THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. LUCIO CAPINLAC, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal taken from the order of
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, sustaining the defendant’s
demurrer to the information filed by the fiscal, which reads as
follows:

“That on or about February 6, 1931, in the
municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippine Islands, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
defendant willfully, maliciously and feloniously, knowingly making
untruthful statements, made and subscribed an affidavit before the
register of deeds, Mr. Marcelo M. Sibal, who is authorized by law to
receive and administer oaths, upon facts pertinent to the
issuance of an order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the
purpose of causing the Register of Deeds of said province to issue to
him a new copy of his homestead title No. 201 (Patent No. 3555),
knowing such facts stated by him in the affidavit in question to be
false.

“Contrary to law.”

The defendant’s demurrer was based principally upon the averment
that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a crime.
The lower court, being of the opinion that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute either the crime of false testimony under
article 183 of the Revised Penal Code or that of offering false
testimony in evidence defined in article 184 of said Code, held that
the demurrer was well founded and ordered the dismissal of the case.
The provincial fiscal appealed from the order of dismissal.

While the Solicitor-General agrees to the conclusions arrived at by
the lower court to the effect that the facts charged do not really
constitute false testimony under any of the two above cited articles,
he contends, for the first time in this instance, that the appealed
order is not in accordance with law and that the defendant’s demurrer
should have been overruled on the ground that the facts alleged in the
information constitute falsification of a public document. This court
is of the opinion that the conclusion of the lower court is correct,
but not precisely for the reason that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute any of the crimes defined in articles 183
and 184 of the Revised Penal Code, but because they do not constitute
the crime of perjury denned and punished in section 3 of Act No. 1697.
It should be taken into consideration that the acts imputed to the
defendant took place on February 6, 1931, “according to the allegations
of the information, and the law then in force in the matter of perjury
was said Act No. 1697, because the Revised Penal Code, articles 184 et seq. of which punish false testimony, took effect only on January 1, 1932.

Even if this court were to consider the question under the
provisions of said section 3 of Act No. 1697, the conclusion arrived at
would be the same on the ground that the information do not allege
facts constituting perjury. In order that this crime could exist, it
was necessary that the false statements of the defendant referred to
material matter and not merely to facts pertinent to the case in
connection with which they were made. The allegation contained in the
information in question is to the effect that the defendant’s false
statements referred only to facts pertinent to the case mentioned by
him without stating, however, in what said facts consist. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable to the case at
bar because they are more severe and strict than those of Act No. 1697.
The rule is that penal laws have a retroactive effect only in so far as
they favor the person guilty of a felony (article 22, Revised Penal
Code).

Without making it understood that this court sanctions the practice
of raising for the first time in this instance a question which could
have very well been raised in the lower court, it is held that neither
is the information sufficient to impute to the defendant the crime of
falsification of a public document. It does not appear that it contains
the least allegation to the effect that such is the charge against the
defendant. On the contrary, he is clearly charged therein with having
committed the crime of either false testimony or perjury. As stated in
the case of United States vs. Enriquez (1 Phil, 179), one of
the purposes of every information is to notify the defendant of the
criminal acts imputed to him so that he can duly prepare his defense.
The information should state the facts and the circumstances
constituting the crime charged in such a way that a person of common
understanding may easily comprehend and be informed of what it is about.

For the foregoing considerations, this court holds that the
defendant’s demurrer to the information filed against him was well
founded and, consequently, the appealed order was in accordance, with
law.

Let the costs be assessed de oficio. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.