SILVESTRE ARZADON, PLAINTIFF, VS. DIONISIO CHANCO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS NORTE, AND LORENZO BALDUEZA, DEFENDANTS.

Arzadon versus Chanco

The Case

This is Silvestre Arzadon versus Judge Dionisio Chanco and Lorenzo Baldueza, an original action for certiorari brought before the Supreme Court. Arzadon had won the office of municipal president of Badoc, Ilocos Norte, in the elections of November 1907, but the defeated candidate, Baldueza, protested, and the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte annulled the election, ordered a special election, declared Arzadon ineligible in that special election, and charged him with its expenses. Arzadon asked the Supreme Court to strike down those two last rulings as beyond the trial court's power. The case matters because it fixes the outer boundary of a court's jurisdiction in election contests: a court may annul an election, but it may impose only the penalties the Election Law gives it, and certiorari is the remedy when it goes further.

Procedural History

After the November 1907 elections, Baldueza filed a protest with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte against the election of Arzadon as municipal president, within the period fixed by law, alleging acts constituting a violation of paragraph 3 of section 30 of the Election Law. Proceedings were commenced under section 27 of that law. After receiving the evidence of both parties, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the election illegal, ordering a special election at the expense of Arzadon, declaring him ineligible in that special election, and providing that any vote cast in his favor would not count, with costs against him. Upon being notified of the decision, Arzadon came directly to the Supreme Court and instituted certiorari proceedings, praying that the decision be declared null insofar as it held him ineligible for the special election and insofar as it ordered that the special election be held at his expense. The matter was submitted to the Supreme Court as an original action.

Facts

At the elections held on the fifth day of November 1907, Silvestre Arzadon obtained a majority of the votes for municipal president of Badoc, Ilocos Norte. The defeated candidate, Lorenzo Baldueza, lodged a protest with the Court of First Instance of the province, within the term appointed by law, on the ground of acts said to constitute a violation of paragraph 3 of section 30 of the Election Law.

The trial court found that since 1903 Arzadon had been the organizer of a group of electors for the office of municipal president. He promised that if elected, his electors would not be employed in any work for the town, and that if they became involved in court proceedings or with the government they would be assisted by him, with expenses paid out of the funds of the group. One of the agreements of the group was to distribute ballots bearing the names of the persons to be voted for before the electors took the oath prescribed by law, and the electors were instructed to elect no others than those designated in the ballots. Arzadon held meetings to influence and induce the electors, and offered money where necessary, or to electors who did not desire employment.

On these findings the trial court held that Arzadon had violated the Election Law, which prohibits every action, influence, and promise of any kind for the purpose of obtaining votes, and decreed that his election was not legal. It ordered a special election at his expense, declared that he should not then be eligible, and directed that any vote entered in his favor should not count, with costs and expenses of the proceedings charged to him.

Issues

• Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy to annul a decision of a Court of First Instance in an election contest.
• Whether or not the Court of First Instance, in deciding an election protest, exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the protestee ineligible in the special election it ordered and in sentencing him to pay the expenses of that election.

Applicable Provisions

Section 27 of the Election Law, as described in the decision, confers on Courts of First Instance the jurisdiction to hear and decide election contests, and that jurisdiction is exclusive and final:

The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance to hear and decide election contests is exclusive and final.

Because that jurisdiction is exclusive and final, its exercise cannot be reviewed by appeal, which is why certiorari lies against a court that exceeds it.

Sections 217 and 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as stated in the decision, govern the writ of certiorari:

Certiorari is the proper remedy whenever an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its or his jurisdiction, and no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to correct such excess or extralimitation.

These provisions supply both the ground and the occasion for the remedy Arzadon invoked.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that certiorari is the proper remedy. The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over election contests is exclusive and final, so their decisions cannot be reviewed by appeal. Since they are not appealable and no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists against them, they are a proper subject of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. If the court below exceeded its jurisdiction in rendering the decision, it is proper to annul the same by virtue of these proceedings.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court did exceed its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance to hear election protests is conferred by section 27 of the Election Law, and neither that section nor any other legal provision authorizes the court, in deciding such protests, to declare ineligible in future elections the person against whom the protest was presented, nor to sentence him to pay the expenses of the new election to be held. The Court put the rule plainly:

Neither the said section, nor any other legal provision authorizes the court, in deciding such protests, to declare ineligible in future elections the person against whom the protest was presented, nor to sentence him to pay the expenses of the new election to be held.

Hence the court below had no power to enter those rulings, and they must be entirely annulled. The Court noted that the order for a special election raised the question whether the trial court was authorized to make it under the Election Law, but that point had not been impugned or appealed from, and could not therefore be the subject of a ruling in this decision.

Doctrine

First, the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance to hear and decide election contests is exclusive and final; their decisions in that jurisdiction are not appealable, and certiorari under the Code of Civil Procedure is the proper remedy when such a court exceeds its jurisdiction, there being no appeal nor any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.

Second, a court deciding an election protest may grant only what the Election Law authorizes. It has no power, under section 27 or any other provision, to declare the protestee ineligible in future elections or to sentence him to pay the expenses of the new election. Any such rulings are void for having been made in excess of jurisdiction and are annulled by certiorari.

Disposition

The Supreme Court annulled the judgment of the trial court insofar as it held Arzadon ineligible at the special election and imposed on him the obligation to bear the expenses of that election, without any special ruling as to costs in the proceedings before the Supreme Court.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an election contest court may annul the election, but it cannot declare the protestee ineligible in the special election or charge him with its expenses, for that is excess of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari. Examiners use this case to test the scope of a Court of First Instance's jurisdiction in election protests and the availability of certiorari against final but non-appealable election decisions.