MAXIMO ABARY AND VICTORIA ZALAMEDA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. FIDELINO AGAWIN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

To
the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the
spouses Maximo Abary and Victoria Zalameda against Fidelino Agawin, the
latter interposed a demurrer based on the following grounds: (1) That
the court lacks jurisdiction over the case on appeal because the
justice of the peace court from which said case originated did not have
it by reason of the amount of the claim set forth in the complaint
against defendant; and (2) that the complaint did not allege facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The lower court
sustained the demurrer on the first ground and inasmuch as plaintiffs
did not amend their complaint, said court dismissed the same. From the
order of dismissal, plaintiffs appealed, assigning as errors committed
by the court the following:

“1. In
sustaining the demurrer after defendant filed his motion for
reconsideration of a previous order overruling said demurrer;

“2. In not rendering judgment in favor of plaintiffs after overruling the demurrer interposed by defendant; and

“3. In dismissing the case and ordering plaintiffs to pay the costs.”

1. The alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over the case is based on
   the fact that plaintiffs’ claim against defendant is for an amount not
   less than P600. Section 68 of Act No. 136, as amended by Act No. 4090,
   provides in effect that justice of the peace courts shall have
   concurrent jurisdiction with the Courts of First Instance to hear and
   determine cases in which the amount of the demand exceeds P200 but is
   less than P600. It should be noted, however, that the complaint in the
   instant case alleges two independent causes of action because the loans
   to which each of the causes of action refers were not secured from the
   same person, and were, moreover, obtained on different dates. The first
   loan for P500 was taken by defendant from plaintiffs on October 17,
   1934, while the other for P100 was obtained from plaintiff Victoria
   Zalameda on October 23, 1934. These are two amounts which do not
   constitute a single account. It is error to add them together in order
   to allege an apparently good ground for demurrer.

   “Where there are several counts in the declaration, complaint, or
   statement, each stating the same cause of action in somewhat different
   phraseology, or upon a different theory of recovery, and each claiming
   an amount within the jurisdictional limit, an objection that the
   aggregate amount claimed is beyond the justice’s jurisdiction is
   without merit, even though the counts are not stated in the
   alternative.” (35 C. J., page 516.)

   “It is well settled that a person cannot split up an entire indivisible
   claim, so as to give a justice’s court jurisdiction that it would not
   otherwise possess. If he could do so, a justice of the peace might be
   given cognizance of causes involving immense sums. * * * On the other
   hand a party cannot combine several separate causes of action for the
   purpose of depriving” a justice’s court of its jurisdiction, for the
   amount of each separate demand or cause of action, and not the
   aggregate of the various causes which may be joined in an action,
   determines the jurisdiction of the justice’s court.” (16 R. C. L., page
   358.)

   This same opinion was adopted by this court in the case of Villaseñor vs. Erlanger and Galinger (19 Phil., 574), in disposing of a similar question.

   It is, therefore, clear that the lower court committed the first error assigned by the appellants.

2. As to the second error, it should be stated that the practice in cases
   in which the demurrer is overruled is to wait until defendant answers
   the complaint within the reglementary period. If he does not do so,
   then plaintiff should be required to prove the allegations of his
   complaint (sec. 128, Act No. 190). Plaintiffs not having adduced their
   evidence after defendant’s demurrer to their complaint was overruled,
   it is not proper to render judgment in their favor, granting them,
   without evidence, what they had prayed for in said complaint.

   On the other hand, the order of the court overruling defendant’s
   demurrer was later reconsidered. For this reason it cannot be strictly
   said that it was overruled. Exactly the contrary happened. In
   reconsidering its order, the court sustained the demurrer and held that
   it had no jurisdiction over the case for the reason hereinbefore
   mentioned. There is indeed no law which prohibits the lower court to
   reconsider its orders on any question if it has, in its opinion, good
   reasons therefor, and as long as the case in which it thus acts remains
   in its hands and it has not lost its jurisdiction through any of the
   grounds prescribed by law.

3. As it has been shown that the lower court committed the first error
   assigned by appellants, we need not consider the third assigned error.
   The case should not have been dismissed because the reason set forth in
   the order appealed from did not justify such dismissal. There is now,
   therefore, no reason why plaintiffs should have to pay any costs after
   they have paid the legal fees.

In view of all the
foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed and it is ordered that
the case be remanded to the lower court for appropriate trial for the
purpose of hearing the parties and deciding the questions raised by the
complaint and the answer which appellee may desire to file within the
period that may be given him, with costs against said appellee. So
ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, and Laurel, JJ., concur.