the employers towards employees engaged in the interisland
trade, and also in the foreign trade when such is permissible under the
laws of the United States and the Philippine Islands.“A casual reading of this section will show that the sea accident in which Dimamay died comes under it, since the Aloneros was then engaged in the interisland trade.”
The next question raised is whether or not Octavio Madrid’s death is
compensable under the law, it appearing that it was caused by the
typhoon which is a force majeure
or fortuitous event, being an act of God unforeseen and imputable to
nobody. Stated in other words, the question submitted, which this court
is called upon to decide, is whether or not Act No. 3428, as amended by
Act No. 3812, includes responsibilities for damages arising from
unforeseen acts wherein no fault or negligence not punishable by law
has intervened (articles 1105, 1902, 1903, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909
and 1910 of the Civil Code).In the case of Enciso vs. Dy-Liacco, supra,
this court stated that the consensus of opinion and of the decisions of
the courts of various States of the Union is that workmen’s
compensation acts have been enacted to abrogate the common law and the
Civil Code relative to obligations arising from nonpunishable fault or
negligence. To that effect it was said:“It is also argued that the accident was due to force majeure
and therefore the appellant cannot be made responsible for it according
to law. It has been repeatedly stated that the Workmen’s Compensation
Law was enacted to abrogate the common law and our Civil Code upon
culpable acts and omissions, and that the employer need not be guilty
of neglect or fault, in order that responsibility may attach to him.
Bearing in mind this purpose, the appellant’s contention is evidently
untenable.“The compensation acts, especially the pioneer enactments differ
considerably, one from another, in many essential aspects. While the
purpose sought to be accomplished is the same, the legislatures of the
various states chose diverse means for its attainment. One thing is
characteristic of all of the acts; the common law doctrines of
negligence are abrogated, and in place of the common law procedure is
substituted a scheme for achieving cheap, speedy justice. (28 R. C. L.,
p. 714.)” * * * Admitting, however, that the compensation acts do create
liability without fault, the courts have uniformly held this to be no
objection to their validity. It is pointed out that our jurisprudence
affords numerous examples of liability without fault and the
deprivation of property without fault being attributable to its owner.
Statutes making railroad corporations absolutely liable, without regard
to negligence, for injuries to property caused by fire escaping from
their locomotive engines, are clearly statutes creating liability
without fault, yet these statutes have been upheld by all the courts of
the states in which they have been enacted, as well as by the Supreme
Court of the United States. As a matter of fact, the workmen’s
compensation act does exactly the same thing as the safety appliance
acts; it imposes new duties of care on the employer—the difference
being that in one case the duty is announced in definite terms, whereas
in the other it rests in implication. As expressed by the United States
Supreme Court, ‘the common law bases the employer’s liability for
injuries to the employee upon the ground of negligence; but negligence
is merely the disregard of some duty imposed by law; and the nature and
extent of the duty may be modified by legislation, with corresponding
change in the test of negligence.’ * * *” (28 R. C. L., pp. 752, 753.)The workmen’s compensation acts are based on a new theory of
compensation distinct from the theories of damages, payments under the
acts being made as compensation, not as indemnity (71 C. J., 232;
Mobile & O. R. Co. vs. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 28 F. [2d] 228; Martin vs. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 252 F., 207; Devine’s Case, 129 N. E., 414; Duart vs. Simmons, 121 N. E., 10; 251 U. S., 547; Kenney vs. Boston, 111 N. E, 47; Erie R. Co. vs. Linnekogel, 248 F., 389; De Biasi vs. Normandy Water Co., 228 F., 234; Schlickenmayer vs. City of Highland Park, 235 N. W., 156; Andrejwski vs. Wolverine Coal Co., 148 N. W., 684; Flanigan vs. Hines, 193 P., 1077).The intention of the Legislature in enacting the Workmen’s Compensation
Act was to secure workmen and their dependents against becoming objects
of charity, by making a reasonable compensation for such accidental
calamities as are incidental to the employment. Under such Act injuries
to workmen and employees are to be considered no longer as results of
fault or negligence, but as the products of the industry in which the
employee is concerned. Compensation for such injuries is, under the
theory of such statute, like any other item in the cost of production
or transportation, and ultimately charged to the consumer. The law
substitutes for liability for negligence an entirely new conception;
that is, that if the injury arises out of and in the course of the
employment, under the doctrine of man’s humanity to man, the cost of
compensation must be one of the elements to be liquidated and balanced
in the course of consumption. In other words, the theory of the law is
that, if the industry produces an injury, the cost of that injury shall
be included in the cost of the product of the industry. Hence the
provision that the injury must arise out of and in the course of the
employment (Mobile & O. R. Co. vs. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 28 F. [2d], 228, 229).Under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812, accidents are
compensated independently of whether or not the employer has incurred
fault or negligence, and the only exceptions thereto are the accidents
arising from the voluntary act of the injured person, those resulting
from the drunkenness of the employee who had the accident, and those
caused by the notorious negligence thereof (section 4, Act No. 3428).Lastly, it is contended by the appellant and by the attorneys for the
Philippine Shipowners’ Association, Inc., who have appeared as amici curiæ,
that the accident is not compensable under the law because it did not
arise out of the employment of the deceased. Section 2 of Act No. 3428,
as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3812, provides that in order that an
accident may be compensated, it is necessary that it has arisen out of
and in the course of the employment. A definition of the phrase arising out of the employment
that has received wide favor is the one stating that this element
required by law exists when there is apparent to the rational mind,
upon consideration of all of the circumstances, a causal connection
between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed
and the resulting injury (71 C. J., 648; Michigan Transit Corporation vs. Brown, 56 F. [2d], 200, 202; In re Employers’ Liability Assur. Corporation, 102 N. E., 697; Industrial Commission of Colorado vs. Enyeart, 256 P., 314, 315; Mann vs. Glastonbury Knitting Co., 96 A., 368; 90 Conn., 116; Vincennes Bridge Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 184 N. E., 603, 605; Triangle Auto Painting & Trimming Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 178 N. E., 886, 889; Landon vs. Industrial Commission, 173 N. E., 49, 50; Franklin Coal & Coke Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 152 N. E., 498, 500; Edelweiss Gardens vs. Industrial Commission, 125 N. E., 260; Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. vs.
McLaury, 54 S. W. [2d], 862, 863). It is said that an accident has
arisen in the course of the employment when it has occurred within the
period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably
be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment
(71 6. J., 659; Stakonis vs. United Advertising Co., 148 A., 334; Taylor vs. St. Paul’s Universalist Church, 145 A., 887; Flanagan vs. Webster & Webster, 142 A., 201; Larke vs. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 97 A., 320). The defendant and the amici curiæ
admit that the deceased met his death in the course of his employment
and while he was fulfilling his duties as first officer, but they
emphatically deny that his death has arisen out of his employment. We
can neither adhere to nor uphold this theory on the ground that it is
contrary to the liberal interpretation of the law and to the spirit
underlying the same. In investigating whether or not the death of said
official arose out of his employment, all of the circumstances present
in the case should be taken into consideration in order to be able to
determine whether or not a causal connection exists between his said
death and the conditions under which he necessarily had to fulfill his
duties. The deceased was contracted and employed to direct and render
services in the vessel. When he accepted the employment, he knew that
he was in duty bound to render services in good weather as well as when
the vessel encountered a storm or typhoon, as it so happened, and it
may be stated that he must have been aware that in case of a typhoon
his services had to be rendered in a higher degree, because in such
event it was part of his duties to save the vessel. Taking into
consideration all of these circumstances, it is clear that his death is
compensable under the law on the ground that a causal relation existed
between such death and the conditions under which he had to perform his
employment. It is obvious that the typhoon was the immediate cause of
the sinking of the vessel and that there existed no causal relation
between it and the employment of the deceased. It is evident, however,
that between the conditions and circumstances under which the deceased
discharged his employment and his death, there existed the causal
connection which makes the accident compensable.The doctrine is generally accepted that the employer is not responsible for accidents arising from force majeure
or an act of God, as it is usually called, when the employee has not
been exposed to a greater danger than usual. However, in the case of
the deceased and in that of a sailor, it cannot be denied that upon
contracting their services to navigate in the waters of the
archipelago, having to render extraordinary services in cases of
typhoon, they are exposed to greater risk than usual, in comparison
with other employees working on land.“Injuries resulting from exposure to the elements are generally classed
as risks to which the general public is exposed. As shown by the
earlier annotations, however, the rule is generally recognized that if
an employee, by reason of his duties, is exposed to a special or
peculiar danger from the elements,—that is, one greater than that to
which other persons in the community are exposed,—and an unexpected
injury is sustained by reason of the elements, the injury constitutes
an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment within
the meaning of the workmen’s compensation acts. And this rule has been
recognized and applied in later cases.” (83 A. L. R. Annotation, page
234).“An assistant engineer on a dredge was drown while attempting to save
the dredge from destruction during a storm. The trial court found that
the sinking of the dredge was due to the violence of the storm, and
that the death of the engineer was due to an accident arising out of
the employment. In affirming the decision, the court said: ‘The nature
of the employment, the conditions under which it was to be and was
pursued, the exposure to probable injury from reasonably to be expected
storms of similar character were all matters incident to such a risk as
was here underwritten, and therefore an injury maturing such a risk, we
think, could well be said to have been incidental to and to have arisen
out of that employment.’ ” (Workmen’s Compensation Law, Schneider, vol.
I, pp. 1076, 1077.)The court, in granting the compensation to the plaintiffs, based its
opinion mostly on the doctrine laid down by this court in the case of
Enciso vs. Dy-Liacco, supra. The attorney for the defendant and the amici curiæ
insist that there is no parity between the facts of the above-cited
case and those of the case under consideration. In said case the motor
boat “Aloneros” sank on its way to a river to seek shelter, because a
hurricane was raging. Upon reaching the sea, the anchor stuck to a rock
and the launch could not get out of the place. The big waves therein
dashed against the launch until it was filled with water, and a little
later it sank with the master. It is contended that there is no
similarity in the facts because the sinking of the launch “Aloneros”
was due to the waves. This court sees no substantial difference between
the facts of one and those of the other case. In the Enciso case the
immediate cause of the master’s death was the sinking of the launch,
but there is no doubt that said accident was due to the typhoon then
raging. In both cases the mediate cause of death was the typhoon.There is similarity between an accident caused by lightning and one
caused by a typhoon because both are fortuitous-events and of the
so-called acts of God. By reason of such similarity some cases decided
by the courts in connection with accidents caused by lightning may be
cited to better illustrate the doctrine laid down by this court.In the case of Aetna Life Ins. Co. vs. Industrial
Commission of Colorado (254 P., 995), the Supreme Court of said State
held that the death of a farm hand, who was struck by lightning while
driving a team of horses across a hill near a wire fence, was
compensable as an accident which arose out of his employment.In the case of Moody vs. Tillman (163 S. E., 521), the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that burns received by a workman employed
to sound a turpentine still, where burns resulted from the still’s
catching fire by lightning, had arisen out of the employment and were
compensable.In the case of Mathis vs. Ash Grove Lime & Portland
Cement Co. (272 P., 183), the Supreme Court of Kansas held that the
death of the employee of some quarries, by lightning, while he was
walking along the railroad track on his way from one quarry to another,
was compensable and that such death arose out of the employment.In the cases of Lebourgeois vs. Lyon Lumber Co. (6 La. App., 216); Fontenot vs. Lyon Lumber Co. (6 La. App., 162), and Gasca vs.
Texas Pipe Line Co. (2 La. App., 483), the Supreme Court of Louisiana
held that an employee killed by lightning while eating his launch near
a tree at the noon hour, was killed by an accident arising out of his
employment and was compensable.The attorneys who appeared as amici curiæ call this
court’s attention to articles 643 and 837 of the Code of Commerce and
contend that it was not the intention of the legislature to repeal the
above-cited articles with the enactment of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act. The pertinent parts of said articles read as follows;“Art. 643. If the vessel and her freight should be totally lost, by
reason of capture or wreck, all rights of the crew to demand any wages
whatsoever shall be extinguished, as well as that of the agent for the
recovery of the advances made.”“Art. 837. The civil liability contracted by the shipowners in the
cases prescribed in this section, shall be understood as limited to the
value of the vessel with all her appurtenances and all the freight
earned during the voyage.”This court is of the opinion that the Legislature, in enacting the
Workmen’s Compensation Act and the amendments thereto, intended to
create a new source of compensation in favor of workmen and employees,
by granting them the right to the compensation, in the cases provided
therein, independently of the fault or negligence incurred by the
employers. The rights and responsibilities defined in said Act must be
governed by its own peculiar provisions in complete disregard of other
similar provisions of the civil as well as the mercantile law. If an
accident is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it must
be compensated even when the workman’s right is not recognized by or is
in conflict with other provisions of the Civil Code or of the Code of
Commerce. The reason behind this principle is that the Workmen’s
Compensation Act was enacted by the Legislature in abrogation of the
other existing laws. Workmen’s compensation acts follow the natural and
logical evolution of society and the theory upon which they are based
is that each time an employee is killed or injured, there is an
economic loss which must be made up or compensated in some way. The
burden of this economic loss should be borne by the industry rather
than by society as a whole. A fund should be provided by the industry
from which a fixed sum should be set apart as every accident occurs to
compensate the person injured, or his dependents, for his or their loss
(State vs. Industrial Commission, 111 N. E., 299; L. R. A. 1916D, 944).This court is aware of the fact that the practical application of the
doctrine laid down herein will perhaps occasion great losses to the
shipowners doing business in this country, but humanity and
civilization demand protection for the workman in every line of labor,
and to fulfill this social objective and at the same time avoid ruin,
employers and shipowners should employ means to insure the stability of
their business. - In his last assignment of error the defendant
contends that the court erred in ordering him to pay to the plaintiffs
the sum of P3,000, with legal interest thereon from November 23, 1936,
and the costs. Such contention is without merit. It has been stipulated
that in case the plaintiffs are entitled to the compensation sought by
them, such compensation would consist in the amount of money in
question. On the other hand, it having been decided that the death of
Octavio Madrid is compensable under the law, the court did not commit
the error so assigned.
For all the foregoing
reasons, the decision rendered by the lower court in this case, which
is the only one appealed from, is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance to the defendant-appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.