G.R. No. 44260. November 02, 1938
MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORROS DE MANILA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MARIA PAZ MARCIANA GUIDOTE, JORGE B. DELGADO, TEODORO R. YANGCO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, AND BANK OF T…
DIAZ, J.:
defendant Teodoro R. Yangco appealed from the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, which subordinates his credit
against the defendant spouses Maria Paz Marciana Guidote and Jorge B.
Delgado to those of the plaintiff against the same defendants,
attacking said judgment as being the result of the error of having
considered certain mortgages constituted by said spouses in favor of
the plaintiff more preferred, by their nature, than his credit.
The alleged credit of the defendant consists of the following sums:
P7,425 plus interest thereon at 10 per cent per annum from March 24,
1932, and P700. The alleged credits of the plaintiff are as follows: (a) P63,000 plus interest thereon at 10 per cent per annum from December 15, 1933; (b) P5,235 plus interest thereon at the legal rate from December 6, 1933, and (c) P1,500, plus the costs of the trial.
The evidence afforded this court by the records and by the stipulation
of the parties, appellant and appellee, with respect to certain facts
which they wish to be taken into consideration, shows that the
appellee’s credit, which was originally P220,000, is now only as
indicated in the foregoing paragraph. All of said credit was secured by
four mortgages, the first of which had been constituted on September
15, 1930, the second on October 23, 1930, the third on November 8,
1930, and the last on January 22, 1931. The four mortgages were duly
registered in the office of the register of deeds of Manila, and noted
further at the back of the certificates of title covering the real
properties described in the complaint. The evidence likewise shows that
the credit of the defendant Teodoro R. Yangco originally amounted to
P20,000, but by reason of payments which the spouses Maria Paz Marciana
Guidote and Jorge B. Delgado had been making to him during and prior to
the first half of the year 1932, the only amount now remaining unpaid
by them is P7,425 with interest thereon at 10 per cent per annum from
March 24, 1932, and the sum of P700. If Teodoro R. Yangco has this
credit, it is certainly by virtue of a judgment obtained by him against
the defendant spouses on September 13, 1932, in civil case No. 41688 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled “Teodoro R. Yangco,
plaintiff, vs. Jorge B. Delgado and Paz Guidote de Delgado, defendants” (Exhibits G and G-1).
Contrary to what Teodoro R. Yangco now states in his brief, the action
then brought by him against said spouses in the above-cited case was
for the recovery of the proceeds of a promissory note for P8,500, the
same note fully quoted by him in his complaint, which reads as follows:
“P8500.00 MANILA, Sept. 23, 1931“For
value received, we, jointly and severally, promise to pay within one
hundred twenty days (120) to the order of Mr. Teodoro R. Yangco,
proprietor of Bazaar ‘Siglo XX’, at his office in the City of Manila,
the principal sum of eight thousand five hundred pesos (P8,500)
Philippine currency, with interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent
(10%) per annum.“If it should be necessary to bring suit
to enforce payment of this note, there shall be paid, in addition to
the aggregate principal sum and interest, a sum equivalent to fifteen
per cent of the total amount then due for attorney’s fees and costs of
collection, in addition to the legal costs provided for in the Code of
Civil Procedure. We furthermore expressly submit to the jurisdiction of
the Courts of the City of Manila any legal action arising out of this
promissory note, without in any way divesting jurisdiction from any
other court or courts.
(Sgd.) “JORGE B. DELGADO “PAZ GUIDOTE DE DELGADO”
The
lower court, finding that the defendants in the abovecited case, who
are the same defendants Maria Paz Marciana Guidote and Jorge B.
Delgado, had paid only a small part of their debt, ordered them both to
pay to the appellant Teodoro R. Yangco the balance of his credit
against them, that is, the sum of P7,425 with interest thereon at 10
per cent per annum from March 24, 1932, plus the penal sum of P700,
which are exactly the same sums constituting the credit now claimed and
contended by said appellant to be, by their nature, more preferred than
those of the appellee, which are secured, as already stated, by four
mortgages the validity of which is beyond dispute and very much prior
not only to the judgment rendered in his favor in said case (civil case
No. 41688), but also to the execution of the unpaid promissory note
which gave rise to his right of action.
If this court were
to decide the question by taking into consideration only the facts
stated heretofore, its resolution could be no other than to hold that
the lower court did not commit the error attributed to it by the
appellant, because such resolution is supported by article 1923 of the
Civil Code. It happens, however, that in the stipulation of facts
submitted by the parties, it is stated that the credit of the
defendant-appellant Teodoro R. Yangco is for construction materials,
such as iron sheets, articles for the bathroom, water-closets, paint,
etc., taken from him by the spouses Maria Paz Marciana Guidote and
Jorge B. Delgado in and before September, 1931. This may be true but,
after all, the appellant’s situation remains unaltered. The appellant,
upon being satisfied with bringing his action for the recovery of the
proceeds of the promissory note executed in his favor, and in agreeing
beforehand to accept said promissory note which, by itself alone,
already altered the relation of vendor and purchasers then existing
between him and the defendant spouses, respectively, clearly waived the
right which, otherwise, he would have had under article 1922 of the
Civil Code. This article to which he now resorts, is certainly not
applicable to his case because in order to be so, following the
doctrine laid down in the case of Unson vs. Urquijo, Zuloaga
& Escubi (50 Phil., 160), it is necessary that the properties sold
by him be still in the possession of the purchasers. It appears,
however, that some of the properties in question, if not all of them,
are no longer in their possession, inasmuch as the houses in which they
had been used were sold to Sy Uy on December 15, 1931 (Exhibit E), and
to the spouses Alberto B. Padilla and Natividad Angeles on March 9,
1932 (Exhibit F). Furthermore, it is necessary to show, and this has
not been done, that said properties continue to retain their original
form and substance and are, until now, easily identifiable.
For all the foregoing reasons, the appeal is hereby declared unfounded, and the appealed judgment is affirmed in toto, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.