THE PEOPLE OP THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MAKABANGAN (MORO), DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On  October  30, 1929, the appellant  Moro Makabangan was sentenced, for the crime of homicide, to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500, and to pay the costs. It was provided in said sentence to suspend the execution thereof on condition that the accused behave well and not again  be accused of any crime in the courts of justice of the  Philippine Islands.  Section 106 of the Administrative Code for the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, among other things, authorizes the judge, at his discretion at any time before the expiration of the period allowed for appeal, to suspend the execution of any penalty or part thereof imposed upon the accused, subject  to such  conditions as he may prescribe.  This is the law by virtue of which the court suspended  the execution of the sentence imposed upon the appellant.

On July 22,1935, charges for the crime of abduction with consent were filed against the appellant in the  justice of the peace court of Dulawan, Province of Cotabato. On the 30th of  said month, the provincial  fiscal  petitioned  the court to  order the execution of said sentence, alleging that the appellant, having been accused of the crime of abduction, violated the conditions  imposed by the court upon suspending the sentence against  him.   The  court  acted favorably upon the petition and it is  from said  resolution that the  appeal was taken whereby the  case is now before this  court

The  question involved  in this appeal  is simply whether or not the appellant, having been  accused of a crime, violated the conditions imposed by the court in suspending the execution of the sentence rendered against him.  Applying literally that part of the  sentence  imposing upon the appellant the condition not to  be accused of any crime, the question should be decided in the affirmative.   However,  this  literal interpretation,  which would  make said condition  unreasonable,  cannot be given to it because it does  not  depend upon the appellant,  being  innocent,  to avoid being accused of a crime by anybody.  It is unreasonable to impose  upon  him  a condition the fulfillment  of which may depend  upon another,  not upon  him.

It should be understood  that the true meaning of this condition  is  for the appellant not to  commit,  or be convicted of any crime, in which case it might be said that he has given proof that he is in no condition  for the realization of the purpose of the law which is his reformation.

Therefore, the condition imposed upon the  appellant for his release cannot be considered violated by the mere fact that he had been accused of a crime, but when he be convicted thereof by final judgment.

The resolution of the court, ordering the execution  of the sentence imposed upon the  appellant, is reversed, with the costs de oficio.

Villa-Real,  Abad Santos,  Imperial,  Diaz, Recto, and Laurel, JJ., concur.