MARTIN ALCORESA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JOSEPH S. JOHNSTON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

The question to be determined in this case is
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to any compensation under the
provisions of Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812 and if so, up to
what amount.

The pertinent facts of the case are briefly as follows:

The plaintiff, as employee of the defendant, suffered an accident
while performing the work which, among others, had been assigned to
him, on January 22, 1934, in the barrio of Baliwasan, municipality and
Province of Zamboanga, Philippines. As a result of the accident, he
suffered a dislocation in his left shoulder, which is now permanent
thereby preventing him from working as he used to before the accident.
The wages he was then earning averaged P4.80 a week. Notwithstanding
the fact that the plaintiff stopped working for 19 weeks from the date
of the accident, the defendant continued to pay him his weekly wages
during the said period, all such payments made by him having amounted
to P89.80. After the nineteenth week, the defendant, seeing that the
plaintiff no longer worked, refused to pay him his usual wages or any
other sum, except that of P100 paid by him to said plaintiff on May 31,
1934, after having obtained from the latter the document appearing in
the record as Exhibit C, containing the following statements attributed
to said plaintiff, to wit:

“That on or about January 22, 1934, while I was
working under Mr. Jos. S. Johnston, I met with a personal accident, as
a result of which I was run over by a railway car loaded with barks.

“That I am fully convinced that by reason of said accident, I am not
entitled to collect anything from my employer Mr. Jos. S. Johnston, in
accordance with the Compensation Act.

“That while I was
injured and have suffered a personal disability as a result of said
accident, my present physical condition is due to my failure to submit
to medical treatment, in spite of having been advised to do so by said
Mi. Jos. S. Johnston who, at the time of the accident, offered to
defray the expenses for the medical treatment.

“That had I
followed the advice and accepted the offer of Mr. Jos. S. Johnston, I
am sure the illness and disability from which I am now suffering would
have been duly cured and I would have fully recovered.

“That I make this statement freely and voluntarily, without any pressure on the part of Mr. Jos. S. Johnston.”

This document Exhibit C was subscribed by the plaintiff at the
instance of Attorney Sydney S. Schwarzkopf, who then represented and
until now represents the defendant, before notary public Eduardo D.
Enriquez, in the municipality and Province of Zamboanga. The plaintiff,
upon being informed that he was entitled to a bigger compensation,
asked the defendant to pay him more. Inasmuch as said defendant refused
to pay him another sum, he brought this action to demand payment of
P691.20 and P25, plus interest and the costs.

The lower court decided the case by absolving the defendant from
the complaint, with the costs to the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed
from said judgment, assigning the following alleged errors as committed
by the lower court, to wit:

“1. In holdjng that the plaintiff, by his failure
to present his claim for compensation within two months from the date
of the accident, in accordance with section 24 of Act No. 3428, as
amended by Act No. 3812, has lost his right to claim compensation.

“2. In holding that the plaintiff waived his right to compensation in
accepting from the defendant his wages corresponding to the 19 weeks
following the date of the accident.

“3. In holding that the
plaintiff waived his right to compensation in accepting from the
defendant the payment of the additional sum of P100 on May 31, 1934,
and finally,

“4. In holding that the sums paid him as wages
for the 19 weeks following the date of the accident had not been
credited to the defendant.”

I. Section 24 of Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 8812, invoked
by the defendant in support of the appealed decision, does not require
the filing of any claim for compensation within two or three months if
the employer, as the herein defendant was with respect to the
plaintiff, having knowledge of the injury for which the compensation is
sought, makes, the compensation payments voluntarily. In the case under
consideration, the defendant had knowledge of the accident suffered by
the plaintiff and also of the fact that, by reason of the injury
received by him, said plaintiff could not render him any service. In
spite thereof, the defendant voluntarily paid the plaintiff and
permitted him to be paid his weekly wages during the 19 weeks following
the date of the accident.

II. The fact that the plaintiff had been receiving his wages, which
by the way were merely at the rate of P4.80 a week, for 19 weeks,
without having rendered any service to the defendant, does not mean
that he waived the compensation to which he is entitled under Act No.
3428. His injury resulted in a permanent partial disability, as this
phrase is defined in section 17 of the above-cited Act, and the same
entitles him, by virtue of said Act, to a compensation equivalent to
fifty per centum (50%) of his average weekly wages above-stated,
multiplied by 208 weeks, which in round numbers represents the sum of
P499.20, computed on the basis ofP2.40 a week.

III. The fact that the plaintiff, on May 31, 1934, received from
the defendant the sum of P100, believed by the plaintiff to be a part
of the indemnity or compensation to which he was entitled, and to
settle the question once and for all, according to the defendant, does
not prevent the plaintiff from collecting the compensation to which he
is entitled under the law, because the above-stated sum, together with
that of P89.80 representing the amount of the weekly payments he had
been receiving for 19 consecutive weeks, is far from, compensating that
of P499,20 which, as already stated, he is entitled to collect by way
of compensation. Agreements of the nature of the one that gave rise to
the execution of Exhibit C which may be paraphrased, as follows: “I pay
you P100 now, so that you will not insist further in your claim”, are
prohibited by section 7 of the above-stated Act which authorizes only
agreements made in accordance with the express provisions of section 29
thereof. Said section provides that an agreement on compensation, in
order to be valid, must be in the form of a public instrument
acknowledged before a justice of the peace and attested by two
witnesses, one of whom must necessarily be the municipal treasurer or
the person acting in his stead; or in the City of Manila before a duly
authorized notary public, attested likewise by two witnesses, one of
whom must also necessarily be the Director of the Bureau of Labor or
his representative. Nothing of the kind was done. If the plaintiff
subscribed the document under consideration, it was through error. He
then believed that he was not entitled to any compensation because he
had been made to believe so. Being ignorant and illiterate, so much so
that it was necessary to interpret to him the contents of said
document, he believed everything, and it appears that he was riot
assisted by counsel or by a representative of the Bureau of Labor. The
purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the spirit underlying it
is to afford protection to the workman without injustice to the
employer. This purpose can not be frustrated by an agreement as the one
which gave rise to the execution of Exhibit C. Let the question be
compromised with the workman claiming compensation, if it is so
desired, but it must be done in accordance with the provisions of the
law and with all the cards on the table.

IV. It being a fact that the defendant has paid the plaintiff the
sums of P89.80 and P100, although the latter rendered no service, the
defendant undoubtedly is entitled to be credited said two sums, minus
that of P25 which, according to the evidence, represents the expenses
incurred by the plaintiff in curing his injury caused by the accident
in question. To maintain the opposite view would be an injustice.

It is inferred from all the foregoing that the defense of the
defendant that the plaintiff’s claim is untenable on the ground that it
was not filed within two months after the date of his injury and that,
after all, the plaintiff voluntarily compromised the case with him upon
accepting the sum of P100, is without merit.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendant is
ordered to pay to the plaintiff the sum of three hundred thirty-four
pesos and forty centavos (P334.40) with the legal interest thereon from
the date of the filing of the complaint, and also the costs of both
instances. So Ordered.

Avancena, C. J.,. Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Laurel, and Conception, JJ., concur.