ANTONIA ZAFRA DE ALVIAR AND PAULINO ALVIAR, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OP FIRST INSTANCE OF LA UNION, PRESIDED OVER BY JOSE R. CARLOS, AND CHUA LIN AND KEH IT, KNOWN BY THE FIRM NAM…

In this petition for certiorari, the
petitioners seek to set aside the judgment ”rendered, against them by
the Court of First Instance of La Union.in civil case No. 1762, and the
writ ordering, the execution thereof. Upon petition of the petitioners,
who had filed the necessary bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued directing the respondent judge to refrain from ordering: the
execution of the judgment in question until further orders.

In the said ease, Attorney Francisco I. Ortega appeared for the
petitioners and Eduardo. Zafra Amor, as defendants, the latter being
the debtor and principal obligor. The action was brought against the,
petitioner Antonia Zafra de Alviar as surety and mortgagor, and her
husband Paulno Alviar was joined as matter of form. When the case was
called for trial in courti, the then, plaintiffs, now respondents, and
the principal debtor, assisted by their respective attorneys, agreed to
make a compromise and in fact executed the so-called document, whereby
the principal debtor and the petitioners admitted a debt in the amount
of P1,250 in favor pi the plaintiffs-respondents. They mutually agreed
to ask the court to render judgment for the sum in question, which
shall not be executed until after the lapse of one year from July 29,
1935, the date of the compromise. On said date the court rendered
judgment in accordance with the terms of the compromise. This document
was subscribed by the plaintiffs-respondents, the. principal debtor and
“their respective attorneys. The signature of the principal obligor
appears at the bottom thereof in the following manner: “Eduardo Zafra
Amor, Antonia Zafrade Alviar, Paulino Alviar, by: (Sgd.) Eduardo Zafra
Amor.” In fact the petitioners did not sign the document. Under the
signature of Attorney Ortega, the following inscription appears:
“Attorney for the defendants. San Fernando, La Union.” On July 28,
1936, the plaintiffs-respondents requested the clerk of court to issue
a writ of execution of the judgment and it was only then that the
petitioners were informed for the first time of the existence of a
judgment against them. They opposed the execution applied for and asked
for the annulment of said judgment. They supported their petition by
their affidavit stating that they had not subscribed the compromise,
that they had not authorized the principal debtor to sign it in their
name, and that they had no knowledge of the existence thereof nor of
the trial of the case, having been absent therefrom. They likewise
supported it by the affidavit of Attorney Ortega wherein the latter
stated under oath that the compromise was made only by the
plaintiffs-respondents and the principal debtor, that he was not
authorized by the petitioners to compromise the case or to sign the
compromise for them, and that in reality he signed the document merely
as a witness. In spite of all this, the court, on August 17, 1936,
overruled the opposition and denied the petition of the petitioners and
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution of the judgment, upon the
opinion that the judgment could not be annulled without evidence and
that the evidence could not be taken in the incident so raised, but in
another proceeding. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order and upon denial thereof, they excepted and instituted this
proceeding. Before going further, it is advisable to state that in this
proceeding the petitioners presented their affidavit and that of
Attorney Ortega in support of the allegations contained in their
petition also under oath. The respondents have presented no similar prima facie evidence to counteract them.

In view of the facts briefly stated above, this court does not hesitate to hold that the judgment in question is null and void ab initio.
It is not binding upon and cannot be executed against the petitioners.
It is evident that the compromise upon which the judgment was based was
not subscribed by them (Exhibit D of the petitioners; Exhibit 1 of the
plaintiffs-respondents; Exhibits G-l, H and K). Neither could Attorney
Ortega bind them validly in the compromise because he had no special
authority and because, as stated by him in his affidavit, Exhibit H, he
really was not authorized to that effect (section 27, Code of Civil
Procedure; Sons of I. de la Rama vs. Estate of Benedicto, 5 Phil., 512; Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil., 613; Tan Lua vs. O’Brien, 55 Phil., 53; Rodriguez vs. Santos, 55 Phil., 72i; Monte de Piedad vs.
Fernando Rodrigo and De Yupangco, 56 Phil., 310). A judgment for a sum
of money rendered by a competent court, based upon a compromise
agreement in writing, is conclusive and is legally binding only upon
the parties to the suit who have subscribed it by themselves or by
special attorney (section 306, subsection 2, Code of Civil Procedure;
articles 1280, subsection 5, and 1713, subsection 2, of the Civil Code;
Balatbat vs. Tanjutco, 2 Phil., 182; Palanca Tanguinlay vs. Quiros, 10 Phil., 360; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Arzadon, 20 Phil., 452; Andres vs. Pimentel, 21 Phil., 429; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; Compania General de Tabacos vs. Sheriff of Occidental Negros, 27 Phil, 41; Solano vs. Salvilla, 29 Phil., 66; Isaac vs. Padilla, 31 Phil., 469; Rubiso vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 39).

It cannot be assumed that the petitioners were present when the case
was called for hearing and that they actually took part in the
compromise merely because it is stated in the judgment that the parties
were present when the compromise was submitted, for the following
reasons: First, because it clearly appears from the petition under oath
and the affidavits in support thereof that they were not really present
and, second, because it irrefutably appears from the compromise that
they neither took part therein nor signed the document executed to that
effect. Inasmuch as the judgment is based upon the compromise and the
compromise incorporated into the judgment, this court must base its
conclusions upon the real contents of the compromise. It should not be
understood, however, that the statement of facts contained in the
judgment is ignored. In this case, it is the duty of this court to
reconcile and complete the facts in order to do justice to all the
parties.

As the judgment in question is null and void ab initio, it
is evident that the court acquired no jurisdiction to render it, much
less to order the execution thereof. Consequently, certiorari lies in
favor of the petitioners as it is clear that against said judgment
there is no longer any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law (section 217, Code of Civil Procedure; Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil., 344; Gala vs. Cui and Rodriguez, 25 Phil, 522; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo and Bantillo, 34 Phil., 157).

Inasmuch as the judgment in question is null and void ab initio,
the petitioners were entitled to impugn it when the execution thereof
was sought and it was the duty of the court to hear the evidence
tending to disclose and determine its validity. A judgment, which is
null and void ab initio, rendered by a court without
jurisdiction to do so, is without legal efficacy and may properly be
impugned in any proceeding by the party against whom it is sought to be
enforced (Rich vs. Mentz, 134 U. S., 632; Kansas City, etc., R. Co, vs. Morgan, 76 Fed., 429; Hatch vs. Ferguson, 68 Fed., 43; Oswald vs. Kampmann, 28 Fed., 36; Carter vs. Atkinson, 77 S. E., 370; Hawk vs. Day, 126 N. W., 955; In re Phillips, 122 N. W., 554; Condit vs. Condit, 168 Pac, 456; Puckett vs. Wynns, 178 S, W., 1184; Alexander vs. Montpelier, 71 A., 720; Ferrell-Michael Abstract, etc., Co. vs. McCormac, 184 S. W., 1081).

For the foregoing reasons, the remedy prayed for is granted the
decision of July 29, 1935, and the order of August 17, 1936, in
question are declared null and void and are set aside in so far as they
affect the petitioners, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued
becomes final, with costs to the plaintiffs-respondents Chua Lin and
Keh It. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concur.

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CONCEPCION, J.,

I regret to have to dissent from the majority opinion although I have great respect for it.

It is sought to prevent by means of certiorari the execution of a
perfectly valid and legal judgment. The respondents Chua Lin and Keh It
brought an action against Eduardo Zafra de Alviar (Eduardo Zafra Amor),
Antonia Zafra de Alviar and Paulino Alviar, for the recovery of a
certain sum of money. The petitioners, defendants therein, answered the
complaint and the court, on July 29, 1935, rendered judgment which
reads as follows:

“When this case came up for hearing this morning,
the parties, assisted by their respective counsel, submitted the
following agreement for settlement:

“Come now both parties assisted by their respective attorneys and to this Hon. Court respectfully submit this compromise:

“That the defendants admit that they are indebted to the plaintiffs in
the sum of one thousand two hundred fifty pesos (P1,250) secured by the
mortgage which is the subject matter of the complaint.

“That
the defendants shall pay this sum within a period of twelve (12) months
from the date of the judgment and once said period expires, the
judgment shall be executory against the mortgaged property.

“Therefore, the parties respectfully pray this Honorable Court to render judgment in, accordance with this compromise.

“Wherefore, the court hereby approves the foregoing agreement and
renders judgment in accordance with the precise terms thereof, without
special pronouncement as to costs.”

One year later, or in July 1936, the plaintiffs, respondents herein,
asked for the issuance of a writ of execution of the judgment in
question and on the 30th of said month the defendants, petitioners
herein, Antonia Zafra de Alviar and Paulino Alviar, filed a motion in
opposition to the issuance of the writ alleging that they had neither
signed nor authorized anybody to sign for them’ the compromise inserted
in the court’s decision. On August 17th, the motion was denied on the
ground that the validity or illegality of the judge’s decision was a
question of evidence and that said decision could only be impugned in
another proceeding, not by means of a motion because the decision has
already become final. The petitioners asked for reconsideration of the
court’s order, which was denied. Hence this petition.

After examining the above-quoted decision of the court, there is
nothing therein which shows, at first sight, any defect of nullity. To
all appearances it is a valid and legal decision.

That the court had jurisdiction not only over the parties but also
over the subject matter of the litigation and that the petitioners had
the opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, are facts
clearly appearing in the decision itself. The majority opinion,
however, concludes that it clearly appears from the petition under oath
and the affidavits in support thereof that the petitioners were not
really present at the hearing and that it irrefutably appears from the
compromise that they neither took part therein nor signed the document
executed to that effect, stating further that “as the judgment in
question is null and void ab initio, it is evident that the
court acquired no jurisdiction to render it, much less to order the
execution thereof. Consequently, certiorari lies * * *

I cannot agree with the majority to that manner of appreciating the
questions involved herein. Granting that the petitioners have neither
signed nor authorized anybody to sign the compromise for them, I have
to say in this connection:

1. That the alleged fact that they did not sanction the
   compromise, by themselves, or by attorney authorized to that effect,
   does not destroy the court’s assertion in the judgment that the
   petitioners and the plaintiffs appeared before it during the hearing
   and submitted the compromise for approval. The decision reads: “When
   this case came up for hearing this morning, the parties, assisted by
   their respective counsel, submitted the following agreement for
   settlement.” (Underscoring ours.) If they presented the compromise
   and asked the court to render judgment thereon, I do not see how said
   judgment can be characterized as null and void ab initio. Any
   defect of nullity in the compromise has been cured, and the compromise
   thereby validated, by the mere fact that the parties presented it and
   asked the court to render judgment in accordance therewith.

2. The petitioners deny that they appeared before the court during the
   hearing. This is a matter not revealed by an examination of the record.
   On the contrary, it appears from the record that they were present
   during the hearing. Then where is the judgment’s defect of nullity ab initio?

3. If it is true that the petitioners did not appear before the court
   during the hearing, may they allege such fact in a motion to oppose the
   execution of the judgment and ask incidentally the annulment thereof?
   No. Is it sufficient to present affidavits in support of the motion?
   Absolutely not, because * * *.

“At the common law a domestic judgment could not be collaterally
impeached or called in question if rendered in a court of competent
jurisdiction, but must be attacked directly by writ of error, petition
for new trial, or by bill in chancery, and the general rule at the
present time is that a judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction cannot be impeached collaterally in any other court for
errors at law or irregularities in practice. Judgments which are merely
voidable cannot be collaterally attacked, and until set aside in a
proper proceeding for the purpose, possess all the attributes of valid
judgments. The reason for the rule prohibiting the making of a
collateral attack on a judgment of a court having jurisdiction is that
public policy forbids an indirect collateral contradiction or
impeachment of such a judgment.” (15 R. C. L., 835-837.)

“A judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction
of the parties and the subject matter, unless reversed or annulled in
some proper proceeding, is not open to contradiction or impeachment, in
respect to its validity, verity, or binding effect, by parties or
privies, in any collateral action or proceeding, except for fraud in
its procurement. Even if the judgment is voidable, that is, so
irregular or defective that it would be set aside or annulled on a
proper direct application for that purpose, it is well settled as a
general rule that it is not subject to collateral impeachment so long
as it stands unreversed and in force.” (34 C. J., 511-513.)

The motion presented in court by the petitioners is a collateral attack upon the judgment.

“A collateral attack upon a judgment has been
defined to mean any proceeding in which the integrity of a judgment is
challenged, except those made in the action wherein the judgment is
rendered or by appeal, and except suits brought to obtain decrees
declaring judgments to be void ab initio.” (15 R. C. L., 838.)

The foregoing principles are not unknown in this jurisdiction. In the case of Ledesma vs. Boronila (9 Phil., 119, 120), this court said:

“It is maintained that it does not appear from the
record that the surety, Vicenta Jalbuena, was made a formal party to
the action either by service of summons or by appearance by attorney.
(Act No. 190, sees. 396 and 397.) However this may be, we are not
called upon to decide the point in this action for the reason that she
has not appealed from the judgment entered against her and its validity
must consequently be left to be determined in other proceedings.”

In the case of Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil,, 921, 949), this court said:

“But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is
entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is one which is not
apparent upon its face. It follows that even if the judgment could be
shown to be void for want of jurisdiction, or for lack of due process
of law, the party aggrieved thereby is bound to resort to some
appropriate proceeding to obtain relief. Under accepted principles of
law and practice, long recognized in American courts, a proper remedy
in such case, after the time for appeal or review has passed, is for
the aggrieved party to bring an action to enjoin the judgment, if not
already carried into effect; or if the property has already been
disposed of he may institute suit to recover it. In every situation of
this character an appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property has
been taken without due process, the law concedes due process to recover
it.” (Underscoring ours.)

Therefore the remedy afforded to the petitioners to attack the
alleged nullity of the judgment in question, not having appealed
therefrom for one reason or other, is not the motion presented to the
court, but an ordinary action brought in said court for such purpose.
Consequently, I am of the opinion that the writ of certiorari applied
for must be denied.