THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA, AND ALFONSO E. MENDOZA AS PRESIDENT OF THE PARTIDO RADICAL, PETITIONERS, VS. SEGUNDO AGUSTIN, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRENTE POPULAR, RE…

This is a petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
municipal board of the City of Manila, pursuant to section 417 of the
Election Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 233, appointed
inspectors and substitute inspectors of election for the impending
December elections, 1937. The said board granted the Partido Radical an inspector and a substitute inspector for each and every election precinct in the City of Manila. The Frente Popular,
represented by Segundo Agustin, claimed a better right as an opposition
party and instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila mandamus
proceedings to compel the municipal board of the City of Manila to
appoint the election inspectors and substitutes for that party (civil
case No. 51940, Court of First Instance of Manila)The Partido Radical and the Young Philippines, upon petition, were allowed to intervene in said proceedings.

After hearing and presentation of the evidence by the parties, the
Court of First Instance of Manila found “that the Radical Party is the
oldest active party of the opposition in the locality, or the one that
has been first organized” and is, therefore, the party entitled to one
inspector and one substitute inspector of election under the provisions
of subsection (d) of section 417 of the Election Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 233. Accordingly, the petition for mandamus was dismissed. The Frente Popular,
represented by Segundo Agustin, appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and ordered the
municipal board of the City of Manila, within two days from the receipt
of notice, to meet and revoke the appointments of inspectors and
substitute inspectors for the Partido Radical, and to appoint, in their stead, inspectors and substitute inspectors for the Frente Popular. From this decision of the Court of Appeals, the Partido Radical has come before this court on a petition for a writ of certiorari.

The petition sets forth various alleged errors of law which, it is contended, have been committed by the Court of Appeals:

“I. La Corte de Apelaciones cometi6 un grave error
at revisar y alterar las conclusiones de hecho del Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Manila, no obstante de que los abogados del recurrido ‘Frente Popular‘ no han presentado ninguna motion de nueva vista en el Juzgado Inferior.

“II. La Corte de Apelaciones tambien err6 grandemente al declarar que el ‘Frente Popular‘
es un partido politico que ha adquirido los derechos del ‘Partido
Sakdalista’, a pesar de los hechos contrarios probados por lbs exhibits
D y D-l presentados por el mismo recurrido ‘Frente Popular‘.

“III. Cometio tambien un error fundamental lai Corte de Apelaciones al
asumir la fecha de la fundacidn del Tartido Sakdalista’, con todo de
que no se ha probado en la vista de la causa de mandamus la fecha exacta en que se ha levantado dicho partido.

“IV La Corte de Apelaciones incurrio igualmente en grave error al
declarar que el ‘Partido Sakdalista’ tiene una organizacion mas general
que el ‘Partido Radical‘, fundandose tan solo en su conocimiento judicial, pero sin estar basado en ninguna clase de prueba en el asunto de mandamus.

“V. La Corte de Apelaciones cometio un gran error al declarar que el ‘Partido Sakdalista’ tiene mejor derecho que el Partido Radical, no obstante que el Partido Sakdalista no ha si do parte en el asunto de mandamus en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila.

“VI. Erro, ademas, la Corte de Apelaciones al declarar que el ‘Frente Popular‘ tiene el concepto de un partido politico de acuerdo con lo que dispone el articulo 417, inciso (h), de la Ley Electoral vigente, a pesar de que no es mas que una conglomeraci6n de agrupaciones politicas y sociedades.

“VII. Cometio, asimismo, un error de gran bulto la Corte de Apelaciones al asumir que el Partido Radical
solamente es un partido local establecido en Manila, no obstante de
que, segun las pruebas, esta extendido en casi todas las provincias y
municipios del Cuarto Distrito Senatorial.

“VIII.
Finalmente, cometio un marcado error la Corte de Apelaciones al revocar
la sentencia apelada y al conceder un inspector de eleccion al ‘Frente Popular‘.”

Some of the errors assigned involve questions of fact which we
cannot review in these proceedings. There are, however, two points
raised in the petition which, in our opinion, involve questions of law
of sufficient importance to warrant our attention. We pass on to
consider them.

(1) It is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing
and altering the donclusions of fact of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, notwithstanding the failure of the respondent Frente Popular
to present a motion for new trial in the latter court. The rule in
civil cases is that, in the absence of a motion for new trial, the
appellate court will not review the evidence presented before the lower
court. (Sec. 497, Code of Civil Procedure; Aznar vs. Norris, 3 Phil., 636, 639; Eced vs. Ocampo, 4 Phil., 664; Buencamino vs. Soriano, 29 Phil., 230; Briones vs. Garcia, 40 Phil., 68, 72; Lazarte vs. Nolan, 42 Phil., 563, and cases cited; Granados and Granados vs. Bandelaria, 45 Phil., 505; Jalandoni vs. Carballo, 48 Phil., 857; Matute vs.
Matute, 55 Phil., 324.) But a judicial proceeding with reference to
elections, whether of primary character and involving a contest, or
merely incidental and involving the appointment of election inspectors,
is urgent in character. Before us now is a litigation of a public
character which must be decided with the utmost promptitude if for no
other purpose than to judicially put an end to a controversy productive
of discord accentuated by the proximity of elections. Expeditious
settlement of election controversies and their incidents is one of the
aims of our electoral system. Under section 480 of the Election Law,
the procedure in appeals in cases therein mentioned is required to be
the same as in criminal cases. This court, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, possessed before the organization of the Court
of Appeals, had thus considered cases of this nature and proceeded to
the speedy settlement thereof without requiring the printing of bills
of exceptions (Altavas vs. Municipal Council of Capiz [1934], G. R. No. 41537, 32 Off. Gaz., 1082; Villareal vs. Municipal Council of Ibajay [1934], G. R. No. 41552, 32 Off. Gaz., 1082; Tumbokon vs. Municipal Council of Altavas [1934], G. R. No. 41557, 32 Off. Gaz., 1082; Diaz vs. Municipal Council of Kawit [1934], G. R. No. 41580; De la Fuente vs. Municipal Board of Manila [1934], G. R. No. 41640; Bacaltos vs. Municipal Council of Sibonga [1934], G. R. No. 41759; Mendez vs. Municipal Council of Iriga [1934], G. R. No. 41770) ; and, in some cases, without the bills themselves (Jacinto vs. Municipal Council of Gapan [1934], G. R. No. 41661; Garganera vs. Municipal Council of Buenavista [1934], G. R. No. 41856; Consing vs. Municipal Council of Buenavista [1934], G. R. No. 41857; Villanueva vs. Municipal Council of Jordan [1934], G. R. No. 41888; Montinola vs.
Municipal Council of Jordan [1934], G. R. No. 41889, and companion
cases [G. R. Nos. 41890, 41891, 41893, 41894 and 41895]; Girado vs. Municipal Council of Guimbal [1934], G. R. No. 41892; Vargas vs. Municipal Council of Tigbawan [1934], G. R. No. 41896; Quilantang vs.
Municipal President of Iloilo [1934], G. R. No. 41897). No argument is
needed to show that there is as much, if not more, urgency in the
settlement of a dispute involving the right to representation on the
board of election inspectors as in the determination of an election
contest. There can be no election without election inspectors. We hold
that in special proceedings involving the rights of contending parties
to inspectors of election, a motion for new trial is not indispensable
to enable the appellate court to review the decision of the lower court
and the evidence supporting it, because the appeal therein partakes of
the nature of appeal in criminal cases and also because of the urgent
character of such proceedings (Cf. Arnedo vs. Llorente and
Liongson, 18 Phil., 257, 272, 273). We, therefore, approve of and
confirm the action taken by the Court of Appeals in this case.

(2) It is urged upon us that the Court of Appeals erred in assuming the date of the formation of the Sakdalista Party
without such date having been proved or in any way disclosed by
competent evidence below. We cannot, to be sure, review in these
proceedings the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. But, the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals granting inspectors and substitute
inspectors to the Frente Popular is one of law, because it is necessarily predicated on the recognition of the legal right of the Frente Popular
to the political representation claimed by it. The Court of Appeals in
its decision finds that the Radical Party was organized in December,
1930. Although the Court of First Instance finds that this party was
actually organized on November 15, 1930, this is a finding of fact
which the Court of Appeals has the right to modify or even disregard
after an examination of the evidence on record. But, the Court of
Appeals also finds that, although the Sakdalista Party was
organized in 1930, it does not appear which of the two opposition
parties was first organized in that year—whether it was the Partido Radical or the Sakdalista Party—and from this uncertainty draws the conclusion that the two parties were organized at the same time. Said the court:

“Y venimos a la cuestion de quien tiene mejor derecho al tercer inspector, si es el Partido Sakdalista o el Partido Radical.
La ley resuelve esa cuestion disponiendo que debe ser preferido aquel
que sea de organization mas antigua en la loCalidad. Pero, no consta
quien se organizo antes entre los dos partidos. Como ya se ha dicho,
ambos se organizaron en 1930, el Radical en diciembre de dicho afio, y
el Sakdalista no se sabe en que mes. En la imposibilidad de determinar
quien se organizo antes, forzosamente tenemos que asumir que se
organizaron a un mismo tiempo. * * *”

We are of the opinion that in every case a conclusion of law must
have something to support it and cannot be predicated on uncertainty.
This is especially true where, as in the case at bar, the right to
minority political representation on the boards of election inspectors
is made to depend on the priority of organization of the party or
parties claiming such right. There, undoubtedly, is a difference
between an assumption of fact and a finding of fact. The conclusion that the Frente Popular is entitled to an inspector and substitute inspector of election by derivation from the Sakdalista Party,
notwithstanding the express admission in the decision of the Court of
Appeals that proof is utterly wanting as to the date of the
organization of this latter party, is a conclusion of law based on a
non-proven and a legally non-existent fact. Stated otherwise, the
conclusion is founded on a mere conjecture and possibility. Under these
circumstances, this court will review on certiorary the error committed
by the Court of Appeals, because it “has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by this court, or has decided it
in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this court” (Rule 47 [e] subsec. 1, Supreme Court), and “has
so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure * * * as to call for
an exercise of this court’s power of supervision.” (Rule 47 [e], subsec. 2, Supreme Court.)

It is contended in the answer filed by the respondent that the
Court of Appeals acted properly in taking judicial notice of the
current political history of the Frente Popular in accordance with the decisions of this court in Bustos vs. Municipal Council of Masantol (43 Phil., 290), and Ysip vs.
Municipal Council of Cabiao (43 Phil., 352). There are facts, indeed of
which courts should take judicial cognizance. These facts refer to a
variety of subjects—legislative, political, historical, geographical,
commercial, scientific, and artificial—in addition to a wide range of
matters, arising in the ordinary course of nature or the general
current of human events. The matter of judicial notice is ever
expanding and will surely keep pace with the advance of the sciences
and the arts. But, a matter to be judicially cognizable must be
well-established or authoritatively settled, or of common or general
knowledge. Obviously, courts should take notice or whatever is or should be generally known because judges should not be more ignorant than the rest of mankind.

Assuming without deciding that courts may take notice of the
existence of the Sakdalista organization at one time or another, as a
matter of contemporary social and political history, the date of its
organization or the time of its birth for the purposes of the
application of the Election Law cannot be said to be of public
knowledge. This information is not available from printed books,
records or current literature. And though the judge himself or some
other persons may know exactly when the Sakdalista Party came
into being, the matter does not necessarily become one of public
knowledge. A matter may be personally known to the judge and yet not be
a matter of judicial knowledge and, vice versa, a matter may not be
actually known to an individual judge and, nevertheless, be a proper
subject of judicial cognizance. If courts may take judicial notice.of
the organization of the Sakdalista Party, they may and should
take equal notice of the dates of the arganization of all the other
component political organizations integrating the Frente Popular,
namely, “United Workers of the Philippines”, “Philippine National
Confederation of Peasants”, “Partido Republicano”, “Liga ng mga
Maralita,” Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Filipinas”, Pambansang Liga
ng Kababaihan sa Filipinas”, Bagong Liga ng mga Kabataan sa Filipinas”,
etc. (Exhibits D and D-l of the petitioner). While judges will not live
in monastic seclusion, they being expected to be live spectators of
passing national events (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad,
40 Phil., 136), they will not spread the mantle of judicial notice over
the different dates of organization of divers political groups, when
such dates are not recorded or found in books of general information or
otherwise possessed of general public recognition. In the present case,
where priority of organization is a material element for purposes of
political representation on the board of inspectors, this fact must be
proved and satisfactorily established.

We have seriously reflected upon the argument that the Frente Popular has a more extended organization as an opposition party than the Partido Radical,
and that the spirit of republicanism must be maintained and kept alive
by the legitimate encouragement of wholesome criticism and the
vigilance of a well-organized opposition. In the case at bar, however,
we are not concerned with the denial of political representation to the
opposition, but with the determination of which party of the opposition
is entitled, under the provisions of the Election Law, to
representation on the boards of election inspectors in the City of
Manila.

Paragraph (d) of section 417 of the Election Law, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 233, provides that, if there be more than one
opposing party presenting candidates, the minority election inspector
“shall belong to the party first organized in the locality.” While in
the oral argument of counsel for both parties there has been a mutual
denial of the existence of the one and the other party, we find from
the relation of facts of the decisions of the Court of First Instance
of Manila and of the Court of Appeals that the existence of the
contending parties here, within the definition of paragraph (h)
of section 417 of the Election Law as amended, is not controverted and
we cannot properly inject our finding into the record. Paragraph (c)
of section 417 aforementioned makes the result of the “next preceding
election” the basis for determining the right to election inspectors
and their substitutes and provides that “two of the inspectors and the
poll clerk, and their substitutes, shall belong to the party which
polled the largest number of votes in the city, municipality or
municipal district at the next preceding election, and the other
inspector and his substitute shall belong to the party which polled the
next largest number of votes at said election.” Such result is not,
however, the basis for the determination of the right of an opposition
party to an inspector or substitute inspector. Rather, the rule in this
regard is found in paragraph (d) of section 417 as follows:

” ‘ (d) In case the parties which polled
the largest and next largest number of votes at the next preceding
election present only one candidate for each office to be voted for in
the city or municipality, the other inspector shall belong to the same
party as the opposing candidates, and if there be more than one
opposing party presenting candidates, said Inspector shall belong to
the party first organized in the locality-‘” Had not the two major
parties fused, one of them—’that one which polled the largest number of
votes “at the next preceding election”—would have been entitled to two
inspectors, and the other party to one. Obviously, no other political
party would have been entitled to representation on the board of
election inspectors. But, in a case like the one at hand, where there
has been a fusion of the major political parties and where there are
more than one opposing political party presenting candidates, the law
lays down unequivocally the basis, namely, priority of organization.
The Frente Popular, as petitioner or party plaintiff in the mandamus proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila, had the burden of proving the date when the Sakdalista Party,
from which it pretends to have derived its right to representation on
the boards of election inspectors in Manila, was organized. This it has
failed to do.

The writ of certiorari prayed for should be, as it ia hereby,
granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, accordingly, reversed
and that of the Court of First Instance declared in full force and
effect. Without costs. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

VILLA-REAL, J., concurring in the result:

I concur in the result on the ground that the petitioner in the
court below and respondent in this court, having failed to furnish
either during the trial or thereafter the exact date of the birth of
the Sakdalista Party—of whose existence we can take judicial
notice (23 Corpus Juris, par. 1937, pp. 123, 124)—thus preventing us
from attaining mental certainty as to said date (23 Corpus Juris, par.
2001, p. 169), we cannot take judicial notice of the same.