THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO GUNGAB, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal taken by the accused
Pedro Gungab from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Norte, which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide committed on the person of his wife and, taking into
consideration the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstances of having surrendered to the authorities immediately
after he had committed the crime, having pleaded guilty before the
trial court and having been intoxicated without being habitually so,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusidn perpetua, with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the family of the
deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs of the trial.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns as the only alleged error committed by the court a quo that of having found him guilty of the crime of parricide and having sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the family
of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs.

When the case was called for trial on January 22, 1937, said
accused Pedro Gungab, accompanied by his attorney, Federico Diaz,
pleaded not guilty, and asked for a period of time up to the 27th of
said month and year to prepare his defense, which motion was granted
him. When the case was again called for trial on January 27, 1937, the
accused Pedro Gungab asked for permission to withdraw his plea of not
guilty previously entered and to substitute it with that of guilty.
This latter petition was also granted him after the court had informed
him of the consequences thereof and after said accused had ratified his
said plea of guilty. Immediately afterwards, said accused asked the
court for permission to prove some mitigating circumstances in his
favor, which was likewise granted him. His testimony is as follows:
That he and the deceased, without having had any courtship between
them, had been married canonically by agreement of their respective
elders eight months before the commission of the crime; that prior to
the incident, he had caught his wife in sexual intercourse with another
man, the second act having taken place two days prior to said incident;
that when he caught her for the first time, he threatened to hack her
with a bolo if she should again be unfaithful and she promised never to
do it again; that, notwithstanding her promise, his wife again had
illicit intercourse with the same man at a later date; that on the day
of the crime, November 9, 1936, he requested his wife to cook rice for
him; that before returning home at about 4.00 o’clock in the afternoon
of said day, he drank one-half frasco full of wine without
having taken any solid food, and when he arrived at his house at that
time, he did not find his wife around; that he suspected that she had
gone to the house of her paramour; that he waited for her and she
arrived two hours later; that as he repeatedly asked her where she had
come from and she refused to answer, he lost his temper and, without
knowing what he was doing, he hacked his wife with his bolo; that he
was not in the habit of drinking wine; that he did not know how to read
or write.

The court a quo, together with the prosecuting attorney,
took into consideration the presence of the aggravating circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation merely because the accused had
pleaded guilty of the crime of parricide with which he is charged in
the information. While it is true that a plea of guilty freely and
voluntarily entered by the accused admits all of the material facts
alleged in the complaint or information (U. S. vs. Barba, 29 Phil., 206; U. S. vs.
Santiago, 35 Phil., 20), the trial court has discretionary power to
take evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not said plea
of guilty was entered by him with full knowledge of its meaning and
extent (U. S. vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil., 541; U. S. vs. Rota, 9 Phil., 426; U. S. vs. Agcaoili, 31 Phil., 91; U. S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil., 305). In this case the court a quo,
upon petition of the accused heard the testimony of the latter relative
to the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. This
court has examined said testimony and has found nothing therein to show
that the accused had premeditated the death of his wife or that he had
acted treacherously in hacking her with a bolo. It is true that the
aggravating circumstances in “question are alleged in the information
but, judging from the testimony of the accused, the latter must not
have understood the true extent of his plea of guilty in the sense that
he admitted not only having hacked his wife with a bolo but also having
done so with premeditation and treachery. Taking into consideration the
ignorance of the accused, it is neither just nor reasonable to assume
that he had understood the allegation that “the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and premeditation were present in the
commission of the crime”, inasmuch as “treachery” and “premeditation”
are highly technical terms the juridical meaning of which is beyond the
understanding not of the illiterates alone but even of those who, being
educated, are not lawyers. Under the circumstances of the present case,
this court cannot, without being unjust, hold that the
accused-appellant, in pleading guilty upon arraignment, admitted not
only having killed his wife but also having done so with premeditation
and treachery.

After the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation are eliminated, only the mitigating circumstances of
intoxication, which is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit
the crime, lack of instruction, voluntary surrender to the agents of
the authorities, and voluntary confession before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, remain to be taken
into consideration. There being four mitigating circumstances present
with no aggravating circumstance to offset them, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death prescribed in article 246 of the Revised Penal Code for a
person who kills his spouse, is clearly excessive. Article 63 of said
Code, which regulates the application of indivisible penalties, as reclusion perpetua
and death, is silent with respect to the case where there were two or
more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance was
present, unlike article 64 of the same Code regulating the application
of penalties composed of three periods, rule 5 of which provides that
when there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem
applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
Article 5 of the Revised.Penal Code authorizes this court to submit to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement
as may be deemed proper, without suspending, of course, the execution
of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code would result in the imposition of clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense. The same is hereby done and it is recommended,
with all due respect, that His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, exercise, in the manner he may deem proper, the authority
conferred upon him by section 11, paragraph 6, of Article VII of the
Constitution of the Philippines, for the benefit of the herein accused.

For the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion and
so holds: (1) that when an accused, who lacks instruction, pleads
guilty of the crime of parricide described in the information as having
been committed with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation, and his testimony given under oath before the
trial court, upon his petition, fails to show the existence of such
aggravating circumstances, his plea of guilty shall be understood as
being limited to the admission of having committed the crime of
parricide, not of having done so with treachery and evident
premeditation, and (2) that as the nonapplication of rule 5 of article
64 of the Revised Penal Code, in cases where the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, is evidently unjust and
inequitable, when there are four mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance is present, recourse shall be had to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, by stating what is deemed
proper, in accordance with the provisions of article 5 of said Code.

Wherefore, modified only in the sense of eliminating the
appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation from the appealed judgment, the same is affirmed in all
other respects, with costs to the appellant.

Let a certified copy of this judgment be forwarded to His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines, through the Honorable,
the Secretary of Justice, for further purposes. So ordered.

Avancena, C, J., Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.