ISIDRO ALEJANDRO, PETITIONER, VS. PASTOR M, ENDENCIA, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, PEDRO L. MERCADO, DOROTEA RAVAGO DE LOS SANTOS, AND HEIRS OP EUGENIO DE LA CRUZ, RESPON…

The petitioner filed this petition for
mandamus to compel the respondent judge to approve and forward to this
court the bill of exceptions presented by him in registration
proceeding No. 921 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in
connection with his apeal from the order of said court approving a plan
of subdivision of the lands disputed by the parties.

On August 31, 1936, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan issued
an order approving a plan of subdivision. On September 11th of said
year, the petitioner, as applicant in the registration proceeding, was
notified of said order and on said date he filed a motion for
reconsideration which is equivalent to a motion for a rehearing. On
September 23, 1936, the court denied the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioner who was notified of the order of denial on the 26th of
said month. On September 23d of said year the court issued another
order adjudicating lots to the parties and reiterating the approval of
the plan of subdivision provided in the order of August 31st. On
October 10, 1936, the petitioner mailed his exception to the denial of
his motion for reconsideration and to the order recently issued,
announced his intention to appeal and at the same time requested an
extension of thirty (30) days to file his bill of exceptions. This
combined motion was received at the clerk’s office and attached to the
record on the 14th of said month. On October 21st of said year the
court issued an order directing notation of the exception taken to its
orders of August 31st and September 23d, and granting the
petitioner-applicant an extension of fifteen (15) days to file his bill
of exceptions. The petitioner was notified of this order on November 2,
1936. The bill of exceptions was filed by him on the 13th of said month
of November.

Although it does not appear in the copy of the bill of exceptions,
the petitioner alleges in his sworn petition for mandamus that the
court disapproved said bill of exceptions on the ground that it was
presented out of time.

In land registration cases any party may appeal from a final
decision, decree or order by filing a bill of exceptions within 30 days
counting from the date on which the party received a copy of the
decision, decree or order (section 14, Act No. 496, as amended by
section 4, Act No. 1108, and section 26, Act No. 2347). The period of
thirty days for filing the bill of exceptions is interrupted from the
time the motion for a rehearing is filed, and the time during which the
court has the motion under advisement is not counted. (Roman Catholic
Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil., 623; Estate of Cordova, and Zarate vs. Alabado, 34 Phil., 920; Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil., 74; Layda vs.
Legazpi, 39 Phil., 83.) As the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration or rehearing on the same date when he was notified of
the order of August 31, 1936, which was on September 11th of said year,
the period for appealing and filing the bill of exceptions was
interrupted from said date and did not begin to run until September 26,
1936, when the petitioner was notified of the order denying his motion
for reconsideration. The period of 30 days expired on October 26, 1936.

The petitioner alleges that he filed his bill of exceptions within
the original period of 30 days or within the extension granted, because
he contends that said period of 30 days was interrupted from October
14th when he filed his petition for extension of time and did not
commence to run again until November 2d, when he was notified of the
order granting him an extension of 15 days, If the contention is
correct, then the bill of exceptions was filed 29 days from the time
the petitioner was notified of the order of September 11, 1936, which
took place on the 26th of said month, because from September 11th to
October 14th, on which he filed his petition for an extension of time,
only 18 days elapsed, and from November 2d, when he was notified of the
granting of the extension, to the date of the filing of the bill of
exceptions, which took place on the 13th of said month, 11 days elapsed.

This court has never resolved that a petition for extension of time
suspends the running of the period fixed by law for the filing of the
bill of exceptions in civil actions as well as in registration
proceedings. What it has decided is that the petition for extension of
time in both cases should be filed before the expiration of the period
fixed by law (Director of Lands vs. Maurera and Tiongson, 37 Phil., 410; Layda vs. Legazpi, supra).
The petition for extension of time should not interrupt the period
fixed by law for the filing of the bill of exceptions or for the taking
of the appeal on the ground that the only purpose of said petition is
to ask the court to grant an additional period to that fixed by law to
that end.

In the present case, however, it so happened
that the petitioner was notified of the order granting the extension of
time only on November 2d, in spite of the fact that it had been issued
on October 21st and the petition to that effect had been filed before
the expiration of the period fixed by law for the presentation of the
bill of exceptions. If the extension of 15 days is computed from
October 21st, or from the expiration of the original period of 30 days
for the filing of the bill of exceptions, it appears that the bill of
exceptions was filed by the petitioner outside the extension granted
him. In this case this court sees no good nor logical reason not to
apply to order of October 21st, the rule of procedure that every
decision or order must produce all its legal effect from the time the
parties are notified thereof.

In view of the foregoing considerations and in order to avoid
failure of certain appeals due to the carelessness or negligence on the
part of officials charged with immediate service of notice of orders
issued by the courts, this court holds; (1) That petitions for
extension of the period for filing the bill of exceptions in land
registration cases must be filed, at all events, before the expiration
of the period fixed by law; (2) that said petitions must be decided
promptly or, at least, before the expiration of the period fixed by
law, and the interested parties or their attorneys must immediately be
notified of the order issued therein; (3) that the extension of time,
if granted and the court fails to determine when it should commence to
run, must be joined to the original period or that fixed by law, and
must be computed from the date following the expiration thereof and (4)
that when the order granting extension of time is issued and notice
thereof served after the expiration of the period fixed by law, said
extension of time must be counted from the date notice of the order
granting it is received.

For the foregoing reasons, the remedy applied for is granted, and
the respondent judge, or whoever presides over the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, is required to approve and forward to this court
the bill of exceptions presented by the petitioner on November 13,
1936, with the costs to the other respondents. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.