G.R. No. 45901. October 10, 1938

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MARTIN FERRY, ZACARIAS MANALANG, AND JUAN JULIO DE LOS SANTOS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions October 10, 1938 DIAZ, J.:
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DIAZ, J.:


The accused Martin Ferry, Zacarias Manalang, and Juan Julio de los
Santos appealed from the judgment of the lower court finding them
guilty of the crime of murder for the death of a Chinaman named Pedro
Uy (alias We Kwan), and sentencing them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of said Chinaman in the
sum of P1,000 and each to pay a proportional part of the costs. In
their brief they allege that the court erred:

“1. In not declaring itself without jurisdiction to try the case.

“2. In giving credit to the testimony of Pedro Bingayen.

“3. In not finding that the deceased Pedro Uy accidentally met his
death by drowning in his attempt to go to the house of Martin Ferry on
September 8, 1937 by crossing the Sibang river.

“4. In
admitting the statement Exhibit M against the accused Martin Ferry and
Zacarias Manalang, and the statement Exhibit E against the accused Juan
Julio de los Santos, and

“5. In finding the three guilty
of the crime of murder and in imposing on them the penalties
above-mentioned, instead of acquitting them of said crime.”

Pedro Uy (alias
We Kwan), for whose death the judgment appealed from makes the three
appellants responsible, was, according to the record, a Christian
Chinaman who was engaged in business in the municipality of Tuao,
Province of Cagayan. Before starting his planned trip to the town of
Aparri, of said province, he desired to see the accused Martin Ferry,
another merchant engaged in gathering tobacco for the account of the
“Alhambra” cigar factory and in the rice milling business which
belonged to him exclusively, in the barrio of Palca, of the said
municipality of Tuao, for the purpose of collecting from him a small
account in the amount of P60 and a few cents and to discuss with him
the sale of Ferry’s rice in Aparri as they had previously agreed. The
two were compadres inasmuch as Uy had acted as sponsor for
Ferry’s daughter Lydia when the latter was baptized In May, 1937. Uy
left his house after breakfast on September 8, 1937. As he did not
return on that day nor on the day following, his family became alarmed
and subsequently employed several men to search for him for fear that
he had been the victim of a mishap or accident on the road. They found
him around five o’clock in the afternoon of the tenth, but already
dead, his body floating in the Sibang estero or river about
one meter from the shore. On his body were found the same clothes he
had worn when he left his house and some of the papers he had brought
with him as Exhibit H, a stub of receipts some of which were filled and
others blank, bearing serial Nos. 750 to 800; Exhibit 1 which is a
letter of the wife of the accused Martin Ferry addressed to the wife of
Pedro Uy; Exhibits J and J-1 which bear the headings “Dr. M. Ferry” and
“Dr. Martin Ferry” respectively, and which, on their face, are some
accounts for merchandise of the total value of P64.93, of which P26.60
is the total appearing in Exhibit J, and P38.33 the total appearing in
Exhibit J-1.

After the cadaver of Pedro Uy was found, it was
examined by the president of the 8th sanitary division Dr. Ricardo
Pagulayan, his sanitary inspector Geronimo Arao, justice of the peace
Canuto M. Baligod, and municipal president Marciano Baligod. In the
record of their proceedings (Exh. G or 1), they state that they did not
find in the body any sign of violence, except a contusion of the size
of a peso in the superior dorsal part of the right ear and that the
same “was in an advanced state of putrefaction.” The body, was later
embalmed with the permission of the proper authorities. On September
12, 1937, Doctors Pagulayan and Gaerlan performed the autopsy, and in
the certificate they issued, they state that they found ecchymosis at
the level of the waist in an horizontal direction and a swelling of the
size of an egg in the temporo-occipital region above the right ear, and
that the nails of the deceased were covered with mud.

As
regards the internal examination, the two physicians also declared
having found the following: “Heart congested; valves dilated and the
ventricular walls are distended with water mixed with blood.
Endocardium also markedly congested.

“Lungs
show acute passive congestion and distention, crepetiates (sic) on
pressure and it floats when placed in a basin of water.”

As to the examination of the head, they likewise declared having found
“semi coagulated blood” around the contusion and “blood in the form of
petechial hemorrhage in the pia mater (sic) in the right side of the
membrane (sic).”

Notwithstanding that the certificate of
autopsy of Doctors Pagulayan and Gaerian says that the lungs “show
acute passive congestion and distention” and that “on section-Nothing
particular except the presence of small quantity of serous liquid”, it
was observed that when the body was fished from the river a quantity of
water which, in the opinion of the justice of the peace, would be
sufficient to fill a glass to half its capacity flowed from the mouth
of the deceased.

Pedro Bingayen, the sole witness for the
prosecution, who alleged having seen the supposed act of aggression of
which Pedro Uy was the victim of the appellant Juan Julio de los
Santos, attempted to show to some extent that the ecchymosis on the
back of Uy at the level of the waist was the mark left by a blow
inflicted by Juan Julio de los Santos on that part of Uy’s body with a
branch broken from a tree, when Uy passed near his aggressor through
the bridge indicated with the letter “G” in Exhibit 6; and that the
contusion found on the upper dorsal part of the right ear or “right
temporo-occipital (sic) region”, was the mark of the blow which the
accused and appellant Zacarias Manalang, in turn, had given the
deceased with the same branch.

The testimony of Pedro
Bingayen is briefly as follows: Martin Ferry, of whom he was a servant
at a monthly salary of P6 plus a cavan of rice, told him on September
6, 1937 that he (Bingayen) and Juan Julio de los Santos kill Pedro Uy
whose visit was expected on the 8th of the month and that when he
(Ferry) would give them the signal, the two should go straight to the
bridge to wait for Uy and kill him; that Ferry threatened them with
death should they not obey his order and that he would pay them P500
upon their complying with it; that for fear rather than the desire to
gain the sum of P500 which had been promised them, he and Juan Julio de
los Santos proceeded to the bridge to carry out their plan to kill
Pedro Uy when their master Martin Ferry winked at them at noon on
September 8, 1937 which was the occasion on which Pedro Uy arrived at
Ferry’s house, but with bare hands, without even a knife or a dull
bolo; that when they almost reached the bridge, his courage failed him
and he deviated from the road and ran to hide himself behind a banana
plant which was about 11 meters distant from the said bridge; that Juan
Julio de los Santos proceeded alone to the bridge in order to wait
there for Pedro Uy who soon showed up; that with a branch broken from a
tree which he casually found near the bridge, Juan Julio de los Santos
hit the deceased in the right hip when the latter passed by him; that
the deceased thereupon fell face downwards on the wooden floor of the
bridge from the horse he was riding; that immediately thereafter
Zacarias Manalang and Martin Ferry arrived unarmed like them; and that
as soon as Manalang reached the scene he took from Juan Julio de los
Santos the branch with which the latter had beaten Pedro Uy and with it
he, in turn, gave Uy a blow on the head, instantly killing him.

With the same emphasis with which he testified concerning the facts
above-related, Pedro Bingayen declared that he saw blood flow from the
wound in the head of Pedro Uy caused by the blow inflicted by Zacarias
Manalang; that Pedro Uy wore white trousers and a “white shirt” at the
time; and that when Martin Ferry, Zacarias Manalang and Juan Julio de
los Santos saw him dead they carried him, one holding his feet and the
others his hands in order to throw him into the Sibang river at a
straight distance of 200 meters from the bridge where the aggression
took place, passing through lands planted with tobacco and corn.

When one proposes to commit a crime of the nature of that imputed to
the accused, it seems that the first step to take would be to provide
himself with a deadly weapon with which to commit it. However, if
credit is to be given to the testimony of Bingayen, the accused did not
act in this manner. It is for this reason that the statement of said
witness has all the trimmings and the flavor of a fairy tale. This
becomes the more evident by the fact that no blood flowed from the
contusion of Pedro Uy in the head as the two physicians who performed
the autopsy stated, and that Uy did not wear white trousers on the day
in question. The justice of the peace who took all the steps for the
recovery of the body, together with the municipal president of Tuao,
Dr. Pagulayan and sanitary inspector Arao positively stated that the
trousers which the deceased wore were black. It appears to us unlikely
that upon Uy’s death, appellants together would carry him in broad
daylight (it was noon of September 8, 1937 according to the record)
about 200 meters from the place of the crime for the purpose of
throwing his body into the Sibang river, passing through tobacco and
corn fields and exposing themselves thereby to the needless risk of
being seen by the owners thereof. It is unlikely that appellant Ferry
who is an educated man (a doctor of veterinary science from the
University of the Philippines) and who is furthermore an enterprising
and industrious merchant inasmuch .as he is engaged not only in the
business of buying and selling tobacco, but also in the milling and
selling of rice, would, after entrusting the execution of the proposed
plan to kill Pedro Uy to his servants Pedro Bingayen and Juan Julio de
los Santos on threat of death and promise to pay them P500 if they
would kill him, two things which hardly go together, follow them not
far behind, unarmed and accompanied by Zacarias Manalang who likewise
did not carry any weapon and had no cause for ill feeling or grudge
against Pedro Uy, so as to see how they would carry out his design. It
is even more unlikely that Zacarias Manalang, just because he was in
the employ of Ferry as his buyer of tobacco, would, more indignant than
his master, beat the deceased with the branch of a tree above-mentioned
until the latter was dead. It is also improbable that if his master
Ferry had succeeded in inducing him to kill Pedro Uy, Pedro Bingayen
would not take part in the commission of the crime, especially when, as
he declared in his affidavit which he signed before two policemen and
the justice of the peace of Tuao, that before proceeding to the bridge,
the place designated for the commission of the crime, Ferry made him
take some gin to give him courage as he did with appellant Juan Julio
de los Santos. And it is likewise improbable that appellant Ferry being
able to commit the crime himself if he had ever thought of committing
it, would employ for that purpose three accomplices, thus making it
more difficult for him to keep the same a secret and less probable the
impunity of his act.

Attempt has been made to show that the
motive for the crime were the rivalries in business between Ferry and
Uy and the latter’s insistence in collecting from the former an account
of some P60 plus. Uy’s widow declared that among the papers which he
brought on the morning of the day in question was a receipt or chit of
Ferry for P60, which seemed to be the account Uy was going to collect
from him. Said paper was not among those found in the possession of the
deceased when the authorities recovered his body, it is insinuated that
Ferry was not ignorant of its disappearance. If this be accepted, even
only hypothetically, then the non-disappearance of the other papers
relating also to the accounts of Ferry like Exhibits H, J and J-1 which
were found in the possession of the deceased can not possibly be
explained.

What rivalries and competition were there between
Ferry and Uy in their business? There is nothing definite in the record
concerning the matter. On the contrary, it appears that their relations
never cooled down from the date they became intimate and that there was
no reason why they should compete because they were not engaged in the
same kind of business. If Ferry and his wife needed some merchandise
and Uy and his wife had it, the former would get from the latter in
preference to others. A sure sign of the good relations existing
between the two couples, besides the fact that they were compadres,
was that, according to the evidence of the prosecution itself, Ferry’s
wife stayed in the house of the Uys on September 5, 1937 and was there
well attended and entertained. Still another such sign are Exhibits 3
and 4, the last one being a letter of Uy dated August 1, 1937 in which
he informed Ferry of the result of his efforts to find out, in
compliance with Ferry’s requests, the prices of rice in Aparri wherein
Ferry desired to sell his rice through Uy.

Dr. Gaerlan
testified at the trial that Pedro Uy died a violent death. He could not
but admit, however, that the presence of mud or clay on the nails of
the deceased were positive signs of death by drowning. It is true that
he declared that the absence of water in the stomach, heart and lungs
of the deceased made him conclude that Uy did not die of drowning but
of the injury received by him in the right temporo-occipital region.
However, granting that he died from said cause, this does not mean that
the injury was inflicted by Zacarias Manalang or by Juan Julio de los
Santos. The testimony of Dr. Gaerlan and of Dr. Pagulayan does not
exclude the possibility that Uy fell from hit horse and that his head
struck a stone. The evidence of record shows that there are many stones
of the size of a person’s head or bigger in the bed of the Sibang river
where Uy’s body was found. To this must be added the fact that Dr.
Gaerlan admitted that the absence of water in the lungs and stomach is
not always an indication that death did not result from drowning,
specially when, as in the case of Pedro Uy, a small quantity of water
mixed with blood was found in the left ventricle of the heart and very
red blood in the other ventricle. The following was his testimony:

“Q.
So that there are cases in which water is not found? (The attorney
refers to the stomach).—A. If the drowning takes place rapidly, I
believe there is no time for the entrance of water.

“Q.
But may a person drown rapidly or do you mean that there are rapid and
slow drownings?—A. That depends upon the resistance of the individual.
There are rapid and slow drownings.

“Q. In rapid drownings
is it generally the case that no water is found in the stomach?—A. No,
sir. There are cases in which water is found-in the stomach.

“Q.
And how may a rapid drowning take place?—A. Sometimes the nervous state
of mind of the individual helps to make this possible, specially when
the individual is of a nervous temperament, and carry heavy weights on
his body which sink straight to the bottom.

“Q. Do I
understand, Doctor, that drowning may take place in two ways: first, by
the closing of the glottis, and second, by the entrance of water into
the lungs through the air passages?—A. Yes, sir.

*******

Q. Is it not true that in all cases of drowning by spasmodic (the word
‘closing’ was suppressed by the stenographer) of the glottis the
individual does not absorb or take in water?—A. This may happen in all
cases.

*******

“Q. In the
particular case of Pedro Uy, although water was found in the lungs but
none in the stomach, as you have said, is it not true that his death
might have been caused by drowning by spasmodic closing of the
glottis?—A. It might have been.” (Pp. 114, 115, t. s. n.)

******

“Q. Have you not examined the pericardium?—A. Only the congestion of the pericardium.

“Q. About the endocardium?—A. There was also congestion there resulting
from the deceased’s fight for his life due to the lack of oxygen.

“Q. Is that another sign that the drowning took place ante mortem?—A. Yes, sir.” (P. 124, t. s. n.)

*******

“Q. Did you open the heart in its place or did you remove it from the body?—A. I removed it.

“Q. Was it then that you examined it?—A. Yes, sir.

“Q. When you cut it open, did you find blood as you said?—A. A small quantity of it.

“Q. To what was that due? You don’t mean that the blood had been
expelled through the circulatory system?—A. The blood found there was
due to accumulation or to crowding in the circulation.

“Q. What was the color of the blood?—A. It was a bit pale or aqueous due to a little mixture of water.

“Q. Was the blood dark in the other part?—A. Yes, sir, it was much darker.

“Q. Is it not true, Doctor, that when the blood in the heart is dark it
means that death took place by asphyxiation through drowning or
strangulation or through the use of chloroform or carbon dioxide?—A.
Yes, sir.” (Pp. 124, 125, t. s. n.)

There
is no doubt that the testimony of Dr. Gaerlan agrees with the studies
made by Dr. Angeles in legal medicine and the opinion set forth in
Wharton and Stille’s Medical Jurisprudence, which are as follows:

“Abrasions
of the hands, mud or sand under the finger nails, and foreign bodies
grasped in the hands are at times found. In the struggles made by a
drowning person to save himself, he clutches wildly at every object in
the water. Hence, if the water is not very deep, or the drowning person
is near the bank, the fingers will most probably bear the marks of the
sand or gravel, and weeds or sticks may remain firmly grasped in the
hands. Unless the substances thus found are peculiar to the water, it
may be impossible to exclude their having come from a struggle on the
bank.” (3 Wharton and Stille, 350, 351.)

“Some of the most
reliable means of diagnosing death from drowning are the physical and
chemical methods, based on the well-known physiologic fact, that blood
from the lungs passes to the left heart, then through the whole system
to the right heart and then back to the lungs. Thus, water entering the
lungs will quickly reach the left heart and dilute to the blood
therein; while the blood of the right heart remains relatively
undiluted. As may be inferred from this, the absence of heart beat will
make it impossible for the water contained in the lungs to get into the
left heart, as will be the case if the individual is thrown into the
water after death.” (Angeles on Legal Medicine, 386.)

“So,
also, death may have been due to some natural cause, such as apoplexy,
and the person have fallen into the water immediately after the
apoplectic stroke. Here, for instance, we should find, perhaps, a
hemorrhage on the surface of the brain, which might be attributed to
violence. So, too, the person, in diving, may have struck a rock or
some obstacle which has inflicted wounds of a very suspicious
character.” (3 Wharton and Stille, 352.)

“Then,
asphyxiation may take place in two ways: first, from the spasmodic
closure of the glottis due to the irritating effect of the water, and
second, from the entrance of the water into the lungs through the
respiratory passage taking the place of the air. In the first case, the
victim falling into the water usually sinks at once and remains below
the surface. With the onset of unconsciousness, there is a relaxation
of the spasm of the glottis which permits the entrance of small amounts
of water into the lungs, while the last inspiratory efforts take place
before death. Under such circumstances death may also be due to
‘inhibition’ which consequently results in a more sudden death, thus
explaining the absence of water in the lungs and stomach in some
cases.” (Angeles on Legal Medicine, 381, 382.)

We must add to all this the fact that about one-half glass of water was
ejected from the mouth of the deceased when his body was placed on the
bank after having been retrieved from the river.

The lower
court admitted the extrajudicial declarations (Exhibits E and M) of the
appellant Juan Julio de los Santos in order to strengthen, by way of
corroboration, those of the witness for the prosecution, Pedro
Bingayen. In the declarations aforementioned this appellant affirmed,
in substance, all that to which Bingayen testified. It appears,
however, that he repudiated them at the trial, denying having ever
taken any part in the commission of the crime for which it is sought to
make him responsible together with his coaccused and stating that,
while under the custody of corporal Orquia and private Villanueva of
the Army or Constabulary and some policemen, he was compelled by
threats to make said declarations. Without considering whether or not
events took place as testified to by Juan Julio de los Santos at the
trial, we believe that the declarations aforesaid are unworthy of
credence for being improbable and absurd, taking into account the
reasons and conclusions above set forth in the discussion of the
testimony of Pedro Bingayen and the further circumstance, truly
remarkable, that said declarations of this appellant and those of
Bingayen in Exhibit F of which Exhibit F-1 is the translation seem to
have come out of the same mold because they are written in, and are of,
the same tenor. Which excludes the idea that they were made
spontaneously and naturally gives color to the belief that they were
prepared without the free consent of both. For the reasons just
enumerated, the declarations of Juan Julio de los Santos are not
competent to prove his guilt and much less that of his coaccused
Manalang and Ferry. If the voluntary admissions of an accused made
extra judicially are ever admissible as evidence against him, they are
not so against his coaccused who have had no opportunity to hear him
testify and cross-examine him (U. S. vs. Galanco and Gamis, 11 Phil., 575; U. S. vs. Cassion and Apduhan, 28 Phil., 285; People vs. Tabuche, 46 Phil., 28; People vs.
Manalo and Atienza, 46 Phil., 572); nor are those of a conspirator,
made after the conspiracy has come to an end, successfully or
unsuccessfully, against his coconspirators (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613).

Discarding the testimony of Pedro Bingayen and the supposed extra
judicial confession of the appellant Juan Julio de los Santos, nothing
remains in the record which may justify a judgment unfavorable to the
accused. Nor was there any motive for them to think of committing the
crime because the alleged rivalries in business between Ferry and Pedro
Uy did not exist. Moreover, considering the financial circumstances of
the former who was a tobacco and rice dealer and was furthermore an
owner of a rice mill, it is not even possible to suppose that to avoid
paying a small account of P60 to Pedro Uy, he would have to take away
the latter’s life. And it is absurd to think that to save P60, he would
bind himself to pay to his servants if they killed Uy the not
inconsiderable sum of 7500.

It follows from what has
heretofore been stated that the lower court really committed the second
and fifth errors attributed to it by the appellants.

As to
the first error it suffices to state to dismiss the same that the lower
court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case until decision
thereof after its remand by the justice of the peace who conducted the
preliminary proceedings. When a complaint charging a person with a
crime is filed with a justice of the peace who, after examining the
witnesses produced by the complainant, issues an order for the arrest
of the accused, it is to be implied that he thus acts because he is
convinced that there is reasonable cause to believe that the crime
charged was committed and that the accused was the one who committed it
(section 334, Nos. 14, 15, of Act No. 190). From the record it appears
that immediately after their arrest, the accused filed their written
plea (Exhibit 2) of not guilty and made formal renunciation therein of
their right to a preliminary investigation. When the case was already
before the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, the presiding judge
ordered that the information be read to the three appellants who, in
open court, indicated that they had been advised thereof and that they
pleaded not guilty. This shows that the lower court acquired and had
jurisdiction to act in the manner it did.

In view of all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is reversed and appellants acquitted with costs de oficio.
It is hereby ordered that a copy of this decision be furnished the
Solicitor-General in order that, after the preliminary investigation
required by law, he may take the proper action against Pedro Bingayen
for perjury and against all those who may have induced him to commit
the same. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.