CONCEPCION P. VIUDA DE PADILLA, PETITIONER, VS. FERNANDO JUGO, JUDGE OF THE SECOND BRANCH OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND ISABEL BIBBY YLUDA DE PADILLA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition instituted by the
petitioner to set aside the orders of the respondent judge, dated June
15 and 28, 1937, removing her from her post as special administratrix
and appointing the Philippine Trust Company in her place, and denying
her motion for reconsideration, respectively.

The
petitioner is the widow of the deceased Dr. Narciso Padilla, who died
in the City of Manila on February 12,1934, leaving two wills dated
December 12 and 17, 1932, respectively. In the first will, the
petitioner was appointed residuary legatee of the estate left by the
testator, while in the second will the respondent, the mother of the
testator, was instituted universal heir of his entire estate, without
prejudice to the widow’s share due the petitioner. Both wills were
presented for probate thereby instituting special proceedings Nos.
46058 and 46063 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court, in
its decision of March 30, 1935, admitted to probate the will of
December 17, 1932, and appointed said respondent as executrix thereof.
The petitioner appealed from said decision and she was appointed
special administratrix during the appeal now pending in this court.

The two cases in question were heard jointly and the decision
admitting the second will to probate was rendered for both. The
petitioner, as special administratrix, filed her first inventory of
properties, dated November 19, 1934, and in it she included only one
immovable property. This gave rise to a strong protest on the part of
the respondent who impugned the inventory as inexact, alleged that the
deceased had left 16 immovable properties and asked that the petitioner
be compelled to include said properties therein. By an order of
December 18, 1934, the petitioner was required to file an additional
inventory. In the additional inventory filed by her on July 12, 19S5,
she included only 12 immovable properties. This was again impugned by
the respondent and after several discussions conducted orally and in
writing, the petitioner, on February 15, 1936, filed another additional
inventory including the 4 immovable properties, reserving the right to
prove that they were her exclusive paraphernal properties. In this
additional inventory, the petitioner likewise included a certain credit
and other movable properties enumerated in the respondent’s motion of
January 9, 1936.

On January 30, 1935, the petitioner
rendered her first account as special administratrix. In it she
mentioned only the income of the only immovable property included in
the first inventory filed by her. On December 19, 1935, the respondent
filed a motion praying that the petitioner be required to submit
another account including all the income derived from all the
properties as well as the lawful expenses incurred by the
administration. On January 13, 1936, the court issued an order
requiring the petitioner to file a complete account within thirty days.
On February 15,1936, the petitioner submitted her second account which
was impugned by the respondent in her opposition thereto dated April
14, 1936. The respondent alleged that the second account did not
include all the income of the properties and that some of the expenses
were unlawful because they were not chargeable to the administration.
The court appointed the assistant clerk of court as commissioner to
receive the evidence presented by the parties. Said commissioner,
submitted his report on August 6, 1936. In its order of November 28,
1936, the court ordered the petitioner to include the income of
P4,180.03 which did not appear in her account in question, and rejected
several items of expenses amounting to P318.56, which the special
administratrix unduly included therein. On March 8, 1937, the
petitioner submitted another account which was again opposed by the
respondent on April 21, 1937, on the ground that the expenses were
excessive’ and the items of income were incomplete, thus revealing
maladministration. This last account of the petitioner and the
opposition thereto are still pending hearing in the court.

On April 21, 1937, the respondent filed a motion of even date, praying
for the removal of the petitioner as special administratrix, and for
the appointment of a banking institution in her place. The motion was
based on the irregularities committed by the petitioner in filing
incomplete inventories and inexact, accounts, which gave rise to
oppositions filed by the respondent. Such irregularities showed the
petitioner’s incompetence and justified her removal for the benefit of
the administration. In the oral argument granted the attorneys for both
parties, the attorney for the respondent emphasized the continuous
conflicts between the respondent and the petitioner, which redounded to
the detriment of the administration and forced the parties to
unnecessarily incur attorney’s expenses. On June 15, 1937, the court
issued an order removing the petitioner from her post and appointing
the Philippine Trust Company thereto. The petitioner asked for the
reconsideration of said order but the motion was denied in another
order of the 28th of said month.

1. The court, in
   removing the petitioner from her post, did not base its decision
   directly on the irregularities committed by her in filing inaccurate
   inventories and accounts, but on the continuous conflicts and disputes
   often arising between said parties, which, in its opinion, redounded to
   the detriment of the properties under administration. For this reason
   the petitioner instituted this proceeding, alleging that the court
   abused its discretion in removing her for causes different from those
   stated in the motion filed by the respondent on April 21, 1937.

The Code of Civil Procedure contains no express provision relative to
the removal of a special administrator. However, section 653 thereof,
which provides for the removal of a regular administrator and of an
executor, is applicable to the case of a special administrator. Said
section reads:

“SEC. 653. The court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator.—If
an executor or administrator neglects, after notice by the court, to
render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to
perform an order or decree of such court, or absconds or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust,
the court may, in its discretion, remove him, and may allow an
executor/or administrator to resign.”

According to the foregoing provision, the power to remove an
administrator falls entirely under the sound discretion of the court,
and the latter may remove him from his post, not only when he fails to
comply with his duty or disobeys a legitimate order, but also when it
is shown that he is incapable to continue discharging the functions
inherent therein, and his removal is beneficial to the interests of
good administration.

2. It is true that in
   the present case the court did not base the removal of the petitioner
   on any of the causes specified in the respondent’s motion for said
   relief, but on the conflicts and misunderstandings that have
   continuously existed between them. It is undeniable, however, that said
   conflicts have really existed from the inception of the administration
   and have redounded to the detriment of the interests of the
   administration. Due to such conflicts and to the lack of good harmony
   between the petitioner and the respondent, the former showed
   incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, which gave rise to the
   filing of inaccurate inventories and accounts which, in turn, required
   the filing of oppositions thereto, the hearings of which absorbed the
   attention of the court for quite a long time. These facts, which cannot
   be denied because they appear of record and are admitted by the
   parties, necessarily denote irregularities in the exercise of the
   administration and, in view thereof, this court cannot hold that the
   respondent judge abused the sound discretion entrusted to him by the
   law, or that he exceeded the exercise thereof (23 C. J., 1124; In re Healy, 137 Cal.,.474; In re Bell, 135 Cal., 194; Deck vs. Gherke, 6 Cal., 666; In re Newell, 18 Cal. A., 258; Odlin vs.
   Nichols, 81 Vt., 219). In the administration of the estates of deceased
   persons and in the selection of the officers to help the court in the
   settlement, liquidation and distribution thereof, the judges enjoy
   ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not
   interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless
   it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion.

For the foregoing considerations, the remedy applied for is denied, and
the writ of preliminary injunction issued is set aside, with costs to
the petitioner. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concur.