MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE DE VERA, COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SERVICE, RESPONDENT. RADIO THEATER INC., ET AL., INTERVENORS.

Case
No. 46482 of the Public Service Commission was initiated before that
body upon formal complaint filed by Dr. Pedro Gil, Assemblyman from the
Second District of Manila, with a view to reduction of electrical rates
of the Manila Electric Company for residential service within the City
of Manila and its suburbs. Case No. 47991, of the same commission,
refers to an application by the Manila Electric Company for the
cancellation of what is therein referred to as general rate schedule
No. 1 and rate schedule (alternative) No. 1, and the temporary approval
of the revised general rate schedule No. 1 and optional power rate
(alternative). In view of the intimate relationship of these two cases,
the same were set for joint hearing on January 15, 1937 against the
objection of the Manila Electric Company based on the ground that, with
respect to case No. 46482, the commission no longer had jurisdiction
because of the order of dismissal of September 26, 1936 which had
already become final. The commission, however, proceeded and ruled in
open court as follows:

“Primero, que esta Comision procedera en este asunto bajo el articulo 17-(a)
de la Ley No. 146 de la Mancomunidad; por tanto, la alegacion de que la
reapertura del Expediente No. 46482 es debida a una reconsideracion no
esta fundada. La Comision, bajo el articulo citado y en vista de la
queja presentada por el Diputado Gil, puede actuar sin previa vista en
este asunto; pero la Comision oira todas las pruebas que ambas partes
quisieran presentar.”

Various hearings were
held and following the suggestion of the respondent commissioner,
petitioner submitted amended schedules of rates transcribed on pages 7
to 13 of the decision of the Public Service Commission, incorporated as
Appendix A of the brief of the petitioner. Proposals and
counter-proposals were made by and between the petitioner and the
respondent judge and, on November 11, 1937, petitioner finally
submitted revised amended schedules of rates inserted on pages 20 to 27
of the decision of the respondent judge, incorporated as Appendix A of
the petitioner’s brief. For purposes material to this case,
petitioner’s revised amended rates for residential service were
classified into four groups, schedules A, B, C and D, as follows:

Class D Rate 0-49 sq.m gross	Class C 50-66 sq.m. gross	Class B 67-88 sq.m. gross	Class A Over 88 sq.m.
P.20 first 9 kwh .10 next 6 kwh .05 all over 15 kwh Minimum charge, P1.00	First 15 kwh Next 15 kwh All over 30 kwh P1.50	First 19 kwh Next 26 kwh All over 45 kwh P2.00	First 23 kwh Next 47 kwh All over 70 kwh P2.00

The
foregoing revised amended schedules of rates, submitted by petitioner
on November 11, 1937, were modified by the respondent commissioner by
reducing the minimum charges on schedules A, B, C and D from P2.00, P2,
P1.50 and P1 to P2, P1.50, P1 and P0.50, respectively, approving
however such revised amended schedules of rates in other respects.
Petitioner did not agree and moved for reconsideration, which motion
was denied. Hence these proceedings for review of the respondent
commissioner’s decision.

Petitioner in its brief makes the following assignments of error:

“I.
The respondent judge erred in taking into consideration when he
rendered his decision a report of the auditor of the Public Service
Commission which was not presented in evidence at the hearing and of
which petitioner had no knowledge.

“II. The respondent
judge erred in making reference in his decision to a memorandum
prepared by the Accounting Division of the Public Service Commission on
the average profit obtained by petitioner during the years 1926 to
1936, which memorandum was not presented in evidence at the hearing and
of which petitioner had no knowledge.

“III. The respondent
judge erred in fixing a minimum charge of P1.50, instead of P2,
including 7 kilowatt hours, for residential service, schedule B; a
minimum charge of P1, instead of P1.50, including 5 kilowatt hours, for
residential service, schedule C; and a minimum charge of P0.50, instead
of P1, including 2 kilowatt hours, for residential service, schedule D,
there being no evidence to justify the minimum charges fixed by the
respondent judge.

“IV. The respondent judge erred in
holding that in the year 1936 petitioner made a net profit of 12.27% on
its business operations.

“V. The respondent judge erred in overruling petitioner’s motion for a reconsideration of his decision.”

Petitioner, however, in the oral argument of its counsel, pressed only
the third assignment and then only with reference to the reduction to
50 centavos under schedule D.

The report and memorandum
referred to in the first and second assignments of error form part of
the official records of the Public Service Commission. The commission
took notice of them and properly considered them without any need of
their being presented as evidence (Manila Yellow Taxicab & Aero
Taxicab Co. vs. Danon, 58 Phil., 75; Manila Electric Co. vs. Balagtas, 58 Phil., 429; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. vs. Araullo, 60 Phil., 833; and Sambrano vs.
Northern Luzon Transportation Co., 35 Off. Gaz., 2271). Upon the other
hand, it should be observed that the investigation was conducted by the
Public Service Commission under paragraph (a), section 17,
Commonwealth Act No. 146, under which the commission has power “to
investigate, upon its own initiative, or upon complaint in writing, any
matter concerning any public service as regards matters under its
jurisdiction.” The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

The third assignment of error refers to the reduction of minimum
charges in schedules B, C and D as hereinabove indicated, whereas the
fourth assignment of error deals with a question of fact regarding the
percentage of net profit made by the petitioner in the year 1936. We
have examined the evidence taken in this connection, and we cannot say
that the findings of the commission are not reasonably supported by the
evidence presented in this case, especially if it is considered that
the petitioner’s computation of its profits for 1936 is based on the
operation in that year of its electrical department alone. There is a
legal presumption that the rates fixed here are reasonable, and we
cannot say that the Public Service Commission, in fixing those rates,
abused its discretion. (Ynchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public
Utility Commissioner and Board of Appeal. 42 Phil., 621, 624.) The
third and fourth assignments of error are also overruled.

The fifth assignment of error need not be considered.

After the filing of the present petition for review in this court, Dr.
Pedro Gil, represented by Attorneys Duran and Lim, the Radio Theater,
Inc. and other commercial and industrial entities, represented by
Attorney Jacobo Gonzales, moved to intervene for the protection of
their rights and interests affected by the action of the Public Service
Commission. The petitioner objected, but this court by resolution of
May 5, 1938, granted the motion. Dr. Pedro Gil and Radio Theater, Inc.,
et al. filed separate briefs.

Intervenors Radio Theater,
Inc., et al. seek modification of the decision of the Public Service
Commission “in such a way that the blocking of electrical consumption
in schedules A, B, C and D be abolished, and in lieu thereof a straight
residential rate embodying a reduction of 46.25% be determined and
fixed and that the electrical bill of commercial and industrial
consumers be reduced by 46.25 per cent.” The contention of these
intervenors appears to be predicated on the report submitted by a
representative of the General Auditing Office (Exh. Gil-1, p. xxxvi;
brief for Radio Theater, Inc., et al. p. 12). The Public Service
Commission has not made any finding or conclusion on the points
contained in the report and brought to its attention and for the
reasons stated hereinbelow with reference to the intervention of Dr.
Pedro Gil, we refrain from making any pronouncement on matters not
touched upon by the commission in its decision and not here made the
object of any specific assignment of error.

Intervenor Gil
objects to the amended schedule of rates as approved by the respondent
commission on the ground that the same are “unjust; unreasonable,
unjustly discriminatory and unduly preferential” and prays in his brief
that the decision of the Public Service Commission be amended by
eliminating what he terms the “block charges” contained in the
residential service schedules A, B, C and D, adopting in their stead a
flat rate of P0.50 per k.w.h. used during the month, but maintaining
the minimum charges therein stated of P2, P1.50, P1 and P0.50,
respectively. In urging for this amendment, a great deal of information
is brought to our attention concerning the organization of the Manila
Electric Company, the franchises granted, the merger effected and the
alleged clever corporation scheme and financing used to hide inflations
and conceal its net gains, and calls attention to the authority of this
court under section 35 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 to review and modify
the decision of the Public Service Commission or even set it aside, if
upon examination of the whole record such action is deemed warranted.
We are of the opinion, however, that as to this variety of informative
matters most of which are embodied in the report on the audit and
examination of the books and accounts of the petitioner (Exh. Gil—1) we
should refrain from making any pronouncement. It is true that this
report (Exh. Gil—1) is part of the record elevated to us in this case.
There are implications of serious character drawn in this report and we
note that the commission makes no reference to them in its decision. We
feel that we are not in a better position to go farther. Upon the other
hand, from intervenor’s own brief it appears that the legislative
department has taken a hand in this matter. It would not be fair to the
Government, the general public and the petitioner, if we were to grant
the prayer of the intervenor under these circumstances. Prudence on our
part and fairness to all concerned demand that we make no other
pronouncement at this time than to affirm, as we do hereby affirm, the
decision of the Public Service Commission, with costs against the
petitioner. With the dismissal of the present petition for review, the
preliminary injunction issued by this court on February 18, 1938, is
dissolved. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.